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THE POLLS—TRENDS

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND U.S. PUBLIC OPINION

TOM W. SMITH

Introduction

The Cuban missile crisis was the world's closest encounter with a nuclear World War III (McKeown 2000). As Defense Secretary Robert McNamara observed about that week, "I thought I might never see another Saturday night" (Finkelstein 1994, p. 91). Anatoly Gribkov, Soviet Army chief of operations, noted, "Nuclear catastrophe was hanging by a thread . . . and we weren't counting days or hours, but minutes" ("An Overview" 1997, p. 1). While the crisis lasted only 13 days (October 16–28, 1962) and the public phase covered barely a week (October 22–28, 1962), the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over nuclear missiles in Cuba is one of the key defining events of the Cold War in general and of John F. Kennedy's presidency in particular.

The story of the Cuban missile crisis is the most examined event of the Kennedy presidency (Smith 2002). But almost all of the work has focused on the geopolitics of the crisis, on what went on in the Kremlin and the White House, and on each side's diplomatic and military moves and countermoves. Scant attention has been given to the public's reaction to the crisis.

This article examines how the U.S. people experienced the crisis, how public opinion changed because of the events, and how the U.S. public views the Cuban missile crisis in retrospect. Data are mostly drawn from two sources: (1) Gallup polls conducted before, during, and after the crisis and (2) two special surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago. The first of these special surveys, the Cuban Crisis Study, was done in late October and early November 1962 in two Illinois

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communities.¹ The second, the Civil Defense/Fallout Shelter Study, was conducted nationally and in various communities in January 1963.²

The Cuban Missile Crisis in Context

MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM

Before the autumn of 1962 Cuba was infrequently cited as a top concern of Americans (table 1). From after Fidel Castro's overthrow of Batista in January 1959 until 1961, typically less than 5 percent of the public considered Cuba to be the "most important problem" facing the country. Even in May 1961, in the immediate aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17–18, only 9 percent of the public mentioned Cuba as the country's most important problem. After that small peak concern steadily subsided until, in August 1962, less than 2 percent of mentions dealt with Cuba. But then the Cuban issue began to heat up. In late August there were a series of attacks on Cuba by exile groups and increasing news reports on the Soviet military build-up in Cuba. On September 4, President Kennedy revealed the presence of ground-to-air anti-aircraft missiles in Cuba and warned the Soviet Union not to install offensive weapons in Cuba. The president again spoke publicly about the Cuba situation on September 13, and on September 20 the Senate passed a resolution authorizing the use of force to counter a Soviet military threat in Cuba.

AWARENESS OF THE CRISIS

In response to these developments, Cuba became a top worry of the U.S. people. The Gallup poll conducted September 20–25 found that 94 percent were aware of "our troubles with Cuba" (table 2), and 24 percent said that Cuba was the top problem. Then, on October 22, President Kennedy addressed the nation, announcing that the Soviet Union had installed long-range nuclear missiles in Cuba and demanding their withdrawal. He indicated that the United States would enforce a blockade of offensive weapons to Cuba until the missiles were removed. A Gallup poll in the field from October 19 to 24 showed that concern over Cuba remained high at 25 percent, but not higher than in late September. The Cuban missile crisis climaxed a week later on

1. In March 1962, NORC446 was conducted in four small Illinois communities selected to represent a range of areas from economically depressed to prosperous (Bradburn and Caplovitz 1965). In response to the Cuban missile crisis, NORC reinterviewed in the best- and worst-off communities (NORC458S). Of the 1,126 people in these two communities, 547 were reinterviewed between October 27 and November 4. See Caplovitz 1963.

2. This study was designed by the Bureau for Applied Social Research, Columbia University, and was conducted by NORC (Levine and Modell 1965).

October 28, when the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement over the withdrawal of the missiles. After compliance was verified, President Kennedy ended the blockade on November 21. In the immediate aftermath of the settlement, but before the crisis completely subsided, public concern over Cuba stood at 31 percent. Worries over Cuba remained above 20 percent through March 1963. But soon after that Cuba faded from the public list of concerns. By September 1963, only 3 percent said Cuba was the most important problem, and only once in the next 3 years did as many as 5 percent mention it.

Moreover, the most important problem figures for Cuba alone understate the extent of the public's concern over the confrontation. All mentions of foreign affairs more than doubled from a relatively low level of 35 percent in August 1962 to a near-record high of 72 percent in November 1962. Only in the weeks preceding the Pearl Harbor attack were concerns over international problems higher than during the Cuban missile crisis (at 75–81 percent; Smith 1985b). Even during the peak of the Vietnam War, mentions of foreign problems only reached 58 percent.

Cuba accounted for most of this concern either directly or indirectly. Many of the non-Cuban foreign-affairs issues mentioned were tied to the missile crisis. For example, in November 1962, besides the 31 percent mentioning Cuba, 21 percent mentioned "threat of war, the Cold War, atomic war, general," 7 percent cited Russia, and 3 percent "threat of war with Russia, specific." Only 7 percent mentioned unrelated foreign policy matters such as Berlin and China.

The Cold War

From the end of World War II until the fall of communism in the late 1980s, the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States dominated international relations. Two of the main issues during this long contest were whether the Cold War would turn hot and erupt into a nuclear World War III and who was winning the Cold War.

EXPECTATION OF WAR

Nuclear anxiety frequently rose and fell sharply during the 1950s and 1960s (Smith 1988). In general, it was high during the Korean War, with up to 76 percent fearing another world war within 5 years (table 5). Worries then waned to just 19 percent expecting a war within 5 years in August 1959. The U-2 incident, the Berlin crises of the early 1960s, and other events pushed concern back up to 53 percent in September 1961. Fear of war probably peaked during the last week of October 1962, but there are no national data to confirm that idea (Smith 1988). The NORC Illinois study does indicate a large rise in

thinking about nuclear matters from the spring of 1962 to late October–early November 1962. In the spring, “the atomic bomb or fallout” had been on the minds of 28 percent of residents during the previous week, while during the crisis 65 percent had thought of it.

But even during and immediately following the peak of the crisis, fear of war was far from rampant. In NORC’s Illinois study, 45 percent said that “the chances of war between the United States and Russia” had decreased “because of the Cuba situation,” with only 28 percent saying that it had increased. Likewise, just 38 percent thought that “there will be a war within the next few years.”

Nationally, in April 1963, only 5 percent expected a world war in the next year—the lowest level recorded during the 1950s and 1960s (table 4). Likewise, only 24 percent thought that a world war would occur within 5 years. This was also one of the lowest levels in the 1950s and 1960s, and the 58 percent who thought war would not happen was the highest during this period. Thus, the outcome of the missile crisis was a lower fear of nuclear war.

Moreover, while the public was concerned about nuclear war, it was not overwhelmed by this fear. A NORC survey in January 1963 (after the Cuban missile crisis, but during the period of high public concern about Cuba) found that from a list of eight named issues, Americans chose communism in the United States as the top problem (31 percent; table 6). Danger of a world war came in second at 24 percent. This was followed by juvenile delinquency (16 percent), education (16 percent), race relations (8 percent), taxes (2 percent), fallout shelters (2 percent), and slums (1 percent). The low importance of fallout shelters was underscored by the fact that it was the public’s first choice as the least important problem (41 percent). Thus, while war was in early 1963 the public’s number two concern among items on the list, less than a quarter saw it as the top problem, and almost no one saw fallout shelters as the most pressing issue.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Concern over war and peace can also be tracked by the public’s outlook about good versus bad relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. During most of the 1950s and 1960s, pluralities believed that a “peaceful agreement” with the Soviet Union was possible (table 7). Optimism was particularly high (66 percent possible) in December 1959 and in December 1962 (61 percent possible). People in December 1962 were less sanguine about whether the coming year would be one of peace or conflict. A majority (53 percent) saw 1963 as “a troubled year with much international discord,” while just 38 percent believed it would be “a peaceful year, more or less free of serious international disputes” (table 8). However, this was the second most optimistic assessment from 1959 through 1977.

