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Author(s): R. Geoffrey Jensen

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R. Geoffrey Jensen

## José Millán-Astray and the Nationalist 'Crusade' in Spain

**The encounter in Salamanca** on 12 October 1936 between Miguel de Unamuno, the renowned Spanish writer and philosopher, and José Millán-Astray Terreros, 'El Glorioso Mutilado' who founded the Spanish Foreign Legion, has become almost legendary. Although the details of the incident remain somewhat obscure, most accounts agree that only the intervention of General Francisco Franco's wife prevented the one-eyed, one-armed Millán-Astray — who was shouting 'Long Live Death!' and 'Death to Intellectuals!' — from striking the elderly poet.

Unamuno had welcomed the military rising orchestrated by Franco, Emilio Mola, Millán-Astray and other leading military figures in July of 1936, hoping that it would end the violence and disorder pervading much of Spanish society. Moreover, the rebels' proclaimed intent to 'unify' Spain under the Catholic and Castilian banner had undoubtedly appealed to Unamuno. He, along with Angel Ganivet and many other intellectuals associated with the 'generation of '98', believed that only a regenerated Spain based on Castilian history and values could rise and reclaim its status as a great country. In fact, this specious concept of a 'Castilian' Spain had attained a truly mystical quality in their writings.<sup>1</sup> The depths to which Spain had fallen since the days of Philip II had become painfully clear to them when their country lost the last remnants of its empire to the United States in 1898. The apparent impotence of the Republican government in the face of growing social and political disorder had led Unamuno to lose hope in the democratic path to Spanish 'recovery'; he thus supported the rebellious generals' pronounced desire to unify Spain's diverse elements and interests.

Yet, as the encounter with Millán-Astray would make clear, the rebels acted on the basis of perceptions and goals that differed considerably from those of Unamuno. The incident took place on the

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Día de la Raza, honouring Columbus's discovery and the subsequent growth of the Spanish Empire, during a ceremony at the University of Salamanca, where Unamuno was rector. Millán-Astray, who routinely delivered speeches characterized by an appeal to irrational fury and punctuated by Legion slogans such as 'Long Live Death!', spoke on the war against the Republic. Unamuno, rejecting Millán-Astray's violent, sweeping condemnation of the Republic's defenders, rose and sharply criticized the general's words. The rebels, Unamuno said, would need to learn to convince (*convencer*) as well as conquer (*vencer*). His assertion prompted the legionnaire's violent outburst, and it also brought about the poet's immediate dismissal as rector. Two months later, living under virtual house arrest, Unamuno died.

After the war, Francoist writers attempted to discount the philosophical and political differences that separated the two Spaniards and to place them together under the 'Nationalist' banner, but even such partisan observers could not deny that the incident of 12 October had taken place.<sup>2</sup> As the exiled Spaniard Arturo Barea later wrote, 'Regardless of the exact details of the discourses and shouts, the essential truth remains that in that large lecture hall in Salamanca the old, fanatical general represented brute force and death, and Don Miguel de Unamuno free intellect and life.'<sup>3</sup>

Interestingly, scholars have since left the figure of Millán-Astray largely unexamined.<sup>4</sup> Of course, he hardly deserves to be classified with Spanish intellectuals like Unamuno. But the thoughts behind his actions were not as simplistic as one might think, and many of the actions themselves had important consequences. As we will see, aspects of Japanese philosophy appealed to him, and he employed Bushido tenets quite successfully in the creation and management of the Tercio, or Spanish Foreign Legion. Like many other important Spanish soldiers, he had found himself at odds with the Republic proclaimed in 1931, and he was one of the generals most actively involved in the planning of the July revolt five years later. Shortly thereafter he headed the rebels' press and propaganda organization, which, according to some reports, he had founded with a friend's donation of 75 pesetas.<sup>5</sup> During the war, the Tercio fought effectively for the Nationalists, and at the same time Millán-Astray's political notions developed from the basic principles he had employed as commander of the Foreign Legion into an elaborate if flawed justification for the so-called 'crusade' against the Republic. His writings, which achieved prominence after Franco's victory as part of the new regime's propaganda front, shed light on an important

ideological pillar that helped sustain the Generalissimo's power until his death in 1975.

A Galician like his colleague Franco, Millán-Astray was born in 1879 in La Coruña. His father first made the name Millán-Astray well-known within certain circles in Spain. The elder Millán served at different times as head of most of the penal colonies on the peninsula and in Havana, superintendent of the 'model' prison of Madrid, secretary-general for the civil governor of western Cuba and chief of police in Madrid and Barcelona, as well as editing *El Día* and writing a two-volume autobiography.<sup>6</sup> At the age of fifteen, his son began his military career as a student at the Infantry Academy, and a year and a half later the younger Millán-Astray was appointed second lieutenant. In late 1896, he began a tour of duty in the Philippines, where he earned several decorations for his performance in combat. The following year he returned to the peninsula, where he enrolled in the Superior War College (*Escuela Superior de Guerra*). When he had completed his course of study there, he chose to become a *diplomado*, thereby joining a privileged group within the Spanish military establishment. At that time, graduates of the Superior War College could choose to return to their corps of origin as *diplomados* or enter the Staff Corps. Faced with the conflict of ambition versus corps loyalty, Millán-Astray apparently viewed becoming a *diplomado* as the most attractive option, as did many fellow War College graduates. After a year-long stint as an instructor at the Infantry Academy in Toledo, he saw action in Africa, arriving in Melilla in 1912.<sup>7</sup> With the creation of the Spanish Foreign Legion eight years later, Millán-Astray would become one of twentieth-century Spain's most important military figures.

On 14 May 1920 Millán-Astray, having attained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, presented the results of the study of the French Foreign Legion that he had undertaken in Algeria on behalf of the Spanish armed forces. The text of his presentation, which he delivered at the Army and Navy headquarters in Madrid, indicated that he would follow the French example as he perceived it quite closely when leading the Tercio.

Although his presentation focused on the technical and organizational aspects of the French Foreign Legion, it also stressed the

Legion's function as a melting-pot in which various elements from different societies came together to form an effective fighting machine. He viewed the body as 'a mixture of men of distinct races who all contribute their virtues and vices, some of which are immense, at the hour of heroic fulfillment of duty'. He spoke of the Legion's 'primary position among all the regiments of the allied armies' during the first world war, and he noted that its ranks included many Spaniards.<sup>8</sup> In the French Foreign Legion, loyalty to the Legion itself superseded all other obligations and affections, he claimed. This notion of the Legion as a unifying force that eliminated differences between men and served as the object of their deepest affection would come to play a fundamental role in Millán-Astray's thinking.

