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In Defense of Fiction: Resistance, Collaboration, and *Lacombe, Lucien**

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"A young peasant who might just as well have become a resister and who enters the service of the Gestapo by accident"—so Louis Malle described the antihero of his 1974 film *Lacombe, Lucien.* The impulsive *primitif,* rejected by the resistance, falls instead into the hands of local Gestapo auxiliaries one night, succumbs, casts in his lot, runs riot during heady months of intimidation and extortion in enemy service, pays the price at the liberation. "I wanted," Louis Malle continued, "to provoke some thought, cast doubts, force the viewer to reconsider conventional ideas, for example that a collaborator was necessarily a monster."[1]

He provoked more than thought. Lucien a victim of circumstance, his misadventure an accident that could have befallen others like him—these ideas shocked. They shocked the diehards of *resistancialisme* or *gaullien* mythology, for whom collaborators, Laval above or Lacombe below, amounted to a handful of miscreants in an otherwise united France, not hapless might-have-beens. And they shocked determinists of one sort or another for whom accident alone could not account for the villainy of Lucien and his like, especially social determinists whose articles of faith Jean-Paul Sartre had glibly set forth almost thirty years earlier: "All the workers," he wrote, "[and] almost the peasants were resisters; most collaborators, it's a fact, came from the bourgeois." Such simplicities were catching. Even in the seminal documentary *The Sorrow and the Pity* an aristocratic collaborator vied for top billing with a peasant resister. It showed sides; *Lacombe, Lucien* blurred edges. As the critic of *Les Cahiers du Cinéma* said, everyone seized on the film's essential "ambiguity," and he himself censured its attempt "to

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[1] Jacques Mallecot, *Louis Malle par Louis Malle* (Paris, 1978), p. 49.

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deprive of meaning—to render insignificant—any taking of sides [*toute prise de parti*].''[2]

But then Louis Malle was an artist, not an ideologue. And well before him other artists, novelists in particular, had also shunned historical mythology and social geometry for human portrait and so had started in print the story that *Lacombe, Lucien* would continue on film. Marcel Aymé's black marketeers and Jean Dutourd's grocers are simpler characters than Louis Malle's errant peasant, but like him they are creatures of circumstance and happenstance and throw-of-the-dice and have little to say about class or nation or ideology. And neither Jean-Louis Curtis's cynical careerist nor Jean-Louis Bory's vengeful villager have much to do with the resisters of Sartre's fiat or De Gaulle's history. In fact, the fictions of prose and of ideology had parted ways even as their live referents still resisted and collaborated. Before Aymé or Dutourd or Curtis or Bory, before the Liberation, a few clandestine authors had jettisoned the Manichaean lexicon of civil war and started treating even collaborators in psychological or sexual or even pathological terms—gray areas, omens of ambiguity, the unsettling presages of *Lacombe, Lucien*.[3]

Accidental or probable or inevitable, random or systematic? Who collaborated and who resisted and why did they do so? A few, like Sartre, answered in ringing declarations or garbled suppositions. But over the years most professional historians held back, and with good reason: there was almost no evidence. To leave De Gaulle and Pétain and the men at the top for the men in the street, to set rank-and-file resisters and collaborators side by side, to know who they were and why they chose to oppose the enemy or to enter his service—all this required material, and what material there was only nourished delusions and sentimentalities. Better to investigate public facts and leave private lives alone.

From resisters still reeling from the past came an avalanche of memoirs, retrospective or introspective. Pious monographs streamed forth—on a movement here, a region there. Diaries were published, pamphlets republished.[4] Around 1960, with the passage of time, with a first international conference and calls for *désacralisation* and rigorous historical method,

[2] J.-P. Sartre, ''Qu'est-ce qu'un collaborateur?'' in *Situations* (1945; reprint, Paris, 1949), vol. 3; P. Bonitzer, ''Histoire de sparadrap (Lacombe, Lucien),'' *Les cahiers du cinéma* 250 (May 1974): 42–47.

[3] Marcel Aymé, ''Traversée de Paris,'' in his *Le vin de Paris* (Paris, 1947); Jean Dutourd, *Au bon beurre* (Paris, 1954); Jean-Louis Curtis, *Les forêts de la nuit* (Paris, 1947); Jean-Louis Bory, *Mon village à l'heure allemande* (Paris, 1945); see, e.g., Louis Parrot's clandestine novel (Paris, 1943), *Paille noire des étables*.

[4] By 1951 Jacques Soustelle had published the second volume of his memoirs (*Envers et contre tous* [Paris, 1950], vol. 2) and ''Rémy'' (G. Renault) the seventh volume of his (*On m'appelait Rémy* [Paris, 1951]). Memoirs of the famous continued to come, including those of De Gaulle (*Mémoires de guerre,* vol. 1, *L'appel* [Paris,

professional historians began to move in on the Resistance, taking up where their less detached predecessors had left off. The time had come, one of them wrote, to move beyond description, to discover how "la vocation résistante" was born and how groups of resisters suddenly came into being.[5] Scholarly pioneers at the unsung Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale looked at new problems and new sources—dossiers from the networks, veterans' records, prefects' reports, even employment records. By the early 1980s their work was newsworthy enough for *Le Monde* to report on it. Did resisters thrive in any one class or region or party? What roles did women and the young play? History supplanted memory, and the Resistance, once celebrated by illustrious insiders, now fell prey to dispassionate outsiders.[6]

So did collaboration, *toutes proportions gardées,* after a lag of about fifteen years. A long silence followed the Liberation, broken occasionally by a self-serving memoir from a Vichy minister or a reexamination of Pétain's trial

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1954], and vol. 2, *L'unité* [Paris, 1956]), Marie Madeleine Fourcade (*L'arche de noé* [Paris, 1968]), Henri Frenay (*La nuit finira: Memoires de résistance*, 2d ed. [Paris, 1973]), and most recently A. Chambon, *Quand la France était occupée* (Paris, 1989). Memoirs of local *maquis* began at once—cf. Jean Dacier, *Ceux du maquis* (Grenoble and Paris, 1945) or Pierre de Préval, *Sabotages et guerilla* (Paris, 1946)—and did not stop (cf. the references below); likewise local resistance monographs of widely varying quality have appeared from M.-J. Bopp, *L'Alsace sous l'occupation allemande, 1940–1945* (Le Puy, 1945) to, most recently, J.-P. Bernier, *Les maquis Rhône-Alpes* (Paris, 1987). Often leaflets and letters appear as appendices to such studies.

[5] The first international conference on resistance in Europe was held in Liège in September 1958; see J. M. D'Hoop, "La première conférence internationale sur l'histoire de la Résistance européenne," *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale* (hereafter abbreviated *RHDGM*) 9, no. 34 (April 1959): 93–95; H. Michel, "Quelques livres sur la résistance française," including his review of *Histoire des groupes francs (M.U.R.) des Bouches-du-Rhône,* by M. Baudoin, *RHDGM* 10, no. 39 (July 1960): 31–46; studies of the resistance by professional historians in the early 1960s included notably M. Baudot, *L'opinion publique sous l'occupation: L'exemple d'un département français: l'Eure, 1939–1945* (Paris, 1960); A. Calmette, *L'O.C.M.: Histoire d'un mouvement de résistance, 1940–1944* (Paris, 1961); H. Michel, *Les courants de pensée de la Résistance* (Paris, 1963).

[6] See, e.g., the use of statistics and prefects' reports in *RHDGM,* vol. 14, no. 55 (July 1964), entirely devoted to "Les Maquis dans la libération de la France"; and the use of agents' dossiers in F. Leclerc, "La composition d'un réseau: 'Zero France,' " RHDGM 16, no. 61 (1966): 75–86; Claude Lévy, "Qui étaient les résistants?" *Le Monde* (January 1981). By 1974 the Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale had helped publish, in the Esprit de la Résistance collection, twenty books on the resistance and had devoted six issues of its historical journal to it—in all, some 5,000 pages of scholarly writing. Meanwhile, that year, some sixty university theses were in preparation on the subject. In the late 1980s the committee undertook an extensive sociological survey of the *maquis* all over France—a survey, to my knowledge, still in progress.

or a political history of his régime.[7] In the mid-1960s came a sudden flurry of such publications, mostly about Vichy and its leaders—historians, as usual, began with the roof.[8] In the 1970s they began moving cautiously toward the cellar, once again following the lead of the Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, which in 1973 finally devoted an entire issue to the subject of collaboration and its people—after seven such issues on the Resistance.[9] These collaborators—who were they? They were, after all, just as real as resisters, and probably as numerous. Soon *Le Monde* reported on the unseemly interest in collaboration, its book reviewer indignantly proclaiming 1978 "the year of the collabos." By the 1980s social historians, clinically dissecting the who and sometimes the why of resistance and collaboration at the ground level, were catching up with their times: opinion polls now revealed among the postwar generation respect for resisters but forbearance with collaborators and impatience, above all, with historical morality plays.[10] *Lacombe, Lucien* had struck home.