The Cuban missile crisis also convinced more Americans that the United

States was winning the Cold War with the Soviet Union. For the only time from 1960 to 1980, a plurality in December 1962 looked to the forthcoming year as a time when Soviet power would decline (45 percent) rather than increase (37 percent; table 9). People saw the outcome of the crisis as a U.S. victory and as an advantage that they expected to continue into the new year.

John F. Kennedy

PRESIDENTIAL JOB APPROVAL

Of all post–World War II presidents, Kennedy ranks as the most popular. During his term in office, he had a higher average job approval rating than any other president. Kennedy's approval averaged 70 percent compared with 65 percent for Eisenhower, 55 percent for Johnson, 49 percent for Nixon, 47 percent for Ford, 45 percent for Carter, 53 percent for Reagan, 61 percent for Bush, and 55 percent for Clinton (Edwards 1990; Newport 2002).

In 2002, Kennedy also led all presidents from 1961 on in the public's retrospective job approval (Newport 2002). Public assessments of the job approval of past presidents are higher than their average ratings while they were in office for presidents deemed successes and lower for those considered failures. Kennedy's retrospective job approval was 83 percent (13 percentage points above his in-office average). He was followed by Reagan (73 percent, +20 points), Bush (69 percent, +8), Carter (60 percent, +15), Ford (60 percent, +13), Clinton (51 percent, -4), Johnson (39 percent, -16), and Nixon (34 percent, -15).

President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis significantly contributed to his strong overall job approval scores. From the fall of 1961 until the spring of 1962, his approval ratings held steady at almost 80 percent (table 10). They then slowly, but steadily, subsided, dropping to a low of 61 percent in mid-October 1962. The Cuban missile crisis then pushed approval up to 74–76 percent from November 1962 to January 1963. Approval then again waned, falling to the upper fifties in the fall of 1963 immediately before his assassination.³

Besides increasing public approval of the president, the Cuban missile crisis also dramatically changed the public's basis for evaluating his performance. In the summer of 1962, few people mentioned foreign policy as either a good or bad thing that they had heard people saying about President Kennedy (tables 11A–B). Just 9 percent mentioned foreign policy as positive remarks, and only 8 percent had heard negative comments on his handling of international

3. The trajectory of President Kennedy's popularity followed well-established patterns of presidential job approval (Edwards 1990; Mueller 1973; Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996; Ostrom and Simon 1985a).

relations. Thus, foreign policy was not frequently mentioned, and the small amount of discussion was about evenly favorable and unfavorable. In November 1962, when asked what President Kennedy had done that they liked the best and worst, 59 percent mentioned foreign policy successes, and only 14 percent chose international failures (table 12). Thus, after the crisis foreign policy in general and Cuba in particular dominated people's evaluations of President Kennedy, and those evaluations were positive by about five to one.

U.S. Policies toward Cuba

To a large degree the Cuban missile crisis did not change public opinion toward Cuba (table 13). Throughout the early 1960s, the public was opposed to the Castro regime and concerned about the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere, but it rejected U.S. military action to remove Castro (Mayer 2001). From after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 through February 1963, support for sending U.S. troops to overthrow Castro held steady at 20–24 percent.

Even near the height of the crisis the public did not turn jingoistic. In September 1962, after public concern over Cuba had already sharply increased, only 10 percent endorsed invasion, bombing, or other belligerent action. Likewise, state polls by Harris in late September and early October indicated opposition to going to war with Cuba. In Michigan the public was opposed to war with Cuba by 68 percent to 32 percent (Kern, Levering, and Levering 1983), while among voters in Kentucky 44 percent opposed going to war, 27 percent favored it, and 29 percent were undecided (McKeown 2000). In mid-November 1962, when the crisis had subsided, but not ended, 17 percent backed invading Cuba and another 3 percent wanted to “kick the Russians and their military supplies out.” In the spring of 1963, 6–7 percent supported military action, 6 percent wanted to “get Russian troops, missiles, etc. out of Cuba,” and 1–2 percent favored getting rid of Castro.⁴

Sentiment did shift as U.S. policy in response to the disclosure of offensive missiles changed. In September 1962, 22 percent wanted the United States to “keep out, hands off,” and 25 percent did not know what action should be taken toward Cuba. During the waning of the crisis in November 1962, a plurality of 38 percent backed President Kennedy's policies and 20 percent endorsed actions consistent with his (e.g., insisting on the removal of bombs, keeping out of war while doing what was needed, and helping the Cuban underground). Only 3 percent still endorsed a hands-off policy, and uncertainty dropped to 17 percent. Both noninvolvement and uncertainty increased again in the spring of 1963.

Also, the public quickly and strongly endorsed President Kennedy's call

4. While the questions asked in the four surveys from September 1962 to May 1963 were identical, different open-ended codings used hamper comparisons.

for the removal of the offensive missiles and the use of a blockade to force their withdrawal. A special Gallup poll taken within hours of his address to the nation found that 84 percent approved of the blockade decision, 4 percent disapproved, and 12 percent “withheld judgment” (Gallup Organization 1962).⁵

Overall, during Kennedy’s presidency, the public consistently rejected invading Cuba and instead favored less extreme measures. Immediately after the Bay of Pigs invasion, 70 percent supported working with Latin American countries and the United Nations, 63 percent backed a trade embargo, 44 percent supported aiding anti-Castro groups with money and military supplies, and just 24 percent endorsed the U.S. military overthrowing Castro. A majority also backed Kennedy’s handling of the situation (table 20).

Many Americans opposed the United States sending troops to overthrow Castro because they feared the consequences. A majority (51 percent) thought that such an action would likely lead to “an all-out war between the United States and Russia.” Among those considering a world war likely, only 19 percent backed invading Cuba, while among those not seeing a general war as likely 36 percent favored overthrowing Castro (see also Chesler and Schmuck 1964).

Others opposed a U.S. invasion as unneeded. Two-fifths (41 percent) thought that within 3 years the people of Cuba would topple Castro.

Psychological Impact of the Missile Crisis

Standard accounts of the public’s reaction to the missile crisis portray high nuclear anxiety bordering on panic (Detzer 1979; Thompson 1992). Referring to Harvard students, Richard Neustadt said that “these kids were literally scared for their lives” (Kern, Levering, and Levering 1983, p. 126). Likewise, a study at the University of Michigan (Chesler and Schmuck 1964) quoted students saying,

I felt numb, afraid, and helpless.

I felt we were going to have a real doozie of a war.

I felt that everything I was now doing was unimportant—meaningless—and

I felt a fear, for us and the world.

Similarly, remembrances of the crisis emphasize a sense of dread and doom. As one typical recall goes, “That evening after the President’s address, my parents moved my bed into their bedroom and told me they wanted me to

5. This Gallup poll was done in 30 areas around the country with 553 adults who had listened to President Kennedy’s address. The data were not archived along with standard Gallup polls at the Roper Center, and not even a copy of a questionnaire with exact question wordings has been found. This may be the first example of an “instant” poll after a presidential address.

sleep with them that night. When I asked why, my Father said, ‘Because, this may be the last night we ever spend alive together’” (Longley 1997, p. 1).

Americans had every reason to be worried. President Kennedy had starkly presented the situation to the public. He warned that it was “a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what cost or casualties will be incurred” (Kennedy 1962, p. 4). He also talked of the threat of “worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth” (Kennedy 1962, p. 2).

But the NORC Illinois study suggests that there was much less anxiety and panic than these accounts portray. First, most people reported no notable disruptions in their lives during the crisis. Only 36 percent said that the previous week (the week of the crisis) was “different from most weeks,” and less than one-third of them (or 11 percent overall) mentioned Cuba as a reason for the difference (table 21B). Likewise, when asked directly if they had made any changes because of the Cuban situation (something that they “did or did not do because of it”), only 11.5 percent reported such changes. Moreover, of those having changed their normal patterns because of the crisis, only one-third (or 4 percent of everyone) engaged in any safety- or survival-related activities.