His report on the French force apparently made a favourable impression on his superiors, and recruitment for the Spanish Legion began three months later. The General Staff had previously concluded a study on the formation of a fighting force based on the French model, and on 28 January 1920 the king had issued a Royal Order creating the 'Tercio de Extranjeros', or Spanish Foreign Legion. But recruitment had been delayed by opposition from General Silvestre in Melilla and by the protests of the *Juntas de Defensa*. The members of the *Juntas*, syndicates formed by junior officers on the peninsula to oppose merit promotions, feared the creation of 'élite' units. Silvestre based his opposition on the belief that Spain ought to use Spanish conscripts in its war efforts. His reluctance to use non-Spanish soldiers made little sense. Other European countries had learned by the late nineteenth century to use only volunteers in their colonial armies, and the *Regulares*, shock troops composed in part of North Africans, had served Spain in Morocco since 1911. Millán-Astray and Franco, at least, clearly grasped the benefits of sacrificing only foreigners and the members of Spanish society's lower strata in war.<sup>9</sup> Opponents of the Tercio also feared the possible 'revolutionary nature' of the recruits, warning that the creation of the Legion might prove 'equivalent to the introduction of Bolshevik germs, officially and at the cost of the state', and they noted that budgetary and legal constraints posed serious obstacles.<sup>10</sup> But on 31 August 1920, after Millán-Astray had delivered his presentation, War Minister Viscount Eza finally authorized recruitment for the Tercio.

The Spanish military press, which reflected the political outlook of its readership fairly accurately,<sup>11</sup> greeted the new corps with varying degrees of enthusiasm. *Ejército y Armada*, the primary daily repre-

senting the interests of non-commissioned officers, reacted to Eza's announcement quite positively. Although it neglected to comment on the man chosen to run the Tercio, it accepted his plans as promoted by the government at face value. The legionnaires 'will wear a snappy uniform, and they will be provided with healthy and abundant nourishment', readers learned. The paper also noted that when the French Foreign Legion had been created ninety years before, one of its first three battalions had been composed entirely of Spaniards. Interestingly, *La Correspondencia Militar*, a paper for regular officers that printed five daily editions, had little to say about the Tercio. Although its editors — like those of all the military papers surveyed here — used a considerable amount of space to print the text of the decree creating the Legion and describing its organization, they chose not to comment on the significance of the new unit. Such apparent indifference is not too surprising, however, given the paper's focus. Despite its readership of regular officers, it tended to sympathize with the discontented junior officers, whose interests lay squarely on the peninsula. The other major daily aimed at regular officers, however, responded to the birth of the Tercio with greater enthusiasm. Although *El Ejército Español*, which boasted three daily editions, ran a rather sceptical editorial regarding the new corps' chances of success several days before Eza announced the recruiting drive, the newspaper adopted a considerably more positive attitude when it learned who would lead the organization. The choice of Millán-Astray was 'a sure stroke by the minister', readers learned. 'With his enthusiasm, his exceptional military qualities, and the prestige he enjoys in the Army, Señor Millán [Astray] Terreros guarantees that the Foreign Legion will be well organized and well commanded. We give him our most cordial felicitation.'<sup>12</sup> The commander of the Tercio, it seems, had already distinguished himself among the Spanish officers.

Millán's organization soon demonstrated its efficacy in combat, playing a key role in the capture of Xauen in October 1921 and in all the important operations in the Jibala that followed.<sup>13</sup> Silvestre's continued opposition to the Tercio had prevented its deployment in the Melilla area, which meant that the Legion played no direct role in the 'disaster' at Anual in July of that year. Conveniently, Millán-Astray thereby found himself detached from the ensuing conflict regarding 'responsibilities' for the débâcle.

The Tercio's military successes increased its founder's popularity in Spain, but his political activities there first made him a truly public

figure. In March 1922 the *Juntas de Defensa*, now exercising considerable political power, reaffirmed the principles of compulsory unionization and opposition to all merit promotions. They enforced their will by insisting on the renunciation of all merit promotions awarded after 30 April 1921; those who refused to act accordingly would have to leave the Corps. Not surprisingly, a large group of *africanistas* responded by resigning collectively. Millán-Astray and Franco announced their decisions in letters, marked by a strongly self-righteous and morally indignant tone, which were widely reprinted in the Spanish press. The government felt the ensuing public pressure and, on 20 July 1922, Congress passed a bill restoring merit promotions to the executive branch.<sup>14</sup>

The public debate surrounding the issue of merit promotions failed to disappear, however, and Millán-Astray continued to play a part in it. When King Alfonso XIII demonstrated his support for the *africanistas* in October 1922 by sponsoring a ceremony on their behalf in Seville, Millán-Astray attracted attention by collecting money from his men in order to buy the queen a jewel. In November he publicly resigned again, issuing a dramatic manifesto. He sent copies of the manifesto, including reproductions of his correspondence with Prime Minister José Sánchez Guerra and leading *junteros*, to Spain's civilian and military newspapers. In one of the letters to Sánchez, dated 15 September 1922, he claimed to be acting only in accordance with 'the ideals that dictate my military life: love for discipline, loyalty to the Throne, and faith in the higher designs of the Fatherland'. His actions yielded a massive outpouring of public support. *El Heraldo de Madrid*, which normally covered its front page with four or more separate articles, greeted its readers on 10 November with a banner headline announcing Millán-Astray's decision and devoted the entire page to the news. The following day the paper described him as a soldier 'of manly vigour, gallantry, indomitable will, courage, and the push that brings victory on the battlefield', words of the sort that Millán-Astray would later use to describe himself and his men.<sup>15</sup>

In Madrid, Barcelona and elsewhere in Spain, students reacted to the news of the resignation by demonstrating in support of Millán-Astray and against the *junteros*. On 11 November, a reported 3,000 students gathered in front of his Madrid residence in a show of support for the legionnaire, and three days later security forces shot and severely wounded several student demonstrators.<sup>16</sup> Four days later, however, Sánchez Guerra reasserted his authority by

introducing a bill dissolving the *Juntas*. The bill's popularity assured its swift passage, and Sánchez simultaneously acted to demonstrate the primacy of civilian government over military interests by dismissing Millán-Astray as head of the Tercio. The legionnaire would not be reinstated until General Miguel Primo de Rivera established his dictatorship in September 1923.

Yet Spain would continue to feel the ramifications of the controversy that had led to Millán-Astray's dismissal. He had generated, of course, a considerable amount of support for the *africanistas* on a political level. But more importantly, he had promoted the ideal of the patriotic and unselfish Spanish soldier who sacrificed everything for his fatherland. Millán-Astray now saw himself as both a martyr and a crusader, and he had already endeavoured to disseminate his outlook.