But still historians held back. They explored groups, whether defined by class or gender or status or ideology, but stopped short of the single man in the street and his predicament, prime motif of Louis Malle and his literary forebears. Most historians wisely left private lives and personalities—microhistory—to them. But with their discoveries behind them and new evidence before them, why not overcome their past reticence, ask the same questions, test the creatures of fiction against the traces of fact? Now and then closed archives mysteriously open and so yield up their local wartime

[7] M. Peyrouton, *Du service public à la prison commune: Souvenirs* (Paris, 1960); J. Carcopino, *Souvenirs de sept ans (1937–1944)* (Paris, 1953); H. Noguères, *Le véritable procès du Maréchal Pétain* (Paris, 1955); R. Aron, *Histoire de Vichy* (Paris, 1954). S. Hoffmann's article "Aspects du régime de Vichy," *Revue française de science politique* 6, no. 1 (January–March 1956): 44–69, was a rare analytic and objective approach to Vichy.

[8] Mémoirs included those of M.-Y. Sicard, also known as Saint-Paulien, *Histoire de la collaboration* (Paris, 1964). Studies of Vichy and collaborationist leaders include M. Cotta, *La collaboration* (Paris, 1964); H. Michel, *Vichy, année 40* (Paris, 1966); P. Bourget, *Un certain Philippe Pétain* (Paris, 1967); all capped by R. Paxton's fundamental indictment of Vichy, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* (New York, 1972), which appeared in France to controversy (see, e.g., the following reviews of *La France de Vichy,* by R. O. Paxton: Paul Gillet, "L'Avènement des technocrates," *Le Monde* [February 1, 1973], pp. 17 and 22; and Paul Auphan and Jacques de Launay, "Controverses autour d'une historie de Vichy," *Le Monde* [March 22, 1973], p. 20).

[9] *RHDGM,* vol. 23, no. 91 (July 1973), issue entitled "Sur la collaboration," and *RHDGM,* vol. 27, no. 108 (October 1977), issue entitled "Sur la collaboration en France"; articles treating collaboration "from the ground up" appeared in vol. 29, no. 113 (January 1979), vol. 29, no. 115 (July 1979), vol. 32, no. 127 (July 1982), etc.

[10] B. Poirot-Delpech, "1978, année des collabos," *Le Monde* (December 29, 1978).

vignettes, told in the austere language of officialdom. The Vichy police, for example, interned resisters, the post-Liberation courts tried collaborators, and today's authorities occasionally open the records both kept. They invite historians to recover the half-effaced character sketches: fragmentary evidence but enough to speculate—no more—about grass-roots resisters and collaborators, about human motives and human differences and the intermittent intruder, accident.

* * *

Accident, for Lucien Lacombe, was a tire puncture landing him after curfew outside *collabo* headquarters. It was critical because his motive—escape—could have led him to resistance and collaboration alike. "His [Lucien's] existence and its vicissitudes," explained one of the critics, a believer, "are the product of chance. By chance he finds himself on the wrong side. . . . Not by conviction." Not everyone went along so willingly. A fired-up minority savaged the idea and the film along with it: "The vicissitudes are so stupid [*cons*] that I give up trying to tell you about them because you won't believe me . . . we're told: he might as well have been a resister. It was due to bad luck. In short, resistance, Gestapo, it's all the same."[11]

Was it all the same? Only rarely, over the years, had historians even come close to saying as much. Where fate, one or two had said, happened to find you in the early summer of 1940, in London or occupied Paris or unoccupied Vichy or annexed Lorraine, could make all the difference.[12] But none investigated the troubling, unspoken notion of the game of chance. Could resisters and collaborators start out with identical motives, resemble each other, end up by accident alone on opposite sides? Only empirical inquiry could tell—inquiry, to start with, into the most plausible case of all, the man on the run from forced labor in Germany.

For if resisters and collaborators ever shared a motive, it was fear of the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO). When Laval's government began designating selected "volunteers" for work in Germany late in 1942, in the wake of the failure of the *relève,* and then early in the following year threatened entire groups of Frenchmen with the STO, it unwittingly created the *maquis* and swelled the ranks of the collaborationist organizations—the

[11] Jean-Louis Bory, "Servitudes et misères d'un salaud: Le portrait, en clair-obscur, d'un traître dont on voit le coeur: Lacombe, Lucien, par Louis Malle," *Le Nouvel Observateur,* no. 481 (January 28, 1974), pp. 56–57; "Lacombe Lucien, film de Louis Malle," *Charlie Hebdo* (February 11, 1974), p. 15.

[12] "Thus," wrote H. Michel in a review of Rémy's mémoirs (*On m'appelait Rémy*), *RHDGM* (n. 5 above), vol. 2, no. 6 (April 1952), "it became clear how chance often reigned over decisive choices in June 1940."

Paris-centered "ultras," its own nascent Milice, and even some of the German organizations in France.

Historians readily acknowledged that most *maquisards* had taken to the hills in flight from the STO.[13] So did the *maquisards* themselves, matter-of-factly, sometimes even before the war was over. Their accounts, circumstantial and precise, leave only the numbers in doubt. The Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (FFI) leader in Charente recorded that fledgling resistance groups around Pressac began growing in November 1942—"with the *relève*"—and snowballing in March 1943, as groups of "several tens of men," mostly workers and peasants, deserted their workplaces to escape deportation. In Vitry-aux-Loges, in the Loiret, resistance began punctually on December 8, 1942, "as soon as the mayoralty had agreed to designate ten young men to go work in Germany." A few skilled factory workers from Alès reached their first hideout, a wooden hut a kilometer up into the Cevennes, in January 1943; by May and June prefects and subprefects were instructing police to hunt down STO-dodgers spreading through the mountains of the Gard and Lozère. Initial numbers varied widely with population and terrain—a handful of employees from a paper factory in the hills in Vaucluse in February 1943, grouplets of two or three men around Limoges in May, about a hundred men in Ferrières (Loiret) by July, eighty of them from Paris, 2,500 in the mountains of Haute-Savoie by August. But whatever the variations in regional rhythm the driving fear was the same: "anything," recalled an early *maquisard* in the Vaucluse, "but Germany."[14]

Less known, because less talked about, was the contribution the STO made to the growth of the collaborationist organizations. Entry into a French collaborationist party normally exempted the new member from the STO: possibly as many as a third of the *miliciens* in Marseille had joined to avoid it. Likewise the city's Parti Populaire Français (PPF), which had an identifiable ethnic, occupational, and residential base before the war, was inundated by a wave of young men, many of them workers or unemployed, united only by their fear of going to work in Germany. A few other fugitives

[13] See, e.g., M. Granet, "Dessein général des maquis," *RHDGM,* vol. 1, no. 1 (November 1950): 51–72—the very first issue.

[14] Hoover Institution Archives, French Resistance Collection (hereafter "Hoover Archives"), box 10, reports of General Angenot (Charente), August 1945, Multrier (Seine-Inférieure), March 19, 1945, FFI leader, Pressac, n.d. (post-Liberation); Hoover Archives, FFI leader, Ferrières, n.d., post-Liberation; Hoover Archives, box 11, report of Alain Le Ray (Bastide) for the Isère, n.d., post-Liberation; transcription of interview, Radio-Limoges, September 14, 1944; Aimé Vielzeuf, *On les appelait "les bandits"* (Uzès, 1967), pp. 16, 37; Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône (hereafter "AD"), 5W141, J. Esc—— and C. Cou—— (full names withheld); recollections of Jean Garcin in H. Aliquot, *Le Vaucluse dans la guerre* (Le Coteau, 1987), p. 87.

from the STO even went to work for the Germans on the spot, driving trucks or building fortifications, choosing the known quantity of the local Todt Organization and its wages over the *terra incognita* of the Reich: mirror images, at first glance, of the fugitives hiding out in the hills.[15]

And indeed the collaborator in the postwar courtroom and the *maquisard* in the wartime police cell occasionally sound like identical babes in the woods, the victims of circumstance and chance encounter. "Withdrawn, passive, would it seems have carried out any order"; "fearful . . . caught in the chain of events . . . still does not seem to realize the gravity of the situation into which his sudden whim [*coup de tête*] has plunged him"; "without intelligence and without courage, almost illiterate, he's the typical weak one, able to let himself be drawn into any collective idiocy"—the gendarmes of Fréjus were patronizing and even sympathetic when they arrested these young fugitives from the STO in an abandoned farmhouse in the Esterel in May 1943. "He's a weak one," their character sketches went on, "gentle and fearful"; "intelligent and gentle. He's a dreamer. He let himself be drawn along." But in 1945 a court-appointed psychologist had much the same to say about a *marseillais* drifter who had joined the PPF fearing deportation: he was weak and short-sighted: "It is clear indeed that it is difficult to speak of honour, of dignity, of energetic resistance, to a subject like this, who besides . . . seems to have tried to take the easy way out . . . he worked as the chances came . . . he was to be found frequenting the dancing establishments of the rue Thubaneau where the clients are used to living by their wits." One night the STO came for him in one of the "dancings," and he hastily joined the PPF. He might instead have joined fledgling *maquisards* in a farmhouse in the Esterel or anywhere else.[16]

But he did not. Similar men in similar predicaments chose dissimilar escape routes: how did they decide to take the first steps one way or the other?