Second, even during the height of the crisis, Cuba did not dominate people’s concerns. When asked what had “bothered you or been on your mind most” during the previous week, 41 percent of people mentioned Cuba, and references to Cuba accounted for 34 percent of all worries (table 23). Cuba mentions were even lower when people considered what things worried them the most (without referencing the previous week). Just 23 percent of people mentioned Cuba, and these represented only 13 percent of all mentions (table 24). Furthermore, when the focus was shifted to over the previous 6 months and the events that had “the greatest effect on you and your family—for better or worse,” only 7 percent cited the “national or international political situation,” and these were only 4.5 percent of all events mentioned (table 25).

Nor did the worries that people had over Cuba concentrate on fear of nuclear war. Of the 34 percent of worries that dealt with Cuba, 5 percent were about someone being called up by the military, 27.5 percent were about the general situation, and just 2 percent were about survival in case of war (table 24). Likewise, of the 13 percent mentioning Cuba as what people worried about the most, 1 percent referred to possible military service, 10 percent to the general situation, and 1.5 percent to survival concerns.

Even directly asking people about worries about Cuba did not indicate excessive public concern: 35 percent thought that most people were “very worried” and shared those feelings, and 30.5 percent believed that most people were “not particularly worried” and said that they felt the same way. Another 24 percent reported mixed or unclear levels of worry, and 9 percent were unsure how most people felt (table 26). Moreover, the amount of worry quickly subsided (table 27).

Third, the Cuban missile crisis clearly occupied people's minds, displacing other subjects from people's attention. Thoughts about "the atomic bomb or fallout" rose from 27 percent in the spring of 1962 to 65 percent during the crisis (table 28). Thoughts about the "world situation" were even more widespread, on 93 percent of people's minds. But all other topics from money to health occupied fewer people's thoughts during the Cuban missile crisis than during the previous spring. Overall, fewer things were on people's minds during the crisis than during more normal times (4.6 vs. 5.0, respectively). Moreover, it is particularly notable that thoughts about death fell from 37 percent in the spring to 29 percent during the crisis.

Likewise, the Cuban situation was a major, but not obsessive, topic of conversation. The NORC Illinois study found that during the previous week 25 percent had spent "a lot of time" talking about Cuba, 51 percent "some time," and 24 percent "hardly any time."

Three measures of psychological response—affect balance, psychosomatic symptoms, and changes in various behaviors—reveal the complex mixture of responses to the Cuban missile crisis. First, as table 29 shows, feelings of positive affect were down during the crisis period compared with the spring. Overall, the average positive-affect score decreased from 4.5 to 3.8.

Yet despite this clear drop in positive affect, assessments of overall happiness rose during this same period. In the spring, 23 percent rated their lives as very happy, while during the Cuban missile crisis, 28 percent said they were very happy.

Second, negative affect did not rise during the crisis period. Three negative experiences (unable to get things done, restlessness, and having too many things to do) did modestly increase in frequency, but five negative affects dropped (being lonely, angry, depressed-unhappy, bored, and uneasy; table 29). Most changes were small, and there was no meaningful change in the average negative-affect score (spring = 5.7 vs. Cuban missile crisis = 5.8).

Third, psychosomatic measures of stress and anxiety changed little (table 30). Of the eight symptoms, four were more common during the crisis and four were less frequent. Moreover, most changes were of modest size.⁶

Finally, on a number of measures people reported rises in concerns and negative behaviors (table 31): 44 percent said that they now worried more than they used to, 24.5 percent said that they now worried the same amount, 28.5 percent said that they now worried less, and 3 percent said that they never worried. However, this item did not refer to either changes because of the Cuban missile crisis or specifically during that period, so it may reflect more nostalgic beliefs that things were easier in the past.

More focused were items about changes in problematic activities during

6. Likewise, after President Kennedy's assassination in 1963, positive affect was lower than during normal times, but negative affect changed little (Smith and Rasinski 2002; Smith, Rasinski, and Toce 2001).

the previous week (i.e., the crisis period; table 32). While most people reported no change in their ability to do their jobs (61 percent), their energy levels (52 percent), smoking (72 percent), and drinking (74 percent), among those reporting a change, most moved in a negative direction. The net declines in energy level (21.8 percent with more energy than usual – 25.0 percent with less energy = –3.2 percentage points), in doing one's job well (–3.9 points), and in smoking (–5.3 points) were fairly small, but there was a larger negative change in drinking behavior (–17.1 points).

Overall, while the Cuban missile crisis was on most people's minds, the public was not overwhelmed by worries and did not dwell on concerns about death and nuclear survival. Nor were there notable declines in psychological well-being. Instead, psychological reactions were rather mixed and muted. Positive affect was down, general happiness was up, and negative affect changed little. Likewise, measures of stress and anxiety showed little alteration and clearly presented no evidence that people were traumatized or debilitated by worries over the crisis. People did, however, report slight gains in some problematic activities and a larger increase in drinking. In sum, the public did not panic, was not overcome by nuclear anxiety, and remained psychologically intact during the crisis.

The Cuban Missile Crisis in Public Memory

In retrospect Americans judge the Cuban missile crisis as one of the most important events of the Cold War. In a 1983 Harris survey, it led the list as the event that they remembered the most about President Kennedy (table 33). Thirty-eight percent mentioned the Cuban missile crisis compared with 29 percent selecting the Bay of Pigs invasion, 25 percent his stand on Civil Rights, and 22 percent his inauguration speech. Less than 20 percent mentioned other events like the Berlin crisis, the Peace Corps, or the nuclear test ban treaty. Also, in 1988 it was rated from among six events as the United States's best use of military force (table 35).

But the Cuban missile crisis is not seen solely in a positive light. A 1974 Harris survey asked the public to judge 12 post-World War II foreign policy events as "a proud moment in American history, a dark moment, or neither" (table 34). The Cuban missile crisis ranked near the middle with a net positive score of +35 (i.e., 53 percent proud, –18 percent dark). It is likely that the Cuban missile crisis received these mixed ratings because many saw it as *both* a proud and dark moment in the recent history of the United States.

Conclusion

Over the past 50 years the United States has experienced several dozen major foreign policy crises (Fitch 1985; Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996; Wang 1996).

Perhaps the two that most gripped the nation were the Cuban missile crisis and the September 11 terrorist attacks. While the particulars of the two events are quite different, they were both events of enormous importance that involved a clear and present danger to the country, galvanized the populace, and propelled the political leadership into decided and forceful action. They also share the characteristic that while they greatly affected the nation, the public was neither paralyzed nor terrorized (Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos 2002; Smith and Rasinski 2002; Smith, Rasinski, and Toce 2001). Politically and psychologically the U.S. people were resilient in the face of these confrontations. They absorbed the shock, backed their leaders, and carried on with their lives. This may be the hallmark of the U.S. people in times of greatest challenge.

Appendix

The Cuban Missile Crisis in Context

1. *Gallup* in Smith 1985b: What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today?

