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The task of reconstructing political identity in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) is influenced by the former polity's unique transition experience of 'democratization through unification' with the pre-existing Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1990. Special features of contemporary eastern German identity derive from a dual historical context consisting of the memory of life under state socialism and the memory and continuing experience of the FRG as reference culture. Various expressions of distinctive eastern German identity can be identified: the 'third way' socialism which originated with the 'peaceful revolution' of 1989; the 'Trotzidentität' (identity of contrariness); 'Ostalgia' (nostalgia for the East Germany of the past) and 'Ossi' pride, a self-aware, positive response to the derisive western stereotype of the 'whingeing' easterner. The last form has the greatest potential to sustain itself as a live and lasting expression of separate easternness within a united Germany.

The GDR's 'Democratization Through Unification' and the Loss of Political Identity

In the context of the east European democratic transitions taking place since the late 1980s, the experience of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) has been unique. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe followed a pattern of transition carried by internal opposition forces, often under negotiation with the communist leading forces. Following the mass protests of the GDR 'peaceful revolution' in the last months of 1989, the GDR deviated from this pattern. The peaceful revolution moved almost seamlessly into the process of German unification, culminating in the Unification Treaty of 3 October 1990. Preoccupied with securing its preferred terms for German unification through the fast-moving developments of 1989–90, the former FRG progressively marginalized both the 'establishment' Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the challenger movements within the former GDR. In consequence, the process of transition within the GDR became secondary to, and eventually almost synonymous with, the FRG-directed unification process.

Contrasting this experience with the East European model of democratic transition, Offe characterizes the GDR experience as a 'transformation from the outside'. He argues that the mode of decision making within the process reduced the GDR to an object of political strategy of the FRG. In the Central and East European transitions, the subject and object of the transformation were one and the same, with each country conducting its own transformation on its own terms. In the German case, though, the FRG was the subject of the transformation and the GDR the object.[1] A potentially self-directed democratic transition within the GDR was submerged under a conflict of interest with the FRG's aims for a democratic unification of the two Germanies. For the GDR, this was to result in a unique process of democratic transition through unification.

Most significant for the democratization of the former GDR was the nature of this conflict of interest. Throughout the post-war period, the former FRG and GDR had been bitter ideological rivals; states established in opposition to one another and embodying the cold war conflicts of their superpower protectors, the USA and USSR respectively. Each had envisaged a future Germany reunified on terms acceptable to its own state values and those of its allies. For the former FRG, this meant territorial restoration based on Western democratic ideals of liberalism, constitutionalism and capitalism. By early 1990, the West German CDU-led government had determined on a course of action leading to a rapid, irreversible German unification which would preserve the constitutional *acquis* of the FRG. Article 23 of the Basic Law was called into play to allow an expansion of the pre-existing constitutional framework to incorporate the territory of the former GDR. This was the basis of the 'transfer paradigm'[2] of the unification process, characterized by the extension of the FRG's established forms of political organization and political representation to the former GDR.

Crucially, the German unification of 1990 was neither pursued nor perceived as a merger of equals; rather the West was tacitly acknowledged to have 'won' the struggle between the rival German cultures and ideologies.[3] In consequence, one of the most striking features of the transfer paradigm was its extensiveness. The First State Treaty on Currency, Economic and Social Union (1 July 1990) removed the GDR's economic order and replaced it with the West German model. The Unification Treaty of 3 October 1990 formally erased the territorial integrity of the former GDR. So complete was the integration of the former GDR into the pre-existing structures of the FRG that formal German language allows for no way of distinguishing, as a self-contained entity, the territory of the former GDR from that of the FRG.[4] Typical of the official forms of terminology were the 'new *Länder*' or the 'area of accession', both of which relegate the former GDR to part of the pre-existing federal polity of the FRG.

The unification of the two German states was welcomed at a popular level and – consistent with the realities of the post-communist international order – there has never been any demand for a wholesale return to the state socialist regime. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the social and economic community of the GDR suffered a sudden and traumatic disjuncture with their past lives, one with which many are still struggling to come to terms.[5] With unification, the people of the former GDR experienced the sudden loss of virtually all points of reference which had framed their political community. They became citizens of the former rival state, the FRG. Their status as workers, key to an individual's status in the former political community, was devalued and in many cases invalidated by the new experience of mass unemployment or the overnight obsolescence of professional qualifications.

Both the mode and extensiveness of the unification process raise many questions for the reconstruction of political identity in post-communist eastern Germany. The GDR's democratization through unification effectively denied east Germans the opportunity to complete their democratic revolution on their own terms and at their own pace. It brought about unprecedentedly abrupt and radical social changes in the political community. What does this concentration of transition effects with its associated social dislocation imply for that community's emerging identity? What does (re)association of the former GDR with the cultural norms of the former FRG imply for an independent east German cultural regeneration? To what extent has the effacement of the state territorial integrity of the former GDR carried over into post-communist identity? In investigating the existence, expression and prospects for post-communist identity in the former GDR, we shall look first at the unique background of territorial division of the two Germanies in the post-war period. There is evidence to suggest that an east German identity is developing within unified Germany which is both framed within and distinct from its west German reference culture. We then investigate the various expressions of post-communist identity in the former GDR and attempt to construct a typology of the phenomenon.

Divided Germany: The Roots of Post-Communist Identity

Commentators are divided over the question of whether the 40-year partition of Germany effectively fostered two separate German identities, one 'eastern' and one 'western'. Two opposing cases can be argued.[6] The first is that each of the Germanies developed a separate identity, marked by the prevailing norms and values of its alliance partners. The alternative view is that one identity persisted, effectively defined in terms of the shared history and cultural heritage of the Germans. This identity was upheld and further developed by the FRG and provided a 'reference culture' for the GDR. Some

– particularly western – commentators have argued that the GDR authorities' failure to create an independent East German identity was compounded by the fact that the FRG became the main source of identity for the East German people.[7] Not only did an 'all-German' identity develop around Western values during the post-war period, but it acted as one of the catalysts of the peaceful revolution of 1989.[8] This debate is central both to the controversy surrounding the transfer paradigm and to understanding the full implications of that paradigm for the reconstruction of identity in the former GDR. The view that the two Germanies had developed separate identities questions the legitimacy of unification by transfer. At its most extreme, it represents this path to unification as 'colonization' or even *Anschluss*. (The term *Anschluss* is highly emotive in German, because of its association with Hitler's illegal annexation of Austria.) The alternative view, that of a western repository of all-German identity, justifies unification by transfer as the rightful re-establishment of a 'natural' unity.[9] This view had been upheld by successive FRG governments and was firmly behind the unification drive of the Kohl government in 1990. It has since been evident in the determination of both the CDU-led and SPD-led post-unification governments to promote the consolidation of 'inner unity' in Germany on the basis of west German constitutional and social values.[10]

