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The Rescue of Jews by Non-Jews in Nazi-Occupied Poland

GUNNAR S. PAULSSON

The case of Poland presents perhaps the sharpest of the many paradoxes of the Holocaust. On the one hand, of the more than three million Polish Jews who fell into the hands of the Nazis, only about three per cent survived, putting Poland at the very bottom of the league table amongst all the countries of occupied Europe. On the other hand, in the league table of people who are known to have risked their lives to rescue Jews, Poland stands at the very top, accounting for more than a third of all the 'Righteous Gentiles'.

Naturally this paradox has given rise to sharp polemics, characterised, unfortunately, by a great deal of jumping to conclusions. The correlation is obvious – Poland was a country of rampant anti-Semitism, and most of its Jews perished: cause and consequence, Q.E.D. On the other hand, Poland is a country with strong Catholic traditions of hospitality, charity, and self-sacrifice, hence the large number of Righteous Gentiles: also Q.E.D.

We should not, however, take such correlations at face value. To prove cause and effect we need not just correlations but concrete links. The failure of the polemicists on both sides lies in starting with preconceived conclusions and shoring them up with carefully selected evidence, rather than trying to find the links – if any – through solid research and reasoned discourse. The result has been a dialogue of the deaf that has persisted for more than fifty years, in

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which each side has had its favourite theories, arguments and proofs. In recent years the debate has become more temperate, but nothing approaching a consensus has yet been reached.

If we are ever to resolve the paradox, it is essential, above all, that we should stop jumping to conclusions, set aside our favourite theories, and have a close and impartial look at what exactly happened. Only in the details will we find the links, if they exist; and only when we have settled the details will we be in a position to draw conclusions in a sensible way.

My remit here is to consider only the rescue of Jews in Poland; that is, the more pleasant half of the paradox. But rescue is necessarily entangled with the question of Jewish survival and therefore of the scale of the disaster in Poland. A solid body of survivor opinion holds that it is wrong to talk about rescue or 'Righteous Gentiles' at all; that the Holocaust should be left as a black hole with no redeeming virtues, and that this is particularly the case for Poland. Therefore, I cannot speak about rescue without also taking time to justify the enterprise and thus dealing with the other half of the paradox as well. This article then will deal with the rescue of Jews, but also with the reasons why so few Jews were rescued, and will attempt to assess the phenomenon of Jewish rescue in Poland both quantitatively and against the Polish cultural background.

I shall begin with a few observations about rescue in general. For a variety of reasons, I find the term 'rescue' somewhat problematical. Rescue, properly speaking, ought first of all to involve an initiative on the part of the rescuer, and, second, to result in the survival of the person rescued. In most case, in Poland and elsewhere, neither of these conditions was fully met.

As an example of rescue in its pure form, let us consider the case of a Mr and Mrs Broniak, who lived in the Warsaw suburb of Praga, near the railway tracks leading to Treblinka. Seeing the Jews being taken to their deaths, they decided that something had to be done to help them: so Mr Broniak built a shelter in their flat where a Jew could hide. But he did not know any Jews. He knew, however, that a Jewish work-gang was working at the Eastern Station near his home, so he went there, befriended one of the workers, Tadeusz Grundland, and invited him to take advantage of his shelter. Grundland agreed and in that way survived until Praga was liberated in September 1944.¹

This is an uncomplicated case: a Polish couple set out to rescue a Jew and succeeded. The vast majority of cases, however, are less clear-cut. First of all, the initiative nearly always came from the Jewish side: a Jew escaped from a ghetto, a camp, or a deportation train, and then appealed to Poles to help him. Or, more often, a Jew would begin by contacting Christian friends – in Warsaw, it is strange but true that the telephones in the ghetto continued to function normally until well into the Ghetto Uprising – until he found one who was willing to take him in. Cases of non-Jews who approached Jews with the proposal of escaping were rare, and this is true not only in Poland but elsewhere.

Second, in the case of the Broniaks, one act of assistance was sufficient for Grundland to survive: it is reasonable, therefore, to say that the Broniaks rescued Grundland by offering him a hiding-place. But the far more usual case, again in Poland and elsewhere, was that to stay alive until liberation a Jew needed to run a gauntlet, relying on many different acts of assistance, no single one of which was enough to ensure survival. In these cases ‘rescue’ is not a single act but the cumulative result of many different kinds of help given by many individuals. Conversely, of course, a Jew might receive help of various kinds and yet not survive, as in the case of Anne Frank.

Many different kinds and degrees of help were extended to Jews ranging from major acts, such as that of the Broniaks, to minor acts of kindness: even passively ‘looking the other way’ was in some circumstances a very real form of help. The issue of motives is an important one, too: the Broniaks helped Grundland out of purely altruistic motives, while in most cases money was involved, sometimes exorbitant sums; or else there were ulterior motives of other kinds, such as the hope of religious conversion. Various figures have been given as the number of people involved in helping Jews in Poland, ranging from the hundreds to the millions; but any reasonable estimate must begin by defining what forms of help are to be taken into account.

The criteria used by Yad Vashem in designating ‘Righteous Gentiles’ are well-defined, if somewhat restrictive, and can serve as a ‘gold standard’. They are as follows: the nomination has to come from the Jewish side; the assistance rendered has to be of a substantial or repeated kind; and it has to be rendered without the

expectation of financial or other forms of gain. It is considered fair enough to have asked Jews to contribute towards their upkeep, if they could, but not to have charged large sums, and there are other restrictions as well. For example, help to members of the immediate family, such as a husband hiding his wife, does not count; nor, usually, does help to a Jewish convert, even one who counted as a Jew under the Nuremberg Laws.²

Help, on the other hand, was often given anonymously, often consisted of many small acts rather than a few large ones, was often done for profit – paid help is still help, though it might not have the same moral value as unpaid help – and was often rendered to family members. In addition, the mechanism of recognition by Yad Vashem can be a slow one. Consider for example the case of Stanislaw Chmielewski, described by Bernard Mark, then director of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw, as a ‘one-man underground organisation’.³ Chmielewski’s activities on behalf of Jews began in the first days of the German occupation, when he carried messages back to Warsaw from Jews who had fled to the Soviet occupation zone, helped in rehousing Jewish refugees and in smuggling Jews to the Soviet zone. During the ghetto period, he, his mother, and a friend called Andrzej Szawernowski – who, Chmielewski says, ‘throughout the occupation bravely helped me with my daily difficulties’⁴ – smuggled food and medicine to their friends in the ghetto, and later helped smuggle them out. After the liquidation of the ghetto, Chmielewski hid 24 Jews (not all at the same time) in his flat, helped many others to find hiding places, raised money, organised documents, and recruited other people to help him.