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Mentioning International Relations (%)</i> | <i>Mentioning Cuba Only (%)</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|-------------|---|---|--------------|
| 6/60 | 52.7 | .0 | 1,511 |
| 6/60 | 46.0 | 4.3 | 1,406 |
| 7/60 | 56.9 | 4.3 | 1,653 |
| 7/60 | 59.7 | 2.4 | 1,553 |
| 7/60 | 57.8 | 3.2 | 1,619 |
| 8/60 | 56.8 | 3.9 | 1,645 |
| 9/60 | 58.7 | 2.1 | 1,066 |
| 9/60 | 58.6 | 3.5 | 1,668 |
| 10/60 | 55.1 | 6.2 | 1,556 |
| 2/61 | 42.4 | 1.5 | 1,629 |
| 5/61 | 46.7 | 9.3 | 1,601 |
| 7/61 | 63.1 | 4.7 | 1,647 |
| 12/61 | 59.8 | 1.2 | 1,500 |
| 5/62 | 44.8 | 2.5 | 1,582 |
| 6/62 | 34.9 | .5 | 1,527 |
| 8/62 | 50.9 | 1.8 | 1,499 |
| 9/62 | 64.9 | 23.8 | 1,701 |
| 10/62 | 65.6 | 25.0 | 1,644 |
| 11/62 | 72.2 | 30.8 | 1,583 |

| | | | |
|-------|------|------|-------|
| 12/62 | 60.9 | 20.5 | 1,482 |
| 3/64 | 28.4 | 3.6 | 1,676 |
| 4/64 | 27.9 | 5.4 | 1,661 |
| 5/64 | 24.3 | 1.7 | 1,581 |
| 6/64 | 20.2 | 1.7 | 1,634 |
| 8/64 | 40.8 | .4 | 1,557 |
| 8/64 | 28.0 | .9 | 1,569 |
| 9/64 | 33.2 | 3.4 | 1,600 |
| 10/64 | 40.8 | 1.0 | 1,550 |
| 2/65 | 52.5 | .2 | 1,550 |
| 3/65 | 36.5 | .1 | 1,541 |
| 3/65 | 53.2 | .3 | 2,285 |
| 7/65 | 55.7 | .5 | 2,407 |
| 8/65 | 57.2 | .5 | 1,599 |
| 9/65 | 46.0 | .2 | 1,571 |
| 10/65 | 55.0 | .6 | 2,399 |
| 11/65 | 55.2 | .3 | 1,646 |
| 5/66 | 56.9 | .2 | 1,563 |
| 8/66 | 46.9 | .0 | 1,509 |

NOTE.—Percentages are based on total number of mentions. The percentage mentioning Cuba is included in the total mentions in the first column.

2. *Gallup*, 9/20–9/25/1962 ($N = 1,701$): Have you heard or read about our troubles with Cuba?

| | |
|-----|-----|
| | (%) |
| Yes | 94 |
| No | 6 |

The Cold War

3. *Gallup*: Would you say there is much danger of world war or not much danger?

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Much Danger</i> (%) | <i>Not Much</i> (%) | <i>Don't Know</i> (%) | <i>N</i> |
|-------------|---------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|----------|
| 7/2–7/7/54 | 59 | 27 | 14 | 1,500 |
| 6/23–7/2/61 | 49 | 39 | 12 | 1,625 |
| 5/31–6/5/62 | 37 | 52 | 11 | 1,512 |

4. *Gallup*: Do you think the United States will find itself in another world war within, say, the next year?

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Yes</i> (%) | <i>No</i> (%) | <i>Don't Know</i> (%) | <i>N</i> |
|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------|
| 7/8-7/13/51 | 26 | 64 | 10 | 1,500 |
| 1/6-1/11/52 | 22 | 64 | 14 | 1,500 |
| 12/11-12/16/52 | 20 | 68 | 13 | 1,500 |
| 10/9-10/14/53 | 17 | 60 | 23 | 1,488 |
| 12/31/54-1/5/55 | 11 | 69 | 20 | 1,446 |
| 4/4-4/9/63 ^a | 5 | 76 | 20 | 1,570 |
| 3/3-3/8/66 ^b | 21 | 66 | 13 | 1,623 |

^a Do you think we are likely to get into another world war in the next 5 years? [IF YES:] Do you think we are likely to get into another world war within the next year?

^b Do you think we are likely to get into another world war within the next year?

5. *Gallup*, reported in Smith 1988: Do you think we are likely to get into another world war in the next 5 years?

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Yes</i> (%) | <i>No</i> (%) | <i>Don't Know</i> (%) | <i>N</i> |
|--------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------|
| 10/50 ^a | 65 | 20 | 15 | 2,981 |
| 3/51 ^a | 76 | 16 | 8 | 1,368 |
| 7/52 ^a | 66 | 21 | 13 | 2,009 |
| 1/52 ^a | 65 | 21 | 14 | 1,944 |
| 12/52 ^a | 54 | 27 | 20 | 1,421 |
| 4/53 ^a | 46 | 28 | 26 | 1,468 |
| 10/53 ^a | 56 | 27 | 18 | 1,488 |
| 12/54 ^a | 50 | 31 | 19 | 1,446 |
| 4/57 ^b | 35 | 49 | 17 | 1,689 |
| 11/57 | 34 | 43 | 23 | 1,535 |
| 4/58 | 24 | 50 | 16 | 1,435 |
| 5/59 | 23 | 53 | 24 | 1,524 |
| 8/59 | 19 | 56 | 25 | 1,463 |
| 10/59 | 31 | 32 | 37 | 1,396 |
| 5/60 | 34 | 47 | 19 | 2,997 |
| 7/60 | 47 | 39 | 15 | 2,760 |
| 3/61 | 32 | 50 | 18 | 3,508 |
| 5/61 | 44 | 39 | 17 | 3,519 |
| 9/61 | 53 | 34 | 13 | 3,440 |
| 4/63 | 24 | 58 | 18 | 3,252 |
| 6/65 | 34 | 53 | 12 | 3,536 |

^a Do you think the United States will find itself in another world war within, say, the next year? How about the next 5 years?

^b Everybody hopes there will not be another world war, but what is your best guess, do you think there will be another world war within the next 5 years?

6. *NORC/SRS100*, 1/63 ($N = 1,482$): Now, of these issues [HAND RESPONDENT YELLOW CARD], which one do you feel is the *most* important facing the country today? Which *one* is the *least* important?

| | <i>Most Important</i> (%) | <i>Least Important</i> (%) |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Communism in the United States | 31.2 | 5.6 |
| Danger of a world war | 23.7 | 3.8 |
| Juvenile delinquency | 15.9 | 2.0 |
| Education | 15.7 | 1.6 |
| Race relations | 8.0 | 10.3 |
| Taxes | 2.0 | 17.5 |
| Fallout shelters | 1.6 | 40.5 |
| Slums | .6 | 13.4 |
| Don't know | 1.1 | 4.8 |

7. *Gallup*: Do you believe that it is possible or impossible to reach a peaceful settlement of differences with Russia?

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Possible</i> (%) | <i>Impossible</i> (%) | <i>Don't Know</i> (%) | <i>N</i> |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------|
| 3/4–3/9/51 ^a | 44 | 46 | 10 | 1,500 |
| 12/10–12/15/59 | 66 | 23 | 10 | 1,527 |
| 12/8–12/13/60 | 50 | 27 | 23 | 1,500 |
| 1/11–1/16/62 | 53 | 35 | 12 | 1,616 |
| 12/13–12/18/62 ^b | 61 | 32 | 6 | 1,482 |
| 6/21–6/26/63 | 48 | 37 | 15 | 1,606 |
| 8/15–8/20/63 | 44 | 39 | 17 | 1,588 |
| 2/28–3/5/64 | 47 | 39 | 14 | 1,662 |
| 11/6–11/11/64 | 57 | 26 | 18 | 1,568 |
| 5/17–5/20/90 ^b | 84 | 13 | 3 | 1,255 |

^a Do you yourself think it is possible or impossible for the United States to reach a peaceful agreement with Russia?

^b Do you believe it is possible or impossible to reach a peaceful settlement of differences between Russia and the West?