The evidence we shall present suggests that the reality is more complex than these two alternatives imply. It is argued here that the GDR failed to develop a separate, legitimate identity at the level of the state and regime. State socialism was definitively rejected by the GDR people with the peaceful revolution of 1989 and with the victory of the centre-right, CDU/CSU-aligned coalition in the first and last free election of the GDR parliament, the *Volkskammer*, in March 1989. Although apparently out of the blue, the potential for a popular rejection of the system had been building up since the 1980s, supported by a generational change in personal values.[11] East and West German intellectuals alike had failed to recognize this change and had consistently overestimated the strength of a separate East German identity capable of ensuring popular attachment to the GDR.[12] Nevertheless, socialist values did and still do find resonance at the popular level, suggesting a potential for a popular identity distinct from that of the western *Länder*. Whereas an FRG reference culture was and still is significant in framing the aspirations of the eastern population, it has not been adopted wholesale by easterners. Rather, the relationship of easterners to their western 'mentors' is a complex one. Easterners admire and aspire to many aspects of the western model, yet are alienated by others. For these reasons, it should not be assumed that the popular rejection of the state socialist system implies a full and unquestioning acceptance of the FRG regime and accompanying values.

It is argued, then, that during the years of German division, the failure of

a separate GDR identity was limited to the level of the state and regime and that this is significant for the formulation of contemporary post-communist identity in the former GDR. Equally important is the way in which attempts by each Germany to secure independent identities were pursued by the respective states. Between 1949 and 1989, each of the German part-states fought a continuous battle for self-legitimation and international recognition defined by the devastating experience of Nazism and by the existence of a rival German state in the context of the cold war's bipolar international order. In each case, self-assertion went hand-in-hand with deprecation of the 'other' Germany. It was pursued by means of state propaganda, through mutual non-recognition, symbolic statements and policy gestures, and, particularly in the FRG, through jurisprudence.[13] Particularly in the early post-war years, these tactics were accompanied by verbally hostile and emotive exchanges between the Germanies. Governments in the West described the GDR as a 'terror regime'. The West German media habitually referred to the 'so-called' GDR. The SED-led GDR referred to the FRG as dominated by 'fascist' and 'monopoly capitalist' elements.[14] For each German part-state, a large element of its self-justification relied on the promotion of perceptions of weakness of the other Germany. Although the introduction of a proactive *Ostpolitik* by Willy Brandt in the 1970s reduced the level of aggression of these exchanges, each state continued to assert itself in part by favourable comparisons with its rival.

It can be argued that the respective 'state myths' which evolved through the pursuit of inter-German relations in the two German states helped to shape the political identity and political discourse of the FRG and the GDR in such a way as to foster lasting popular preconceptions, east and west, about the 'other side'.[15] One significant feature of inter-German rivalry was that, with the years, the game became increasingly skewed in favour of the former FRG. The FRG came to enjoy a considerably more secure position within its western alliance and subsidiary organizations than did the GDR with its Soviet counterparts. The FRG was able to develop independent economic resources sufficient to secure international respect and popular legitimacy for its post-war regime in a way which was simply not open to the GDR. Both at the level of the state and at the popular level, then, aspirations in the GDR were in part constructed in reaction to the perceived success of the FRG in creating a successful economy and a legitimate state. This structural asymmetry in political resources was later to be reflected in the western bias of the unification process, and, indeed, in social perceptions dividing the eastern from the western *Länder* in united Germany.

At the time of unification, West German social preconceptions of East Germans had come to be characterized by condescension, embarrassment and suspicion regarding the moral integrity of the eastern community. They were formulated in the context of western perceptions of the past (notably of

national socialism), relations between the state and the individual (particularly the eastern 'passive' acceptance of the Stasi, or secret police, regime), and the economic community (the 'welfare' mentality of the easterners). The eastern social preconceptions of westerners comprised a deep sense of inferiority, envy of the social and economic freedoms of the West, resentment over the western blanket rejection of eastern values, and not a little helplessness. These preconceptions form a backdrop to the development of postcommunist forms of identity in the former GDR. They feed the negative stereotypes of 'Ossi' (easterner) and 'Wessi' (westerner), as well as a shared perception of eastern Germans as 'second-class citizens'. These perceptions will be developed below.

Perceptions of East–West Difference within the Former GDR

We have claimed that the eastern Germans have an uneasy relationship with the culture and values of their western counterparts, characterized by respect and envy, on the one hand, and by derision and rejection, on the other. Evidence for these mixed feelings can be found in subjective evaluations of contemporary German society and in perceptions of regional versus national identity, both of which point to a popular self-awareness of eastern difference from the FRG reference culture.

Shortly after unification, political sociologists documented substantial differences in the fundamental values and outlook of eastern and western Germans, which they explained in terms of the differential social, economic and political development of the two Germanies between 1949 and 1989.[16] GDR society had been defined by the individual's role in the workplace, strictly regulated by command structures. In contrast, FRG society was, by 1989, essentially a post-modern society where social life was defined outside the workplace, primarily in terms of 'leisure'. Marked by the experience of living with the state security organization, the 'Stasi', East Germans displayed much lower levels of social trust than West Germans, finding it difficult to trust those outside their immediate family and circle of close friends.

Writing in 1993, Bauer-Kaase described social-psychological tensions in the relationship between East and West Germans, popularized (and arguably exacerbated) in the media as the Ossi/Wessi divide. Her findings showed that only six per cent of East Germans and 14 per cent of West Germans viewed relations between the two groups as positive; and 68 per cent of East Germans blamed the West Germans for the friction between Ossis and Wessis.[17] All this boded ill for the FRG state's goal of achieving 'inner unity' between east and west. Research on personal goals and values offered a more optimistic prognosis. Here were indications that both German societies had been undergoing a radical and remarkably similar process of change from the 1960s onwards,

characterized by a move away from a value-system centred on duty and obedience to one dominated by self-fulfilment. In particular, there were indications of a far narrower discrepancy between the values of the younger generations in east and west than between the older generations.[18] In line with the attitude that depicted unification as an 'economic transaction',[19] the FRG conceived of the task of achieving inner unity chiefly as one of the progressive modernization and economic upgrading of the eastern *Länder*.