Poles were themselves oppressed under Nazi rule and did not enjoy the privileges of a German and a Nazi Party member such as Oskar Schindler or a diplomat such as Raoul Wallenberg. Taking into account what was possible for a Pole, Chmielewski, the ‘one-man underground movement’, to my mind deserves fame as much as such well-known rescuers. He certainly worked harder and risked more, over a longer period of time, than either Schindler or Wallenberg. He is clearly a major rescuer. Full documentation of Chmielewski’s case was available in the Jewish Historical Institute as early as 1962, the year that the first Yad Vashem awards were made, but Chmielewski did not receive an award until 1983 – 21 years later, forty years after

the war, and, fortunately, nine years before his death. Nowadays, most awards are posthumous. To this day, neither Chmielewski's mother, nor his helper Andrzej Szawernowski, nor any of the other people who he says helped him have been recognised.

A similar pair of helpers, Feliks Cywinski and Jan Bochenski, sold family land to rent flats where Jews could be kept and co-operated in rescuing 26 Jews. Cywinski has been recognised but Bochenski has not. Nor have the Broniaks. I am compiling a list of cases, gleaned from memoirs and testimonies that seem to meet the Yad Vashem criteria. This is work-in-progress and it is too early to report a definite results, but on the early returns it does not seem that those who have been officially recognised represent as many as ten per cent of the deserving cases. Keeping in mind that these cases are drawn from published memoirs and from cases on file at Yad Vashem and the Jewish Historical Institute, it is probable that the 5,000 or so Poles who have been recognised as 'Righteous Among the Nations' so far represent only the tip of the iceberg, and that the true number of rescuers who meet the Yad Vashem 'gold standard' is 20, 50, perhaps even 100 times higher.

Some benchmark cases suggest that this is the case not only in Poland. In the French village of Le-Chambon-sur-Lignon some 5,000 villagers are credited with co-operating in rescuing 5,000 Jews, yet the number of *Chambonnais* recognised as Righteous Gentiles is about 40 – fewer than one per cent of the total. Again, although there is a tree at Yad Vashem honouring the whole Danish nation for aiding the flight of its Jews to Sweden, individual awards to Danes number only 11 – fewer than one per cent, surely, even of those actively involved in the operation.⁵

Emmanuel Ringelblum calculated that 40–60,000 people were involved in hiding Jews in Warsaw alone⁶ – an estimate that I would judge on the basis of my research to be on the conservative side – while Teresa Prekerowa has estimated that 160–360,000 people were involved in this activity throughout Poland.⁷ On these estimates, it would seem that the Polish 'Righteous Gentiles' represent about one and a half to three per cent of those who helped Jews in Poland. If we allow that many of these would not meet the Yad Vashem criteria, then we might guess that the 5,000 awards constitute perhaps three to six per cent of the deserving cases. This can stand as one answer

to those who maintain that it is too soon to speak of 'Righteous Gentiles', or that the phenomenon has been exaggerated.

Let me return to the concept of rescue and of acts of assistance. I have suggested that survival in the usual case required an initiative from the Jewish side and that the Jew being rescued had to run a gauntlet, living in hiding, in some cases, for more than four years. During this period, the fugitive encountered numerous threats: he was hunted by the police, German and Polish, and by those who wanted to profit from his misfortune. If, for example, he jumped from a train taking him to a death camp, he first had to avoid being shot by the guards with machine-guns who staffed the train. Next he might encounter scavengers who roamed the track-side, looking for the bodies of Jews that they could loot. Such a scavenger might easily, especially if a Jew had injured himself whilst jumping, rob him while he was still alive, or hasten his end. If the Jew survived these threats, he still had to make his way to somewhere where he could hide, where he had friends or contacts of some kind. This involved travelling, usually on foot, through many miles of alien and potentially hostile territory. It was a trip that could take several days or even weeks. On the way, he would need to rely on local people to feed him, give him a place to stay for the night, give directions, and so on. None of these small acts can be described as 'rescue' in itself, yet all of them taken together were required for the Jew to survive.

Of course a Jew in such a situation hoped that he would not be taken for a Jew; but, inevitably, many were. Jews in Poland at that time constituted what nowadays would be called a 'visible minority', distinguishable by many traits of language, behaviour and appearance. Even fully-assimilated Jews were recognised as Jews, and not only by 'keen-eyed extortionists', as Yisrael Gutman puts it.⁸ Helena Szereszewska, for example, tells this story. One day her daughter, who was Polish-speaking, had a non-Jewish appearance, and moved about freely on the 'Aryan side', saw some lemons in a market-stall. Out of curiosity, since lemons were nearly unobtainable in wartime, she asked how much they were. When the stall-keeper named an astronomical sum, she exclaimed 'Jesus, Mary!' – a common enough exclamation in Polish, rather like 'Jesus Christ!' in English – to which the stall-keeper retorted: 'You've known them such a short time, missy, and already you're on first-name terms.'⁹

Very small details could serve to identify a Jew. Thus Stefan Chaskielewicz, himself a Jew in hiding, once recognised another man as Jewish because he asked 'what street are you from?', whereas a Pole would have asked 'what district are you from?'¹⁰

Once he had made his way, for example, to Warsaw, the fugitive's troubles were only beginning. He needed a *pied-à-terre* until he could get established, and so had to find someone willing to take him in. Once that had been arranged, he had to make his way there, all the while in fear of being stopped by police or blackmailers. He had either to supply himself with money somehow and obtain forged documents, or find somewhere where he could live in strict seclusion. If he lived 'on the surface', using forged documents, he could be spotted as a Jew, as we have seen, no matter how well-assimilated he was; if he lived 'under the surface', in hiding, it was difficult to conceal all traces of his existence: neighbours might hear or see something, rumours would spread. One way or another, Jews on the 'Aryan side' would come to the attention of blackmailers or the police. I can confirm Gutman and Krakowski's observation that nearly *all* Jewish memoirs report such encounters, most often several of them.¹¹

When blackmailers discovered a *melina* (hiding place), it was 'burnt', and the Jew then had to find a new place. Or the Poles providing the *melina* might become nervous, or would hear gossip and ask the Jew to move. So Jews shifted from one *melina* to another, five, ten, sometimes 20 or more times. Janina Bauman, whose case is not untypical, had to move 15 times in 18 months.¹²

As Jews were passed from hand to hand, their connections with their helpers would grow ever more tenuous: a helper could be a former neighbour's friend, a cousin's brother-in-law, sometimes simply a stranger met by chance. After repeated blackmail, money would become ever scarcer and even Jews who had managed to bring large sums out of the ghetto with them would, sooner or later, become paupers, often forced to ask for charity from people who were less and less familiar to them.