8. *Gallup*: Which of these do you think is more likely to be true of [YEAR]? A peaceful year, more or less free of serious international disputes, or a troubled year with much international discord?

| <i>Survey Date</i> | <i>Year</i> | <i>Peaceful</i> (%) | <i>Troubled</i> (%) | <i>Same</i> (%) | <i>Don't Know</i> (%) | <i>N</i> |
|--------------------------|-------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|----------|
| 12/3–12/8/59 | 1960 | 54 | 31 | ... | 15 | 1,560 |
| 12/13–12/18/62 | 1963 | 38 | 53 | ... | 9 | 1,482 |
| 1/7–1/12/65 ^a | 1965 | 31 | 57 | ... | 12 | 2,435 |
| 12/11–12/16/65 | 1966 | 11 | 82 | ... | 7 | 1,565 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|------|----|----|-----------------|----|-------|
| 11/30-12/3/73 | 1974 | 23 | 65 | ... | 11 | 1,550 |
| 12/6-12/9/74 | 1975 | 29 | 61 | ... | 10 | 1,517 |
| 11/18-11/21/77 | 1978 | 35 | 45 | 12 ^b | 8 | 1,506 |
| 1/1-1/4/78 | 1979 | 38 | 53 | ... | 9 | 1,563 |
| 11/30-12/3/79 | 1980 | 14 | 80 | ... | 7 | 1,549 |
| 11/20-11/23/81 | 1982 | 12 | 45 | 37 | 6 | 1,508 |
| 11/19-11/28/82 ^c | 1983 | 18 | 32 | 43 | 7 | 1,038 |
| 11/11-12/4/83 ^c | 1984 | 11 | 55 | 29 | 5 | 1,037 |
| 11/26-12/9/84 ^c | 1985 | 15 | 34 | 43 | 8 | 1,057 |
| 11/11-11/18/85 ^c | 1986 | 13 | 31 | 51 | 6 | 1,008 |
| 10/27-11/24/86 ^c | 1987 | 23 | 56 | 16 | 5 | 1,002 |
| 11/30-12/7/87 ^c | 1988 | 20 | 25 | 49 | 6 | 505 |
| 12/5-12/16/88 ^c | 1989 | 30 | 19 | 47 | 4 | 1,008 |
| 12/8-12/10/89 ^c | 1990 | 37 | 26 | 32 | 5 | 1,010 |
| 12/6-12/9/90 ^c | 1991 | 11 | 46 | 38 | 5 | 1,007 |
| 11/1995 ^c | 1996 | 11 | 31 | 57 | 1 | 1,000 |
| 1/16-1/18/98 ^d | 1998 | 31 | 65 | ... | 4 | 1,004 |
| 12/28-12/29/98 ^d | 1999 | 27 | 69 | ... | 4 | 1,055 |

^a "More" dropped from lead sentence after 1962.

^b The volunteered response "same" was given by 12 percent.

^c Will it [YEAR] be a peaceful year, more or less free of international disputes, a troubled year, with much international discord, or remain the same?

^d As I read a series of statements, please tell me which you think is more likely to be true of [YEAR]. A peaceful year, more or less free of international disputes, or a troubled year with much international discord.

9. *Gallup*: Which of these do you think is likely to be true of [YEAR]? A year when Russia will increase her power in the world or a year when Russian power will decline?

| <i>Survey Date</i> | <i>Year</i> | <i>Increase (%)</i> | <i>Decrease (%)</i> | <i>Don't Know (%)</i> | <i>N</i> |
|-----------------------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------|
| 12/3-12/8/59 | 1960 | 54 | 24 | 23 | 1,560 |
| 12/13-12/18/62 ^a | 1963 | 37 | 45 | 18 | 1,482 |
| 1/1-1/12/65 | 1965 | 38 | 34 | 28 | 1,435 |
| 12/11-12/16/65 | 1966 | 42 | 36 | 23 | 1,565 |
| 12/8-12/13/66 | 1967 | 49 | 26 | 25 | 1,469 |
| 12/7-12/12/67 | 1968 | 56 | 22 | 22 | 1,549 |
| 12/5-12/10/68 | 1969 | 58 | 19 | 23 | 1,497 |
| 11/30-12/3/73 | 1974 | 56 | 14 | 31 | 1,550 |
| 12/10-12/13/76 | 1977 | 63 | 16 | 21 | 1,559 |
| 11/18-11/21/77 ^b | 1978 | 53 | 16 | 11 | 1,506 |
| 12/1-12/4/78 | 1979 | 61 | 19 | 20 | 1,563 |
| 11/30-12/3/79 ^c | 1980 | 56 | 21 | 22 | 1,549 |

^a "More likely" added to lead sentence in 1962.

^b "Same" was volunteered by 20 percent.

^c Which of these do you think is likely to be true in [YEAR]? A year when Russia will increase her power in the world or a year when Russian power will decline?

John F. Kennedy

10. *Gallup*, reported in Edwards 1990: Do you approve or disapprove of the way that Kennedy is handling his job as president?

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Approve</i> (%) | <i>Disapprove</i> (%) | <i>Don't Know</i> (%) | <i>N</i> |
|----------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------|
| 2/10–2/15/61 | 72 | 6 | 22 | 1,629 |
| 3/10–3/15/61 | 73 | 7 | 20 | 1,608 |
| 4/6–4/11/61 | 78 | 6 | 16 | 1,583 |
| 4/28–5/3/61 | 83 | 5 | 12 | ... |
| 5/4–5/9/61 | 77 | 9 | 14 | 1,601 |
| 5/17–5/22/61 | 75 | 10 | 15 | 1,545 |
| 5/28–6/2/61 | 74 | 11 | 15 | 1,502 |
| 6/23–6/28/61 | 72 | 14 | 14 | 1,625 |
| 7/27–8/1/61 | 75 | 12 | 13 | 1,647 |
| 8/24–8/29/61 | 76 | 12 | 12 | 1,534 |
| 9/21–9/26/61 | 79 | 10 | 11 | 1,552 |
| 10/19–10/24/61 | 77 | 12 | 11 | 1,500 |
| 11/17–11/22/61 | 79 | 9 | 12 | 1,523 |
| 12/7–12/12/61 | 77 | 11 | 12 | 1,500 |
| 1/11–1/16/62 | 79 | 10 | 11 | 1,616 |
| 2/8–2/13/62 | 78 | 11 | 11 | 1,529 |
| 3/8–3/13/62 | 79 | 12 | 9 | 1,599 |
| 4/6–4/11/62 | 77 | 13 | 10 | 1,582 |
| 5/3–5/8/62 | 74 | 16 | 10 | 1,503 |
| 5/31–6/5/62 | 71 | 19 | 10 | 1,512 |
| 6/28–7/3/62 | 69 | 19 | 12 | 1,527 |
| 7/26–7/31/62 | 66 | 23 | 11 | 1,611 |
| 8/23–8/28/62 | 67 | 20 | 13 | 1,499 |
| 9/20–9/25/62 | 63 | 22 | 15 | 1,701 |
| 10/19–10/24/62 | 61 | 25 | 14 | 1,644 |
| 11/16–11/21/62 | 74 | 14 | 12 | 1,583 |
| 12/13–12/18/62 | 76 | 13 | 11 | 1,482 |
| 1/11–1/16/63 | 74 | 14 | 12 | 1,525 |
| 2/7–2/12/63 | 70 | 18 | 12 | 1,661 |
| 3/8–3/13/63 | 67 | 20 | 13 | 1,675 |
| 4/4–4/9/63 | 66 | 21 | 13 | 1,570 |
| 5/2–5/7/63 | 64 | 25 | 11 | 1,632 |
| 5/8–5/13/63 | 65 | 23 | 12 | 1,729 |
| 5/23–5/28/63 | 64 | 24 | 12 | 1,658 |
| 6/21–6/26/63 | 61 | 26 | 13 | 1,606 |
| 7/18–7/23/63 | 61 | 27 | 12 | 1,573 |
| 8/15–8/20/63 | 62 | 26 | 12 | 1,588 |
| 9/12–9/17/63 | 56 | 29 | 15 | 1,550 |
| 10/11–10/16/63 | 58 | 29 | 13 | 1,589 |
| 11/8–11/13/63 | 58 | 30 | 12 | 1,635 |