Although bent on the success of this project, official sources now acknowledge the problems faced even by a simple 'economic' resolution of differences between east and west. Moreover, opinion research has shown that the task of achieving inner unity faces much broader east–west differences concerning perceptions of a just society.[20] Some discrepancies between the two regions have moderated in the decade since unification took place; others have persisted or even sharpened. In particular, eastern Germans remain unimpressed by the prospects for self-fulfilment and equality of opportunity. Official sources see two explanations for this dissatisfaction. First, it reflects continuing problems of transition. To date, real discrepancies persist in the economic health of the eastern *Länder* compared with the western *Länder*. It is also argued that East Germans had inflated expectations of freedoms within a Western democratic society and are now having to come to terms with the limits of those freedoms – in particular, the need to compete for scarce jobs and training opportunities, the limits to what money can buy, and the difference between freedom of expression and political influence. Second, it reflects values inculcated under state socialism, particularly a greater priority for social and economic equality and less familiarity with the concept of conflict as a valid and necessary element of a pluralist society.[21] Together, the variety and tenacity of differences between the east and the west suggest some potential for a self-sustaining, distinct social profile in the eastern *Länder* (see Table 1).

In some areas, eastern perceptions of a just society in today's FRG do not differ markedly from those in the west. In particular, this applies to freedoms of expression and of religious practice. Both easterners and westerners believe that religious freedom is effectively realized in contemporary German society. East Germans lag behind westerners slightly in their evaluation of freedom of expression: 69 per cent of easterners see this as a reality compared with 80 per cent of westerners. Given the caution with which East Germans were accustomed to expressing free opinion under the GDR regime, though, the fact that some seven out of ten east Germans feel free to express their personal opinion must be seen as quite a triumph for the inner unity project.

At the other end of the scale, neither westerners nor easterners perceive a just distribution of wealth within their society, albeit with perceptions of

TABLE 1
PERCEPTIONS OF A JUST SOCIETY IN GERMANY, EAST AND WEST, 1998
'Basic rights of ... are realized/not realized in Germany' (per cent)

	'Are realized'		'Are not realized'	
	East	West	East	West
Freedom of religion	94	96	6	4
Freedom of expression	69	80	31	20
Free development of the individual	52	72	48	28
Free choice of work	32	78	68	22
Social security	33	63	67	37
Public safety/security	29	50	71	50
Equality of opportunity	23	45	77	55
Fair distribution of wealth	8	29	92	71

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Datenreport 1999* (Berlin, 2000), pp.603–8.

injustice being felt more keenly in the east. Less than a third of westerners and only eight per cent of easterners are satisfied with the current distribution of wealth. In other areas, the balance of opinion falls differently in the two regions. Easterners see far less opportunity for freedom of personal develop-ment and in their working lives. In part, this is related to inequalities of social mobility which will take time to redress. However, it may also be related to higher community priorities relating to economic equality; possibly also to a self-perception amongst easterners as 'second-class citizens' (see below).

East Germans still struggle to cope with the conflict that is an inherent part of the competitive work and social environment of the West Germans. Compared with West Germans, East Germans read a greater intensity into specific social conflicts that characterize Germany today. Table 2 compares findings on such perceptions for the years 1993 and 1998. As might be expected, the east Germans' early preoccupations lay with ideological conflicts between left and right: questions of economic distribution and the East–West conflict. By 1998, eastern perceptions of the gravity of distribution conflicts had sharpened. Interestingly, though, perceptions of the gravity of the East–West conflict had dropped back by 1998, albeit marginally. It is not yet clear whether or not this trend will be sustained or whether this is no more than a dip in the perceived gravity of the conflict.

Opinion research on feelings of regional identity in east and west shows that the process of 'transformation through unification' has not yet impinged on the East Germans' predominantly regional identity: rather, feelings of eastern identity have increased slightly since unification. Proponents of the 'inner unity' drive can draw comfort from the fact that a higher proportion of the youngest East Germans see themselves as 'Germans' rather than 'East Germans'. This suggests that there is some potential for a generational change in perceptions in the medium to long term.

TABLE 2
PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS, EAST AND WEST GERMANY, 1993 AND 1998
'Conflicts between ... are "very pronounced" or "pronounced"' (per cent)

	East		West	
	1993	1998	1993	1998
Asylum seekers and Germans	76	83	82	81
Guest workers and Germans	52	74	57	56
Left and right	70	78	65	64
Employers and employees	66	67	49	54
Rich and poor	61	73	45	54
East and west Germans	61	57	50	39
Young and old	22	27	20	26
Men and women	–	14	14	17

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Datenreport 1999* (Berlin, 2000), p.594.

TABLE 3
PERCEPTIONS OF REGIONAL VERSUS NATIONAL IDENTITY, EAST AND WEST
GERMANY, 1992 AND 1997, AND BY AGE GROUP
Question: 'Do you feel more "German" or "east/west German"? If you identify with both,
which identity is stronger?' (per cent)

	1992	1997	Age			
			16–29	30–44	45–59	60+
East Germans						
I feel more 'German'	31	28	39	19	28	29
I feel more 'east German'	63	67	56	76	66	66
Undecided	6	5	5	5	6	5
West Germans						
I feel more 'German'	57	60	48	61	62	65
I feel more 'west German'	34	34	44	33	32	29
Undecided	9	6	8	6	6	6

Source: E. Noelle-Neumann and R. Köcher (eds.), *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1993–1997*, Vol.10 (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1997), p.560.

At present, East Germans lag behind their western counterparts in their awareness of the trappings of German nation-state identity. In March 1997, an opinion poll asked Germans to recite the opening words of the German national anthem as it is sung today. Only 24 per cent of East Germans compared with 63 per cent of West Germans gave the correct answer, or were able to make a stab at the right version: that beginning 'Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit ...'. The majority of East Germans had no idea (52 per cent); a further 22 per cent cited the old version beginning 'Deutschland, Deutschland über alles ...', now considered politically incorrect with its aggressive overtones, and not used on official occasions; and two per cent (all aged over 60) named the national anthem of the former GDR.[22]

Interesting too is the way in which Germans of east and west perceive their recently unified state. An opinion poll of 1994 found all but unanimity on 'what holds a nation together': language and a common state framework. There was also a minority consensus on the value of a shared history. The existence of shared political principles was more important to the West Germans – a point which arguably derives from their ideological victory in unifying the Germanies on their own terms. For East Germans 'the will to live together' was much more significant than for the westerners. This is perhaps indicative of eastern feelings of susceptibility within the new system. When it came to perceptions of 'what threatens the unity of a nation', the East Germans at this time (1994) demonstrated a far greater awareness of a continuing East–West divide and were more concerned about the problem of social isolation, one which has been keenly felt by many East Germans since the collapse of the social organizational framework provided by the socialist state.

