

# The Splintering of **SPAIN**

Cultural History and the  
Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939



Edited by Chris Ealham  
and Michael Richards

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## The Splintering of Spain

This book explores the ideas and culture surrounding the cataclysmic civil war that engulfed Spain from 1936 to 1939. It features specially commissioned articles from leading historians in Spain, Britain and the USA which examine the complex interaction of national and local factors, contributing to the shape and course of the war. They argue that the 'splintering of Spain' resulted from the myriad cultural cleavages of society in the 1930s. Thus, this book views the civil war less as a single great conflict between two easily identifiable sets of ideas, social classes or ways of life, than historians have previously done. The Spanish tragedy, at the level of everyday life, was shaped by many tensions, both those that were formally political and those that were to do with people's perceptions and understanding of the society around them.

CHRIS EALHAM is Senior Lecturer in History at Lancaster University. His previous publications include *Policing the City: Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937* (2005).

MICHAEL RICHARDS is Senior Lecturer in Contemporary European History at the University of the West of England. His previous publications include *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936–1945* (1998).



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For Paul Preston





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## Preface

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In the course of preparing this book the editors have incurred numerous debts of gratitude. I would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Board who made it possible for me to enjoy a sabbatical year during which I completed chapter 6. I would also like to thank Beatriz Anson, Xavier Díez, Andrew Dowling, Sharif Gemie, Helen Graham and Mike Richards for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this chapter. I am also grateful to Manel Aisa for facilitating valuable information on revolutionary Barcelona. Josep Lluís Martín Ramos assisted with copyright matters, while Mark Barrett helped prepare images for publication.

CHRIS EALHAM

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MICHAEL RICHARDS



William Davies, until recently editor at Cambridge University Press, first mooted the notion of a 'revisionary' collection on the Spanish civil war several years ago and thanks are due to Bill for his gentle prompting and for permitting the deadline to slip on several occasions. Michael Watson, the current editor at the Press, and Isabelle Dambricourt and Joanna Breeze, have overseen the production stages with patience and understanding. Thanks are also due to Kay McKechnie who has been a model of calm thoroughness as copy editor. We would both also like to thank all of the scholars who contributed to the volume, who gave not only in terms of intellectual understanding but also demonstrated some forbearance at times throughout the editing process.

Finally, it gives us enormous pleasure to dedicate this volume to Professor Paul Preston who inspired us both, first as undergraduates together at Queen Mary College in the late 1980s and then as postgraduates under his supervision in the early 1990s. The endlessly fascinating interplay between individuals and great historical processes depicted in Paul Preston's work serves as an inspiration to the kind of cultural and social history presented here as a human story about individuals and collectivities, their experiences and how they are handled.

CHRIS EALHAM AND MICHAEL RICHARDS

## Abbreviations

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AEC	Asociación de Estudiantes Católicos – Association of Catholic Students
CCMA	Comité Central de Milicias Antifascistas – Central Committee of Anti-fascist Militias
CEDA	Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas – Confederation of Spanish Autonomous Rightist Groups
CNT	Confederación Nacional del Trabajo – National Confederation of Labour (anarcho-syndicalist union confederation)
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya – Republican Left of Catalonia
FAI	Federación Anarquista Ibérica – Iberian Anarchist Federation
FJS	Federación de Juventudes Socialistas – Federation of Socialist Youth
JAP	Juventud de Acción Popular – Popular Action youth movement
JONS	Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-sindicalista – National-Syndicalist (fascist) Offensive Committees
JSU	Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas – the joint Socialist–Communist youth movement
MAOC	Milicias Antifascistas Obreras y Campesinas – Anti-fascist Workers’ and Peasants’ Militias
PCE	Partido Comunista de España – Spanish Communist Party

PNE	Partido Nacional Español – Spanish Nationalist Party
POUM	Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista – Workers’ Party for Marxist Unity
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español – Spanish Socialist Party
PSUC	Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya – Catalan Unified Socialist Party
RE	Renovación Española – monarchist elite political grouping
SEU	Sindicato Español Universitario – Spanish University Students’ Union
UGT	Unión General de Trabajadores – Socialist General Workers’ Union

## Chronology

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- 711 Beginning of Islamic occupation in Iberia. According to legend, initiated by military Muslim invasion.
- 718 Battle of Covadonga when, according to historical legend, King Pelayo expelled the Moors from Asturias, thus initiating some eight centuries of ‘reconquest’ (the *Reconquista*).
- 1085 25 May: Triumphant entry into Toledo of Alfonso VI (in legend, accompanied by El Cid, warrior champion of Christian Castile).
- 1212 Navas de Tolosa – victory of Navarrese over the ‘infidel’.
- 1479 Union of Catalonia – Aragon with Castile.
- 1492 Fall of caliphate of Granada to the Catholic monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella. End of *Reconquista*, marked by expulsion of Moors and Jews. Beginning of conquest of the ‘New World’.
- 1545–63 Ecumenical Council of Trent determining principles of Catholic Counter-Reformation.
- 1558 Accession of Philip II. Height of Spain’s global empire.
- 1563 Founding of monastery of San Lorenzo at El Escorial.
- 1571 Naval defeat of Turks by papal and Habsburg forces at Lepanto, in the name of Holy Roman Empire.
- 1640 Rebellion of Catalonia against government from Castile.
- 1714 Siege of Barcelona.
- 1808 2 May: Popular rising in Madrid against the French invasion: the War of Independence.
- 1812 March: Liberal Constitution of Cádiz.
- 1813–14 French withdraw. Restoration of absolutism: Ferdinand VII.
- 1833–40 Carlist civil war against liberals.
- 1868 September: Liberal military pronouncement and revolt overthrows Isabella II.
- 1873 First Republic. Cantonalist revolt and Carlist War (1870–5).
- 1874 January: Republic overthrown. Bourbon monarchy restored – Alfonso XII (December).