11A. *Gallup, 7/26–7/31/62 (N = 1,611)*: Regardless of how you, yourself feel, what are the good things you hear most often said about Kennedy among your friends and acquaintances?

| | (%) |
|--|-----|
| Doing good job (general) | 19 |
| Young, vigorous, good change, brought new blood in government, good new men around him, smart advisors | 12 |
| Fighting for Medicare, helping old people | 10 |
| Stands up to Russia-Khrushchev, handles Berlin well, good foreign affairs | 9 |
| Gets more jobs, helps unemployment | 4 |
| Helps ordinary man, understands common people, for little man | 4 |
| Gives views to people, honest, forthright, tells truth in press conferences, press conferences good | 4 |
| Keeps his religion out of office, fought Catholics on school aid, kept aid only to public schools | 2 |
| Helps negroes, working for negroes, helps civil rights | 1 |
| Miscellaneous | 10 |
| Heard nothing good, only bad | 10 |
| Heard nothing, don't know, not interested in politics | 27 |
| Total | 112 |

11B. *Gallup, 7/26–7/31/62 (N = 1,611)*: What are the criticisms or bad things you hear most often about Kennedy among your friends and acquaintances?

| | (%) |
|--|-----|
| Too much federal spending, running country in debt, New Dealers economically | 13 |
| Foreign policy | 8 |
| Medical care to aged | 8 |
| Antibusiness, against free enterprise, steel action, stock market cause | 6 |
| Too many Kennedys, too many relatives in office, pushing his brothers | 5 |
| Too many parties, too arty, running around too much, swimming pool dunkings | 4 |
| Farm bill bad, not handling farm problem, not helping farmers | 4 |
| His religion, any anti-Catholic sentiment | 4 |
| Weak, does not get things done, has not kept promises, just a politician | 4 |
| Miscellaneous | 16 |
| Heard nothing bad, only good | 11 |
| Heard nothing, don't know, not interested in politics | 31 |
| Total | 114 |

12. *Gallup*, 11/16–11/21/62 ($N = 1,583$): Now I'd like to ask you what things Kennedy has done that you like best and what things you like least. First of all, what things has Kennedy done that you like best? And what things has he done that you like least?

| | <i>Best</i> (%) | <i>Least</i> (%) |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Foreign affairs: | | |
| Cuba | 49.0 | 10.8 |
| Kept us out of war | 3.1 | .0 |
| Firm stand with Russia | 2.1 | .0 |
| Peace Corps | 1.4 | .0 |
| Soft on communism | .0 | 1.0 |
| Berlin | .7 | .7 |
| Foreign affairs, general | 2.8 | 1.8 |
| Subtotal | 59.1 | 14.3 |
| Economics: | | |
| Jobs, unemployment | 4.6 | 2.1 |
| Raised government wages, etc. | .9 | .0 |
| Steel situation | .6 | .0 |
| Farm policies | .4 | 2.5 |
| Taxes | .0 | 1.4 |
| Government spending | .0 | 3.8 |
| Economy, general | .8 | .8 |
| Subtotal | 7.3 | 10.6 |
| Specific other: | | |
| Medicare, aging, social security | 9.5 | 6.2 |
| Civil rights | 5.4 | 10.1 |
| Education | .8 | 1.2 |
| Open press conferences | .8 | .0 |
| Space program | .6 | .0 |
| Prolabor | .0 | 2.2 |
| Pro-Catholic | .0 | .3 |
| Too many Kennedys in office | .0 | 3.5 |
| Government power, too much | .0 | 1.3 |
| Miscellaneous | 5.2 | 8.0 |
| Subtotal | 22.3 | 32.8 |
| Other, missing: | | |
| Nothing good/all good | 4.7 | 28.0 |
| Good in general/bad in general | 9.4 | 2.3 |
| Don't know | 10.1 | 17.6 |
| Missing | 2.3 | 4.5 |
| Total | 115.2 | 110.1 |

U.S. Policies toward Cuba

13. *Gallup*: Some people say that the United States should send our armed forces into Cuba to help overthrow Castro. Do you agree or disagree?

| Date | Agree (%) | Disagree (%) | No Opinion (%) | N |
|--------------|-----------|--------------|----------------|-------|
| 4/28–5/3/61 | 24 | 65 | 11 | ... |
| 9/20–9/25/62 | 23 | 61 | 15 | 1,701 |
| 2/7–2/12/63 | 20 | 63 | 17 | 1,661 |

NOTE.—The April–May 1961 Gallup poll (AIPO643A) is not archived at the Roper Center. The Gallup Organization believes that its sample size was around 1,600.

14A. *Gallup*, 9/20–9/25/62 (N = 1,701): Taking everything into account, what action, if any, do you think the United States should take at this time in regard to Cuba?

| | (%) |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| Bomb, invade, belligerent action | 10 |
| Trade embargo, starve them out | 13 |
| Do something short of actual war | 26 |
| Keep out, hands off | 22 |
| Other action | 4 |
| Don't know | 25 |

14B. *Gallup*, 11/16–11/21/62 (N = 1,583).

| | (%) |
|---|-----|
| Invade Cuba and overthrow Castro | 17 |
| Go personally and find out what's going on | 1 |
| Kick the Russians and their military supplies out | 2 |
| Insist that the bombers and bombs are taken out | 5 |
| Maintain our present policy, don't give in, stand firm | 38 |
| Keep out of an out-and-out war, while still doing whatever is necessary | 4 |
| Help underground movement | 1 |
| Do something, general | 7 |
| Stay out, leave alone, mind own p's and q's | 3 |
| Miscellaneous | 5 |
| Don't know | 17 |

14C. *Gallup*, spring 1963.

| | 4/63 (%) | 5/63 (%) |
|---|-------------|-------------|
| Go into Cuba, use troops, invade, go whip them, continue aerial observation | 7 | 6 |
| Get Russian troops, missiles, etc., out of Cuba | 6 | 6 |
| Get rid of Castro (general) | 1 | 2 |
| Support Cuban underground, exiles, anti-Castro forces, etc. | 1 | 2 |
| Blockade, quarantine, embargo | 9 | 7 |
| Work together with South American countries | 1 | ... |
| Be firm, strong, exert pressure (but short of war), keep watchful eye on them | 14 | 16 |
| Government doing all it can right now, leave it to the president, leave it as it is | 13 | 11 |
| Don't do anything, none of our business | 6 | 8 |
| It's too late to do anything | 2 | 2 |
| Miscellaneous | 7 | 5 |
| Don't know | 35 | 36 |
| <i>N</i> | 1,570 | 1,632 |

SOURCE.—Gallup Polls, 4/4–4/9/63, 5/2–5/7/63.

15. *Gallup*, 4/28–5/5/62: Some people say that the United States should. . . . Do you agree or disagree?

| | Agree (%) | Disagree (%) | No Opinion (%) | <i>N</i> |
|--|--------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------|
| Work with United Nations ^a | 70 | 15 | 15 | ... |
| Trade embargo ^b | 63 | 23 | 14 | ... |
| Aid to anti-Castro forces ^c | 44 | 41 | 15 | ... |
| U.S. invasion ^d | 24 | 65 | 11 | ... |

^a Some people say that the United States should work with Central and South American countries—through the United Nations—to decide what policy we should follow with regard to Cuba. Do you agree or disagree?

^b Some people say that the United States should refuse to buy or sell products to Cuba so long as Castro is in power. Do you agree or disagree?

^c Some people say that the United States should aid the anti-Castro forces with money and war materials. Do you agree or disagree?

^d Some people say that the United States should send our armed forces into Cuba to help overthrow Castro. Do you agree or disagree?