Sometimes simple reflection, seemingly solitary, indicated preemptive action. Better to act now than join a trainload to Germany later, especially if the family's daily bread depended on it: "With my widowed mother, a young wife, a six-month old baby, my sister whose husband is a prisoner of war, and a grand-nephew who all live off my work, I joined the Milice to avoid going to Germany."[17] He might have joined the other side, he suggested, but upon reflection practicality prevailed.

[15] P. Jankowski, *Communism and Collaboration: Simon Sabiani and Politics in Marseille, 1919–1944* (London and New Haven, Conn., 1989), chap. 7, passim.

[16] AD 5W146, arrest records of P. Gio——, V. Lau——, A. Gui——, F. Vil——, G. Mil——, J. Mil——, R. Lau——, R. Cap——, J. Boe——; Jankowski, p. 103; although pretrial statements by suspected collaborators should be used with caution their accounts are often both plausible and supported by witnesses (Jankowski, app. 3).

[17] AD 500U253, case of M. Gor——.

More often, probably, interested agents of persuasion pushed the exposed young man onto the road to resistance or collaboration. In their recruitment efforts Resistance propagandists openly appealed to fears of the STO. In Sénas, in the Bouches-du-Rhône, Communist sheets went out in March 1943 mixing praise for the USSR—"the true bastion of liberties"—with attacks on the STO and an appeal to take to the mountains "where there is no lack of hideouts." In nearby St. Rémy de Provence slogans appeared on the mayor's house in July 1943 ignoring the Soviet Union but inviting the Germans to leave and the young to stay: "get out, Krauts [Boches]," "young man, don't go to Germany, it's a prison." The young *réfractaires*—STO fugitives—arrested in the Esterel had all joined in the same way—seduced by the blandishments of a recruiting agent who overheard their complaints about the STO and who offered them a way out, together with directions to Ste.-Maxime where they were taken in hand by one of his resistance colleagues. Collaborationist organizations could not campaign openly on this basis—could not promote the cause of Franco-German solidarity with an anti-German theme—but they could quietly recruit in the same way. Sometimes collaborationist agents, like those of the Resistance, moved in when they overheard complaints in a café; sometimes they extracted men in extremis, conscripts already in the hands of the inspectors and about to board trains for Germany.[18] Openly or quietly, both sides used the STO to sway the minds of its potential victims.

Persuasion also came from private corners, closer to home—from a potential conscript's family, friends, co-workers, and barroom acquaintances, sympathetic to his plight and convinced of the imminence of his enslavement. In the Vaucluse a farm servant persuaded his two brothers-in-law to leave their paper factory and hide out in the mountains when they received a summons from the STO in February 1943; in Marseille a university student took advantage of his parents' friendship with the local PPF leader to join the party and thus avoid going to Germany when the STO came for him in the spring of 1944. A barman in the same city joined the PPF at the suggestion of clients, a carpenter at the suggestion of a co-worker. Rumor and hearsay could likewise suddenly turn an *attentiste* into a resister or a collaborator, for in a climate of fear and anxiety alarming news could provoke rash decisions: a newspaper article in the morning, a radio report at night. The BBC helped swell the ranks of the resistance by spreading fear about the STO, but sometimes its plans backfired—when announcers in London informed a Marseille policeman that a third of his colleagues were to be deported he promptly joined the Milice.[19] They were prisoners of circumstance, com-

[18] AD 5W146, P. Bo——; AD 5W147, A. Bon——; AD 5W146, P. Gio—— et al.; Jankowski, chap. 7, passim.

[19] AD 5W141, C. Cou——; AD 500U62, L. Roc——; AD 500U65, G. Sal——; AD 500U103, G. DiM——; AD 500U100, R. Tou——; AD 500U99, C. Bor——.

pelled, in their eyes, to follow the beckoning recruiter along his promised escape route.

Was there then no other element—belief, however weak—pushing the hapless conscript-to-be one way or the other? The historian of the *maquis* in the Cevennes thought so: "The first to refuse to go away beyond the Rhine, at a time when the Allied victory still seems uncertain indeed, demonstrate an uncommon strength of character, a rare [*peu banal*] courage."[20] He saw conviction. But even the communist Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP), in their wartime instructions on guerilla tactics and strategy, doubted the zeal of the *maquisards* gathering here and there in large concentrations: "That sort of approach . . . has more to do with a wish to wait for better days than to chase away the invader."[21] There were two views of the *maquis,* even among their friends.

Fear of the STO was decisive, but conviction loses no sincerity for being grafted onto self-interest. In Bagnols sur Cèze, in the Gard, a farm laborer watched the first STO *requis,* among them his brother, marching away in March 1943. He shouted "Vive Giraud!" and then, "Don't worry about it, we'll get you out in two months!" provoking an answering yell from the *requis* themselves: "Down with Hitler!"[22] Patriotic as well as plaintive, they obscure the frontier between conviction and convenience.

And another look teases out a distinctive level of conviction among the *maquisards.* Regional numbers reveal that only a fraction of the fugitives from the STO chose to join the *maquis:* most *maquisards* were *réfractaires,* but most *réfractaires* were not *maquisards.* In the Isère and the Jura, in Burgundy, about half the STO conscripts took off, and of these only a fraction joined the *maquis*—perhaps one in five in the Jura. In the Toulouse region about a fifth fled the STO; of these about one in four joined the *maquis.* The others went elsewhere—to the country, to hideouts or friends, even to the *collabos,* refuges like the *maquis.* But in the *maquis,* refugees became combatants. Some left after a brief taste of life in the wild; most adapted to the harsh discipline imposed by their new political or military leaders, sometimes surprising them as they took to guerilla and then to *guerre.* "[These] *réfractaires* who had the courage not to leave for Germany," one internal report noted, "are undeniably the most apt to become combatants."[23] The *réfractaires* became *résistants,* committed to a collective cause.

[20] Vielzeuf, pp. 16–17.

[21] Hoover Archives, box 9, FTPF circular of June 27, 1944.

[22] AD 5W 178, A. Mar——.

[23] P. Silvestre, "STO, maquis et guérilla dans l'Isère," *RHDGM* (n. 5 above), 130 (April 1983): 1–50; F. Marcot, *La Résistance dans le Jura* (Besançon, 1985), pp. 166 ff.; M. Lombard, "Les maquis et la Libération de la Bourgogne," *RHDGM* 55 (July 1964): 29–54; R. Fabre and D. Fabre, "La main-d'oeuvre au service de l'Allemagne dans la région de Toulouse," *RHDGM* 131 (July 1983): 93–96.

By contrast the collaborators on the run from the STO saw no further than their immediate deliverance. In Marseille the members of the PPF who had joined to avoid the STO had no interest in the party's ideology and tried to stay away from its meetings. One of them managed to have his name erased from the party lists. Others prudently tried to keep their contacts in the resistance alive. A former prostitute who joined to keep her STO-threatened lover company declared that they had "PPF ideas." But she did not say what these "ideas" were and when pressed declared she had joined to patronize with her lover one of the party-affiliated restaurants. They were collaborators of convenience.[24]

And so accident at its most plausible—a chance encounter sending a fugitive from the STO one way or the other—is at best a seductive half-truth. In *Lacombe, Lucien* it explains the situation—the punctured bicycle tire, the proximity of German hirelings—but not its *dénouement*. In occupied France it could explain the sudden encounter of a human problem—fear of the STO—with a political solution—resistance or collaboration. But each solution attracted different kinds of people; if the encounter was accidental, the upshot was not. The collaborators, political imbeciles like Lucien Lacombe, saw only expedience while resisters shared some sense, however vague, of a wider and longer-term collective interest. Equally fearful of the STO, resisters and collaborators may yet have differed mentally—a difference that other motives confirm.

* * *

Other motives—boredom and frustration, wretched material conditions—drove collaborators to exploit and resisters to protest the German presence. Like his compatriots fleeing the STO, Lucien Lacombe jumped at the chance to escape his own miserable lot, the heartless home and the cheerless job. One critic saw Lucien "[eternally condemned] to silence and obedience, as a muffled revolt, made of innate violence and frustration, vaguely stirs [within] him"; another added that he first approached the *maquis* "to escape his own existence."[25] Both sides beckoned to others like him—men and women unhinged by adversity, craving better lives.