The average Jew in hiding ran the following gauntlet: seven different *melinas*, three or four different sets of documents, two or three encounters with blackmailers, recognition as a Jew an unknown number of times. A Jewish fugitive had to survive a year, two years,

even four years in hiding, facing one danger and difficulty after another. One false step, one malicious person could cause his death, but he had to surmount *all* the obstacles, run the entire gauntlet, to come out alive. No wonder, then, that many of the Jews, and many post-war authors, have calculated that the chances of survival on the Aryan side were slim indeed. Abraham Shulman wrote that the Jews in hiding were 'a hunted pack, living twenty-four hours of the day and every second of the hour in torment and terror. Their chances of survival were negligible, and the prospect of death ominous and all-pervading'.¹³

But were the prospects of survival really 'negligible'? Here is where the temptation to jump to conclusions must be resisted. On the face of it, the answer is yes: only 3 per cent of the Polish Jews survived. In a famous diatribe, Emmanuel Ringelblum blamed 'Polish fascism and its ally, anti-Semitism' for 'creating conditions so unfavourable that Poland was able to give shelter to at most one per cent of the victims of Hitlerite terror'.¹⁴ Ringelblum wrote in the heat of the moment; had he survived the war he might well have reassessed his conclusions. Post-war research would have convinced him that the number of Jews in hiding was several times larger than he thought (in Warsaw, about five or six per cent of the Ghetto population); and he might have reflected on the fact that 'rescue' everywhere took place mainly on initiatives from the Jewish side; that is, that before they could be rescued, Jews had to flee. As a proportion of those who did flee, the number who found shelter was much larger still.

We are confronted therefore with two separate problems: why did so few Jews manage to escape from camps, ghettos, and trains; and what happened to those who did manage to escape? For more than ten years I have been delving into these questions, limiting my inquiry to Warsaw (on the principle of looking where the light is best). I cannot in a short article provide a detailed account of my research, but I can offer a brief summary.

How many Jews went into hiding in Warsaw? I shall answer this question backwards. Dr Adolf Berman, the chairman of the Jewish National Committee (JNC), estimated after the war that in 1944 the JNC was distributing money to 5,500–6,000 Jewish fugitives in Warsaw, that the Polish Council to Aid Jews (*Zegota*) was similarly

helping 4,000 and the *Bund* another 1,500-2,000. Berman added these numbers up and concluded that between them these organisations were caring for 11-12,000 persons at that time.¹⁵

On the basis of my research, I am able to offer corrections to Dr Berman's figures, while confirming that he was essentially correct. I have found archival records that appear to be fairly complete lists of names of persons receiving money from the JNC and the *Bund*, and a partial list for *Zegota* has previously been published.¹⁶ I have entered these names into a computer database and compared them. This work shows that there is concrete support for Berman's claims on behalf of the *Bund* and the JNC: it appears that the JNC was indeed helping 5,500 people or so and the *Bund* 1,500 or so. But about 200 people appear on both *Bund* and JNC lists, so that the two organisations between them account for 6,800 people. As to *Zegota*, Berman's estimate of 4,000 is correct, but pertains to the whole of Poland; the correct figure for Warsaw is about 3,000. Furthermore, the overlap in coverage between this organisation and the two Jewish ones is still greater, approaching 50 per cent. Thus *Zegota* contributed only an additional 1,500 aid recipients, making about 8,300 all together rather than 11-12,000. A few hundred more people received assistance from various other organisations: Jewish activists in the Socialist and Communist parties (PPS and PPR, respectively) were supported by their parties, and a few Jews also received financial assistance from the Polish General Welfare Council (RGO) and other organisations such as the Warsaw Housing Co-operative. Thus approximately 8,500 Jews received financial assistance in Warsaw.

These 8,500, however, represent only about half the Jewish fugitives in Warsaw, judging from comparisons between Jews mentioned in memoirs and those appearing in the lists of aid recipients. We thus have fairly direct evidence of about 17,000 Jews in hiding. Yet even this figure is too low. The records on which this estimate rests date mostly from the spring and summer of 1944, and none is earlier than October 1943. The records pertain, therefore, to a period from five to 14 months after the destruction of the ghetto. Obviously, then, there must have been still more Jews in hiding at an earlier point in time.

We know of another 3,500 Jews in 'Aryan' Warsaw. These were people who fell into a Nazi trap, the so-called Hotel Polski affair. In the summer of 1943, the German authorities let the rumour circulate that foreign passports and visas had arrived for Jews who were no longer alive, and that these documents were for sale. The Germans were supposedly interested in exchanging Jews for German prisoners. They accumulated volunteers for this scheme all summer – and then these volunteers were sent to Auschwitz, some directly, some via Vittel, Bergen-Belsen, and other transit camps: 3,500 Jews all together. Only a few dozen survived.¹⁷

Therefore we have accounted for 20,500 Jews in hiding in Warsaw, and we have not yet begun to consider attrition. Throughout this period, Jews were being caught on the Aryan side, one or two dozen a day. Some were betrayed, some were caught in house searches and roundups, some died as a result of ill-health and poor housing conditions. I estimate the total attrition at about 6,500, giving about 27,000 Jews in hiding all told.

We are now almost in a position to answer the second question posed above: what happened to the Jews who did escape? Of the 27,000 Jewish fugitives in Warsaw, 17,000 were still alive 15 months after the destruction of the ghetto, on the eve of the Polish uprising in 1944. Of the 23,500 who were not drawn in by the Hotel Polski scheme, 17,000 survived until then. Of these 17,000, 5,000 died in the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, and about 10,500 were still alive at liberation.

How does this rate of survival compare with that in other countries? First, we have to level the playing-field. The number of final survivors is not useful for comparative purposes, because the 1944 uprising was very costly and no such event happened elsewhere, nor did the Hotel Polski affair. If we therefore consider only those who avoided the Hotel Polski ruse, and suppose that the uprising had not happened, and then project the observed rate of attrition over the 6 months remaining until liberation, then notionally about 14,500 Jews would have survived until liberation, or about 62 per cent of those who fled.

As it happens, there is an excellent standard of comparison, because it is estimated that in the Netherlands, 20–25,000 Jews went into hiding – about the same number as in Warsaw – of whom 10–15,000 survived – again, about the same number. If we take the

mid-point of the two estimates for the Netherlands, that is, 12,500 survivors out of 22,500 in hiding, then the percentage of survivors in Holland will be 56 per cent – actually a bit lower than in Poland. But Holland was also liberated a bit later, and when we account for that, the figures come out almost equal. The conclusion, then, is quite startling: leaving aside acts of war and Nazi perfidy, a Jew's chances of survival in hiding were no worse in Warsaw, at any rate, than in the Netherlands.