16. *Gallup*, 9/20–9/25/62 (*N* = 1,701): If the United States sends troops to Cuba to try to overthrow Castro and the communists, do you think this is or is not likely to bring about an all-out war between the United States and Russia?

| | (%) |
|---------------|-----|
| Is likely | 51 |
| Is not likely | 37 |
| No opinion | 12 |

17. *Gallup, 9/20–9/25/62* ($N = 1,701$): Do you think the United States should or should not invade Cuba?

| | All-Out War Likely (%) | All-Out War Unlikely (%) |
|------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Should | 19 | 36 |
| Should not | 69 | 57 |
| No opinion | 12 | 7 |

18. *Gallup, 9/20–9/25/62* ($N = 1,701$): Some people say that within the next 2 or 3 years the people of Cuba will overthrow Castro and the communists. Do you think this is or is not likely to happen?

| | (%) |
|------------|-----|
| Is likely | 41 |
| Is not | 43 |
| No opinion | 16 |

19. *Gallup, 2/7–2/12/63* ($N = 1,661$): Do you think the Cuba situation is a serious threat to world peace at this time or not?

| | (%) |
|------------|-----|
| Is | 59 |
| No | 31 |
| No opinion | 10 |

20. *Gallup*: In general, would you say that you are satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the Kennedy administration has been handling the Cuba situation in recent weeks?

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Approves/ Satisfied</i> | <i>Disapproves/ Dissatisfied</i> | <i>No Opinion</i> | <i>N</i> |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|----------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | |
| 4/28–5/3/61 ^a | 61 | 15 | 24 | ... |
| 2/7–2/12/63 | 56 | 27 | 16 | 1,661 |
| 3/8–3/13/63 | 50 | 32 | 18 | 1,675 |
| 4/4–4/9/63 | 49 | 30 | 21 | 1,570 |
| 5/2–5/7/63 | 45 | 35 | 20 | 1,632 |
| 5/23–5/28/63 | 50 | 30 | 20 | 1,658 |

^a Do you approve or disapprove of the way that President Kennedy is handling the situation in Cuba?

Psychological Impact of the Missile Crisis

21A. *NORC458S*, 10/27–11/4/62 ($N = 547$): Thinking back over the last week (7 days)—for instance, taking the things that happened to you and your family during the week and the things that happened at work and during your leisure time—would you say that it was an ordinary week or was it different from most weeks?

| | (%) |
|-----------|------|
| Ordinary | 63.8 |
| Different | 36.0 |
| Missing | .2 |

21B. [IF “DIFFERENT,” ASK:] What made it so?

| | (%) |
|-------------------|------|
| Mentions of Cuba | 11.2 |
| Non-Cuba mentions | 24.8 |
| Not different | 63.8 |
| Missing | .2 |

22. *NORC458S*: In the last week or so, have there been any changes in your activities as a result of the Cuban situation? For example, is there anything that you did or did not do because of it?

| | (%) |
|--------------------|------|
| Yes, changes | 11.5 |
| No changes | 88.0 |
| Missing/don't know | .5 |

23. *NORC458S*: Everything considered, what would you say has bothered you or been on your mind most in the past week or so?

| | <i>People</i> (%) | <i>Mentions</i> (%) |
|---|----------------------|------------------------|
| Cuba | 41.3 | 34.4 |
| Possibly being called to serve in military (self or family) | 5.5 | 4.6 |
| Survival in case of war | 2.7 | 2.3 |
| Cuba or international situation | 33.1 | 27.5 |
| All mentions besides Cuba | 70.2 | 58.4 |
| Nothing, never worry, don't know | 7.3 | 6.1 |
| Missing | 1.5 | 1.2 |
| Total | 120.3 | 100.1 |

24. *NORC458S*: What kind of things do you worry about most? What else?

| | <i>People</i> | <i>Mentions</i> |
|---|---------------|-----------------|
| | (%) | (%) |
| Cuba | 22.7 | 13.3 |
| Possibly being called to serve in military (self or family) | 2.4 | 1.4 |
| Survival in case of war | 2.6 | 1.5 |
| Cuba or international situation | 17.7 | 10.4 |
| All mentions besides Cuba | 138.9 | 81.6 |
| Nothing, never worry, don't know | 7.7 | 4.5 |
| Missing | .9 | .5 |
| Total | 170.2 | 99.9 |

25. *NORC458S*: We have been talking about last week. Now thinking back over the last 6 months, what are the events which have had the greatest effect on you and your family—for better or worse? What else?

| | <i>People</i> | <i>Mentions</i> |
|---|---------------|-----------------|
| | (%) | (%) |
| National or international political situation | 6.8 | 4.5 |
| Health | 26.7 | 17.5 |
| Interpersonal relations | 12.4 | 8.2 |
| Changes in family status | 13.5 | 8.9 |
| Job changes | 13.0 | 8.5 |
| Finances | 14.1 | 9.3 |
| Other | 40.2 | 26.4 |
| Nothing | 22.1 | 14.5 |
| Missing | 3.5 | 2.3 |
| Total | 152.3 | 100.1 |

26. *NORC458S*: Are most people you have talked to *very worried* about the [Cuban] situation or *not particularly worried*? Do the people you have talked to feel the *same way* as you do about the [Cuban] situation, or do they feel *different*? (These two questions were combined to make a personal worry index.)

| | (%) |
|---------------------|------|
| Very worried | 35.3 |
| Unsure, mixed | 23.6 |
| Not worried | 30.5 |
| Don't know, missing | 8.6 |

27. *NORC458S*: Compared with how you felt when you first heard the news, how do you feel about the [Cuban] situation *today*? Are you *more worried* about the situation now, *less worried*, or *about the same*?

| | (%) |
|--------------------|------|
| More worried now | 5.7 |
| Same | 38.9 |
| Less worried | 54.5 |
| Missing/don't know | .9 |

28. *NORC446* and *458S* ($N = 547$): Psychological changes: Now I'm going to read you several things that some people think about. Would you tell me which ones were on your mind during the past week? [NOT AT ALL/SOMETIMES/OFTEN; % sometimes /often thinking about and change in percentage points].

| | <i>Spring</i> <i>1962</i> ^a | <i>Cuban</i> <i>Missile Crisis</i> ^b | <i>Change</i> <i>Fall-Spring</i> |
|---|---|--|-------------------------------------|
| <i>Things</i> | | | |
| Money | 87.4 | 76.4 | -11.0 |
| Growing old | 40.5 | 28.2 | -12.7 |
| Work | 74.0 | 70.9 | -3.1 |
| Marriage | 32.6 | 23.9 | -8.7 |
| Getting ahead | 67.4 | 55.0 | -12.4 |
| Bringing up children | 54.5 | 52.1 | -2.4 |
| Death | 36.9 | 29.4 | -7.3 |
| The atomic bomb or fallout | 27.3 | 65.2 | +37.9 |
| Personal enemies | 8.1 | 4.2 | -3.9 |
| Health | 67.1 | 52.2 | -14.9 |
| World situation | ... | 93.0 | ... |
| Mean no. of topics thought about existing world situation | 5.0 | 4.6 | -.4 |

^a *NORC446LF* and *NORC446SF*. The question wording for *NORC446SF* was: "The following list describes several things people sometimes think about. Please indicate how often each thing was on your mind *last week*." (NOT AT ALL/SOMETIMES/OFTEN).

^b *NORC 458S*.