When a resentful farm worker in the Var took his tribute of potatoes to the local *mairie* he declared that "we've had enough of this government, let the English and the Americans come quickly and let's cut off a few heads." The

[24] AD (n. 14 above) 500U162, E. Mar—— (May 2, 1946); Jankowski (n. 15 above), pp. 101–5.

[25] François Maurin, "Un salaud de 17 ans: 'Lacombe, Lucien' de Louis Malle," *L'Humanité* (February 2, 1974); Jean de Baroncelli, "Un nouveau film de Louis Malle: 'Lacombe, Lucien,' un adolescent dans la Gestapo," *Le Monde* (January 31, 1974).

outburst of a disgruntled cleaning woman in a nearby German-occupied hospital did not escape the notice of local police either; she announced in December 1943 "that the war would soon be over and would last until about December and that Chancellor Hitler [was] evil and only ate well without working."[26] Such spontaneous acts of protest, the sudden politicization of hard lives, were probably widespread. Organized anger, less frequent but more consequential, assembled malcontents in collective demonstrations of protest—most dramatically in strikes. High prices, low wages, empty foodstores brought the workers out, sometimes en masse: several thousand from the mines in the Bouches-du-Rhône in the meatless winter month of February 1944, for example; 18,000 in the Pas-de-Calais in October 1943; 7,000 in Marseille in March 1944. Occasionally these protests paid off, winning concessions, however paltry, from French and even German authorities.[27]

But more often protesters, acting alone or in a group, met with repression and reprisals. The German doctor running the hospital in the Var demanded that the outspoken cleaning woman be punished and the prefect obliged by interning her for a month. In Marseille the local SS demanded arrests when the strikes erupted in March. That time the prefect refused, but the Germans could always carry out arrests themselves, as they did after a mere two-hour strike at a Citroën factory in Lyon in October 1943 or after another that autumn at a shipyard in the Var—an act itself provoking further unrest among the workers. Inescapably the strikers defied the Germans as well as their French employers. Sometimes they demanded to meet with them: in Marseille they insisted on negotiating directly with the Germans upon learning that their employers had done so.[28] The occupation itself became their main grievance: workaday in origin, strikes became political in scope.

Thus, on the Canebière in Marseille, on Bastille Day 1942, cries of "bread without coupons!" alternated with "Vive De Gaulle!" and even "down with Laval!" And thus, in Marseille in May 1944, a strike by steelworkers in the morning set off a general protest over bread supplies by women in the afternoon and a siege by 2,000 demonstrators of the collaborationist PPF headquarters in the evening. When shipworkers occupied the drydocks in La Ciotat in August 1942 the prefect insisted that they were politically as well as "professionally" motivated. Some strikes were exclusively political in character: as early as October 1941, in the same La Ciotat shipyards, workers

[26] AD 5W165, E Ge——; 5W189 J. Rey——.

[27] J.-P. Beauquier, "Répétition ou démonstration? L'agitation ouvrière dans la région marseillaise au printemps 1944," *Provence Historique* 29, no. 117 (July–August 1979): 305–41; Archives Nationales, F[1]C III 1143, prefect report, April 1944, and F[7]14897, police national report, October 15, 1943.

[28] AD 5W189, J. Re——; Beauquier; Archives Nationales, F[7]14897, Police national to SS, October 12, 1943; AD F[1]III 1143, prefect report, December 1943.

struck symbolically for five minutes at the behest of the BBC. And workers striking for bread or money one day might strike for abstractions the next. Some of the La Ciotat shipworkers who had struck in August 1942 had also demonstrated in Marseille on Bastille Day the month before. A miner who had struck in Martinet in 1942 also handed out pamphlets and scrawled anti-German graffiti on walls before police interned him in October, a marriage of conviction to self-interest, the morganatic union dimly discernible in the *maquisard* on the run from the STO.[29]

Collaborators simply tried to find better jobs: if the Germans or French intermediaries had to be the employers, so be it. "By profession I'm a peasant, and when unable to work because of illness . . . I joined the Milice. . . . I confess in order to earn some money without working very much": the peasant from the Hérault could not resist. In the Indre-et-Loire the members of the PPF *groupes d'action* had all joined, declared the prefect, for pecuniary advantage—"3.500 francs a month, special food coupons, etc." The Germans themselves offered the best jobs, particularly the Todt Organization, which employed French workers in construction projects all over the country. In Marseille a third of the organization's French employees had signed on for the work: no coincidence that so many were taxi drivers and chauffeurs, come to practice their superannuated skills in the mean years of the occupation. The military organizations—Wehrmacht, Kriegsmarine, Sicherheitsdienst—employed maids and telephonists and gardeners, whatever they needed. At Estampes, near Versailles, the list of German-employed French citizens, "about whom," the police noted after the liberation, "there is [otherwise] nothing unusual to point out," is a catalog, *pace* Sartre, of lower-class professions, the butcher, the baker, the candle-stick maker: twenty-eight artisans, including ten carpenters and ten excavators; twenty-four unskilled workers; eighteen skilled ones, including eight mechanics; sixteen service employees, including ten drivers and two cooks; five professional or managerial employees, including two accountants. At Maisons-Laffitte, outside Paris, the Germans employed four hundred locals, "from the simple dishwasher," the police further noted, "to the interpreter." In Paris a taxi driver enlisted in the Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps (NSKK), a German transport organization, went to Poland and Russia, returned with frozen hands and feet, found work in Marseille in a German-contracted oil refinery, which he deserted at the liberation—only to work for the Americans during what some briefly called "a second occupation." Like the others he lived from day to day, trimming his sails to the wind.[30]

[29] AD $M^{6}10985$, prefect to minister of interior, July 1942; Beauquier; Archives Nationales, $F^{1}CIII$ 1143, prefect report, August 1942; AD 5W144, A. Ber——; AD 5W143, F. Ba——; AD 5W146, C. Bl——; AD 5W165, P. Ga——.

[30] Archives Nationales, $F^{7}15304$, reports of ministry of prisoners, deportees and refugees, October 3, 1945, $F^{7}15897$, prefect, Indre-et-Loire, to regional prefect, July 22,

Other collaborators tried to escape. Dissatisfied with their lot, they found departure more to their liking than collective protests braving German reprisals. They could go to Germany; among *marseillais* volunteering for work there, escape as a motive was second only to the need for work itself. A factory worker left for Germany in March 1943, he declared, "on a sudden whim, after an argument with my wife." A railroad employee abandoned his job at the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer (SNCF) and to escape his employers' wrath went to Germany, where they would not, he felt, come after him. A pipefitter left for Germany after a drunken row with his fiancée. These were not men of conviction. All deserted their new jobs across the Rhine, returned, and joined the Resistance—but only at the Liberation.[31]

Escape could also drive such men into one of the most extreme forms of collaboration possible, military collaboration. The distant Russian front put most of Europe between themselves and a wretched life at home, a domestic quarrel, a criminal prosecution, boredom, poverty. In Grenoble an unemployed nineteen-year-old joined the French Waffen-SS unit after an argument with his father; earlier he had been arrested for breaking the window of a suspected collaborator, earlier still for trying to reach the Free French in Algeria. He was adrift, an urban Lucien Lacombe. In Marseille a seventeen-year-old from a broken family, brought up in various state *pensionnats,* just out of prison after a conviction for black marketeering, joined the Waffen-SS "in a moment of despair." Another seventeen-year-old in the city joined after losing his job and quarreling with his mother and stepfather. Evidence from Marseille suggests that a quarter of the volunteers for the Legion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchévisme and a fifth of those for the French Waffen-SS unit joined simply to get away. Sometimes these collaborator-fugitives tried work in Germany as well as war in Russia, returning from one to try out the other, creatures of impulse jumping at short-term solutions.[32]

Longer-term measures—organized dissent, some attempt to bring pressure to bear on French or German authorities, collective change—were not their forte. The resisters protested; they adapted.

* * *

"I knew some Lucien Lacombes," wrote a critic when the film came out. "They were not in the Gestapo but in the *maquis:* and the weapons they

1944, and F^{7}15303, *renseignements généraux,* Seine-et-Oise report, August 9, 1945; AD 500U119, A. Red——, February 14, 1946.

[31] AD 500U124, R. Str——, May 2, 1946; AD500U12, J Com——, November 7, 1945; AD500U72, J. Vin——, March 12, 1945.

[32] AD500U158, L. Mos——, February 28, 1946; AD500U153, J. Pia——, November 29, 1945; AD500U88, C. Amb——, February 25, 1946; Jankowski, p. 128, n. 21.

brandished brought them the same compensation (the taste of power, the will to be important, easy women and money at hand)."[33] The new deck and the new deal of foreign occupation promised quick gain to a few players—the sudden acquisition of power or riches.