TABLE 4
PERCEPTIONS OF THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES OF NATIONAL
UNITY, EAST AND WEST GERMANY, 1994 (PER CENT)

	East	West	All Germany
'What holds a nation together?'			
Language	71	67	68
A common state framework	57	57	57
History, the past	41	40	41
Shared political principles	25	36	34
The will to live together	40	29	31
'What threatens the unity of a nation?'			
Economic crises	54	62	61
Social isolation, a lack of human contact	43	36	37
Continuing tensions between east and west	45	29	32

Source: E. Noelle-Neumann and R. Köcher (eds.), *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1993–1997*, Vol.10 (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1997), pp.494–5.

Characteristics of Post-Communist Identity

With the events of 1989, new forms of eastern German identity began to take shape and to be openly expressed. These have shared some key characteristics. All have been defined by two contexts which stand in a reciprocal relationship. The first is the shared memory of life under the GDR, dominated by the ruling SED; the second is the memory and continuing experience of the FRG as a reference culture. Further shared features of post-communist identity derive from this dual context. First, the new forms of eastern identity

have been largely retrospective, having their roots in the cold war conflicts manifested so directly in inter-German relations between 1949 and 1989. Arguably, the only unique or distinguishing feature of the GDR as a sovereign state was its socialist identity. Once this was gone, there was no real means of distinguishing it from the FRG. In consequence, expressions of post-communist identity are pushed into a retrospective identity based upon the cold war years and the FRG reference culture forged during that time. Second, they tend to be reactive rather than proactive, formulated in protest against perceived forms of oppression or inequity, or, as Yoder suggests,[23] simply as a defensive strategy for coping with the turmoil of the transition. Within the dual framework, some forms of post-communist identity react mainly against the SED regime, others – particularly since unification – against the FRG. The latter forms are fuelled by the rapid deflation of expectations following unification and by contemporary economic and social strains, with the problems of the eastern community often compared unfavourably with the situation in the west. To a greater or lesser extent, post-unification forms of eastern identity are marked by perceptions of the negation or the undermining of the eastern community by the west. Post-unification forms of popular identity look back with some fondness on the 'rediscovered' positive attributes of life in the GDR.

Finally, the new forms of eastern identity share a popular 'grassroots' quality. They are led from below rather than from above. They express perceived or actual popular conflict with the post-war German regimes, east and west; they question German government values and actions. This too is perhaps inevitable. Transitional expressions of 'post-communist' identity were motivated by the perceived failure of the socialist state. Since unification, there has been no attempt by the FRG state to promote a separate east German identity. On the contrary, for western elites, unification confirmed their long-established 'state myth' of 'one Germany'.[24] Since unification, western elites have pursued the consolidation of 'one Germany' through the inner unity project. Any separate eastern identity to emerge since unification automatically finds itself at odds with this aim. These characteristics can be found, albeit with different priorities, in various manifestations of post-communist east German identity since the peaceful revolution. These include the 'third way' socialism originating with the events of 1989 and the linked post-unification phenomena of the *Trotzidentität*, *Ostalgia* and *Ossi* pride (see below). Where these expressions of eastern identity differ is in their attitude to what, in the characterization of unification employed by Offe (see above), might be termed their 'object stance'. They differ with respect to their outlook as passive recipients of the actions of others or as active perpetrators. The concept of 'second-class citizens' is of particular relevance here. Many East Germans feel that they do not, in practice, share equal citizenship with

West Germans, but, among the western political elites, are considered inferior to westerners: a view that is manifested in preferential treatment for westerners in the distribution of resources and in access to opportunities.

'Third Way' Socialism: A Transitional Identity

In chronological terms, the first expression of a new, grassroots post-communist identity was 'third way socialism'. This was the incipient ideology of the protest and reform movement which shook the SED regime towards the end of 1989.[25] It was limited to a largely intellectual sector of society committed to the reinvention of socialism within the existing state framework of the GDR. It did not fundamentally reject the socialist state, but rather the SED regime, which it saw as 'arrogant' and 'suffocated by incompetence'.[26] It hoped to win reforms in the GDR which would bring about a 'true' socialist regime, more closely linked to the original communist principles which the GDR had patently failed to realize. Ironically, it was the precursor of the later mass movement which destabilized and ultimately overturned the socialist system.[27] As a movement, third way socialism was highly fragmented, and, initially at least, associated with intellectual misfits. Also, it was soon overtaken by the collapse of the GDR and unification through absorption into the FRG. Nevertheless, its legacy can be seen in various expressions of 'easternness' in the united Germany. First, the concept of third way socialism remains as a live concern to an intellectual minority. Possibly more significantly, its priorities and characteristics continue to influence the development of mass popular attitudes in the eastern *Länder* towards their own community and that of the wider Germany, attitudes which have begun to manifest themselves since unification.

In an account of the emerging third way socialism in 1989, the East German radical Gunther de Bruyn suggests that the GDR 'socialist' patriotism expressed by the reformers in 1989 was forged in the context of two sets of pressures: the rigid state socialism upheld by the SED, and the complacent, unegalitarian FRG. He implies that the grassroots third way socialism was reactive, in that it was forged through popular confrontation of the state authorities during the events of 1989:

It seems that the activists of the opposition have developed a GDR patriotism that is stronger than the one hitherto prescribed from above. It is composed of pride in what has been achieved through democratic protest, of insight into what is attainable in the Europe of today, of a vision of social justice and of defiance of the rich, paternalistically inclined relative in the West (to which one also owes thanks), and it does not take nationalist feelings seriously, but frequently suspects them

of serving as a cover either for chauvinism or for the yearning for prosperity.[28]

Hämäläinen[29] asserts that the changing focus of the mass protests in 1989 from demands for reform under the existing framework of the socialist state ('we are the people') to demands for unification ('we are one people') demonstrates a shared sense of 'Germanness' – that is, of national identity. However, the writings of eastern commentators and popular statements cast some doubt on this interpretation. While the protests came to demand recognition as Germans under a unified state, de Bruyn's statement implies that they did not seek 'West Germanness': that is, Germanness on the norms for national identity upheld by the FRG.