29. NORC446SF-LF and 458S (N = 547): We are interested in the way that people are feeling these days. I am going to show you a card which describes some of the ways people feel at different times, and you tell me whether you felt like that during the past week. [IF "ASK," ASK:] How often did you feel that way? [ONCE/SEVERAL TIMES/OFTEN; percent experiencing feeling and change in percentage points].

| <i>Affects</i> | <i>Spring 1962^a</i> | <i>Cuban Missile Crisis^b</i> | <i>Change Fall-Spring</i> |
|---|--------------------------------|---|---------------------------|
| a) On top of the world | 45.7 | 31.1 | -14.6 |
| b) Very lonely or remote from other people | 23.7 | 22.3 | -1.4 |
| c) Angry at something that usually will not bother you | 35.2 | 26.0 | -9.2 |
| d) That you could not do something because you just could not get going | 43.0 | 48.5 | +5.5 |
| e) Particularly excited or interested in something | 62.7 | 54.1 | -8.6 |
| f) Depressed or very unhappy | 29.9 | 28.8 | -1.1 |
| g) Pleased about having accomplished something | 76.4 | 67.8 | -8.6 |
| h) Bored | 29.2 | 22.7 | -6.5 |
| i) Proud because someone complimented you on something you had done | 61.5 | 51.2 | -10.3 |
| j) So restless you could not sit long in a chair | 32.0 | 34.4 | +2.4 |
| k) That you had more things to do than you could get done | 68.7 | 70.1 | +1.4 |
| l) Vaguely uneasy about something without knowing why | 30.7 | 28.4 | -2.3 |
| Mean negative affect ^c | 5.7 | 5.8 | +1 |
| Mean positive affect ^d | 4.5 | 3.8 | -.7 |

^a NORC446LF and NORC 446SF. The question wording for NORC446SF was: "We are interested in the way people are feeling these days. The following list describes some of the ways people feel at different times. Please indicate how often you felt each way during the *last week*." (NOT AT ALL/SOMETIMES/OFTEN).

^b NORC 458S.

^c Mean number reporting the eight negative affects (b, c, d, f, h, j, k, and l). The score could go from a low of 0 for someone with no negative affect to a score of 24 for some who experienced each affect often.

^d Mean number reporting the four positive affects (a, e, g, and i). The score could go from a low of 0 for someone with no positive affect to a score of 12 for some who experienced each affect often.

30. *NORC446SF/LF* and *458S* ($N = 547$): I'm going to show you a sheet that tells about different troubles or complaints people sometimes have. For each one please tell me how often you were bothered by such a complaint during the past week . . . [NOT AT ALL/ONE OR TWO TIMES/SEVERAL TIMES/NEARLY ALL THE TIME; percent with symptom and change in percentage points].

| <i>Symptoms</i> | <i>Spring 1962^a</i> | <i>Cuban Missile Crisis^b</i> | <i>Change Fall-Spring</i> |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|---------------------------|
| Dizziness | 17.3 | 15.4 | -1.9 |
| General aches and pains | 49.4 | 48.3 | -1.1 |
| Headaches | 47.3 | 40.9 | -6.4 |
| Muscles twitches or trembling | 14.3 | 16.7 | +2.4 |
| Nervousness or tenseness | 51.0 | 53.9 | +2.9 |
| Rapid heart beat | 16.6 | 14.0 | -2.6 |
| Skin rashes | 6.7 | 7.3 | +0.6 |
| Upset stomach | 25.1 | 27.5 | +2.4 |
| Mean symptoms score ^c | 3.5 | 3.9 | +0.4 |

^a *NORC446LF* and *NORC 446SF*. The question wording for *NORC446SF* was: "How often last week did you have . . . ?" (NOT AT ALL/ONE OR TWO TIMES/SEVERAL TIMES/NEARLY ALL THE TIME).

^b *NORC 458S*.

^c The score could go from 0 for someone who had no symptoms to a score of 24 for some who experienced all symptoms nearly all the time.

31. *NORC458S*, 10/27-11/4/62 ($N = 547$): Now let's shift from things people do to some things people think about. Everybody has some things he worries about more or less. Would you say you worry more now than you used to, or not as much?

| | (%) |
|-------------|------|
| More | 44.2 |
| Same | 24.5 |
| Less | 28.5 |
| Never worry | 2.6 |
| Missing | .2 |

32. *NORC458S*, 10/27-11/4/62 ($N = 547$): Do you ever smoke or use tobacco? [IF YES:] During the last week have you been smoking/using it more or less than you normally do? Do you ever take a drink (beer, whiskey, or any other alcoholic drink)? [IF YES:] Did you take a drink last week? [IF YES:] About how many times did you take a drink during the past week? Is that more or less than usual? [IF EMPLOYED:] During that last week, would you say you were able to do your work better than usual or not as well as usual? Compared with your normal feelings, would you say that you had more energy or less energy during the last week?

| | <i>More</i> | <i>Same</i> | <i>Less</i> | <i>Don't Know</i> | <i>More-Less</i> | <i>N</i> |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|------------------|----------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | |
| Less energy | 21.8 | 51.7 | 25.0 | 1.5 | -3.2 | 547 |
| Not doing job as well | 14.1 | 61.0 | 10.5 | 14.1 | -3.9 | 305 |
| Smoking | 14.7 | 71.9 | 9.4 | 4.0 | -5.3 | 299 |
| Drinking | 21.1 | 73.9 | 4.0 | 1.0 | -17.1 | 305 |

The Cuban Missile Crisis in Public Memory

33. *Harris*, 11/9–11/11/83 (*N* = 1,252): Let me read you a list of things some people have said they remember most about President Kennedy. From this list of things, which one or two do you remember him for?

| | (%) |
|--|-----|
| The missile crisis in Cuba | 38 |
| The Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba | 29 |
| His stand on civil rights | 25 |
| His inauguration speech | 22 |
| The first Catholic elected to the White House | 15 |
| His winning the 1960 election | 12 |
| His standing firm on the Russia threat to Berlin | 11 |
| The way he handled live new conferences | 11 |
| His starting the Peace Corps | 11 |
| His negotiating first nuclear test ban treaty | 7 |
| Other (volunteered) | 5 |
| Nothing (volunteered) | 4 |
| Not sure | 3 |

34. *Harris*, 12/6–12/14/74 (*N* = 1,513): Here is a list of international events that the United States has been involved in in recent history. For each, please tell me whether you think it was a proud moment in U.S. history, a dark moment, or neither a proud moment nor a dark moment.

| | <i>Proud</i> (%) | <i>Dark</i> (%) | <i>Neither</i> (%) | <i>Not Sure</i> (%) | <i>Proud– Dark</i> |
|--|---------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Founding of the Peace Corps | 81 | 2 | 10 | 7 | +79 |
| U.S. role in the founding of the United Nations | 82 | 4 | 9 | 5 | +78 |
| U.S. sending emergency food to Bangladesh | 76 | 3 | 11 | 10 | +73 |
| Nixon’s trip to Communist China | 60 | 9 | 24 | 6 | +51 |
| The Marshall Plan of aid to Europe | 56 | 6 | 15 | 23 | +50 |
| The Berlin airlift | 53 | 7 | 15 | 25 | +46 |
| Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban missile crisis | 53 | 18 | 14 | 15 | +35 |
| U.S. support of Israel during the October 1973 war | 43 | 11 | 29 | 17 | +32 |
| U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic | 10 | 20 | 27 | 43 | –10 |
| U.S. role in the Korean war | 22 | 41 | 27 | 10 | –19 |
| Central Intelligence Agency involvement in Chile | 7 | 41 | 19 | 34 | –34 |
| U.S. role in the Vietnam War | 8 | 72 | 15 | 5 | –64 |

35. *Market Opinion Research*, 9/7–9/18/88 ($N = 1,005$; registered voters): I'm going to read you some cases where the United States has used its military power since World War II. For each one, please tell me if you feel we should have or should not have used our military the way we did.

| | <i>Should</i> (%) | <i>Should Not</i> (%) | <i>Don't Know</i> (%) |
|---|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| The naval blockade around Cuba during the missile crisis in 1962 | 76 | 10 | 13 |
| The bombing of Libya by the U.S. Navy and Air Force in 1986 | 65 | 27 | 8 |
| U.S. participation with other United Nations members in the Korean War | 60 | 26 | 14 |
| The invasion of Grenada by U.S. forces in 1983 | 56 | 33 | 11 |
| The U.S. military intervention as peacekeeping force in Lebanon in 1982 | 55 | 35 | 11 |
| U.S. participation in the Vietnam War | 28 | 65 | 7 |

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