Some resisters acted out of greed—criminal greed, attracted by the novel possibilities of apparent anarchy and revolt. Gangsters hired themselves out to the Resistance to inform on their counterparts on the other side and occasionally to eliminate them. During the fighting at the Liberation in Marseille a famous *caïd* of the milieu invaded the local PPF headquarters, and an important informer for the resistance among the collaborators was a known procurer living off the prostitution of his wife. Some *passeurs* guiding resisters across mountains or demarcation lines extracted exorbitant sums for their services. But they were black sheep. Profits in the Resistance were incommensurate to the risks; the two most famous gangsters in Marseille, briefly tempted, quickly thought better of it. The first *maquisards* in the Gard fleeing the STO found themselves rubbing elbows with a few black marketeers, gangsters, and even blackmailers, curious or cynical or themselves on the run. They did not stay long, finding the hardships more than they could bear. A black marketeer from Marseille joined the nascent *maquis* in the Hautes-Alpes in March 1943, left it with a few others to form a gang of thieves, fell into *maquis* hands twice, escaped twice, and eventually became a German agent and gave away his former fellows. Near Limoges, the Swiss consular agent reported, a few of the *maquisards* were uncontrolled terrorists, burning down houses for no apparent reason.[34] But they, too, were exceptional, profiteers in a nonprofit organization.

Crime, in the countersociety of the *maquis,* sprang from survival. In the Gard hungry *maquisards* fed themselves at first by raiding a nearby youth camp and holding up black market meat dealers. Near Pressac in Charente they bought some supplies with small payments and large IOUs, but they stole clothing and arms and state-rationed items—coffee, sugar, tobacco—wherever they could find them, from a nearby Vichy-run officers' school, from the local headquarters of the Légion and the Milice, from town halls. At once predators and fugitives, they inspired fear as well as sympathy in the surrounding country: "They [the local inhabitants] doubtless [would have] preferred to see us elsewhere to judge from the unbelievable terror seizing

[33] Richard Marienstras, "Des intrus dans le Lot: Le 'drôle de jeu' de Louis Malle et de Lacombe Lucien," *Le Nouvel Observateur,* no. 485 (February 25, 1974), pp. 48–49.

[34] AD (n. 14 above) 500U128, J. Pad——, May 31, 1946; AD500U92, J. Poz——, May 22, 1946; P. Paillole, *Services spéciaux, 1935–1945* (Geneva, 1978), pp. 101–3; Vielzeuf (n. 14 above), pp. 33, 42; AD 500U84, E. Pie——, December 10, 1945; Hoover Archives (n. 14 above), box 10, report dated June 30, 1944.

them [when] we went through their towns and villages."[35] Near Orléans the *maquis* raided local town halls for ration cards and false papers to give incoming *réfractaires*. In Britanny the *maquis* of Spezet stole food from the château of a local marquis, tobacco from vans on the road, ration tickets from the town hall of St. Goazec—crime of a sort, the consequence of their self-imposed lockout, but not the motive for their resistance.[36]

Yet crime did motivate collaboration. As the occupants settled in, criminals moved in to prey on the *occupés*. Bounty hunters reaped German rewards for turning in Jews, *réfractaires*, and resisters; blackmailers and impostors extorted sums from their frightened compatriots; thugs and hooligans enjoyed their hour in the sun. For them collaboration was an aspect of crime; for the *maquisards* crime was an aspect of resistance.

In Paris many of the operators in the Bony and Laffont gang of the rue Lauriston had prior criminal convictions when they went to work for the Gestapo. They had been arrested at one time or another for theft, embezzlement, assaulting the police, *vagabondage qualifié* or *spécial*. In Marseille hunters of Jews and *réfractaires*—already de facto criminals—routinely blackmailed and robbed their prey. In the Indre-et-Loire the prefect called the Milice and the PPF "veritable gangsters . . . [carrying out] veritable operations of banditry for their own profit," and in Nancy and Orléans and Bordeaux his colleagues had little better to say of them. Sometimes they roamed the streets wild West style, armed and drunk, threatening passers-by and firing revolvers into the air. Petty thieves in German pay boasted of their newfound rank: a black marketeer just out of prison caroused openly with a former fellow-inmate, an escapee: "We had apértifs together almost every day . . . he couldn't give a damn about the Police, because he has more powerful protectors." And agents flashing Sicherheitsdienst identity cards—swaggering nobodies whose hour had come—provoked and insulted the French police in the cafés and métros of Paris.[37]

After the Liberation collaborators took flight and resisters exulted in the streets. Mice became cats. People began to complain that some FFI were acting like the "gangsters" of the Milice and the PPF. Small-time operators even began trafficking in false FFI cards, charging from five to ten thousand francs, whatever they could get, for the newly desirable identity pieces. SD

[35] Hoover Archives, box 10, reports on the maquis de Pressac, August 1945 (folders 14 and 20).

[36] Hoover Archives, box 10, report on Orléans (post-Liberation), and box 11, report of war ministry, fourth military region (post-Liberation).

[37] Archives Nationales, F^{7}15303, *renseignements généraux* (file 89), and F^{7}14897, prefect to regional prefect (Angers), July 22, 1944, and reports of prefects in Nancy, Bordeaux, and Orléans, November 12, 1943, July 17, 1944, and December 11, 1943, respectively.

cards were now worse than useless.[38] Criminal greed, ever adaptable, changed sides. It went where the opportunity lay—during the occupation with the occupiers, during the Liberation with the liberators.

Less obviously criminal, less parasitical, but just as greedy were some of the collaborators in commerce and industry, from the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas in Paris—the most deeply implicated bank—to a miller, a heating systems entrepreneur, and a baker in Marseille, all trading profitably on the black market with the occupiers. Some bankers found the new temptations irresistible: loans to companies working for the Germans, joint Franco-German ventures, sales of shares at inflated prices to German buyers, all justified by the raison d'être of a bank, profit. Like industrialists and entrepreneurs who did well out of their German contracts, the financiers pleaded *force majeure* after the Liberation. But rich balance sheets belied their claims of constraint and duress, and sometimes the evidence was incontrovertible: the first approach had come from the French side. Other employers complied only under a real or implied threat, to their employees or themselves, of deportation: they stood somewhere between the collaborators and the expropriated. On the other side matters were simpler. There was little profit in the Resistance. Probably late in the day—after the Normandy landings—some banks began financing the Resistance, but by then the Resistance was imminently triumphant, imminently obsolete. Businessmen and entrepreneurs had joined Combat or Movements Unis de la Résistance (MUR) or the FFI, but they had little to gain, and some, like Maurice Chevance, who gave up his shipping business in Marseille, had sacrificed their profits to their patriotism. Resistance unlike collaboration rarely satisfied greed.[39]

* * *

"No ideological or political sentiment motivates the behaviour of this boy. Such problems are beyond him," thought one critic of *Lacombe, Lucien.* Louis Malle agreed: "The theme which interested me essentially was how someone who had no ideological motivation could end up in the fascist camp." And so he reaped the whirlwind when a few critics dared to proclaim

[38] AD M^{6}13300, *renseignements généraux* reports of September 1944.

[39] Anne Lacroix-Ruiz, "Les grandes banques françaises de la collaboration à l'épuration," *RHDGM,* vol. 36, nos. 141–42 (January and April 1986); AD 500U107, K. Tou——, 500U78, M. Cou——, 500U140, P. Phi——; Frenay (n. 4 above), 1:41–42; H. Noguères, *Histoire de la résistance,* 2d ed. (Geneva, 1981), 1:157; cf. also the entry "Collaboration économique," in H. Rousso, *La Collaboration* (Paris, 1987), pp. 58–62.

resisters no different from his apolitical antihero. "It was only in the communist resistance," wrote one of them, "that ideas were touted and society rebuilt. Elsewhere the young peasants who had 'joined' after the landings in Normandy did not, emphatically not, have political minds or souls." Ideas, political or not—whom did they move?[40]

In their propaganda and recruitment drives the organizers of resistance groups reminded their compatriots of duty or country or belief, abstractions half effaced by the banal preoccupations of occupation life. Even the appeals to potential victims of the STO included such moralistic *aides-mémoire*. In Brive, within days of the armistice, the first resisters distributed crudely mimeographed sheets quoting Péguy on the need to resist and on the ignominy of resignation. In Marseille the local Combat leader started with newsheets but graduated to mimeographed bulletins and finally to printed newspapers. Small production and distribution networks sprang up—typically, near Alès, in the spring of 1941, one man to supply typewriters and stencils, one man to keep them, another to supply paper, others to distribute the tracts, all governed by a raison d'être—to get the word out. Even the violent resisters, those who sabotaged military or industrial installations, left political literature on the scene to mark their cause, as a leader of the Marseille *groupes francs* (commandos) recalled shortly after the war: " 'Action must be linked to propaganda' . . . operations were carried out against the enemy and his collaborators. The purpose of propaganda was to exploit them [the operations], to make them known, to bring the public to draw conclusions from them."[41] The leaders of the Resistance were proselytizers, trying to develop at least tacit mass support for their ideas.