After his dismissal, Millán-Astray found the time to write *La Legión*, which he completed in March 1923.<sup>17</sup> His relative uninterest in publishing contrasted sharply with the attitude of most of his colleagues, especially those who had become public figures. General Ricardo Burguete, an early twentieth-century public figure in Spain and the author of many books himself, wrote that the Spanish military literature of his day was already 'as copious as the Persians' arrows'.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, one year later, publishing became an officially recognized method for winning promotion, and top army officials frequently ordered the writing of accounts of important campaigns or other military affairs. In her study of the ramifications of the Spanish campaigns in Morocco between 1909 and 1914, Andrée Bachoud notes that a deterioration in style and poor organization often characterized the works of Spanish soldiers — 'as if the author had been more interested in adding up pages than in expressing a new point of view'.<sup>19</sup> Millán-Astray, however, obviously did not write *La Legión* in order to improve his chances of winning promotion. Although he undoubtedly hoped to generate positive publicity for his accomplishments as founder and commander of the Tercio, he might never have completed such a lengthy work had his dismissal not afforded him more free time. During the rest of his life — even when he served Franco as propaganda chief — he limited himself to writing short discourses and prefaces for books by others. *La Legión*, written in the form of a handbook, thus provides us with a unique opportunity to analyse his thoughts on politics and war during a key period in his career.



An especially morbid and apocalyptic tone characterized Millán-Astray's portrayal of war, and he presented life and death on a personal level in similar terms. The prominent role death played in his thinking stands out as perhaps the most striking aspect of *La Legión*; its author clearly believed he could create the most effective fighting force by using an exalted vision of death as a spiritual pillar. 'To die in combat is the highest honour', the 'Legionnaire's Creed' proclaimed. 'You only die once. Death comes without pain, and to die is not as horrible as it appears. More horrible is to live as a coward.' The Tercio's motto, Millán-Astray wrote, consisted of the phrases 'Legionnaires, to fight; Legionnaires, to die', which the men cried out to the sound of a bugle. When officers called out for 'volunteers to die', their men customarily responded by shouting 'everyone!' in unison. Millán-Astray also referred to the Tercio's most popular hymn as 'the wedding march of the soldier who betroths death', and the soldiers called themselves 'the bridegrooms of death'.<sup>20</sup>

Of course, the men of Millán-Astray's Tercio were hardly the first soldiers to incorporate such a conception of death into their thinking and actions. Elsewhere in Europe, regiments had previously called themselves 'Hussars of Death', and Spain had hosted the cavalry order Hunters of Lusitania, which had featured a skull and bones on its shield and taken the name 'Dragoons of Death' during the eighteenth century. Moreover, the Spanish Infantry Academy's hymn, composed in 1909, included the following stanza: 'And in order to see you frightened and honoured/ Your sons happily go to their deaths.'<sup>21</sup> Franco, whose book on the Tercio appeared in 1922, shared at least partially this vision of a soldier's intimate relationship with death. As commander of the Tercio's first battalion, and as the designer of the Legion uniform, he worked closely with Millán-Astray. And despite the considerable differences in form between the two *africanistas*' works — Franco's book is comprised primarily of narrative accounts of battles to which he added a dose of anti-*Junta* sentiment — both highlighted the notion of 'glorious' death in battle.<sup>22</sup>

Gabriel Cardona writes that this 'mythification of the feeling of death' (*mitificación del sentido de la muerte*) culminated in Africa with the founding of the Tercio, and he rightly points out that it shaped the outlook of all the rebellious generals in 1936. Moreover, Carlos Blanco Escolá has demonstrated how the system of values and mindset fostered in the Legion came to dominate the Academia General Militar after it was re-established under Franco's leadership

in 1928. According to Cardona, 'The mentality of these officers was shaped during this very long colonial war, which lasted from 1909 until 1927.' It was

War without great manoeuvres and spectacular advances, with great hardship and cruelty. With the anguish of thirst, heat, and the guerrilla tactics of the enemy. With the cruel characteristics of war in the Rif: torment, assassination, the castration of prisoners . . . .<sup>23</sup>

Yet Cardona's description fails to illustrate how far Millán-Astray's vision of death advanced beyond that of his colleagues. The hardships in Morocco that Cardona so aptly describes did indeed create a shared mentality and common feeling of martyrdom, as Franco's book demonstrated. But the mythical conception of death in war did not 'culminate' with the founding of the Tercio, as Cardona asserts. Instead, it was then that Millán-Astray began to add a new dimension to the vision. For Franco and most of his colleagues, death in battle may have represented the supreme sacrifice and war a most noble cause, but in the eyes of Millán-Astray the concepts were already attaining much stronger religious overtones. As we will see, Millán-Astray even referred to the Tercio as a 'religion' in itself, and he viewed death in battle as 'holy sacrifice' and one of his faith's 'foundations'.<sup>24</sup> Other soldiers would come to share his visions, and their outlooks would prove important in shaping Spain's future. Although political beliefs undoubtedly explained many rebelling soldiers' actions in 1936 and thereafter, another set of fundamental values and beliefs — based on the perceived apocalyptic and purifying nature of war — may have propelled many of the rebels to continue the struggle in spite of the magnitude of their initial failures.

After all, although the rebels of 1936 had expected that they might fail in Madrid, they were hardly prepared to see their efforts meet defeat in three-fifths of the country. In order to generate support for the long, difficult struggle, Franco and his colleagues thus turned to the Falangist movement, which they had previously ignored. The Falange offered the ideological and political basis they needed in order to appeal to the masses, as they quickly realized. But few of the generals themselves adopted a truly Falangist outlook during the war or thereafter. The rebel leaders, and most likely a good portion of the rest of the orthodox right, therefore needed 'a *mystique* adequate to sustain a civil war'.<sup>25</sup>

In fact, for many of the rebels, the concepts of war and death as developed in Spanish Morocco undoubtedly served as the starting-

point for the creation of such a mystique. Hence arose the interpretation of the uphill struggle as a 'reconquest' and 'crusade', and Millán-Astray, as Franco's first propaganda chief, occupied an ideal position from which to initiate the official promotion of the 'holy war'. It seems, then, that historians who have dismissed the legionnaire as an ineffective propaganda boss may have ignored the efficacy of his efforts *within* the rebel movement. Scholars have correctly pointed out that news of Millán-Astray's encounter with Unamuno and his threats to shoot foreign correspondents could hardly have aided the Nationalists' public image abroad, but they fail to consider how the founder of the Tercio worked to strengthen the rebels' resolve. Millán-Astray may have been 'at the extreme margins of Nationalist propaganda' from an international perspective, but he held a much more central role in the movement itself.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, by viewing the figure of Millán-Astray as separate from the ideological force of the Catholic Church, which undeniably provided Franco with highly significant support, historians have largely ignored the religious overtones — albeit unorthodox and sometimes contradictory — that permeated the legionnaire's ideas.<sup>27</sup>