- 1898 'The Disaster': Spanish fleet lost in battle with US. Spain loses last American colonies, including Cuba.
- 1906 March: Law of Jurisdictions whereby military courts given power to try political protesters.
- 1909 July: 'Tragic Week' in Barcelona – anti-clerical and anti-conscription popular protests.
- 1917 State crisis centred in Catalonia. Culmination of reform movements amongst sections of bourgeoisie, military and working class.
- 1919 31 May: Alfonso XIII consecrates Spain to the Sacred Heart of Jesus at Cerro de los Ángeles, a hilltop near Madrid, marking the geographical heart of Spain.
- 1919–25 War in Morocco. (July 1921, disastrous Spanish defeat at Anual.)
- 1923 September: Military coup led by General Miguel Primo de Rivera.
- 1930 January: Fall of Primo dictatorship.
- 1931 14 April: Proclamation of Second Republic. Alfonso XIII goes into exile.  
27 April: National flag decree: recuperating red, yellow and purple republican tricolor of the nineteenth century to fly from all public buildings.  
1 May: Pastoral letter of the cardinal primate of Spain, Segura, in barely concealed support of the monarchy.  
11–12 May: Church and convent burnings in Madrid, Málaga and other cities.  
May–July: Republican dispositions on religious education and (20 May) proclamation of 'freedom of worship'.  
July–October: Acts of the provisional government on reform of schools (laicisation).  
14 October: Parliamentary approval of articles 24 and 26 of the Constitution dealing with religion and the church.  
3 November: Decree liberalising marriage and legalising divorce.
- 1932 18 January: First anarchist rebellion, Alt Llobregat (Catalonia).  
23 January: Dissolution of the Jesuit Company of Jesus (Jesuits).  
10 August: Anti-government insurrection led by General Sanjurjo fails.  
9 September: Approval of Catalan statute of autonomy.
- 1933 8 January: Second anarchist rebellion (Casas Viejas).  
17 March: Law of Religious Confessions and Congregations.


- 1933      3 June: Pius XI's papal encyclical, *Dilectissima Nobis*, on 'oppression of the church in Spain'.  
 November: Parliamentary elections. Victory of right-wing republican parties (CEDA and Radical Party).  
 8 December: Third anarchist rebellion.
- 1934      6 October: Left-wing insurrections in Asturias and Cataluña.
- 1936      16 February: The Popular Front alliance wins parliamentary elections. Manuel Azaña becomes head of the government.  
 March: The fascist Falange banned. Its leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, arrested. Street clashes between rightists and leftists.  
 10 May: Azaña named president of the Republic. Many strikes and land seizures.  
 12 July: A leftist officer of the Republican Assault Guards assassinated by Falangists.  
 13 July: Monarchist leader, José Calvo Sotelo, assassinated while in police custody.  
 17–20 July: Military rising initiated in Spanish Morocco, quickly followed in mainland Spain. Beginning of social revolution in areas with strong socialist, republican or anarchist presence where the rebellion is successfully resisted.  
 19 July: Prime minister Martínez Barrio succeeded by José Giral, who dissolves the regular army and orders arms to be distributed to popular militias. General Franco arrives in Spanish Morocco to head the Army of Africa.  
 19–20 July: The rebellion is welcomed in Pamplona, Burgos and Salamanca. It also quickly succeeds, with much violence, in Seville, Cádiz, Córdoba and Zaragoza.  
 25 July: Hitler agrees to provide aid to the insurgents.  
 30 July: Airlift of the Army of Africa to the Iberian Peninsula with planes supplied by Germany and Italy.  
 3 August: Aerial bombing of Zaragoza cathedral, home to the chapel of Our Lady of the Pillar, patroness of Spain, associated with the *Reconquista*.  
 7 August: 'Execution' of the Sacred Heart of Jesus at the Cerro de los Ángeles by republican militia.  
 13 August: Report of the Roman Catholic primate, Cardinal Isidro Gomá, to the Holy See which essentially justifies the war as a religious crusade.  
 23 August: Killing of nationalist prisoners in the Model Prison of Madrid.

- 1936      23 August: Creation of Popular Courts to process those accused of collaborating with the rebellion against the elected government.
- 27 August: Red-and-gold national Spanish flag is restored in the nationalist zone.
- 30 August: Junta de Defensa Nacional annuls the dispositions of the republican agrarian reform.
- 4 September: Prime minister Largo Caballero forms a new Popular Front government, gaining the support of the communist PCE, and reorganises the popular militias. CNT joins Generalitat, dominated by Catalan nationalist Esquerra and communist PSUC.
- 29 September: Junta de Defensa Nacional transfers powers to Franco who becomes supreme military commander and head of the government.
- 6 October: Basque statute of autonomy is promulgated.
- October: First aid from the Soviet Union arrives in Spain.
- November: Arrival of International Brigades. Nationalists fail to take Madrid. CNT join Largo government which moves from Madrid to Valencia.
- 17 December: Anti-Stalinist POUM expelled from the Catalan government.
- 1937      7 February: Málaga falls to nationalists.
- 19 April: Decree unifying political forces of nationalist Spain with the name of FET y de las JONS, under Franco's command.
- April: Nationalists begin a major offensive in the north. Bombing of Basque towns. On 26 April the German Condor Legion destroys the town of Guernica.
- 3–8 May: In Barcelona, intense fighting between Marxists and anarchists of the POUM and the CNT on one side, and socialists and communists on the other.
- 17 May: Largo Caballero resigns as prime minister; replaced by Dr Juan Negrín. Some earlier revolutionary reforms are rescinded.
- June: Nationalist troops enter Bilbao.
- 21 June: Andrés Nin, leader of the POUM, murdered by Soviet agents.
- 1 July: collective letter of the Spanish bishops in Franco's support issued.
- August: Violent dissolution (by republican government forces) of anarchist Council of Aragón.