Support came, but as a Gallic salad of arguments and beliefs and competing utopias. Resisters pitted their views of the national interest against those of their fellows, united only in their determination to expel the occupier. Some even spurned patriotism, the *sine qua non* of resistance according to the late doyen of its history. Anarchists in the Var put out broadsheets in their bicycle shop urging workers to revolt against everything—against the country, the Swastika, the Red Star, the Cross of Lorraine, the Francisque.[42] Fomented by

[40] Baroncelli (n. 25 above); "'Lacombe, Lucien' et l'occupation: Louis Malle s'explique, René Andrieu conteste," *L'humanité dimanche* (April 3, 1974), pp. 19–22; Marienstras (n. 33 above).

[41] Noguères, *Histoire de la résistance*, vol. 1, app. 1; Frenay, p. 110; AD 5W175, H. Maz—— et al.; M. Baudoin, *Histoire des Groupes Francs (M.U.R.) des Bouches-du-Rhône* (Paris, 1962), p. 73.

[42] H. Michel, "The Psychology of the French Resister," *Journal of Contemporary History* 5, no. 3 (1970): 159–75—the problem with this of course is that patriotism also explains *Pétainisme;* AD 5W141 M. Ar—— et al.

one side or another, intrinsic or incidental to resistance itself, ideological strife set resisters against each other, and sometimes the historians have emulated their subjects.

Below the jungle of convictions lay a tangle of associational roots and prior attachments. Shortly after the Liberation one of the organizers of the *maquis* in the Isère recalled his exasperation at "the existence of multiple individualisms [*particularismes*] created by the sensitivities of seniority or parochial chauvinism":[43] resisters proclaimed their shared ancestries, kept prewar associations going, even resurrected dead ones.

Their associations could be political, like those of the communists or of the socialists, as one of them recorded in 1944—"Who started? Where and when? It would be difficult indeed to say, since we found out later that in many places the socialist sections . . . had remade themselves without receiving any order." And, as another recalled in 1976: "For me the problem is simple; I have only to go and look up the section secretaries of the *Jeunesses Socialistes,* with whom, moreover, my contacts remain friendly . . . they agree without difficulty [to enter the resistance]." Or they could be military: the Organisation de Résistance de l'Armée (ORA) gathered steam throughout 1943, swelling its ranks with officers already in the *maquis* or dispersed after the dissolution of the *armée de l'armistice* in November 1942. In Clermont-Ferrand, officers at the headquarters of the thirteenth military division began stockpiling their arms and laying their plans on November 11, the day the Germans invaded the southern zone; in the Aude, the following month, a lieutenant began gathering other demobilized officers around him; in the Maine-et-Loire a naval officer began assembling "other sailors, infantrymen, cavalrymen, [military] engineers, artillerymen, airmen, officers and non-commissioned officers." These were the nuclei of the ORA, which developed later elsewhere—in the Eure, the Ain, the Dordogne, and the Alpes-Maritimes, for example—in the summer or autumn of 1943 and later still disappeared into the Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (FFI). Escaped or repatriated prisoners of war also coalesced in the spring of 1943 into an umbrella resistance group, the Rassemblement National des Prisonniers de Guerre, thrown together from spontaneous local groups and from the shambles of Vichy's own prisoners' organization.[44] Like the idle officers, they instinctively reassembled.

[43] Hoover Archives, box 11, item 386, report of Le Ray ("Bastide"), p. 12.

[44] R. Verdier, *La vie clandestine du parti socialiste* (Paris, 1944), p. 7; M. Jouanneau, "Les Mouvements Unis de la Résistance dans le département de l'Indre," *RHDGM* (n. 5 above) 26, no. 103 (July 1976): 27–50; Hoover Archives (n. 14 above), box 11, reports on ORA, and box 17, *Historique de la création et des activités du rassemblement national des prisonniers de guerre.*

Or the associations could be religious. Left-wing catholics put out a first clandestine paper in the autumn of 1940, in Marseille, and a year later in Lyon the largest religious resistance group of the war, Témoignage Chrétien, issued its first *cahier*—no mimeographed broadsheet but a seventeen-page printed booklet: "France: Beware Not to Lose Your Soul." Témoignage Chrétien reconciled religion with resistance. One of its southern leaders, from a convent school and a Pétainiste family, declared that resistance for her was a "veritable commitment which seemed finally to reconcile my [inner] contradictions."[45] The Jews, forced into resistance and a fight for survival, perhaps resembled the *maquisards* more than Catholic or Protestant resisters, but like them they asserted a collective religious identity—their papers now spoke of that identity, and the Organisation Juive de Combat survived the war to lend support to Jews (and, later, Israelis) fighting in Palestine.[46] Spiritual or denominational kinship inspired resistance.

Finally, the associations could be occupational. In Clermont-Ferrand, members of the exiled University of Strasbourg resurrected their "captive university" as a resistance as well as a pedagogical organization. Three of its professors led Combat in the town, a fourth led the Armée Secrète, another led the regional communist Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP), another founded Libération; students went into the commando groups; doctors from the medical school joined the *maquis*. Eight professors and a hundred students were deported, taken from various resistance groups but remembered *en masse* late in 1945 by a professor of the Faculté des Lettres.[47] In Marseille 180 students from the lycées and the university had joined MUR by November 1943. Likewise, police got together: in Marseille their local bar became the headquarters of the O'Leary organization, which repatriated downed English airmen. Boy scouts got together too, as did railway workers, and schoolteachers, and many others. Even *maquisards* with nothing in common save their fear of the STO claimed a common ancestry. In Provence they invoked a real or legendary past of Robin Hood–like hinterland outlawry. And their younger fellows, exempt from the STO, succumbed to the contagion of camaraderie. True, after the Liberation a few resisters spoke of solitude and even ostracism. In 1952 Alban Vistel, who had led the FFI in the Rhône-Alps region, recalled the resister's "solitude." Later, Emmanuel d'Astier de la

[45] R. Bédarida, *Témoignage Chrétien: Les armes de l'esprit, 1941–1944* (Paris, 1977), pp. 23, 47; M. Baudoin, "Témoins de la résistance en région II," 3 vols. (thèse pour le doctorat d'état, Université de Provence Aix-Marseille, 1977), 1:203.

[46] Compare, e.g., R. Poznanski, "La résistance juive en France," *RHDGM* 35, no. 137 (January 1985): 3–32.

[47] Hoover Archives, box 12, transcript of remarks by S. Lassus, November 22, 1945, on the reopening of the University of Strasbourg.

Vigerie, the former leader of Libération, told Marcel Ophuls in "The Sorrow and the Pity" that "one could only be a resister if one was maladjusted." Alban Vistel almost forgot that all resisters instinctively sought and found fellows, Ophuls that every avant-garde lives off its admirers.[48]

Loyalties could reinforce or undermine or cut across one another in patterns that await their historian—some railway workers were also communists, for example, and noncommunist Jews were sometimes at odds with their communist coreligionists. Surely the theme of *résistance et sociabilité* would repay further research. Freemasons and Alsaciens-Lorrains recruited for Franc-Tireur, and the students and faculty of the Sorbonne protested the arrest of Professeur Langevin in November 1940: acts of collective self-defense. Isolated Christians linked themselves through radio broadcasts, isolated *réfractaires* through organizations like the Organisation Civile et Militaire (OCM) or the ORA: instruments of association. The *maquisards* invoked ancient memories—in the Cevennes the Camisard Roland, in the Limousin the peasant rebel Jacquou le Croquant, in the Haut-Jura Capitaine Prost, "Lacuzon de Longchaumois": mobilizing myths, the legends of the local past.[49]

Surely, then, Maurice Agulhon's insights into intermediary groups, those between the family and the state, would illuminate the opaque history of the resistance and its members. "Politics . . . were everywhere practised using groups initially not conceived for that purpose . . . the number and vitality of associations in a [rural] collectivity is an index of its tonus, of its will to exist as such"—surely such findings outlive the nineteenth century of their author's eye.[50]

[48] Baudoin, "Témoins de la résistance en région II," 1:226; AD 500U172, P. Fa——, July 3, 1946; J.-M. Guillon, "Le maquis: Une résurgence du banditisme social?" *Provence Historique* 37, no. 137 (January–March 1987): 57–67; Alban Vistel, "Les fondements spirituels de la Résistance," *Esprit* 10 (October 1952): 480–92; M. Ophuls, *Le chagrin et la pitié* (Paris, 1980), p. 143. H. R. Kedward refutes d'Astier's remark in *Resistance in Vichy France,* 2d ed. (Oxford, 1983), pp. 76–77.