In *La Legión* the notions had already begun to surface that would eventually develop into the concept of a moral 'crusade' against the Republic. 'The Legion is a religion', Millán-Astray wrote, and its 'prayers' (*comprendidas*) embrace ideals such as 'suffering, hardening in the face of fatigue, fellowship under fire, and the cardinal virtues: Discipline, Combat, Death, and Love for the Battalion [*Bandera*].' War became a personal and spiritual matter, and a soldier's intimate relationship with a mystical vision of death superseded all other concerns. *La Legión* made virtually no references to the more tangible, human elements in Morocco against which the Spanish troops had to fight; even when Millán-Astray finally used the term 'enemy' to refer to the opposing soldiers, the word clearly described something of secondary importance. As usual, he focused on a soldier's greater concern: death.<sup>28</sup> In his writing, the Tercio, like war itself, signified an overwhelmingly spiritual affair in which death played the leading role. Neither the defeat of the enemy nor any other possible justification for war even entered the picture.

Religious imagery surfaces repeatedly in the remaining records of Millán-Astray's later speeches and his essays, although a more tangible enemy than his vision of death did indeed begin to emerge: the Republic. The object of his ire shifted from civilian politicians and the bureaucratic *junteros* of the Spanish army to the democratic

government and its supporters, and at the same time his attacks began to take on the moral and religious tone that he had previously reserved for his abstract conception of war. Eventually, then, his vision of war and death in battle could become an integral part of the 'crusade' as envisaged by the rebels.

He employed a notable amount of religious terminology in a speech he delivered to the Spanish community in Italy in 1926. He had stopped in Rome on the way back from Germany, where he had gone to be fitted with an artificial eye after losing his natural one in the fighting at Loma Redonda in March of that year. He had already lost his left arm in October 1924 in Tetuan as a result of a combat injury, and his physical appearance clearly made a strong impression.<sup>29</sup> His hosts in the Italian capital received the 'mutilado de Africa' enthusiastically, greeting him as 'the great soldier, the true example of the valiant and enduring Spanish soldier'. While in Rome he also met Mussolini, with whom he said he conversed 'honestly and cordially regarding Spain, the Monarchs, and President Primo de Rivera'. In his speech he referred to 'the absolution in articulo mortis' he had first received as a young second lieutenant in the Philippines, and he offered to his listeners his 'mutilations as sacrifice [*holocausto*]'. He also emphasized the similarities he perceived between soldiers and members of religious orders. Speaking to the clergy in the audience, he told them that they 'endure for the faith the same hardships that we endure for the Fatherland'.<sup>30</sup> Such a strongly sympathetic view of the Church was not widespread within the Spanish officer corps in 1926; even a decade later, General Mola planned the July uprising with the intention of maintaining the Republic's separation of Church and State. But by that time Franco already perceived Catholicism as an intrinsic part of Spanish nationalism,<sup>31</sup> and his view was shared by Millán-Astray. The legionnaire would later stress more explicitly the common ground that he believed soldiers like himself shared with religious orders, especially the Jesuits.

When Millán-Astray's religious ideal culminated in the 'crusade' of the Civil War, the Nationalists portrayed their endeavours as a struggle against godless Marxism, Masonry, and — less frequently — Judaism. In a speech he delivered to cadets at the Staff Academy in Valladolid during the third year of the war, he extolled 'the virtues of "service" and "sacrifice"', and he employed an especially threatening tone in his demands for both from his listeners. He also advised the cadets to remember their 'moral mission, which is to establish the spiritual perfection of command'. In the prologue to a *Tercio*

chaplain's biography that was probably published during the final days of the war, he once again emphasized the similarities he perceived between the Spanish Foreign Legion and the Society of Jesus. 'Jesuits and Legionnaires grounded their souls and their bodies in a single block when danger threatened the Religion of Christ and the Fatherland', he wrote. 'Hence the Jesuits are Legionnaires and the Legionnaires are Jesuits at the sublime hour of sacrificial death before the altar of God and the Fatherland: Spain.'<sup>32</sup>

Other ways in which the Nationalists made use of 'crusade' imagery are already well-known and too numerous to be treated here. Yet a book of poetry to which Millán-Astray contributed the prologue merits attention, as it best exemplifies to what absurd lengths the religious metaphors were pushed in the service of Franco's cause. The title page features a full-colour illustration of a gallant Jesus Christ riding a white horse and clutching a spear, which is pointed below the surface of the earth. There a group of devilish creatures, several of whom sport communist red stars, tear apart religious relics and in the background several churches are aflame. The book's following pages contain similar illustrations and many bad poems devoted to the 'Holy War' and to the figures of Franco, Millán-Astray and other key rebels.<sup>33</sup>

Long after Franco's victory in 1939, the 'crusade' myth persisted; the Caudillo relied heavily on such ideals to legitimize his dictatorship. As Paul Preston writes, for more than two decades the Franco regime propagated its 'more or less racist vision which linked the Civil War to the crusading spirit of the wars between Christians and Moors and to the evangelical imperialism of the conquest of America'. This ideological offensive continued, albeit with decreasing efficacy, even into the late 1960s, when 'the maintenance of an idealized notion of the Civil War as a medieval religious crusade was even more anachronistic'.<sup>34</sup> Millán-Astray's ideas, not surprisingly, made important contributions to this propaganda front. Moreover, until his death in 1954 he continued to view war as a spiritual and morally cleansing affair. He could thus speak of the 'ex-combatants of the War of the Holy Crusade, who have passed through its purifying crucible, where man's virtues are exalted and his defects, vices, and egoisms surface'. In his eyes, a soldier's defence of his country was 'the most glorious of all enterprises' and soldiery a 'temple of Duty'.<sup>35</sup>

In the prologue to a Jesuit's biography of Loyola that appeared shortly after the war, Millán-Astray once again emphasized the solidarity with the religious order that he felt as a legionnaire.