- 1937      31 October: Republican government moves from Valencia to Barcelona.
- 1938      12 March: Civil marriages are declared outside the law in the Nationalist zone. The 1889 Civil Code, under which women were treated as minors before the law, is reintroduced.  
16–18 March: Heavy bombing of Barcelona by the nationalists.  
April: Press Law whereby newspapers become organs of the state.  
5 April: As Francoist troops prepare assault on Catalonia, Law of Derogation of the Catalan statute of autonomy pronounced.  
14–15 April: Nationalists reach the Mediterranean coast, north of Valencia. Republican Spain is split in two.  
April: Reorganisation of Negrín government. Resignation of Indalecio Prieto.  
1 May: Negrín offers peace plan to the insurgents (his ‘thirteen points’). Franco insists on unconditional surrender.  
July–November: Battle of the Ebro. Republican war effort begins to collapse.  
29 September: Munich agreement.
- 1939      26 January: Barcelona falls. Thousands of refugees flee to France.  
9 February: Law of Political Responsibilities against supporters of the Republic.  
27 February: Britain and France recognise Franco’s regime.  
27 March: General Franco announces Spain’s adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact.  
28 March: Madrid surrenders.  
1 April: Unconditional surrender of the republican army. US recognition of regime.  
18–20 May: On Ascension Day, Franco rides triumphantly into Madrid on white horse. Victory parade in Madrid follows, replicating the ritual of Alfonso VI’s entry into Toledo.  
27 May: Measures introduced against the use of Catalan language.  
July and August: Orders for ‘purging’ of teaching profession.  
8 August: Franco’s complete power is legislated in law of state organisation.  
23 September: Law of Widow and Orphans’ pensions for families of men on the nationalist side only.




- 1940      1 March: Law 'Against Freemasonry and Communism'.  
            18 March: Decree making 1 April (anniversary of the victory)  
            a national holiday.  
            1 April: Beginning of work on monumental pantheon of the  
            'crusade', the Valley of the Fallen.  
            12 July: Reestablishment of the Military Code of Justice for  
            crimes 'derived from the Movimiento Nacional' (civil war).
- 1953      26 September: Accord between US and Spanish govern-  
            ments on technical and economic assistance.
- 1959      1 April: Inauguration by Franco of monumental tomb at the  
            Valley of the Fallen.  
            21 July: 'Stabilisation Plan' announced as a 'Decree Law'  
            aimed at liberalising economy.
- 1964      Resolutions of Second Vatican Council.
- 1969      1 April: Thirty years after Franco's victory, final 'prescrip-  
            tion' of punishments for all 'criminal acts' before April 1939  
            announced.
- 1975      20 November: Death of General Franco. Juan Carlos is  
            proclaimed king.
- 1977      October: Political amnesty decreed by parliament.
- 1982      October: Electoral victory of PSOE, first socialist involve-  
            ment in government in Spain since 1936.
- 1996      March: Election victory of conservative Partido Popular.
- 2001      11 March: Beatification of 233 priests and religious killed  
            during the civil war.
- 2002      November: Under pressure from protest groups, Spanish  
            Congress approves a motion condemning the coup d'état of  
            July 1936.




Map 1. The division of Spain following the rebellion, 20 July 1936.



Map 2. The division of Spain at beginning of February 1937.



Map 3. The division of Spain, April 1938: republican territory split in two.



Map 4. The division of Spain, March 1939, as war draws to a close.



# 1 History, memory and the Spanish civil war: recent perspectives

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*Michael Richards and Chris Ealham*

For decades the historiography of the Spanish civil war was dominated by ‘grand narratives’ which focused primarily on the conflict’s origins and outcome. Historical time in Spain was marked and measured according to the chronology of the rise and fall of the Franco regime (1939–75). Interpretation was primarily moulded by the unavoidable reality of the polarised positions of the war itself and judgements about each of the competing sides.<sup>1</sup> Within Spain, the official bi-polarity, as depicted in the 1940s and 1950s, verged on the metaphysical – the division was between the forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, or ‘Spain’ and ‘anti-Spain’, the latter including regional nationalists, democratic liberals and working-class radicals singled out for repression. Outside Spain, simplistic Manichean myths were almost as persistent. In the extent of its over-simplification, the explanatory framework of ‘communism versus fascism’ went further than the other principal depiction of the war in the popular imagination as a struggle between ‘democracy’ and ‘fascism’.<sup>2</sup> The latter representation of the war, however, was also somewhat misleading, not least because it manifestly failed to incorporate adequately the fiercely contested social revolution which took place in republican Spain during the first year or so of the conflict.

To an extent, this liberal-democratic framework overlapped with another rigid structure of interpretation that depicted the war as a struggle between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’. This way of looking at the conflict, though not without some merit, was weakened by the inherently normative nature of the key terms – ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ – which relied on a number of limiting assumptions. Republicans, for example, have often been viewed somewhat uniformly and uncritically since they have been deemed to be on the side of ‘modernisation’. Recent analysis of the public values, collective action and symbolic expression of both Spanish republicanism and, indeed, Catholic ‘traditional’ political thought and action, have begun to modify our understanding of the various competing forces as portrayed by the modernisation theory of the war.

The aim of this book is to depart from these various dual frameworks by directing attention towards the cultural sphere. The essays here, commissioned from historians in Spain, Britain and the United States, explore the ideas and mentalities surrounding the cataclysm that engulfed Spain from 1936 to 1939. Rather than focusing on discrete forms of cultural expression, such as newspapers<sup>3</sup> and literature,<sup>4</sup> areas of ambiguity are confronted here in an effort to establish some dividing lines between the categories of 'culture', 'ideology', 'consciousness', '*mentalités*' and 'traditions'.<sup>5</sup> Part 1 explores three broad themes that have, in recent years, become paradigms for conceptualising the civil war historically: violence, nationalism and religion. The chapters that form part 2 apply particular cultural models and concepts – populism, urbanism and empowerment – to the tension-ridden politics of the republican zone during the war. In part 3 the focus shifts to regions or social groups that, in the main, supported the 1936 rebellion against the Republic and the ways in which this support was articulated and justified.