To answer the other question – why did so few Jews escape? – we have to look in detail at the sequence of events, and again, I shall restrict myself to Warsaw. The history of the Warsaw Jews during the Second World War can be divided into four main periods: before the formation of the ghetto in 1940; the main ghetto period, from November 1940 until July 1942; the period of the liquidation of the ghetto, from 22 July 1942 until the end of the Ghetto Uprising, and after the destruction of the ghetto, when the only Jews left were those in hiding.

Before the ghetto was closed, there was of course no ghetto to escape from. Flight during this period took the form of escape to the Soviet-occupied zone of Poland, which took place on a very large scale – about 300,000 Polish Jews in total, 20–30,000 from Warsaw. But this is a separate matter. In this first period, there were no obstacles to flight, but as the Jews were not yet faced with annihilation so there was no pressing need to escape. Nor was it yet clear that Stalin's Russia was a healthier place for Jews than Nazi-occupied Poland. Most Jews therefore stayed put.

During the main ghetto period, from November 1940 until July 1942, the Nazis waged economic warfare on the Jews: they tried to starve the ghetto to death. The appropriate response was therefore an economic one, and it came on a very large scale in the form of the smuggling enterprise. This was a bilateral trade, carried on illegally by Poles and Jews. Ringelblum called it 'one of the finest pages in the history between the two peoples in the present war'.¹⁸ And there can be no doubt it kept the ghetto alive: of the 490,000 Jews who passed through the Warsaw ghetto, 80,000 starved to death, and another 60,000 were forced into labour camps where they died in their thousands and ten of thousands; but 350,000 survived in the ghetto until mid-1942, and that was many more than the Nazis had

intended. We can argue about what could or should have been done about the 80,000 or 60,000, but that the 350,000 were saved by smuggling, there is no doubt.

Was smuggling a form of rescue activity, then? Yisrael Gutman says not, that it was a mere commercial enterprise.¹⁹ I should like to engage Professor Gutman in a discussion over this but here I shall restrict myself to two points: first, that paid help is still help – we do not begrudge the surgeon his fee; second, that commercial smuggling was not the only kind of smuggling. There were the celebrated child smugglers, who would not have succeeded if people had not been willing to give them food and money when they begged and, most important, refrained nearly unanimously from turning them over to the police. And there were also people like Chmielewski – a few hundred, perhaps – who maintained contact with their Jewish friends and brought them food, medicine, and other forms of help. Naturally these charitable forms of aid were much smaller in scale than the commercial enterprise, but they have a moral significance beyond mere numbers.

As a result of this ramified activity, the ghetto was still alive in July 1942, and only a few people – I estimate, 5,000, or about one per cent of the ghetto population – had escaped from it. There was no pressing need. The economic challenge had been met with an economic response, and for most people the ghetto had proved survivable. Those who were most at risk in the ghetto – orphans, the destitute, and refugees from other towns – had in any case no prospects on the 'Aryan side': those who had the money and the contacts to contemplate escape also had the money and the contacts to survive within the ghetto. Moreover, escape from the ghetto at this stage solved nothing, only adding the problems of a clandestine existence to all the other problems that Jews faced. Even friendly Poles like Chmielewski dedicated their efforts to helping their friends within the ghetto, rather than to persuading them to escape. Jews regularly crossed the ghetto wall to smuggle, and Irena Polawska reports that she took 'holidays' on the 'Aryan side' with her daughter;²⁰ but the thought of leaving the ghetto for good crossed very few people's minds.

Then came the hammer blow: in less than two months the ghetto was emptied but for 55-60,000 people. Jews were taken from the

Warsaw ghetto at the rate of 6,000 per day (compared with 1,000 per week from the whole of France and a similar number from the Netherlands). These 52 days were the only time when a mass rescue of Jews would, in theory, have been possible. Afterwards, nearly everyone was dead.

But the Nazis were clever. Before they undertook the Great Deportation in the summer of 1942, they took steps to isolate the ghetto: passes were cancelled, the wall was rebuilt to eliminate easy crossings, trams were re-routed to avoid the ghetto, the number of gates was reduced and all non-Jews were forced to leave. On the day the *Aktion* started, the Polish policemen at the ghetto gates were replaced by German *gendarmes*, so that each 'friendly' German policeman now had another, unknown policeman watching him. Thus it became difficult to leave the ghetto. Smuggling stopped and never resumed on the same scale. It was really only towards the end of the period of the Great Deportation that larger numbers of Jews began to escape. In addition, the Germans played divide and conquer: they held out various classes of exemptions, so that people chased after false hopes. The exemptions were cancelled, one by one. Letters were received from friends and relatives who had left on the deportation trains – some perhaps from Jews who had escaped, others from the few who had been taken to labour camps, still others written to dictation in Treblinka. In short, it took the ghetto several weeks to work out what was going on, and until the end many people refused to believe it. Even then, there were plausible alternatives to escape. People who were employed in the German 'shops' and so had 'numbers for life' enjoyed a temporary and precarious security; so did the Jewish police, the Jewish Council, and all the friends and relatives they could protect. In particular, however, the idea of hiding in bunkers within the ghetto took hold, and some 20,000 'wild' Jews were able to evade the deportations in this way. Besides these distractions, there was psychological resistance to leaving the ghetto: people did not want to split up their families, abandon their possessions; they procrastinated. There were numerous practical difficulties: many Jews had no contacts on the 'other side', had no money or felt that they would be conspicuous as Jews because of their appearance or their poor knowledge of Polish. Finally there was fear, though this should not be overplayed. People had been crossing and

re-crossing the ghetto wall for two and a half years to smuggle, conquering their fears, and when the alternative was Treblinka, any risk was worth taking.