According to the Tercio's founder, the injuries Loyola suffered defending Pamplona against the French made him:

a Mutilated Knight of War for the Fatherland. And when the Virgin inundated him with faith and transformed the Mutilated Legionnaire into a mystical saint, She did so without removing his military and legionary qualities and created the founder of the Society of Jesus, in which mixed consubstantially and inseparably Religion and Soldiery, charity and work, austerity and energy, intelligence and modesty, the most pure faith and the exact appreciation of reality, the immaculate honour; heroic, sublime, and magnificent valour.<sup>36</sup>

Similar assertions regarding 'the legionary-Jesuit Honour' and 'the victorious battalions of Christ in the ruins of the atheistic enemy's redoubts' followed, and Millán-Astray characterized the activities of a Christian warrior as 'wrapped in the unsoiled cloak of ascetic virtue'. He concluded that 'Saint Ignatius was first a Mutilated Legionnaire and then the Most High Founder of the Society of Jesus.'<sup>37</sup>

Although Millán-Astray relinquished his position as head of the Francoist press and propaganda office on 23 January 1937, he continued to play an important role in the Nationalist ideological offensive. Throughout the war and thereafter he gave patriotic speeches, including several discourses that he delivered under Franco's orders on the Madrid front in 1938 and 1939. In 1937 he also became head of the newly-formed Distinguished Body of Disabled Veterans of the War for the Fatherland (*Benemérito Cuerpo de Mutilados de Guerra por la Patria*), a position which he held until his death in 1954. The organization promoted the same values that he had developed in Morocco and that had become so important for the Franco regime's ideology: love for the fatherland and glorious redemption through sacrifice in the 'holy war'.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, although one historian has written that the Tercio 'ceased to have a discernible influence on Spanish political and cultural life after the victory of the Nationalists in 1939', Millán-Astray and his ideas clearly continued to play important roles in the ideology of the Franco regime.<sup>39</sup> Such ideas permeated even the school textbooks of post-war Spain, which went as far as to follow Millán-Astray's example and portray Loyola as an exemplary member of a race 'of mystics and knights, captains and conquistadores, saints and ascetics'.<sup>40</sup> As his post-war writing demonstrates, Millán-Astray's spiritual vision of war culminated during the period immediately following the Civil War when, in Raymond Carr's words, the world

‘saw ambulant missions to reconvert Spain to a harsh brand of Tridentine Catholicism’. The 1940s were ‘the *blütezeit* of what was called “National Catholicism”’, the modern edition of the old alliance of throne and altar’.<sup>41</sup> And the experience of war in Morocco, shared by the men who rose against the Republic and eventually ruled Spain, had facilitated the development of this ‘holy war’ mystique. Millán-Astray had both exemplified and promoted the transformation of an abstract conception of glorious death in battle into the apocalyptic vision of the ‘crusade’.

In Millán-Astray’s writing on Loyola we see another important component of the Nationalist ideology: the unification of Spain’s diverse elements and peoples. The same lack of unity that Loyola had opposed later threatened pre-Franco Spain, Millán-Astray asserted. ‘Separatism was a matter that worried us enormously’, he wrote.<sup>42</sup>

As noted above, the lack of harmony among the country’s different elements had long troubled many Spaniards, including Miguel de Unamuno and Angel Ganivet, and Millán-Astray had greatly admired the sense of unity he perceived in the French Foreign Legion. In *La Legión* he portrayed the Tercio as an organization in which differences in class, race, nationality and political outlook disappeared. The initial recruits, he wrote, included 200 Catalans, ‘an “undesirable” Belgian’, and a ‘gigantic black from New York’, each of whom had come for different reasons. ‘They are life’s fighters, adventurers, dreamers, the hopeful and the desperate’, he continued, citing financial woes, women, ‘the desire to die’, a yearning for excitement, the law, alcohol, patriotism and the hope of a successful military career as common reasons for enlisting.<sup>43</sup>

In spite of the diversity of its recruits, however, Millán-Astray claimed that the Legion acted as the ‘loving mother of all who come, obliterating racial differences and hatred between nations’. Political differences ceased to play a role, he wrote. ‘In the Legion there have been men of all ideas and all leanings: syndicalists and anti-syndicalists from Catalonia and other areas; anarchists, nationalists, and foreign Bolsheviks’ — but all left their political ideas ‘at the door’. Actually, his perception of an apolitical Foreign Legion represented at least in part wishful thinking; the 1936 revolt saw the creation of the ‘Committee of the Rising’, charged with breaking up a communist cell operating within the Tercio.<sup>44</sup>



Nevertheless, Millán-Astray and most of his colleagues considered themselves above politics. Like so many of their predecessors, they equated the rejection of party politics with apoliticism; when they did intervene in civilian government they claimed to be acting in response to the 'general will'. Two decades earlier, after the 'disaster' of 1898, the immensely popular 'Christian General' Camilo Polavieja had been positioned to gain control of Spain's parliamentary regime, but his refusal to form a new political party had ensured his downfall. He and his supporters rejected party politics, 'but they were also incapable of coming up with an alternative', as José Andrés Gallego observed.<sup>45</sup> Twenty years later Millán-Astray, a similarly popular figure, displayed the same negative attitude toward party politics. After all, Spanish soldiers — like virtually all soldiers — had traditionally objected to disorder. During most of the nineteenth century they had allied with political liberalism, which they had interpreted as legalism and stability in the face of Carlist absolutism and subversion.<sup>46</sup> But twentieth-century officers like Millán-Astray believed that all aspects of civilian politics reflected and fostered discord. When the army finally did act to control its government's course, it bypassed the party system altogether and resorted to the *pronunciamiento*.

In an atmosphere characterized by such an aversion to civilian politics, Millán-Astray's claim to have created a truly apolitical body in the form of the Tercio clearly appealed to many Spanish soldiers. In fact, as the writings of Unamuno and other members of the generation of '98 demonstrated, many Spaniards yearned for the sense of unity ostensibly felt by the members of an organization like the Foreign Legion. In the minds of soldiers like Millán-Astray and Franco, the Legion could thus become a paradigm for the society they hoped to create when they rose against the Republic in July 1936.

Interestingly, beneath Millán-Astray's conception of a unified Legion lay aspects of traditional Japanese military thought, to which he would publicly devote a considerable amount of attention during the final years of his life. As early as 1922 he referred to a 'Japanese statute' as the model for the sense of unity and fellowship he tried to foster in the Tercio. The statute proclaimed, he wrote, that in 'a regiment the Colonel must be the father and the highest-ranking major the mother, and in the company the captain will be the father and the commissioned sub-officer the mother'. He also revealed that



his perception of Japanese military thought may have helped shape his notion of death in war. As a result of the excellent care in a certain modern and well-equipped Moroccan hospital, he wrote, any soldier admitted there would surely live. This meant that 'combat death was reduced to glorious death on the battlefield . . . . "To be taken on the green hill staring at heaven", as the Japanese samurai warrior requests.'<sup>47</sup>

He later wrote that Bushido, a code of unquestioning obedience and loyalty that bound samurai warriors to their lords, strongly influenced his actions as founder and commander of the Tercio. 'I am profoundly convinced that Bushido is, as a path, way, or rule of conduct for gentlemen, a perfect creed', he wrote. Moreover,

the Bushido inspired a large portion of my lessons in morals for the infantry cadets at the Alcázar of Toledo, when I had the honour of teaching them during the years 1911–1912. Bushido also abetted the Legion's creed, with its legionary spirit of combat and death, of discipline and fellowship, of friendship, of suffering and resolve, of facing fire. The Spanish legionnaire is also a samurai and practises the Bushido essentials: Honour, Valour, Loyalty, Generosity, and Spirit of sacrifice. The Spanish legionnaire loves danger and despises material wealth.<sup>48</sup>