[49] D. Veillon, *Le Franc-Tireur: Un journal clandestin, un mouvement de Résistance (1940–1944)* (Paris, 1977), pp. 165–67; R. Josse, "La naissance de la Résistance à Paris," *RHDGM* 12, no. 47 (July 1962): 1–32; F. Bédarida and R. Bédarida, "Une résistance spirituelle: Aux origines du 'Témoignage Chrétien,' 1941–1942," *RHDGM* 16, no. 61 (January 1966): 3–33; cf. e.g., P. Clémendot, "Les maquis des Vosges," *RHDGM* 14, no. 55 (July 1964): 81–98; Lt.-Col. Pavelet, "Des Camisards aux maquisards," *Revue historique de l'armée* 3 (1956): 32–34; G. Guingouin and G. Monédiaire, *Georges Guingouin, premier maquisard de France* (about the Limousin) (Limoges, 1983), p. 191; F. Marcot, *La Résistance dans le Jura* (Besançon, 1985), p. 174.

[50] M. Agulhon and M. Bodiguel, *Les associations au village* (Le Paradou, 1981), pp. 23, 53–54.

But applied to the collaborators of the occupation they would yield nonsense—for most collaborators obeyed neither ideas nor associational loyalties. Most entered the occupier's service for selfish and not collective motives, for banal, material, humdrum considerations, for money or bounty or employment or security or escape. They did not drive trucks or extract weeds from generals' gardens out of any burning commitment to the New Order in Europe. Their lives were governed by appetites of the hour.

A few true believers, the élites, made most of the noise and so won the attention of onlookers then and of historians later. Intellectual historians have studied the likes of Brasillach and Rebatet and the crowd at Je Suis Partout, and political historians have written of Doriot and Deat and the other Paris ultras. They and their subalterns attacked Vichy for *attentisme* and faintheartedness, losing all restraint in lands where Vichy's writ did not run—at a PPF meeting in Epinal, for example, successive local leaders denounced Vichy's leaders for losing North Africa and Corsica, its prefects and subprefects for "detesting" the Germans, its police for tolerating "terrorists."[51] These were committed fascists, men of conviction, and they turned up in most of the collaborationist organizations, among the leaders of the ultra parties and occasionally among the military volunteers; the Christian de la Mazière of "The Sorrow and the Pity" is their best-known spokesman.

But elsewhere, among the rank and file, the level of conviction is doubtful. Evidence across the country points not to ideologues but to opportunists. In Nancy very few collaborators declared their views or their colors—a handful of journalists, few others. Post-Liberation trial dossiers in Orléans and Marseille reveal the primacy of personal over ideological motives—of vengeance or greed or ambition or survival. In Rennes they likewise reveal the dominance of self-interest, monetary or other.[52] And declared Germanophilia could camouflage self-interest. In Rennes a local businessman went to work for the Gestapo from the earliest days of the occupation; his Paris offices doubled as the STO headquarters; he entertained German officers at home with dances and revelry. But he also sold black market wine and liqueurs to his new masters, objects of his interested if not disingenuous support. In Paris a naturalized Frenchwoman living near Montmartre denounced resisters and became known as an ardent nazi, but she also transformed her apartment into a museum of pornographic engravings and a pleasure den for German officers.

[51] Archives Nationales, F^{7}14897, Préfet des Vosges to Interior, November 12, 1943.

[52] P. Barral, "La Lorraine pendant la guerre," *RHDGM* 27, no. 105 (January 1977): 3–8; Jean Goueffon, "La cour de justice d'Orléans (1944–1945)," *RHDGM* 33, no. 130 (April 1983): 51–64; Jankowski (n. 15 above); C.-L. Foulon, "L'opinion, la Résistance et le pouvoir," *RHDGM* 30, no. 117 (January 1980): 75–100.

In Marseille a German-speaking Swiss hotel employee openly fraternized with German officers but in so doing exempted fellow employees from the STO, using one set of friends to help another.[53] Pétainiste patriotism led men and women into organizations like the Légion or the Amicale de France but rarely into full-time German service. Even many *miliciens* initially hoped for money or escape or safety from the STO. After the Liberation a few surviving volunteers of the Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchévisme (LVF) and Waffen-SS blamed Vichy for their folly, singling out Pétain's ill-fated single declaration that "you are carrying part of French military honor." But such belated professions of faith were exceptional as well as suspiciously similar in their formulaic phrases. In both the LVF and the Waffen-SS the marginal and the desperate swamped the idealistic, and Vichy allowed rather than provoked their enlistment.[54] Their motives, like those of other collaborators, were practical and not abstract.

No wider loyalty could govern so expedient a choice. Collaborators acted out of individual interest and so displayed a Protean diversity in their actions. "That there were almost as many forms of collaboration as collaborators," writes Henri Amouroux, "is obvious enough."[55] If they expressed loyalty to the organizations they joined, like Todt or the LVF or the Rassemblement National Populaire (RNP), they only made a virtue of necessity, for these were artificial wartime creations lacking ancestry as well as progeny, promoting leaders and feeding followers. Only the PPF and the Francistes antedated the occupation—by four and seven years. But the PPF probably lost many of its original members while gaining new ones as it slid into the mire of collaboration, and the Francistes had ceased to exist between 1936 and 1940.[56] Prior attachments were irrelevant: the collaborator was the quintessential loner.

And so the rootless, the drifters, the criminals and idlers, the *marginaux,* discolored collaboration while barely tarnishing resistance. In the Ariège they formed the shock troops of the Milice, a "sub-proletariat not wanting in Lacombe Lucien[s] and dubious elements." In Marseille they soon took over the PPF, and their number was always high in the LVF. But of 298 people arrested in the city for anti-Vichy or anti-German agitation between July 1940

[53] Archives Nationales, F^{7}15303, Sûreté Nationale to Cour de Justice (Seine), September 24, 1945, and *renseignements généraux* note on M. Ber——; Ad 500U213, J. Y—— (non-lieu).

[54] Compare, e.g., Archives Nationales, F^{7}15304, cases described in *renseignements généraux* report of October 5, 1945; Jankowski, chap. 7, passim.

[55] H. Amouroux, *La grande histoire des Français sous l'occupation* (Paris, 1978), 3:471.

[56] J.-P. Brunet, *Doriot: Du communisme à la collaboration* (Paris, 1986), pp. 436–38; and Jankowski, pp. 100 ff.

and December 1941, only sixteen were unemployed; of the sample of 313 political internees in Provence, only eight were unemployed and five of these were housewives. Only nine had prior criminal records.[57] Here at least numbers support what anecdotes merely imply—that resisters rarely, collaborators often, drifted in from the margins of society; that the roots of the one underlay a sense of purpose, the rootlessness of the other an abiding aimlessness; and that the semi-fictional Lucien Lacombe, without attachment to family or church or party or village—"his only real love is hunting," as one critic said—is also the unfictional and unvarnished collaborator of forty-five years ago.[58]

* * *

In short, the sense of a wider interest, the daily pursuit of remote rather than immediate satisfactions, distinguished the resister from the collaborator.

No other characteristic so consistently set them apart from each other. Not class: the fragmentary evidence belies the quasi-religious convictions of Sartre, for example, or of left-wing critics of *Lacombe, Lucien* who denounced the film for attacking the working class and its director for ignoring "the ruling circles, who for class reasons acclaimed the 'divine surprise' of 1940, sought collaboration and profited from it."[59] The social and occupational data, such as they are, amount to a royal muddle on both sides. The sample of 313 resisters from Provence interned by French police reveals a

[57] A. Laurens, "Le phénomène milicien en Ariège et l'évolution de sa représentation dans l'opinion," *RHDGM* (n. 5 above) 33, no. 131 (July 1983): 3–23; and P. Laborie's comment on Laurens in the same issue, "La Milice en Ariège: La collaboration et son engrenage," pp. 113–15; statistics compiled from AD (n. 14 above) M[6]11292, prefect's reports of arrests for "menées antinationales."

[58] Baroncelli (n. 25 above); Zygmunt Bauman, in *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989), might seem to take the opposite view in discussing the participants, direct or indirect, in the Holocaust and the few who resisted it. In a cogent critique of the notion that "whatever moral instinct is to be found in human conduct is socially produced" (p. 4), he argues of those who resisted that "their moral conscience was truly their own personal attribute" while of those who participated that their "immorality . . . had to be socially produced" (p. 168). But for the latter this meant rendering them morally indifferent, which in turn meant subverting "communally-sustained attitudes" toward the victims of the Holocaust (p. 185). And the morality of those who resisted, manipulated but not produced by society, he argues, stems from a "pre-societal" condition of "being with others" (pp. 179–83). While not marginal to the Nazi state, the participants had to be marginalized with respect to the rest. It may boil down to the meaning of "social," which Bauman appears to read as "organized from above" while I wish to emphasize "associational roots" growing from below—those that a Nazi state would seek to destroy.