People told themselves that one needed friends, money; that one had to be blond and blue-eyed; but these assumptions were rarely put to the test. There were people who escaped without any of these supposedly necessary attributes. Sara Bergazyn says she left the ghetto with 14 *zlotys* in her pocket (less than £2.00 in today's money) and the clothes on her back.²¹ Anna Lanota was given 200 *zlotys* by a friend in the ghetto, who said to her: 'What are you sitting here for? Tomorrow morning ... go to ... Zelazna Street and give these 200 *zlotys* to the German who guards the gate there. He'll either shoot you or let you through.' So she did and he let her through. Then, she says,

I was dazed ... I remember walking along some viaduct ... Some man in a worker's outfit came up to me and asked if I'd escaped from the ghetto. I didn't know about *szmalcowniks* [blackmailers] then, or perhaps it had slipped my mind. I said, yes. To that he said: 'Then come with me, ma'am. After the war we'll need educated people.' ... He lived in two rooms with his wife and children. I lived with them for two weeks.²²

Michael Line got his daughter and fiancée out of the ghetto by walking up to a pair of German soldiers and saying: '*Retten Sie drei Seelen*' ['Save three souls']. The Germans were startled, looked around, and seeing no officers about, one of them said: '*Aber schnell!*' ['But quickly'], and waved them through.²³

Thus spontaneous escape, without advance preparations, was possible, if rare. As to those who had a 'Semitic' appearance, or 'bad looks' as it was called, it was first of all possible to hide in strict seclusion, in an attic or cellar or a special shelter, as Grundland did; secondly, there were not a few Poles with, perhaps, some Jewish ancestor who also looked Jewish. For example the famous lawyer Leon Nowodworski, a notorious anti-Semite, was of Frankist descent and had conspicuously 'Semitic' looks. The Polish police therefore did not carry out German orders to execute Jews on the spot, since they had learned by experience that many of the people they arrested for being Jewish were not. Those who spoke Polish badly could also

get by; for example, by pretending to be deaf-mute. Therefore even though those who did escape were predominantly from the acculturated middle class, there were possibilities for other Jews as well. What would have happened if a mass breakout from the ghetto had been organised in the summer of 1942? Most of the fugitives would have perished, no doubt; but some would have survived. How many, we shall never know.

Once the Great Deportation ended on 12 September, and only 55–60,000 Jews were left in the ghetto – then and only then did the major wave of escapes begin. By this time there were about 11,000 Jews in hiding; another 13,000 escaped after that date.²⁴ The latter is an astonishing number. It means that almost a quarter of the remaining Jews managed to escape: 30 per cent of the women, in fact, and one-sixth of the men.

The Jews who survived the Great Deportation were of course not representative of the whole population. The very young, the very old, and the very poor had perished, and more women than men. Those with influence in the ghetto – contacts with the Jewish Council or ghetto police – and those who worked for German enterprises had survived. So had those who had managed to hide. The assimilated upper and middle class had survived in larger numbers than the unassimilated Jews, but the former group was too small to account by itself for the number of fugitives. Probably most of the surviving assimilated Jews got out of the ghetto, but some of the others did too.

Those who stayed prepared to go into hiding in bunkers within the ghetto, on the theory that the Germans would not liquidate their work-force until the last possible moment; then one could go into hiding for a few weeks, and the war would be over. If this competing and entirely plausible idea had not taken root, perhaps many more people would have escaped. Again, we shall never know.

How many escaped all together, across Poland? Judging from the post-war memoirs, Warsaw accounted for about a quarter of the Jews in hiding in Poland, so that perhaps 100,000 Jews escaped all told, about three per cent of the Jewish population, three times Ringelblum's estimate. In the absence of an organised effort to escape, it is really only this remnant that the Polish population were in a position to rescue.

Three per cent will be a familiar figure: it represents roughly the proportion of Polish Jews who survived the Nazi occupation. Some survived in camps or as partisans, or in 'family camps' in the forests; the rest survived in hiding. The exact numbers are controversial. Some 30,000 Polish Jews survived in labour and concentration camps, of 80,000 who had registered with the Central Committee of Jews in Poland by the end of 1945. A significant number of the remaining 50,000 had been in the forests or in the 'Berling Army', giving estimates of survivors 'on the Aryan side' as low as 30,000 or even 20,000. But on the other hand some Jews had been in the camps as 'Aryans', including several thousand who had hidden in Warsaw until the collapse of the 1944 uprising. Many Jews also did not register in 1945, for example Jewish children adopted by Christian families who often did not learn of their identities until many years later, if at all. It is very hard to guess their numbers, but a total of 50,000 survivors 'on the Aryan side' is not unlikely. Obviously those who survived 'on the Aryan side' made up a vastly greater proportion of those who escaped (about half of them) than those who survived in the camps did of all who were taken there (about one per cent). Escape offered by far the best prospects of survival.

The small number of survivors, therefore, is not a direct result of Polish hostility to the Jews, though the hostility was real enough. The link between Polish anti-Semitism and the fate of the Jews was broken by the ghetto wall. The Jews were deported from the ghettos to the death camps, not by Poles, but by German *gendarmes*, reinforced by Ukrainian and Baltic auxiliaries, and with the enforced co-operation of the ghetto police. Neither the Polish police nor any group of Polish civilians was involved in the deportations to any significant degree, nor did they staff the death camps. Nor did the fate of the Jews who were taken to their deaths depend to any significant degree on the attitudes and actions of a people from whom they were isolated by brick walls and barbed wire. In theory, something could have been done to save those Jews: Rafael Scharf has famously claimed that the Poles would have 'torn up the tracks with their teeth' if their own people had been taken to their deaths. But such thoughts are the product of hindsight. They did not occur to anyone – to Poles or Jews, in Poland or elsewhere – at the time.

It was only those Jews who escaped whose fate was in the hands of the Polish population, and, as we have seen, the rate of survival among these Jews was relatively high, despite adverse conditions. The paradox mentioned at the beginning of this article is therefore resolved: few Jews survived because few Jews escaped, because escape was difficult and the need to escape did not become evident soon enough; there are many 'Righteous Gentiles' in Poland because even the few Jews who did escape were still many in comparison with those who went to ground elsewhere, and because they took a lot of saving.

Had Polish anti-Semitism therefore no influence at all on the Jews' prospects of survival? Of course it did. I am not one of those who would claim that anti-Semitism vanished or even diminished during the war: all the evidence is that it remained strong and perhaps grew stronger. A minority of Poles – including not only fringe elements but also some eminently respectable citizens – embarked on the path of violence and murder, following the Nazi example, with the result that 1,300 Jews were murdered in the first two years after the war. Popular prejudices against the Jews continued to flourish and could be mobilised, as they were during the pogroms in Warsaw in the Spring of 1940 and in the post-war pogroms, notably the one in Kielce.