A common theme running through all of the contributions is the complex interaction of national political events and crucial *local* factors. These local, often cultural, facets of the landscape of the war, though neglected by historians, gave meaning to the struggle for those entangled in it. This *meaning* contributed to the shape and course of the war. Unsurprisingly, it is often these elements – those to do with experience – that figure most prominently in the ways the years of conflict are remembered, collectively and individually, in Spain. Thus, viewed from these several vantage points, the war can be seen as a process of fracturing or 'splintering', resulting from the many cleavages within society in the 1930s. It follows from this that the contributions to this volume tend to see the Spanish civil war less as a single great clash between two easily identifiable sets of ideas, social classes, or even ways of life, than historians have previously done.<sup>6</sup>

The devastating civil war of 1936–9 has long been seen as the defining moment of contemporary Spanish history, forming a vital part of Spain's social and political inheritance. The dictatorship of General Francisco Franco was born as a result of the violent suppression of democracy during the conflict. Some 350,000 Spaniards lost their lives during the formal period of the war itself. A high proportion of these deaths resulted not from battlefield action but as a result of repression carried out by what became conceptualised, formally, as the two competing groups on each side of a single divide. It has been estimated that more than 200,000 Spaniards died in the first years of the dictatorship, from 1940 to 1942, as a result of political repression, hunger and disease



related to the conflict.<sup>7</sup> The omnipresent figure of Franco, in state newsreel films and heavily censored newspapers of the post-war era, was a constant reminder, not merely of the lack of freedom, but also of the pain of the fratricidal conflict of the late 1930s.

Some 500,000 people fled into exile at the end of the war, and probably 50 per cent of these exiles were women and children, representing a dramatic displacement with considerable implications for memories of the conflict and its brutal aftermath.<sup>8</sup> At the end of 1939, according to the calculations of the regime, there were more than 270,000 men and women held in the regime's prisons from where political executions took place and where punishment beatings, suicides, starvation and epidemics were commonplace. Thousands of exiles ended up in French holding camps after fleeing the Nationalist armies and many Spanish republican supporters fought in the French resistance after May 1940. Large numbers of those captured were returned to Spain to face a firing squad or were interned in Nazi concentration camps as 'stateless enemies'. Between six and seven thousand exiles from Spain were to die in the extermination camp of Mauthausen.<sup>9</sup>

In European terms, Spain was unique in experiencing the great cataclysm of 1939–45 in the aftermath of a fully consummated civil war. There were of course important elements of social and political polarisation and conflict in many other European states in the 1930s and marked features of a more or less civil war mentality during the Second World War, especially in France and Italy. The result, in Spain, was that the civil war was remembered for several years in the context of the most repressive phase of the pro-Axis Franco dictatorship. In terms of state violence against political enemies (rather than 'racial aliens'), the Spanish regime was considerably more terroristic than Mussolini's fascists or Nazism.<sup>10</sup> Unlike fascism and Nazism, moreover, the Franco regime was neither militarily nor politically defeated at the end of the war. In the early decades the Spanish dictatorship sought legitimisation on the basis of its triumph – the Nationalist 'crusade' became the principal founding myth of Franco's 'New State'. In the 1940s, Spanish histories of the civil war, and of the Second Republic (1931–9) which had been engulfed by the war, were written by army officers, policemen and priests.<sup>11</sup> In post-war Germany and Italy, processes of denazification and defascistisation, however inadequate, symbolised a break with the dark times of the 1930s. By contrast, in Spain the legal process of redress was aimed *against anti-fascists*, supporters of the Spanish Republic and leftists. Internationally, the cold war, which quickly followed the cessation of hostilities in 1945, produced an ideal context for the continuation of Franco's staunchly anti-communist

regime. In this sense, if in no other, the Spanish experience of the 'suspension of memory', during long years of dictatorship, was similar to that of Eastern Europe. In spite of 'constitutional evolution', expressed, for example, in the 'Spaniards' Charter' (*Fuero de los Españoles*) of 1945 – introduced to keep abreast with the new international emphasis on 'human rights' – Spaniards were not permitted to become political citizens. Independent political parties and trade unions were banned throughout the duration of the dictatorship.

Since the turn of the millennium, as the Spanish democratic Constitution of 1978 neared its twenty-fifth anniversary, there has been an upsurge of popular interest in the civil war and post-war period. Many stories have emerged of anonymous mass graves, imprisonment, forced labour and collective and individual humiliations.<sup>12</sup> The unearthing of mass graves has become central to organised attempts to recuperate aspects of 'lost memories' in Spain. Common graves became a feature of the landscape throughout Spain as the Nationalist wartime campaign proceeded. Many towns and villages all over Spain had a ravine, gully or embankment where the victims of civil war violence, especially the Francoist repression, were buried.<sup>13</sup> Many of the bodies of those on the 'Nationalist' (or 'Franco') side could be recovered in the aftermath of the war; this was far less the case with republican victims. Many people in each community long knew of the existence of the graves of those killed extra-judicially by the Francoists. But this local knowledge was only exchanged in limited, 'off-stage' ways and was rarely verbalised for decades. Knowledge of the graves became symbolic of a generalised silence about the traumas of the past. There was a great deal of fear surrounding the suppression of these memories, as has been illustrated in the testimonies of the now elderly witnesses of the recent exhumations who were children of the war and whose attitudes contrasted with the boldness of the succeeding generation.

A widely held view among people participating in these acts of recuperation is that there remains unfinished business to do with the war and its human effects. The Francoist side had always made it abundantly clear that it would not negotiate a settlement. After the war there was no peace settlement and vast numbers of people who were innocent of any crime were thus placed in a state of legal limbo. They had few formal rights with which to counter the panoply of punitive measures against republicans introduced by the Francoist state. The political implications of this claim are obvious. Genuine reconciliation, it has been argued in some quarters, requires a public acknowledgement of responsibilities for the past.