Merkel[30] warns that the 'one people' demand should not be mistaken for an expression by East Germans of a perceived nationalism shared with West Germans: rather, she sees it as a demand for social equality with West Germans. Use of the term 'people' (*Volk*) has specific and radically different overtones in the western and the eastern *Länder*. It is most unlikely that contemporary western and eastern Germans read the same connotations into this term, despite the key role it plays in political discourse. The West Germans' understanding of the term 'people' is closely linked to a concept of nationhood based upon ethnicity and cultural heritage. It relates to 'all-Germany' – an aspirational concept in the years of post-war division now realized in unification. Moreover, it is associated with a reactionary stance and with the centre-right parties of the political spectrum.[31] By contrast, the use of the term 'people' by the protesters of 1989 was limited to East Germans and their experiences of popular solidarity in confronting the establishment during the peaceful revolution and to the transitional efforts of the Round Table to establish independent post-communist structures of government.

There is a clear link between the concepts of 'the people', 'the streets' and 'solidarity in confrontation'. This is reflected in comments made by older children who experienced this transition period. After reports of police brutality towards protesters, a 14-year-old girl spoke about her fear of going to join the Monday demonstrations, but added with pride that 'we (the people) have achieved something' [parentheses in the original]. A submission by a group of school pupils to the Round Table demanded consideration of their interests, noting 'we schoolchildren also count as the people – that's why we took to the streets with you [adults]'.[32] Yoder[33] implies that the euphoria over unification expressed by both East and West Germans in 1989–90 as 'one Germany' and 'one people' was based on a fundamental misunderstanding. Shortly afterwards, the Germans were to learn about the many deep differences between the two German societies, an experience which prompted a 'rediscovery' of separate identities.

The Identity of Contrariness

Much of the eastern identity now emerging at a popular level is elaborated with respect to specific characteristics of western culture, and is clearly a reaction against perceptions of a western political, economic and cultural dominance in the united Germany. For many easterners, western hegemony is reflected in the widespread elite assumption that easterners must accept western ways wholesale; they must be resocialized into a western mentality.[34] From a western perspective, the cultural learning process within united Germany is assumed to be unidirectional. The elites and public of the west do not believe they have anything to learn from the GDR's cultural experience – if they so much as consider such a possibility. In reaction, some East Germans have retreated into a bitter, sulky *Trotzidentität* (identity of contrariness), a victim mentality which helps to justify their reputation as 'whingeing Ossis' (*Jammer-Ossis*).

In his book on the problems of adjusting to the West German paradigm, the easterner Klaus Schlesinger's vitriolic comments offer a taste of the 'identity of contrariness'.[35] Schlesinger can't stand hearing the jumped-up monkeys on the talk-shows telling him how he coped with life in the GDR and why it was not worth it. He doesn't like the way the westerners are tearing up and rebuilding half of the former East Berlin. The Alexanderplatz was certainly no grimmer than the Ernst-Reuter-Platz (in the former West Berlin) – so why don't they start over there? He describes the swarms of westerners buying up one plot of eastern land after another, who find it so quaint that there are still tree-lined alleys and storks nesting in the east. Do they never ask themselves why these beautiful birds steer clear of the freest Germany there has ever been as the devil shuns holy water? He looks down on these people with wry condescension: they don't know what they are talking about, after all, and he finds their efforts at social climbing really rather sweet. Worse, for him, are the attitudes of his fellow easterners who have 'converted' to the new western ways. He has nothing but contempt for people who give the impression they always knew that the former GDR was a complete waste of space, even while they were singing 'little white dove of peace' in the Young Pioneers. They're enough to make him bring up his coffee.

(N)Ostalgia

After the initial euphoria of German unification gave way to disillusionment in the GDR, East Germans began to identify 'positive' features of their lost socialist past – they were discovering a GDR identity in retrospect (*nachgeholte Identität*). Regrets for the lost security of life under the SED state have been dubbed 'Ostalgia' (*Ostalgie*), a play on words depicting a specifically 'eastern' nostalgia. Ostalgia acts as a focus both for the reinvention of

the past in an attempt to salvage some collective dignity from unification on western terms, and for the formulation of a collective identity for a self-aware community which does not identify fully with its western mentors. Attempts to test perceptions of Ostalgia through opinion polling indicate that about half of East Germans have a propensity towards nostalgic feelings for the GDR. A poll taken in 1996 asked a sample of East Germans the rather complex question: 'If someone talks about the GDR and says "Those were good times – everyone was equal and we were all in work", would you agree or disagree?' Forty-eight per cent of respondents said they would agree with this statement; in each case, 26 per cent indicated that they would not agree or would be undecided.[36]

More tangible expressions of Ostalgia can be found in the contemporary social and cultural life of the east. In its 'street' form, Ostalgia is characterized by a somewhat masochistic nostalgia for the 'bad old days'.[37] For example, the 'Easty Girls' became a popular cabaret act after unification. They wore a Spice Girl-style cut-off version of the Young Pioneer uniform and toured with an Erich Honecker lookalike, performing old Red revolution songs.[38] An Ostalgia market has sprung up to meet the social need to reminisce about the past. Tapes and CDs of the familiar socialist patriotic songs for children and young people are widely available. There are books, board games and 'Trivial Pursuit'-style games which reflect the Ostalgia theme, covering everything from sharp, satirical GDR jokes to the menus served up to visiting dignitaries on state occasions. Internet sites supply once-familiar furnishings, toys and even foodstuffs from the days of the former GDR.[39]

Ossi Pride

Another specific expression of reactive popular identity can be found in the easterners' attempt to adapt the negative Ossi stereotype to a positive focus for eastern identity. As presented in the media, the Ossi and Wessi stereotypes are those elaborated by the 'other side' and are essentially negative. The Ossi is seen from the west as lazy, passive, lacking in initiative and drive, sly, secretive, distrustful, discontented and having a scrounging 'welfare men-tality'. The Wessi is seen from the east as arrogant, pushy and ambitious (a product of the 'elbow' society), humourless, selfish, materialistic and greedy.[40] Since unification, easterners have adapted their Ossi tag to reflect those values perceived amongst themselves as both positive and characteristic of easterners. By contrast, West Germans tend to reject the Wessi stereotype out of hand. As the dominant, self-referential culture, they have no need to take account of how they are viewed from the east. This is evident from the far greater tendency for West Germans to identify themselves as 'Germans' rather than 'West Germans' (see Table 3 above). They therefore feel no need

to elaborate a positive version of the Wessi stereotype. Ironically, many of the features contributing to the positive or ideal-type of the Ossi appear to be formulated with direct reference to perceived negative attributes of the cultural stereotype of the Wessi. The positive ideal of the Ossi is easy-going (compared with the 'pushy', self-assertive westerner); with a sharp sense of humour (unlike the westerner) honed through years of coping with life under the SED regime; and a strong sense of community (whereas westerners are selfish and greedy). This choice of attributes suggests that the emerging eastern identity is not primarily self-referential, but depends for its formulation on western standards and influences.