The Bushido 'vows', death, fidelity, dignity and prudence, and the opposing 'plagues' of sleep (*sueño*), extravagance, sensuality and avarice all applied to the legionnaire as to the samurai, he wrote. Eventually these principles became key elements of the Nationalist military ideology. The Franco regime would even use the disavowal of material wealth to justify the dismal salaries in its army. Until the Caudillo's death in 1975, the government strove to exalt the figure of the soldier, but it paid army officers so little that they often had to seek outside work. Army salaries were especially low during the 1940s — the same period in which Millán-Astray embraced Bushido thinking most openly and enthusiastically.<sup>49</sup>

On a national level he focused on the similarity he perceived between Japan's debilitated condition in 1855 and that of his country in 1941, arguing that adherence to Bushido principles could transform Spain into a great power of Japan's status. 'Japan is a high and dazzling example for a people who possessed in their souls the most pure qualities of the Christian religion, of chivalry and valour, but fell to vilification after forgetting these virtues', he wrote. He even found a way to justify the incorporation of Eastern spirituality into Catholicism, asserting that the 'Principles of Christian morality are not in conflict with, nor much different from, Bushido, which is older

than Jesus Christ'. After all, he reasoned, 'Bushido infuses into the mind the purest morality and in practice applies to all men — as does Christianity'. He also wrote of 'the sublime spirit of sacrifice, which is grounded in the norms of our Christian morality and in Bushido'. And finally, he was quick to assure his readers that the author of his primary source on Bushido, Inazo Nitobe, was a Christian.<sup>50</sup>

Yet Millán-Astray conveniently failed to mention that the Japanese scholar had explicitly rejected the type of dogma that constituted the Nationalist 'crusade' and characterized Spanish 'National' Catholicism. 'I have little sympathy for ecclesiastical methods and forms that obscure the teachings of Christ', Nitobe had written. 'Moreover, I believe that God has made an alliance, which could be called "ancient", with every people and nation, whether Gentile or Jewish, Christian or pagan.' Millán-Astray apparently chose to ignore these words, which appeared in the preface to the 1909 Castilian edition of Nitobe's work. And after the Civil War the Franco government, presumably at Millán-Astray's urging, believed enough in the book's didactic potential to distribute free copies to Spanish youth.<sup>51</sup>

Finally, Millán-Astray also developed a view of history that, like his intertwined conceptions of war, religion and death, reflected the mind-set of the *africanistas* who rose with Franco in 1936. Not surprisingly, what originally united the dedicated officers in Morocco was their fear that Spain might abandon its African protectorate. Millán-Astray, like many Spaniards, based his argument for Spain's presence in Morocco on a flawed view of Spain's historical mission as a colonial power. Although he could convincingly employ historical examples in order to advocate reasonable responses to specific problems, he came up with a very weak justification for the broader question of why Spanish troops were there in the first place. Interestingly, his views had much in common with the interpretations of the generation of '98, and especially those of Angel Ganivet. The renowned cultural critic had written of 'excessive vitality' and a strong spirit of independence as Spain's most important gifts to the peoples it subjugated in America. Both qualities, he wrote, were necessary for the growth of 'true social progress'.<sup>52</sup> Millán-Astray, however, unhesitatingly applied the same manner of thinking to Northern Africa in a manner that even Ganivet resisted.

One year before the outbreak of the Civil War he delivered a speech in which he put forward his justification for the continued Spanish presence in Morocco. Spain's mission, he said, was

to bring civilization and culture to Humanity, adding to the golden list of twenty flowering nations — her children, today free and independent — the name of the zone of her Protectorate of Morocco, where she came in her secular mission to calm, civilize, and extol.

Referring to Spain's colonial past, he maintained that 'Spanish generosity' dictated that Spain 'conquers first, gives culture and wealth, and then leaves her protégés free and independent in order to enjoy happily the gifts she has given them at the cost of her blood and her treasury'. As a result, he concluded, 'Spain can render her noble account before the Supreme Tribunal of God and before Humanity'.<sup>53</sup>

Quite clearly, Millán-Astray viewed Spain's fall from the position of world dominance she had enjoyed in the sixteenth century through rosy but seriously distorted lenses. Moreover, the description of the former Spanish colonies as 'flowering' was hardly apt. Ganivet himself viewed the conditions of these countries as anything but ideal, although he did believe that their 'Spanishness' would enable the young nations eventually to become great powers. And while scholars are hardly in agreement over how to interpret Ganivet's writings on Morocco, the cultural critic clearly did not simply transfer his vision of America to Morocco in the manner of Millán-Astray. In fact, Ganivet condemned 'the absurd and censurable system of colonization employed today in Africa', and stressed the racial differences between the native inhabitants of the two continents.<sup>54</sup> While Millán-Astray undoubtedly shared some of the basic notions espoused by members of the generation of '98, by equating Africa with America he demonstrated that his simplistic perceptions differed considerably from theirs. And Millán's words undoubtedly echoed the feelings of other *africanistas*.

Finally, it was by no means clear, not even to many Spaniards, that Spain had any business 'civilizing' other peoples. Arturo Barea, who had served as a soldier in the Spanish protectorate, illuminated the Spanish hypocrisy in an oft-cited passage. Soldiers sent to the protectorate, he wrote, could not help but ask themselves:

Why do we have to fight against the Moors? Why must we 'civilize' them if they don't want to be civilized? Civilize them — we? We from Castile, from Andalucia,

from the mountains of Gerona, who cannot read or write? Nonsense. Who is going to civilize us? Our village has no school, its houses are of clay, we sleep in our clothes on a pallet in the stable beside the mules, to keep warm. We eat an onion and a scrap of bread in the morning and then go work on the fields from sunrise to sunset.<sup>55</sup>

Yet despite the flaws in Millán-Astray's belief in Spain's historic mission to conquer and civilize, when writing of more concrete matters he could also draw fairly reasonable lessons from history. For example, in the prologue to a book on Aben Humaya and the 1568 Morisco rebellion, Millán-Astray asserted that Spanish soldiers could learn a considerable amount by studying the uprising's history. Referring specifically to the 1921 débâcle at Anual and its causes, he linked the methods with which Cardinal Cisneros and his predecessors had treated the Moriscos with the policies of the recent High Commissioners in Morocco. Such comparisons are necessary, he wrote, because historical events 'repeat themselves isochronically in broad outlines'.<sup>56</sup> But regardless of how apt some of his historical comparisons might have been, Millán-Astray, like the other *africanistas*, could not bring himself to see the speciousness of his country's claim to civilize Morocco.