Consent to the 'pact of oblivion' as a condition of peaceful transition in the 1970s has been central to the critique of the establishment politics of memory in Spain. From the standpoint of the protagonists of the transition, several features of the 1970s political landscape – not least the political violence of terrorist groups of left and right – appeared very much like the political violence during the Second Republic in the 1930s. Certainly the political class, but also broader society, was very aware of the risks of returning to conflict after Franco's death. But this 'pact' meant that there remained no peace accord or explicit reconciliation following the death of Franco. Instead, a general amnesty for all 'political crimes' was signed in October 1977. Opposing the dictatorship, on the basis of republican or democratic conscience, was thereby officially equated with the institutional violence of the military regime of General Franco.

The Franco dictatorship was always keen to disguise its own origins in a conspiracy against the legal, elected Popular Front government. For at least two decades after 1939, history was assigned the task of justifying what the regime called the 'Guerra de Liberación Nacional'. History, as taught in schools, amounted to the 'Formation of National Spirit'.<sup>14</sup> A particular narrative of the Christian *Reconquista* of Spain from Islam, beginning in the eighth century and culminating in the Moorish and Jewish 'purifications' of the fifteenth century, was forever replayed. 'Ownership' of this notion that Spanish nationality was forged over centuries through war and propagation of the Catholic faith had been contested – though not terribly successfully – by the short-lived republican regime during the war, a point illustrated with specific examples in the chapters here by Xosé-Manoel Núñez and Pamela Radcliff.

Up to a point, the state-controlled version of history in the 1940s was built upon a pre-existing methodological conservatism. Historians have rightly been at pains in recent years to show that Spain was not so different to the rest of Western Europe as certain (usually foreign) commentators, going back to the sixteenth century, have charged. The Spanish experience of crisis in the 1930s and 1940s in some ways underlines the similarities with much of the rest of Europe.<sup>15</sup> In certain important respects, however, Spain was indeed out of step with the leading European states.

This difference can be illustrated by tracing and comparing the broad historical contours of Europe in the modern era. One of the leading historians of contemporary Spain, Santos Juliá, has emphasised the significance for historical method of the absence of a religious

reformation in Spain, a cataclysmic social and political revolution, comparable to 1789 in France, or a transformative industrial revolution on the English model and scale.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, as in other countries, consolidation of the Spanish central state in the nineteenth century was in many respects a largely *formal* process and its authority throughout society was often wavering.<sup>17</sup>

In the intellectual field, Spain could boast a rich cultural tradition, but natural and social science had not generally developed 'organically'.<sup>18</sup> Intellectual renewal in Spain was a very public process, relying to a considerable extent on rhetoric, pamphleteering and journalism, and the Spanish bourgeoisie often merited the commonplace accusation that it lived more from and for politics than thrusting economic dynamism.<sup>19</sup> The abiding concern of public thought in the post-imperial era from the eighteenth century and into the twentieth was with the 'problem' of national identity: defining 'Spanishness' and explaining 'the mysteries of the race' had priority over analysis of and concerns with social issues. The figurehead of this Catholic-nationalist orthodoxy during the latter nineteenth century was the polymath high-priest of Spanish (Castilian) nationalism, Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo.<sup>20</sup>

An important section of the social elite continued to yearn for the glories of the Catholic imperial past even into the 1930s and this vision reached a high point in the 'years of victory' from 1936 onwards. After the civil war, whenever this version was contested, much controversy was created. An example was the publication, in exile in 1948, of the account, by the liberal medievalist Américo Castro, of how the flourishing 'melting-pot' culture of Christians, Moors and Jews in pre-sixteenth-century Spain was in fact the very substance of Spanish identity. The author presented a convincing challenge to the Catholic essentialist picture of the past painted by the Franco regime. Copies of Castro's book were smuggled into Spain and circulated enthusiastically among students and intellectuals.<sup>21</sup>

The Franco state granted an exclusive right to patriotic sentiments and public self-justification to those groups and individuals who could demonstrate their wartime adherence to the rebel cause. Although, gradually, social groups discriminated against were able, with some difficulty, to express covertly some sense of community, its real articulation within the public sphere was always a problem until the death of Franco in 1975. The acknowledgement only of the sacrifice made for the Francoist side during the war made the post-war dismantling of wartime mentalities problematic. Memories of the republican war effort were denied expression, representation and public ritualisation. This was essentially a symbolic continuation of the war.

While this reality was unchanging, there were important changes going on in Spanish society by the 1950s that had significant political effects.<sup>22</sup> Pressure from a circumscribed civil society for greater liberty and the regime's own ambitions toward greater international acceptance and economic development (the two things were closely related) meant that regime-society relations were not static in the 1950s and, especially, the 1960s. From the 1940s to the 1960s there was a gradual shift in the official discourse on the civil war. This shift was from the 'crusade' narrative of the war for 'the nation' against a foreign invasion, towards a new, more conciliatory, construction in the 1960s and 1970s, apparently widely supported within society, of the conflict as a fratricidal war (the mutual killing of brothers). The war gradually became a tragedy for which all Spaniards were somehow culpable.

Under social and political pressure for economic progress and development, a Decree of Economic Stabilisation was introduced in 1959. This effectively sanctioned the dismantling of many of the features of the 'internal colonisation' that had characterised life under Franco since the war and opened the way for massive foreign investment in Spain.<sup>23</sup> This Stabilisation Plan can be interpreted as a collective psychological turning point and a watershed in post-war economic, social and ideological *normalisation* leading to extraordinarily rapid economic growth. The myth of the 'economic miracle' would soon supersede the myth of the 'crusade' completely as the primary axis around which the official politics of memory revolved. In 1964, this dual 'stabilisation-normalisation' stimulated a major propaganda effort by the regime in celebration not of victory but of 'twenty-five years of peace'. The normalisation of history, as claimed by the reformers within the government, thus ran parallel to Spain's delayed participation in the Europe-wide post-war economic normality centred on mass consumption and consensus, in marked contrast to the concurrent reality of the Soviet bloc.