This is not to suggest that the western role model can provide a ready-made identity for easterners, negative or otherwise. As we have noted, the relationship of easterners to westerners is characterized by both admiration and alienation. According to Richter,[41] one of the reasons for the failure of the transitional reform movements to translate into mass parties capable of representing eastern interests within united Germany was their blanket rejection of western values. In particular, the reform movements' disdain for 'consumerism' and the West German 'elbow society' did not appeal to a GDR public who wanted a better material standard of living and whose standards were measured against the achievements of the FRG in this area. At the same time, the grudging expression of that admiration, the rather childish 'identity of contrariness', and the willing identification with their own positive version of the Ossi stereotype, all reveal that easterners feel a need to pursue an identity separate from that of the western Germans.

Consumerism and Post-Communist Identity

Nowhere is this ambivalence more evident than in the East Germans' attitude towards consumerism. For East Germans, westernizing forces of materialism throughout the post-war period had largely been mediated through the West German reference culture. West Germany had been the East Germans' shop window to Western values and developments, allowing a clear view, but without the chance for direct participation. Since unification, East Germans have in principle been open to forces of westernization from countries throughout the western world. Interestingly, though, easterners continue to perceive such forces through the traditional west German 'filter', and have reacted ambivalently to them. Staab[42] describes how, following unification, the sudden mass access to Western-style consumption patterns in the former GDR stood in pointed contrast to the easterners' prior experience of limited supplies and suppressed consumer demands. On one hand, the easterners internalized consumerism by approximating to the levels of consumption found in the west. On the other hand, they reacted by politicizing

consumerism. Consequently, patterns of consumption in the former GDR between 1989 and 1991 graphically demonstrate the extraordinary U-turn described in the easterners' collective political identity during this period.

In the euphoria which followed unification, eastern consumers at first abandoned eastern products for western brands, irrespective of price or quality. Prompted by a combination of patriotism and consumer naiveté, such uncalculating behaviour attracted the unscrupulous, and the easterners were often exploited. Very soon, though, East Germans began to assert their newly emerging, post-unification identity by changing over to buying eastern goods in a way which reflected both Ostalgia and defiance against the West German-led transformation of their lives. Between December 1990 and December 1991, the proportion of eastern households surveyed preferring eastern products over western had risen from half to almost three-quarters. Easterners began to associate particular eastern products with a romanticized past, which had been more stable, secure and friendly than the new turbulent times.[43] Valued for its apolitical associations with childhood and security, the eastern German character displayed at pedestrian crossings (the *Ampelmännchen*, the equivalent of the British 'little green man') has been marketed in various guises as a symbol of eastern identity. The *Ampelmännchen* has become a cult figure,[44] together with characters from children's stories, such as Pittiplatsch and Moppi the dog.

Towards a Model of Post-Communist Identity in Eastern Germany

We have reviewed the evidence for east–west divisions in the subjective evaluation of contemporary German society and have examined some of the expressions of a distinct 'eastern' identity emerging, first with the transitionary period of the peaceful revolution, then with German unification. We are now in a position to marry the specific expressions of post-communist identity in eastern Germany with our suggested typology. We claimed that all forms, or expressions, of post-communist identity reflected the dual framework of the memory of life under state socialism and the memory and continuing experience of the FRG as reference culture: features that stood in a reciprocal relationship owing to the state rivalry between the divided Germanies during the cold war years. We claimed that further features of post-communist East German identity derived from this dual context. Expressions of contemporary eastern identity are retrospective, are reactive rather than proactive, and are popular or grassroots movements, rather than being state-led. Where the forms of identity differ is in their attitude to themselves as the 'object' of action by outside forces, victims or 'second-class citizens'. It is this category which is potentially most significant for the future development of an independent eastern German identity (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1
A TYPOLOGY OF POST-COMMUNIST EAST GERMAN IDENTITY

	Third-Way Socialism	*Trotzidentität*	*Ostalgia*	*Ossi pride*
GDR state socialism/ FRG reference culture	Rejects GDR, differentiates from FRG	Tacit reference to GDR, rejects FRG	Positive reference to GDR, differentiates from FRG	Ironic references to GDR and FRG, differentiates from FRG
Retrospective	Focus on system failures of GDR	Focus on Cold War inter-state rivalries	Focus on 'bad old days' of GDR	Focus on positive features of GDR community
Reactive	Reacts against oppressive features of GDR, inappropriate 'model'	Backlash against extensiveness of 'transfer paradigm' of unification	Reacts against extensiveness of 'transfer paradigm' of unification	Reacts against social superiority of West Germans
Popular	Resists GDR state	Resists FRG state myth of 'one Germany'	Resists FRG state myth of 'one Germany'	Resists FRG state myth of 'one Germany'
'Object' stance	No	Yes	Yes	Yes and no

Although housed chronologically within the communist period, the 'third way socialism' of the peaceful revolution can be seen as an expression of post-communist identity in the sense that it posed a head-on challenge to the state socialism of the GDR and began to look for post-communist alternatives. The pro-socialist patriotism expressed by the reformers in 1989 was defined by the dual German context. First and foremost, third way socialism voiced popular discontentment with the unresponsive SED regime of the GDR. A secondary focus of the third way movement was the East Germans' perceived ideological conflict with the values of the FRG regime. As a protest movement it was distinctly reactive, confronting the existing state system. It looked back to the ideals of the Marxist revolutionaries for inspiration, comparing these with the failed promise of state socialism in the GDR. Given time, it might well have developed a more forward-looking outlook with positive plans for the future, but its transitory role in transition was curtailed by unification. Third way socialism was solely a popular movement, nailing its colours to the mast at a time when public rejection of official values and regulations was dangerous for individual participants. Although reactive in its demands, it was not characterized by an 'object' stance. In taking to the streets, the protesters behind third way socialism were the most active perpetrators of 'post-communist' German identity to date.