But these actions were within the normal limits, so to speak, of what the Jews had come to expect in Poland over 800 years of cohabitation: ugly words and sporadic violence, especially in times of crisis and unrest, as during wars and in the wake of wars. But these 800 years were only punctuated by such incidents. 99.9 per cent of Polish Jews never experienced a pogrom, and 99.9 per cent of Poles never took part in one. The norm in Polish-Jewish relations was peaceful, if mistrustful, coexistence and I do not think that things were changed very much by the arrival of the Nazis. The number of people responsible for the post-war murders, the wartime Jew-hunts carried out by peasants and right-wing extremists, the crimes of the blackmailers and others amounted to perhaps a few tens of thousands of people out of a population of tens of millions. If such people had not existed, the number of Jews killed would have been reduced by a few thousand out of three million. The bark of the Polish anti-Semite, in other words, was worse than his bite. If that were not the case,

then it would not have been possible for such a large proportion of the Jews who did escape to survive, or for Poland to head the league table of 'Righteous Gentiles'.

If anti-Semitism did not contribute directly to the death-toll in any significant degree, undoubtedly it did play a role in increasing the atmosphere of terror to which the Jewish fugitives were exposed. This atmosphere inhibited Jews from escaping from the ghettos, induced some to surrender at the Hotel Polski and others to return to the ghetto. The terror showed in the faces of Jews in the street and made them easy prey for the blackmailers and police. Anti-Semitism allowed blackmailers, police agents and others to square their anti-Jewish actions or their collaboration with their consciences, and even to persuade themselves that they were acting in the national interest and with popular support. Anti-Semitism confused otherwise good people, and left them in doubt as to where their duty lay: the resulting paralysis allowed the Jew-hunters to carry out their work at will. Anti-Semitism, linked as it was with nationalism, caused Poles to feel greater solidarity with fellow Poles, even when they committed crimes against Jews, than with the Jews who were the victims of these crimes, so that few of the perpetrators were ever brought to justice. Finally, the acts of a few thousand criminals, though hardly noticeable to the Poles, could do serious damage to a small and vulnerable minority. Every nation, of course, has its bigots, extremists and criminals, but it is the responsibility of every nation's political and moral leaders to protect its citizens from such elements. In Poland anti-Semitism ensured that when it came to the Jews, protection was sporadic, half-hearted, and often absent.

The Catholic Church is a case in point. Its wartime record is on the whole a good one: Catholic convents and orphanages harboured a few thousand Jewish children – not many, but nearly every Catholic institution looked after a few. It must be remembered that these facilities were already strained by the human refuse of the worst war in the nation's history, and that the Church itself was persecuted and oppressed. Catholic priests co-operated in providing forged birth and baptismal certificates and altering parish records, the Catholic charity, Caritas, provided relief to the Warsaw ghetto (though the Jewish Council had to pay for it), and, in the celebrated case of Mgr Marcelli Godlewski of All Saints' Church, helped smuggle Jews out of

the ghetto. Now and again one hears of Catholic priests preaching sermons exhorting the faithful to extend charity to all persons regardless of faith, and such sermons could have a real and positive effect: Rabbi Shimon Huberband, for example, describes how villagers near the Ponary labour camp, in which he toiled, would bring food and clothing to the inmates under the influence of the local priest. Regrettably, such instances were few. Catholic activists were prominent in *Zegota*. Zofia Kossak-Szczucka was the organisation's co-founder, and Wladyslaw Bartoszewski and Witold Bienkowski sat on its governing council, all three representatives of the (Catholic) Front for the Rebirth of Poland.

On the other hand, the Catholic Right kept up its barrage of anti-Semitic propaganda. For example, an underground newspaper printed the following:

... the Jews fed parasitically on the body of the nations of Europe, universally hated and despised. They fought against everyone, but only underhandedly, never openly, never with weapons in their hands. They were the cause, the motor of three-quarters of the wars fought in Europe ..., but they most diligently erased the traces of their influence.²⁵

Was this a newspaper of the far Right, of some fascist organisation? Not at all. It was *Prawda Mlodych*, the youth organ of the Front of the Rebirth of Poland, edited by Bartoszewski and most of whose material was written by Kossak-Szczucka. Both are 'Righteous Gentiles'.

These were the ideas, then, that even some of the best Polish Catholics continued to drum into the heads of the young. The much larger National Party, Catholic and nationalist to the core, refused to participate in *Zegota*, opposed its foundation and was unremitting in its anti-Semitic propaganda throughout the war. The Church itself assisted directly in poisoning the atmosphere, through the preaching of traditional anti-Semitic sermons, especially on Good Friday, and contributed even to the killing: the police could find Catholic priests who were prepared to rule on the religious knowledge of a suspected Jew, knowing the consequences of an adverse ruling. Individual churchmen could do still worse: Elkana Ahlen, a dental technician who served a seminary before the war, says he was blackmailed and betrayed by one of the seminarians.²⁶

The fault of the Catholic church lay less in its wartime record, however, than in the effects of its long-time preaching against the Jews. Michael Zylberberg recounts that he and his wife were being hidden by a very poor family, which despite its poverty refused all payment for keeping them. One day, however, his landlady told Zylberberg that she intended to confess to her priest the 'sin' of hiding Jews. She would not be talked out of this plan. When she came back from church, to the nervously awaiting Zylberbergs, she was 'overjoyed', says Zylberberg, because the priest had told her she was doing a fine and noble thing.²⁷ This incident shows the Catholic church at its best; but we also see that a good woman, with all her Catholic instincts for charity and self-sacrifice, was so confused by the teachings of the Church that she believed that she was committing a sin. Many a priest agreed; many less good people were led astray. In short, the Catholic church, which by its own lights should have been unambiguously a force for good in that time of darkness, was in fact a force for evil as well. It will not do for the Church's apologists to claim that crimes against the Jews were the work of 'bad Catholics': many very good Catholics made their contribution too.

Having resolved one paradox, then, we are led straight to another: the strange cohabitation of Christian charity with Christian hatred of Jews, sometimes in the same person. The following are some characteristic stories. A woman sees the smoke of the burning ghetto drifting past the window, and says: 'it's good to see those Jewish bedbugs burning up' – while serving dinner to a Jewish couple for whom she is knowingly risking her life.²⁸ George Pfeffer escapes from Majdanek, and goes to an acquaintance in Lublin to ask for help. The man says to him: 'if God himself won't help your people, what do you expect me to do?' But then he gives him clothes and some money, the first small act of help that starts Pfeffer on the road to survival.²⁹ What can we make of such cases, which are very frequent in the memoir literature, or of Kossak-Szczucka and other prominent cases: the anti-Semitic 'Righteous Gentiles'? Kossak-Szczucka's motives were openly proselytical: '[Our] help cannot be limited only to material succour. At the same time spiritual help must keep pace. [...] by teaching the Jews that if they thirst for it deeply enough they can be saved from the face of death by aspiring to baptism and the true faith.'³⁰