The values of the war meant less to the first post-war generation, which harboured a complex, more advanced set of legitimate social desires: vocations, private interests, appetites – which the dictatorial system and culture up to 1959 could not accommodate. As a corollary of rapid economic modernisation, each generation of Spaniards seemed more and more quickly to be discarding the customs of their parents. There was increasingly little choice but for the Franco regime to accept that rigid social control through primary agencies like family and school would no longer be viable.<sup>24</sup>

The liberalisation of the church, associated with the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s, was also, in part, a response to this accelerated urbanisation and the generational evolution that went with it.<sup>25</sup>

Modernisers within the government also colluded in change, taking up a sociological analysis of Spain's recent history rather than the epic version full of outmoded symbolism and hero-worship which characterised the immediate post-war decade. These *aperturistas* invoked the liberal nineteenth century that tended to reconnect the state with society, relativising the place of the 1930s civil war in Spain's past and placing it within a much broader process of change. This official acceptance of change would pave the way for democracy with the death of Franco.

In the quarter of a century or so since 1975, Spanish history writing has undergone a process of renewal and transformation. This development has, in no small degree, been made possible by the disintegration of the dictator's regime. Francoist prescriptions had retarded the emergence of a critical historiography capable either of exploring the crisis of liberalism in the 1930s or of addressing the experience of those described by the regime as the 'anti-Spain'. Understandably, then, the intellectual climate of the decline of Francoism and the democratic transition of the 1970s facilitated an outpouring of histories of groups whose stories had previously been denied a place in history.<sup>26</sup> Researching 'sensitive' questions remained problematic, however. Until its dying days, the Franco state controlled access to much important archival material, encouraging a bureaucratic and secretive mind-set that relented only slowly with the widening post-Franco democracy.

It was, perhaps, a reflection of the fiercely labour-repressive nature of the dictatorship, that much of the social history writing of the immediate post-Francoist era focused on the workers' movement, whose role in Spanish history had been systematically distorted for decades.<sup>27</sup> The still repressive context and the reaction against the declining dictatorship, however, combined in encouraging functionalist accounts of the recent past. Almost inevitably, given the spirit of the times, it seemed reasonable to argue that every facet of social and political life had been more or less directly controlled from above by the dictatorship. This control seemed logically to have functioned in the interest of social equilibrium as defined by the regime. These influences, however, encouraged a relative lack of methodological and theoretical enquiry. In part, this reflected the weaknesses of the political left. Real discussions of theoretical problems caused major schisms in the main political organisations, like the PCE, because of their dogged determination not to question theoretical orthodoxies.<sup>28</sup>

The middle classes and aristocracy were yet to be considered an appropriate subject for social history, for example, thereby obviating any need for a relational understanding of the role of social class in history.

Even into the 1970s, Spanish social history presented the concept of social class unproblematically as a category of analysis unmediated by any other factors. Major conclusions about the economic and political structure, like the alleged absence of a Spanish bourgeois revolution during the nineteenth century, or the claim that Spain lacked an urban petit-bourgeois fascist constituency, were nonetheless made. 'Class analysis' was ultimately reduced to descriptions of exploitation, an undifferentiated theory of domination, and notions of subordination and accommodation were hardly discussed.<sup>29</sup> The quite extensive popular support for Francoism, or, at least, tacit assent to its authority, seemed hardly to matter.<sup>30</sup> Historiographical advance allows us to see nowadays that the conflicts of the twentieth century were indeed partly caused and shaped by contradictions within the social structure such as those magnified by the late nineteenth-century uneven expansion of capitalist production (especially in the great *latifundio* estates of central and southern Spain). But, as this volume of essays argues, we can also see that the great political mobilisation of the 1930s reflected *both* the evolving balance of class relations *and* a variety of other tensions, contradictions and collective claims.

The renovation of historiography was also limited by the tacit 'pact of oblivion' that underpinned the transition to democracy of the 1970s and meant that most people were reluctant to ask difficult questions about the recent past for fear of jeopardising 'national reconciliation' and the restoration of liberal-democratic freedoms. The price for this was '*desmemoria*' ('forgetting'). The idea of the conflict as a tragedy for which all Spaniards were somehow to blame seemed to be generally accepted as a consensus across society.<sup>31</sup> According to this view, no particular social or political group was to carry the moral responsibility for the start and conduct of the civil war or the repression that followed. In practice, this presupposed suppressing painful memories derived from the dictatorship's division of the population into 'victors' and 'vanquished'.<sup>32</sup>

By the early 1980s, it was clear that, although there had been some liberalisation allowing for a change in the focus of historical investigation, the methodologies employed by many historians continued to be burdened by the past. The extent of this first post-Franco historiographical 'rupture' was, in effect, constrained. In particular, the reliance on methods associated with traditional political history ensured that social history was by-passed or, at least, defined in narrow terms. In the case of labour history, the cultural world of rank-and-file activists and militants was almost wholly neglected. The relationship between ideas, leadership and social classes was obscured beneath a welter of studies that dwelt

on the history of workers' institutions, the relations between political parties and trade unions, and uncritical accounts of ideological polemics. This process resembled the 'great man' version of history, as workers' movement leaders were cast as 'kings' or 'laic saints'. In part, this conservatism reflected the nature of the Spanish labour movement itself.<sup>33</sup> The sense of social alienation around the turn of the century and into the 1930s in Spain produced a generalised working-class dissent but in a peculiarly *apolitical* form. The labour movement, both anarchist and socialist, developed no coherent or internally agreed theory of the state.<sup>34</sup>