Reflecting post-unification structural realities, those forms of eastern

identity to develop since 1989–90 have largely voiced popular discontent with the all-German FRG regime and governments, but as a secondary focus have also reflected the shared experience of the constraints imposed by the former SED regime. The querulous *Trotzidentität* (the 'identity of contrariness') can be seen as a knee-jerk reaction to the sense of helplessness that many East Germans experienced with the overnight loss of their former patterns of social and political identity and security. This is the form of post-communist identity in which the sense of negation of a community comes most strongly to the fore. The bitterness felt at the prospect of having the future dictated by the FRG state, formerly seen as the ideological rival, is topped only by rage and loathing of those fellow easterners who have sold out to the 'Wessis'.

This form of identity reacts strongly against the FRG state and its values. It is reactive in the sense that it is blind to the future, a 'head-in-the-sand' stance. It is a popular movement in that it runs counter to the FRG state myth of 'one Germany'. Its defining characteristic is its victim mentality, an extreme 'object' stance. Evidence from opinion research suggests that mass identification with such a victim mentality might prove to be limited to the early years of the transition. Shortly after unification, feelings of helplessness, alienation and lack of direction were very widespread among the eastern population. Since then, such feelings of distress have begun to diminish and to tend towards the West German norm. In particular, the proportion of eastern respondents who felt that 'life is so complicated they do not know how to cope' has halved from 40 per cent in 1990 to 21 per cent in 1998 (this compares with 14 per cent of westerners in 1998).[45] As easterners continue to find their feet in the new Germany, so the driving force behind the *Trotzidentität* is likely to be undermined.

As expressions of eastern identity, Ostalgia and Ossi pride are clearly related, but I believe a distinction can usefully be made. Ostalgia looks back wistfully (rather than with the anger characteristic of *Trotzidentität*) and selectively to the more positive features of life under the SED, and tries to recapture the sense of security lost in the turmoil of the unification process. It reacts against the extensiveness, rather than the fact, of the transfer paradigm of unification and against the standardization of society implied by the FRG's drive for inner unity. It does not deny that unification has brought benefits, but seeks to retain elements of value from the past four decades of socialist rule. It thereby promotes a separate eastern identity, shaped by the experience of socialist rule. Some western commentators, particularly those of the centre-right, argue that Ostalgia is a phenomenon which can be restricted to the 'losers' of unification and can therefore be expected to diminish as eastern society adjusts to western norms. Certainly, Ostalgia tends to an 'object' stance and a 'second class citizen' mentality. Both

Ostalgia and Ossi pride strongly reflect the ambivalence of post-unification expressions of eastern identity in the way in which they participate in consumer culture.

Ossi pride adopts a more ironic view of the socialist past. It too selects positive features of the experience of life under socialism and identifies with them, but distances itself slightly through ironic self-deprecation and rather black humour. It too adopts a distance from the FRG reference culture, seeking its own distinct path. At present, a backward view and a sense of second-class citizenship feature strongly in Ossi pride. Although difficult to judge at this stage, it appears to give a slightly higher priority than Ostalgia does to positive features of the GDR community rather than to past experience. This is significant, as a shift in identification to features of contemporary eastern society could lend Ossi pride the potential to break the mould I have described here for expressions of eastern post-communist identity. It could reorient the identity to living concerns of the present and future, rather than the current fixation on the past. It could imbue Ossi pride with a more self-assertive, less 'object' outlook. As such, Ossi pride could prove pivotal for the future of a separate East German identity.

At this stage of the consolidation of the new Germany, it is not possible to arrive at a definitive conclusion as to whether a distinct eastern identity will prove to be merely transitional, or will become a lasting German subculture. It is possible that this is a temporary phase of adjustment to the wholesale West-Germanization of the GDR polity in a very short space of time. Alternatively, the East Germans may become entrenched as a self-aware minority comparable to those found in the territorially-established West European countries, such as the Basques in Spain, or the Scots in the UK. By definition, a separate eastern identity is a territorial identity: at once inclusive potentially of all East Germans, irrespective of further structural or attitudinal divisions, and exclusive in that it is closed to West Germans. This carries two problems for the future.

The first is that the territorial delineation of separate eastern identity no longer has any basis in accepted national territorial boundaries. This fact binds forms of eastern identity to a retrospective outlook. In itself, the backward-looking orientation of contemporary eastern identity need not imply the lack of potential for development. Indeed, contemporary European societies all depend to a certain extent on historical 'myths' which have transcended their original context to act as an integrative force for social and national identity.[46] Nevertheless, the fact that so much of the new eastern identity depends on the memory of shared experiences within the social structures of divided Germany, together with the convergence of social attitudes particularly amongst younger people in east and west, suggests that 'ostalgic' myth-making might in practice be limited to the generations born

in the aftermath of the Second World War. This brings us to the second of the problems faced by a future separate eastern identity.

The future sustainability of German easternness depends on the integrity of shared eastern perceptions in the face of a determined effort, on the part of the west, to consolidate the inner unity drive. The more perceptions of easternness are fragmented according to, for example, age, partisanship, income, subjective evaluations and so on, the less tenable will be a legitimate eastern identity. Much of the opinion research referred to above indicates that, although clear eastern preferences can be demonstrated, these are far from monolithic. In particular, differences of opinion are distinguishable in terms of the age of respondents, with older people demonstrating a higher commitment to values associated with state socialism, and partisanship, with supporters of the radical left PDS and Green and Alternative parties expressing more critical views of German society.[47] We have noted that there appears to be a convergence of social and personal values among younger generations across the east–west boundary. We have also identified the particular vulnerabilities of specific expressions of eastern identity to the effects of transition. If, however, the structural marginalization of East German interests is exacerbated through continuing social and economic inequalities, the 'ostalgic' impetus may conceivably outlive the transition period of unification, passing on to the post-unification generation of East Germans to form the basis of a lasting cultural myth and a lasting regional divide in German politics.