Other Poles saw in the Holocaust the proof of nationalist propositions about the Germans: it was evidence of Teutonic barbarism and neo-paganism; by treating even the Jews decently, the Poles proved to themselves their own superiority in the face of Nazi contempt. Still others, less philosophically inclined, simply kept their beliefs in separate compartments: one set of beliefs pertained to the abstract Jew, and a different set to the actual Jew, who was always an exception to the rule. The Jews in general might be avaricious, unscrupulous, and morally depraved, but 'Yankel the tailor' and 'Dr Rosenberg next door' were different. Sometimes one's 'own' Jews were the object of an odd sort of local pride: 'Sure, they're Yids. But they're *Warsaw* Yids.'³¹

For a Jew to find salvation in an anti-Semitic country, he needed to break through the social barriers and somehow be seen as a human being and not as a Jew. Leon Guz describes such a moment of enlightenment. He had been employed in a labour camp near Minsk Mazowiecki, under a 'crude and brutal' Polish foreman named Stanislaw Koperek, who, it turned out, was also the area commander for the fascist NSZ underground. Guz evaded deportation by hiding in a wood-pile in the camp, and then, having nowhere else to turn, approached Koperek for help:

He was greatly astonished to see me. He stared at me, saying nothing. I began to be frightened. At last I asked him to get me something to eat. He remained silent. This was a bad sign. I looked terrible, like a ghost. At a certain moment, I noticed that Mr Koperek was moved by this meeting. His expression changed, softened. He immediately expressed willingness to help me.³²

Koperek subsequently brought Guz food and water in his hiding-place, carried messages, and arranged for him to be reunited with his wife.

It must not be taken, of course, that the whole of Polish society was anti-Semitic or that the majority of those who helped Jews first had to overcome their antipathy. A healthy proportion of the population – in Warsaw, about 40 per cent – voted for parties that were ideologically opposed to anti-Semitism, especially the Socialist PPS. Naturally not all those who voted for the PPS shared its views

about Jews; on the other hand, the same can be said about supporters of the National Party or the governing *Sanacja*. Most Poles believed in various stereotypes and misconceptions about Jews, but this did not necessarily imply malice. Since anti-Semitism in some degree was a cultural norm – shared to an extent even by assimilated Jews – it was not necessarily associated with the same pathological personality types to which we tend to ascribe it today. A Jew who knocked on a random door and asked for help could meet with one of three responses: he could be taken in, turned in, or turned away; and, contrary to the almost universal perception (or rather assumption) of Jews at the time, the second of these responses was by far the least likely.

Rescue, let me reiterate, was rarely due to a single action or a single person. Rather, the survival of a Jew in hiding depended on repeated acts of assistance, large and small, over an extended period of time. Nearly every Jew who was rescued was rescued by the co-operative efforts of a dozen or more people. Even Jews who seemed entirely self-sufficient, living ‘on the surface’ under the protection of forged documents, still needed help to escape from the ghetto and acquire the documents, find a place to live and a source of income, and often emergency shelter if their *melinas* became ‘burnt’; furthermore their landlords often knew or guessed their identity, and they were victimised by blackmailers to the same extent as other Jews. Whether he lived ‘on’ or ‘under’ the surface, a single act of betrayal was enough to kill a Jew, but a single act of assistance was not enough to save him. As ‘Antek’ Zuckerman put it, albeit with some rhetorical exaggeration: ‘one swine could betray a hundred Jews to the Germans. But to save one Jew, you needed the participation of a hundred Poles.’³³

I should judge the ratios somewhat differently: the 27,000 Jews in hiding in Warsaw relied on about 50–60,000 people who provided hiding-places and another 20–30,000 who provided other forms of help; on the other hand, blackmailers, police agents, and other actively anti-Jewish elements numbered perhaps 2–3,000, each striking at two or three victims a month. In other words, helpers outnumbered hunters by about 20 or 30 to one. The active helpers of Jews thus made up seven to nine per cent of the population of Warsaw; the Jews themselves, 2.7 per cent; the hunters, perhaps 0.3

per cent; and the whole network – Jews, helpers and hunters – constituted a secret city of at least 100,000 people: one tenth of the people of Warsaw; more than twice as many as the 40,000 members of the vaunted Polish military underground, the AK.

Could more Jews have escaped? The housing conditions in occupied Warsaw were difficult, and as it is, the city took in a larger number of Jewish refugees than most neutral countries did throughout the war: the 27,000 Jews in hiding therefore probably represented close to the saturation point. For that reason among others, Jewish activists had difficulty in finding places for 70 ghetto fighters who escaped at the end of the Ghetto Uprising. On the other hand, an organised effort could have placed Jews elsewhere in Poland, and organised efforts in other cities might have allowed them to rescue proportionally similar numbers of Jews. If the rest of the country had matched the effort made by Warsaw, perhaps one-tenth of the Polish Jews might have been saved. This is entirely a theoretical possibility, however, and does not take into account the many factors that distinguished the capital from the rest of the country. Among other things, there was the central location of the ghetto and the relative porousness of its walls, the size and strength of the Polish underground in Warsaw, the city's role as the country's intellectual centre and also as the centre of Jewish assimilationism. In any case, comparisons are inappropriate until detailed studies of other centres are available. The Polish underground could certainly have done more: it might have sprung into action during the crucial 52 days in Warsaw, for example, if it had not been disabled by indifference towards a population it regarded as alien. *Zegota* might have received more support from the underground, but as Bartoszeski admits, 'we were not [its] darling child'.³⁴ More could have been done to combat the blackmailers, although the available evidence suggests that information about such people was hard to find: Berman's archive contains a file on blackmailers, but in it are only a dozen or so cases, and in only two or three is there enough information to support a prosecution. The war on blackmailers, such as it was, was really part of the war against police spies in the Polish underground: most of the evidence about them was obtained from the files of the Criminal Police (*Kripo*), which the Polish underground had infiltrated, and most of the blackmailers who were executed were guilty of other

crimes as well. The war against *Kripo* agents was undertaken quite late in the day – the Civil Courts were not established until the end of 1942, and the first sentences were carried out in January 1943 – so that the fact that the first execution of a blackmailer did not take place until July 1943 is not especially remarkable. The main service of the civil underground was to provide forged documents to Jews in hiding and a certain amount of money; but very little was done to create secure housing and almost nothing to help Jews escape.