The story was by no means one of complete stasis, however. Certainly, the growth of local histories of early twentieth-century Spain forms part of an important work of historical recuperation. This endeavour produced a series of 'maps' of obscured landscapes and organisations which demonstrate how, contrary to Francoist apologists, the social and political movements repressed by the dictatorship were firmly rooted in civil society and were not part of an 'alien conspiracy'.<sup>35</sup> This 'codified' element of the recuperation of collective memories – carried out by trained historians – has therefore been under way for more than two decades. The painstaking task of piecing together often fragmented and dispersed source materials in order to reconstruct the histories of repressed groups that were largely hidden from history during the dictatorship has required the application of considerable care and expertise. In some cases, the empirical strength of many local studies has approached a 'fetishism of facts', possibly produced in reaction against the decades of official control of access to 'the truth', as written down in official papers, and the sense of release of pent-up frustration provoked by public access to official archives.<sup>36</sup>

The 1982 call, made by two of the most influential social historians of modern and contemporary Spain, José Álvarez Junco and Manuel Pérez Ledesma, for 'a second rupture' within the historiography of twentieth-century Spain, particularly with regard to social and labour history, was therefore timely.<sup>37</sup> Broadly speaking, this 'manifesto' was based on the need for a far wider conception of social history. It applied, for example, several of the ideas that had shaped E. P. Thompson's path-breaking work on the culture of the English working class, but had not previously been incorporated into the practice of Spanish historians working on the twentieth century.<sup>38</sup> The call was for a social history reacting against what was seen as the methodological stasis of much Spanish history, advocating an authentic *working-class* history, a history of workers, their everyday lives and mentalities, and not just a history of those encadred in political and trade union organisations. Most importantly, the emphasis



was to be upon the concept of social class as mediated via cultural sensibilities.

Only slowly, during the 1980s, did the notion that social conflict, consciousness and collective action might revolve around more than a single external reference point, such as the mode of production, begin to reshape accounts of the era of war and dictatorship in Spain. Even after the election in 1982 of the first socialist government in Spain since 1936, the traditionally rigid demarcation of academic disciplines in universities continued to discourage the interchange of ideas and approaches. It would take another decade for the concept of *identity*, for example, to become a respectable category of analysis, making some in-roads into the monolithic notion of *ideology* in history writing on the civil war. With hindsight, however, it has become clear that the call for a 'second rupture' was instrumental in subverting methodological orthodoxies, encouraging a revitalised social and cultural approach to history. Since it first appeared in spring 1988, the showcase journal, *Historia Social*, has established itself as a much-respected, high-quality forum for this process of revitalisation.

Increasingly, behaviour and belief are viewed as the product of a range of interconnecting factors. One of the key links between historians and approaches that were formerly seen in Spain as the preserve of other disciplines has been women's studies, given initial impetus by the founding in 1981 of the Seminario de Estudios de la Mujer of the Universidad Autónoma in Madrid.<sup>39</sup> Women's history, for example, has contributed much of the most innovative and refreshing scholarship, reflecting the concerns of the 'second rupture', in the sphere of a consciously democratic oral history, offering a voice to those whose history frequently remains untold.<sup>40</sup> Oral history has thus developed in tandem with the renovation of historical method.<sup>41</sup> This has been facilitated by the creation of important sound archives, such as that at Barcelona's Casa Ardiaca, the Institut Municipal de l'Història de la Ciutat, which holds thousands of interviews, including those conducted by Ronald Fraser in the course of his monumental oral history of the civil war.<sup>42</sup> Spain's leading oral history journal, *Historia, antropología y fuente oral*, was established in 1990, and its change of title in 1996 – from *Historia y fuente oral* – reflects the pivotal importance of cultural anthropology as part of increasingly interdisciplinary approaches. The 'pact of oblivion', sealed in the 1970s, has itself become an object of historical enquiry rather than an obstacle to it. Social and cultural history – with its emphasis on everyday life and the social and cultural significance of repression – has played a role in the process of recentring the memory of those who were repressed by Franco.<sup>43</sup> Equally important,

these same themes have been charted in more detail in many local studies.<sup>44</sup>

In its focus on the atmosphere, texture and language of everyday life, cultural anthropological approaches have contributed to showing how the era of the civil war relates to the broader themes of modern and contemporary Spanish history. New questions have been formulated and subject areas that seemed to have been extensively surveyed by historians have been reopened. 'High politics', for example, was often shaped and reshaped by culture. Recent research on the Restoration monarchy (1875–1931) has explored how endemic public unrest nourished elite interest in authoritarian solutions to reshaping the liberal state.<sup>45</sup> This has challenged revisionist arguments about the period of the monarchy which has seen the Restoration system more positively as a form of 'proto-Christian democracy' and the Republic and civil war, therefore, as some form of 'aberrant' distortion.<sup>46</sup> Anticlericalism and the urban insurrections of 1909 have also been submitted to a far-reaching social and cultural analysis in a series of studies that have explored the public values, collective action and symbolic expression of republicanism that underpinned populist mobilisation and protest.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, the historians of modern Spain who have shown a sensitivity to spatial issues have invariably been informed by the new adventurous spirit.<sup>48</sup>

There has been an obvious shift from high politics – the state as an entity and official political institutions – towards the broader environment in which politics was conducted: the process by which the state was formed, and the establishment of its collective and public values.<sup>49</sup> Social historians have looked beyond the essentially narrow concern with institutional power to consider its social, cultural and spatial dimensions.<sup>50</sup> The myths, beliefs and values of political groups, organisations and systems have moved to the centre of the historiographical stage. The broadening of the way political activity is understood, as implied in this shift of focus, depends upon a more complex notion of the public sphere: its symbolic and material creation, perception and contestation. And as with the thematic and spatial focus, the recent preoccupation with political culture has also refocused temporal considerations. Aspects of social life during the civil war, when set against longer established cultural patterns and processes and the 'rhythms' of social activity, allow a measuring of exceptionality against 'normality'.<sup>51</sup>

In discussing three broad themes, language, locality and identity, all of the contributors to this volume adopt a similar approach to the concept of culture. The term as understood here is not restricted to the art gallery and the concert hall, to artifice and manners, but incorporates a

considerably broader range of lived experiences.<sup>52</sup> The Spanish tragedy was shaped by many tensions, both those that were formally political and those that were to do with people's ways of comprehending the social events around them. This conception of culture is reflected in the definition adopted by the historian Peter Burke for whom culture is 'a system of shared meanings, attitudes and values and the symbolic forms in which they are expressed'.<sup>53</sup> 'Culture' here, therefore, refers to 'the very material of our daily lives, the bricks and mortar of our most commonplace understandings, feelings and responses',<sup>54</sup> or, to use Raymond Williams's celebrated expression, 'a structure of feeling'.<sup>55</sup> Culture, however, does not exist in isolation from social structure. Understood as sets of collective beliefs, it is shaped by networks of social relationships, including social classes, and does not, therefore, either supplant or merely replicate society.