NOTES

1. C. Offe, *Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).
2. G. Lehmbruch, 'The Process of Regime Change in East Germany', in C. Anderson, K. Kaltenhaler and W. Luthardt (eds.), *The Domestic Politics of German Unification* (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp.17–36; G. Lehmbruch, 'The Process of Regime Change in East Germany: An Institutionalist Scenario for German Unification', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.1, No.1 (1994), pp.115–41.
3. I. Merkel, 'From a Socialist Society of Labor into a Consumer Society? The Transformation of East German Identities and Systems', in Michael D. Kennedy (ed.), *Envisioning Eastern Europe: Postcommunist Cultural Studies* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp.55–65.
4. Offe, *Varieties of Transition*, pp.156–7.
5. Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), *Datenreport 1999. Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, series no.365, 2000).
6. R. Rose and E. Page, 'German Responses to Regime Change: Culture, Class, Economy or Context?', *West European Politics*, Vol.19, No.1 (1996), pp.1–27.
7. For example, see P.K. Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994); M. Thompson, 'No Exit: "Nation-stateness" and Democratization in the German Democratic Republic', *Political Studies*, Vol.44, No.2 (1996), pp.267–86.
8. Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany*, pp.59, 142.
9. A succinct account of the controversy surrounding the mode of unification in the German-language literature is given by S. Gissendanner, 'Transfer or Transformation? What the

German Social Science Literature Has to Say about Unification and its Systemic Effects', *German Politics*, Vol.5, No.3 (1996), pp.460–84.

10. P. Hogwood, *We Are One People: German Politics and Society since Unification* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming); Statistisches Bundesamt, *Datenreport 1999*.

11. M. Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.271–5; H. Klages and T. Gensicke, 'Geteilte Werte? Ein deutscher Ost–West-Vergleich', in W. Weidenfeld (ed.), *Deutschland. Eine Nation – doppelte Geschichte* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1993), pp.47–59.

12. Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany*, p.144.

13. G. Schweigler, *National Consciousness in Divided Germany* (London: Sage, 1975), p.21, n.8.

14. E.D. Plock, *East German–West German Relations and the Fall of the GDR* (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview, 1993), p.9.

15. Hogwood, *We Are One People*.

16. For example, the edited collection by W. Weidenfeld, *Deutschland. Eine Nation – doppelte Geschichte* (n.11), particularly the contribution of M. Greiffenhagen and S. Greiffenhagen, 'Eine Nation: Zwei politische Kulturen' (pp.29–45); also P. Bauer-Kaase, cited in Rose and Page, 'German Responses to Regime Change'.

17. Bauer-Kaase, cited in Rose and Page, 'German Responses to Regime Change', pp.5, 23.

18. Klages and Gensicke, 'Geteilte Werte?', pp.48–50, 53–5.

19. Offe, *Varieties of Transition*.

20. Statistisches Bundesamt, *Datenreport 1999*.

21. Ibid., pp.593–4, 603–4; on the values derived from state socialism, see also H. Meulemann, 'Research Report: Value Changes in Germany after Unification: 1990–1995', *German Politics*, Vol.6, No.1 (1997), pp.122–39; J.A. Yoder, *From East Germans to Germans? The New Postcommunist Elites* (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1999), p.205). East–West discrepancies have fluctuated considerably during the period since unification. It would be beyond the scope of this article to track and account for these cycles of response; I will attempt instead simply to establish the status quo. Of note, though, is that fluctuations in response have been framed within the context established above, that is, the real economic inferiority of the eastern *Länder* coupled with the transition experience.

22. E. Noelle-Neumann and R. Köcher (eds.), *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1993–1997*, Vol.10 (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1997), p.493.

23. Yoder, *From East Germans to Germans?*, p.205.

24. Hogwood, *We Are One People*.

25. As such, third way socialism should not be confused with the 'politics of the middle way' espoused by the German SPD–Green government coalition formed in 1998, which has sometimes been compared to 'Blairism'.

26. K. Schlesinger, *Von der Schwierigkeit, Westler zu Werden* (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag (AtV), 1998), p.100.

27. Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship*, p.16.

28. De Bruyn (1990), translated and reproduced in H. James and M. Stone (eds.), *When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German Unification* (London: Routledge, 1992), p.136.

29. Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany*, pp.59, 142–4.

30. Merkel, 'From a Socialist Society of Labor into a Consumer Society?', p.60.

31. P. Hogwood, 'Citizenship Controversies in Germany: The Twin Legacy of Völkisch Nationalism and the Alleinvertretungsanspruch', ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Copenhagen (2000).

32. G. Leidecker, D. Kirchhöfer and P. Güttler (eds.), *Ich weiß nicht ob ich froh sein soll. Kinder erleben die Wende* (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1991), pp.83, 111–12.

33. Yoder, *From East Germans to Germans?*, p.205.

34. Klages and Gensicke, 'Geteilte Werte?', p.47.

35. Schlesinger, *Von der Schwierigkeit*, pp.11–13.

36. Noelle-Neumann and Köcher, *Allensbacher Jahrbuch*, p.582.

37. P. Merkl (ed.), *The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty-Five* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p.5.

38. *The Times Magazine*, 15 March 1997.

39. For books, CDs and games, see, for example, Kaiser mail order <http://www.mokm.de>. Other 'GDR' products are available through internet mail order through sites including: <http://www.shop.ossiversand.de> and <http://www.ddrnostalgie.de>.
40. For characteristics of the Ossi and Wessi stereotypes see, for example, Klages and Gensicke, 'Geteilte Werte?', p.47; Noelle-Neumann and Köcher, *Allensbacher Jahrbuch*, p.571.
41. M. Richter, 'Exiting the GDR: Political Movements and Parties between Democratization and Westernization', in M.D. Hancock and H. Welsh (eds.), *German Unification: Processes and Outcomes* (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview, 1994) pp.116–18.
42. A. Staab 'Testing the West: Consumerism and National Identity in Eastern Germany', *German Politics*, Vol.6, No.2 (1997) pp.139–49.
43. Ibid.
44. M. Duckenfield and N. Calhoun, 'Invasion of the Western *Ampelmännchen*', *German Politics*, Vol.6, No.3 (1997) pp.54–69; M. Heckhausen, *Das Buch vom Ampelmännchen* (Berlin: Eulenspiegel Verlag, 1997).
45. Statistisches Bundesamt, *Datenreport 1999*, pp.425–6.
46. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
47. Statistisches Bundesamt, *Datenreport 1999*.