On the other hand, it has to be added that the Jewish underground also did not distinguish itself. During the 52 crucial days in Warsaw, when it would have been possible to organise escape on a large scale, we find that this idea did not occur to anyone on either side of the ghetto wall. Likewise, Yisrael Gutman has proposed all sorts of things that the Polish underground could have or should have done, such as blowing up the railway tracks to Treblinka or attacking the death camps themselves: those are all fine ideas, but they are the product of hindsight. Again we do not see Jewish groups at the time asking, much less demanding, that the Polish underground do such things, or complaining that they were not done. If organised help for the Jews came into being only late in the day, at the end of 1942, the same can be said of preparations for armed resistance in the ghetto: the Jewish organisations, the Jewish National Committee, Jewish Co-ordinating Committee, and the Jewish Combat Organisation, came into existence as part of the preparations for armed resistance, and got involved in rescue only as an afterthought. As for the Hotel Polski affair, it is a misconception to think that Jews went there in desperation because they had no way to survive on the 'Aryan side'. That was true of the few hundred so-called 'wild' Jews, but most of those who volunteered for the scheme were well-connected and well-heeled, and often gave up secure *melinas* and paid large sums to participate in the scheme. Some of the Jewish leadership fell for it, especially David Guzik, head of the 'Joint' in Warsaw, and became its enthusiastic promoters. Here is yet another enigma: after all that had happened, after Treblinka, after the destruction of the ghetto, after German intentions were known to everyone: why did so many Jews, given a choice between trusting the Poles and trusting the Germans, choose to trust the Germans?

By way of summary, the rescue of Jews in Poland was difficult and dangerous, and one has to keep in mind the fundamental fact that a single act of betrayal could mean death, but that a single act of assistance did not ensure survival. To be rescued, Jews usually had to take the initiative, and then count on many small acts of help rather than a few big ones. The magnitude of these efforts on behalf of the Jews is insufficiently appreciated, and is not reflected in the statistics on 'Righteous Gentiles', who are only the tip of the iceberg.

Help began with feeding the ghetto, which in Warsaw kept 350,000 Jews alive for two and a half years, and later took the form of helping to arrange escapes, forging documents, providing *melinas* – down to minor acts of help that I would call 'passive protectiveness'. For example, Anna Lanota recounts that her cousin, while riding on a tram, was spotted by a former university colleague, who immediately shouted at the top of his voice: 'She's a Jewess – catch the Jewess!' Lanota's cousin, who was lame, got off at the next stop and mingled with the crowd as best she could, as this man kept running after her shouting 'catch the Jewess!'³⁵ But nobody caught her. If it were not for the fact that most people passively ignored such provocation, did not turn the child smugglers over to the police, did not report Jews that they spotted on the street, very few Jews would have run the gauntlet and survived.

How many people in Poland rescued Jews? Of those that meet Yad Vashem's criteria – perhaps 100,000. Of those that offered minor forms of help – perhaps two or three times as many. Of those who were passively protective – undoubtedly the majority of the population. All these acts, great and small, were necessary to rescue Jews in Poland.

NOTES

1. Memoirs of Tadeusz Grundland, Archiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego (AŻIH) 301/5544.
2. See the article by Mordecai Paldiel in this issue of *The Journal of Holocaust Education*.
3. Supporting letter to the memoirs of Stanisław Chmielewski (AŻIH) 301/5815.
4. Memoirs of Stanisław Chmielewski (AŻIH) 301/5815, p.4.
5. Private correspondence with Dr Mordecai Paldiel, Yad Vashem.
6. Emmanuel Ringelblum, *Polish-Jewish Relations During the Second World War* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1976), p.247.
7. Teresa Prekerowa, 'The "Just" and the "Passive"' in Antony Polonsky (ed.), *My*

- Brother's Keeper? Recent Polish Debates on the Holocaust* (London: Routledge, 1990), p.73.
8. Yisrael Gutman, *The Jews of Warsaw* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), p.26.
 9. Helena Szereszewska, *Krzyż i Mezuza* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1993), p.300.
 10. Stephan Chaskielewicz, *Ukrywałem się w Warszawie* (Krakow: Znak, 1988), p.88.
 11. Yisrael Gutman and Shmuel Krakowski, *Unequal Victims* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1986), p.196.
 12. Janina Bauman, *Winter in the Morning* (New York: Free Press, 1986).
 13. Abraham Shulman, *The Case of the Hotel Polski* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1982), p.22.
 14. Ringelblum, *Polish-Jewish Relations*, p.246.
 15. Adolf Berman, 'Ha-yehudim b'tsad ha-ari' in *Entsiklopedia shel galuot*, Vol. 7 (Varshe), p.686.
 16. Teresa Prekerowa, 'Komórka "Felicji": Nieznane archiwum działaczy Rady Pomocy Żydom w Warszawie', *Rocznik Warszawski* XV (1979); reproduced in Prekerowa, *Konspiracyjna Rada Pomocy Żydom w Warszawie 1842–1945* (Warsaw: PIW, 1982).
 17. Nathan Eck, 'The Rescue of Jews with Aid of Passports and Citizenship Papers of Latin American States' *Yad Vashem Studies* 1 (1957), pp.125–52. Also Shulman, *The Case of the Hotel Polski*.
 18. Ringelblum, *Polish-Jewish Relations*, p.86.
 19. Yisrael Gutman, *The Jews of Warsaw 1939–1943* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), p.70.
 20. AŻIH 301/5211.
 21. AŻIH 301/5681.
 22. Chaskielewicz, *Ukrywałem się w Warszawie*, p.135.
 23. Euginia Szajn-Lewin, *W getcie warszawskim* (Poznan: Wydawnictwo a5, 1989), pp.57–8.
 24. G.S. Paulsson, 'Hiding in Warsaw: The Jews on the 'Aryan Side' in the Polish Capital, 1940–1945' (University of Oxford PhD thesis, 1998), p.66.
 25. *Prawda Młodych*, April–May 1943, in Pawel Szapiro (ed.), *Wojna żydowsko-niemiecka* (London: Aneks, 1992), p.218.
 26. AŻIH 301/5882.
 27. M. Zulberg, *A Warsaw Diary 1939–1945* (London: Vallentine Mitchell), p.88.
 28. Barbara Engelking, *Zagłada i pamięć* (Warsaw: IFiS, 1994), p.56. Jerzy Tomaszewski believes that the expression 'Jewish bedbugs' refers literally to the bedbugs which infested the city, and which were thought to breed in the ghetto. But this does little to mitigate such remarks.
 29. Yad Vashem Archive O33-1418.
 30. Szapiro, *Wojna żydowsko-niemiecka*, pp.218–19.
 31. *Ibid.*, p.217.
 32. Leon Guz, *Ulica Targowa 64* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1990), p.105.
 33. Quoted in Polonsky, *My Brother's Keeper?*, pp.148–9.
 34. *Ibid.*, p.232.
 35. Chaskielewicz, p.138.