[59] "'Lacombe Lucien' de Malle Louis: Un film pétainiste," *L'humanité rouge* (February 21, 1974); René Andrieu in *L'humanité dimanche* (n. 40 above).

strong working-class element. But the sample reflects Vichy's predilection for arresting communists. Bourgeois—businessmen, engineers, lawyers, doctors—founded the OCM. Preliminary social analyses elsewhere reveal the bourgeois proportionately outnumbering the lower middle and working classes in the Somme resistance and constituting thirty of the thirty-one *commissaires de la République,* the resistance leaders, as well as 141 of a sample of 173 lay members of Témoignage Chrétien. Conversely, varying mixtures of working and lower middle class and unemployed elements turned up among the collaborators in studies of the Nord, the Somme, the Var, and the Côte d'Or, for example, as did numerous shopkeepers on both sides in the Ille-et-Vilaine. They further weaken the case for class-based explanations, so often ideologically and so rarely empirically inspired.[60]

As for politics, many resisters and collaborators had no political past, proclaimed no political beliefs, shunned politics altogether. Among the leaders politics were of the essence, but peacetime allegiances cut across wartime choices. Sometimes leftists of 1930, like Doriot or Deat, not to mention Laval, collaborated while rightists like Marin or Vallin, not to mention De Gaulle, resisted. The political animals among their followers, those acknowledging a partisan past, came from all over the political spectrum: former communists in the PPF, former socialists in the RNP, former royalists and *ligueurs,* probably, in the Milice. Eighteen resisters profiled in a study of the unoccupied zone present a mosaic of earlier loyalties: six communists, four nonpartisan leftists, two socialists, one nonpartisan rightist, one Christian Democrat, one *personnaliste,* one *Républicain Indépendant,* one radical, one indeterminate.[61] Intuition and even plausibility may call up a working-class resistance, but empirical inquiry disposes of the Manichaean simplicities reducing one side to the bourgeois and the other to the proletarian,

[60] Statistics compiled from arrest records in AD 5W141-190; A. Calmette, "La formation de l'O.C.M. (Organisation civile et militaire) août 1940–mars 1942," *RHDGM* 35 (July 1959): 1–24; D. Duverlie, *Les Picards devant l'occupation allemande,* cited in A. Daumard, *Les bourgeois et la bourgeoisie en France* (Paris, 1987), p. 301; C.-L. Foulon, *Le pouvoir en province à la libération* (Paris, 1975), p. 79, table; Bédarida (n. 45 above), p. 278, table; M. E. Dejonghe, "Aspects du régime d'occupation dans le Nord et le Pas-de-Calais durant la seconde guerre mondiale," *Revue du Nord* 53, no. 209 (April–June 1971): 253–66; D. Duverlie, "Amiens sous l'occupation allemande," *Revue du Nord* 64, no. 252 (January–March 1982): 145–72; J.-M. Guillon, "Les mouvements de collaboration dans le Var," *RHDGM* 29, no. 113 (January 1979): 91–110; P. Gounand, "Les groupements de collaboration dans une ville française occupée: Dijon," *RHDGM* 23, no. 91 (July 1973): 48–56; J. Sainclivier, "Sociologie de la Résistance: Quelques aspects méthodologiques et leur application en Ille-et-Vilaine," *RHDGM* 30, no. 117 (January 1980): 33–74.

[61] Kedward (n. 48 above), pp. 250–85.

one to the Right and the other to the Left, one to black and the other to white.[62]

But in the gray areas of personalities and mentalities a pattern emerges, setting long-term against short-term thinking, conviction against convenience, the collective against the selfish. As long as French authorities did not stand in the way there was nothing to stop the opportunists from exploiting the German presence, no inner voice or inhibition or *arrière-pensée*. For after the handshake at Montoire, Vichy corrupted passively, absolving rather than inspiring direct collaboration, perhaps facilitating it by example. Vichy's very existence, more damning than its deeds, attenuated the notion of treason. To the uncritical minds of the rank-and-file collaborators, to the gardeners and chambermaids and small-time adventurers of one kind or another, silence implied consent, and they asked no questions of authority or of themselves. "What do I care about what only matters to me" [*que m'importe ce qui n'importe qu'à moi*][63]—André Malraux's question, twenty-five years after his own actions as Colonel Berger, would only have baffled them. But resisters would have understood.

Few in the population at large stopped to ask themselves such a question. But few were imbecilic enough to enter enemy service. Most avoided danger and dishonor alike: the French people survived, some more expediently than others, in weakening circles of commitment around a tiny intense center of resistance.

Sometimes they defied description: the *maître-chanteur,* once a policeman in Cahors, then a private detective in Nîmes, then a "resister" in Paris and near Bordeaux, who fed military disinformation to the Germans but also pocketed the handsome sums they paid him for it—patriot or profiteer, resister or collaborator?[64] There were other dark horses. But mostly the level of commitment betrayed the mental mix, as a batallion leader in the Vercors recalled: "Certainly all France, with a few exceptions, was on our side, even though many underestimated the value of direct action, but rare were those who had truly decided to cut their links to that human concern for bourgeois security which is so natural to us." Those few, the *maquisards* or *groupes francs* living on the run, relied on a first circle of "friends" living legally but

[62] Compare P. Novick, *The Resistance versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France* (New York, 1968), p. 15: "Resistance was an *individual* phenomenon, based more often on temperamental than ideological considerations"; and H. Michel, "Une feuille clandestine: 'Arc,' " *RHDGM* 8, no. 30 (April 1958): 23–32: "The founders' first reaction is that of character as much as intellect" (p. 25).

[63] A. Malraux, *Antimémoires* (Paris, 1967), p. 10.

[64] Archives Nationales, F^{7}15303, Police, Marseille, to *renseignements généraux*, Paris, February 10, 1948.

riskily: the government employees in the Loiret and the Isère and Haute-Savoie handing out thousands of false ration, identity, and demobilization cards to camouflage the *réfractaires,* foiling the administration of the STO, planning for the post-D-Day insurrection; the seventy-seven-year-old retired captain lending his "château" in the Gard to the local *maquis;* the farmers in the Eure and elsewhere hiding allied airmen and housing *maquisards.* Around the "friends" ran the active well-wishers, more numerous, less consequential, less audacious, one night putting up a resister or one day joining a demonstration, lending their support without risking their lives.[65] In Marseille some tram employees placed a wreath at a local monument with the words "France for ever" and then went to a café after being dispersed by police. One was on his way to buy fishing supplies when he joined the procession. In St. Jean-du-Gard the Germans began sweeping up hostile broadsheets scattered in the village streets after they had destroyed a nearby *maquisard* camp. In Nîmes a local printer, Gaullist as well as socialist, regularly held forth in the Grand Café and called Pétain a traitor; Vichy's police briefly assigned him to residence.[66] Around the vocal well-wishers teemed the silent masses, practical yet patriotic, as René Rémond writes, "whose 'waiting it out' [*attentisme*] had never excluded hostility to the occupier and whose sympathies increasingly went to those who were fighting him." And around them ran a ring of gainsayers and naysayers, their fragile security threatened by the busybodies of the resistance, their numbers dwindling as the months went by. In Périgord peasants at first held their peace, wanted nothing to do with the *maquis,* and in the Isère they openly condemned the Vercors batallion leader and his friends, no more than "a slender phalanx of phantoms," he recalled, through much of 1943. "You're making war on the French more than on our enemies," an old villager told the soldier-resister, and he and his like presage the distant outer circle.[67]

For around them, finally, ran the rim of collaborators, the Lucien Lacombes, marginals without conviction or inner radar: the wretched lot, as Louis Malle said, "who [had] no political conscience because they were not given one."[68]

[65] Hoover Archives (n. 14 above), box 11, reports of Le Ray ("Bastide") war ministry reports on the Eure and the Mayenne, n.d., post-Liberation (items 353, 354, 359), and box 10, reports from the Loiret (item 289); Vielzeuf (n. 14 above), p. 155.

[66] AD (n. 14 above) 5W152, A. Ce—— et al.; Vielzeuf, p. 76; AD 5W149, E. Bru——.

[67] R. Rémond, *Notre Siècle: 1918–1988* (Paris, 1988), p. 331; G. Pénaud, *Histoire de la Résistance en Périgord* (Périgueux, 1985), p. 105; Hoover Archives, box 11, report of Le Ray ("Bastide").

[68] Malle (n. 40 above).