Both warrior and Christian mystic, in some ways Millán-Astray truly was a modern incarnation of his exemplar Loyola. Fallacies in his view of Spanish history made little difference in the end; the popularity of his ideas demonstrated that flawed or incomplete ideology can prove effective, especially when propelled by the powerful alliance of emotion and mysticism. Moreover, the combination of strength and social harmony that the Legion represented seemed ideal in a country that lacked both attributes. Even Miguel de Unamuno, who in his encounter with Millán-Astray would demonstrate his preference for reason over irrational violence, had initially found the rebels' promise of a harmonious society too attractive to resist. Yet the ideal of a united Spain comprised only a part of the Nationalist vision. The rebels' belief in the righteousness of their cause and their conception of glorious, sacrificial death in battle played more important roles: they helped facilitate the interpretation of their struggle as a holy war. And Millán-Astray, more than any other individual, both reflected and fostered the vision of the 'crusade'.

## Notes

The author wishes to thank Jennifer M. Jensen and Professors James M. Boyden and Michael Howard for their reading of earlier drafts of this article.

1. As José Luis Abellán notes, the Franco regime later adopted the Castilian myth as promoted by these intellectuals in order to create 'the false image of a centralist, Castilian imperialism based on pure demagogy'. See his 'La guerra de Cuba y los intelectuales', *El desastre de '98* (Cuadernos Historia 16, No. 30), (Madrid 1985), 28. For an analysis of how the generation of 1898 developed the myth, see his *Sociología del '98* (Barcelona 1973).

2. See, for example, Joaquín de Entrambasaguas's pamphlet, 'La posible clave de un incidente ya histórico. Unamuno y Millán-Astray', in *Punta Europa*, Vol. 11, No. 108 (1966). Even Entrambasaguas cannot deny that Millán-Astray shouted 'Mueran los intelectuales!', although he dismisses the outburst as insignificant. Other accounts of the encounter include Gabriel Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931–1939* (Princeton 1967), 300; Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War 1936–39* (London 1986), 108; Margaret Thomas Rudd, *The Lone Heretic. A Biography of Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo* (Austin 1963), 296–303; and Ramón Garriga, *La señora del Pardo* (Barcelona 1979), 95–6.

3. Arturo Barea, *Unamuno*, trans. Emir Rodríguez Monegal (Buenos Aires 1959), 78.

4. John H. Galey, 'Bridegrooms of Death. A Profile Study of the Spanish Foreign Legion', *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, 2 (1969), is based largely on an uncritical reading of Millán-Astray's *La Legión* (Madrid 1923). Although Galey presents an interesting picture of the Legion and its founder's self-proclaimed role therein, he does not grasp the full ramifications of Millán-Astray's ideology for Franco's Spain. *General Millán-Astray (El Legionario)* (Barcelona 1956), by Millán's colleague Gen. Carlos de Silva, is much too partial to be reliable. For strong criticism of Silva's portrayal of Millán-Astray see Carlos Blanco Escolá, *La Academia General Militar de Zaragoza (1928–1931)* (Barcelona 1989), 85–93. Despite the problems in Silva's account, most histories of the Tercio have relied heavily on it. See, for example, the official history Subinspección de la Legión, *La Legión Española (Cincuenta años de Historia)*, 2 vols (Madrid 1970). The work explicitly relies on Silva's biography for its treatment of Millán-Astray, but its authors also make the amazing statement that they do not intend to write an 'exact and accurate biography, with precise dates, numbers and facts, since history and fiction as well as truth and legend come together in an admirable fashion in the figure of the FOUNDER . . .' (1–2). A more recent but essentially hagiographical portrayal of Millán-Astray can be found in Carlos de Arce, *Historia de la Legión Española* (Barcelona 1984).

5. Jackson, op. cit., 66. José-Mario Armero, *España fue noticia. Corresponsales extranjeros en la Guerra Civil Española* (Madrid 1976), 69.

6. José Millán-Astray, *Memorias*, vol. 1, (Madrid [1918]), 10–11.

7. Carolyn P. Boyd, *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain* (Chapel Hill 1979), 39, 289–90; Silva, op. cit., 39–82.

8. José Millán-Astray, 'La Legión Extranjera en Argelia y el Tercio de Extranjeros Español. Conferencia pronunciada el día 14 de mayo de 1920 en el Centro del Ejército y de la Armada' (Madrid 1920), 25–6.

9. Blanco Escolá, op. cit., 79–87; Boyd, op. cit., 172; Gabriel Cardona, *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la Guerra Civil* (Madrid 1983), 8. Blanco demonstrates that the idea of the Spanish Foreign Legion did not originate with Millán-Astray, despite the legionnaire's subsequent assertions. Historians both within and outside Franco Spain have tended to accept Millán-Astray's claim at face value. See, for example, Galey, op. cit., 48–9.

10. 'La Legión Extranjera', *El Ejército Español*, 28 August 1920. The fear of the possible growth of Marxist movements within the Tercio may have indeed had merit. See above, p. 438.

11. See Boyd, op. cit., 34; Francisco J. Valanclocha Bellver, *Prensa político-militar y sistema de partidos en España* (Madrid 1981), 7–8, and Andrée Bachoud, *Los españoles ante las campañas de Marruecos* (Madrid 1988), 128.

12. 'Creación del Tercio de Extranjeros', *Ejército y Armada*, 4 September 1920; 'Tercio extranjero', *La Correspondencia Militar*, 6 September 1920; 'El Mando del Tercio de extranjeros', *El Ejército Español*, 3 September 1920.

13. Boyd, op. cit., 172. See Galey, op. cit., for another description of the recruitment, organization, composition and military feats of the Tercio until 1939.

14. Except where otherwise noted, the discussion of the conflict between the *africanistas* and the *junteros*, Millán-Astray's reaction to it, and its consequences is drawn from Boyd, 209–29, 290. The letter to Sánchez is quoted as it appeared in *Ejército Español*, 11 November 1922.

15. 'Millán-Astray pide su separación del Ejército', *Heraldo de Madrid*, 10 November 1922; 'La figura de Millán-Astray', *Heraldo de Madrid*, 11 November 1922.

16. *Ejército Español*, 10–15 November 1922; *Heraldo de Madrid*, 10–16 November 1922.

17. José Millán-Astray, *La Legión*, 2nd edn (Madrid 1980).

18. Quoted in Bachoud, op. cit., 106.

19. Bachoud, op. cit., 107. The bibliographies of Bachoud and Boyd demonstrate to some degree the plethora of books written by Spanish soldiers — often *africanistas* — during the first quarter of the century.

20. Millán-Astray, *La Legión*, 32, 63, 104, 55. Accounts by other Spanish soldiers in Africa during this period confirm that Millán-Astray promoted an exalted vision of death within the Tercio. See Arturo Barea, *The Forging of a Rebel*, trans. Ilsa Barea (New York 1972), 299–306; Manuel González Iglesias, *Los novios de la Muerte* (Madrid 1968); Carlos Micó España, *Los Caballeros de la Legión* (Madrid 1922); and Julio de la Torre Galán, *'La Legión! ... ¡Esa Novia! ...'* (Madrid 1969). Torre's book is a sort of updated version of Millán-Astray's *La Legión*; it also takes the form of a handbook for legionnaires, instructing readers on everything from the proper way to salute to how to 'die well' (28).

21. Cardona, op. cit., 33.

22. Boyd, op. cit., 172; Francisco Franco, *Marruecos, Diario de una Bandera* (Seville 1939). (First published in 1922.)

23. Cardona, op. cit., 32–3; Blanco Escolá, op. cit., 86.

24. Cardona, op. cit., 33; Millán-Astray, *La Legión*, 29, 115.

25. Stanley G. Payne, *Falange. A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford 1961), 121.

26. Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War*, 111.

27. See, for example, *ibid.*

28. Millán-Astray, *La Legión*, 29, 115.

29. Carlos de Silva, op. cit., 182–3, 187–9.

30. Casa de España en Roma, 'Conferencia pronunciada por el Coronel D. José Millán-Astray ante la Colonia Española de Roma con motivo de la entrega de un rame de laurel del Monte Palatino y de un Album de firmas de los españoles residentes en Italia, como homenaje de gratitud y cariño para el glorioso Legionario español mutilado' (Rome 1926), 3, 7–12.

31. Stanley G. Payne, *The Franco Regime 1936–1975* (Madison 1987), 199.

32. Gen. Millán-Astray, 'El Caudillo Franco y Nuestro Glorioso Estado Mayor. Conferencia a los Cadetes de la Academia de Estado Mayor en Valladolid' (no date), 2, 5 (on pages 2–3 he speaks of 'this third triumphal year'); Millán-Astray, prologue to Adro Xavier [Pseud. for Alejandro Rey Stolle], *Caballero Legionario* (Madrid, no date), 11–12.

33. Bernardo de Ramay, *Romanceros de la Nueva España*, prol. Millán-Astray, illus. A. Ituarte and D. Olivares (Buenos Aires 1937).

34. Paul Preston, *The Politics of Revenge. Fascism and the Military in Modern Spain* (London 1990), 32, 40.

35. José Millán-Astray, 'Academia del Cuerpo Jurídico Militar. Curso 1940–1941. Conferencias Culturales' (Madrid 1940–1), 25–6.

36. José Millán-Astray, prol. to R.P. Enrique Ascunce, *Iñigo de Loyola. Capitan Español y el Castillo de Pamplona* (Madrid [1941–42]), 10.

37. *Ibid.*, 10–12.

38. Armero, *op. cit.*, 69; Agustín García Laforga, *Mutilados de Guerra por la Patria (Soldados, Viejos y Estropeados) Siglos XVI al XX* (Saragossa 1971). See General Millán-Astray, *Franco el Caudillo* (Salamanca 1939), for the texts of the speeches he delivered during the war.

39. Galey, *op. cit.*, 62.

40. Adolfo Maíllo, *Patria* (Saragossa [1940?]), 46–7, quoted in Gregorio Cámara Vilar, *Nacional-Catolicismo y escuela. La socialización política del Franquismo (1936–1951)* (Jaén 1983), 311. For a detailed examination of National-Catholic themes stressed in the school textbooks of Franco Spain see Cámara Vilar, *op. cit.*, 293–385.

41. Raymond Carr, *Spain 1808–1975*, 2nd edn (Oxford 1982), 701.

42. Millán-Astray, prol. to Ascunce, 10.

43. Millán-Astray, *La Legión*, 16, 21–2. Gabriel Cardona speculates that the Catalans joined the Tercio in desperation after the government's repression of the Barcelona syndicalist movement. See Cardona, *op. cit.*, 37.

44. Millán-Astray, *La Legión*, 21–2, 111–26; Manuel González Iglesias, *Los Novios de la Muerte* (Madrid 1968), and Galey, *op. cit.*, 61n.

45. José Andrés Gallego, 'Regeneracionismo y crisis del 98', (Cuadernos Historia 16, no. 30) (Madrid 1985), 25. For the 'general will' interpretation of Spanish praetorianism see Raymond Carr, 'Spain. Rule by Generals' in Michael Howard (ed.), *Soldiers and Governments* (London 1957).

46. Julio Busquets, *El militar de carrera en España* (Barcelona 1984), 59.

47. Millán-Astray, *La Legión*, 126, 106. Galey speculates that Millán-Astray's attitude toward death in war 'may have been influenced, during his service with the Moorish regulars, by a similar tenet in the Islamic faith' (*op. cit.*, 56n.) But Millán's writings make no explicit reference to such an influence.

48. José Millán-Astray, prol. to Inazo Nitobe, *El Bushido (El alma de Japón)*, trans. Gen. Millán-Astray (Madrid 1941), 9–10. Another edition translated by Millán-Astray appeared in 1943.

49. Busquets, *op. cit.*, 228.

50. Millán-Astray, prol. to Nitobe, 12, 8, 10–11.
51. Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido. El Alma de Japón*, trans. Gonzalo Jiménez de la Espada (Madrid 1909), 15. In the introduction to the 1941 edition Millán-Astray claimed that he had translated his edition of the book from French into Castilian (9). The title page and the back cover of this edition contain notes prohibiting the book's sale and requesting that the book be widely distributed among school youth.
52. Angel Ganivet, *Idearium Español y El Porvenir de España*, 5th edn (Madrid 1957), 97.
53. Quoted in 'Ceuta ha elevado un monumento a González Tablas', *Africa* (Ceuta), vol. 11 (August 1935), 158. Franco echoed such sentiments in his attempts to propagate 'Hispanidad' after the war, often drawing on references to such 'Spanishness' from the writings of 1898. See Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 360–2, and Preston, *Politics*, 30–3.
54. Ganivet, op. cit., 96–7. For a brief summary of the critical disagreement regarding Ganivet's positions on Africa and other matters, see H. Ramsden, *Angel Ganivet's Idearium Español* (Manchester 1967), 29–32.
55. Barea, *Forging*, 295.
56. Prol. to Fidel Fernandez, *Aben Humeya* (Barcelona 1935), 16.

**R. Geoffrey Jensen**

is a doctoral candidate at Yale University.  
He is currently a Fulbright scholar in Spain  
where he is doing research for his  
dissertation on the evolution of Spanish  
military thinking between 1898 and 1923.