Analysis of this intertwining of culture and society requires consideration of '*mentalités*'. Our working understanding of what the term means for historians revolves around historical actors' *outlook and perceptions of events*. Rather than primarily the events themselves, the focus is on the relationship between events and popular conceptions.<sup>56</sup> The following chapters thus tackle questions to do with collective understanding as expressed in symbolism and discourse, in the mediation of social relations through perceptions of the lived environment, and in public rites and rituals.

These perceptions, during the years 1931–6, affected the formation and transmission of political ideas. Eduardo González Calleja (chapter 2) traces the pre-war dissemination of ideas that advocated projects of violence as a solution to political problems. The author views political violence as 'extra-linguistic communication' – a social relation that seeks to modify modes of public behaviour through force. Two historical factors propelled the 1930s discourses of violence. First, the political crisis after the fall of the military dictatorship in 1930 weakened the legitimacy of the state, which had not anyway been an arena for social representation but acted as a 'buffer' between antagonistic social classes. Second, because of this weak tradition of civic participation and political education, intimate bonds were established between political leaders and 'the masses'. González Calleja analyses how the linguistic and symbolic dimensions of political discourse became a weapon of struggle. The focus is upon particular 'networks of mobilisation': the role of politicised youth in the radicalisation process and the various armed groups and party militia that contributed greatly to the spread of political conflict in the republican period. The author also explores sites of violence and the occupation of public space at political meetings,

in schools, neighbourhoods and places of work. Suspicion of the adversary became a means to affirmation of group values and, he argues, there was a recognition of the incapacity of the democratic system to defuse differences through legal means. Even with growing participation in the 1930s, debate was framed by an 'increasingly fragmented repertoire of social imagery'. Poor functioning of conventional social communication produced the necessary conditions for *rumour* to become a motivating factor in violence. Often doctrinally weak, vocabularies of confrontation relied on a series of stereotypes and prejudices about political enemies that were transmitted via language and other forms of non-verbal communication.

Competing ways of defining 'the nation' and national identity are explored by Xosé-Manoel Núñez Seixas in chapter 3. The cult of 'the nation in arms' was a significant part of discourse on all sides, used as a tool for mobilisation and employing similar discursive patterns, and historical myths and icons. There were, however, important differences in the meanings attached to these symbols. 'Spiritual' nationalism, focusing on the Catholic 'essence' of the *Patria* ('Fatherland'), or *nation*, exemplified in the sixteenth-century empire and Counter-Reformation, was the *mainspring* of Francoist mobilisation. By contrast, republican mobilisation only rested partially on nationalism. Alongside class aims and the social revolution, loyalist national discourse focused more on resistance myths of the past (such as 1808) and the concept of 'the people' (*el pueblo*). This form was criticised by Francoists as a 'materialist' deformation of nationalism associated with liberalism. The concept of 'the nation', largely uncontested in rebel territory, was inevitably more divisive in the republican zone where regional nationalists were determined to limit the reach of 'Castilian paternalism' and establish and further their own spheres of action. Catalans, Basques and Galicians thus developed a *constitutional*, rather than explicitly *national*, identification with the republican wartime regime.

Enric Ucelay-Da Cal (chapter 5) studies the dynamics of political association in Catalonia during the war through the category not of social class but of populism. Catalan politics was very different to Spanish politics. In 1931 three groups, Catalan nationalists (organised via the 'Catalan left', or *Esquerra*, formed in March 1931), the Radical Party of Alejandro Lerroux, and anarchist affiliates of the CNT, many of them poor immigrants, were faced with an uneasy co-existence. Concentrating on the institutional structures and tensions and the competing interests of this peculiar mix, it is argued that 'Catalanism' ended up permeating all wartime political association because it best served the wartime necessity of relying on 'the people', appealing vaguely

to activism, anti-elitism and reformism. This was particularly so of the communist PSUC, as the Esquerra slowly withered. The latter, before the war, had been the hegemonic political formation, but it was essentially a loose, unstable movement encompassing Catalan nationalists and republicans that had difficulty selecting between fascism and communism as an ideological framework. Ucelay-Da Cal further argues that a form of *Spanish* 'neo-populism' developed under the premiership of Juan Negrín, in line with his appeal to resistance at all costs. This 'new patriotism' discourse was particularly evident after the central government relocated from Valencia to Barcelona in October 1937, though its effectiveness was limited.

Despite the advances detailed already, there has been an almost complete absence of social perspectives on the city in Spain.<sup>57</sup> When spatial considerations *are* made, there is a tendency towards a circumscribed, one-dimensional conceptualisation, reducing space to the context or 'container' for social relations and not as an entity that is constitutive of these relations.<sup>58</sup> A culturalist concern with *meaning* can, however, be combined with a recognition of the importance of space for the mapping of social practices, sociability and social networks.<sup>59</sup> Albeit in different respects, all the chapters here adopt a more dynamic, historically contingent, conception of local space through the cultural, economic and political factors inscribed in any given locale.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, when we consider that combined and uneven development produced a series of local specificities that were at variance with dominant 'national' realities, a social history of space offers a privileged vantage point from which to examine wider political processes.<sup>61</sup>

Chris Ealham's focus in chapter 6 is upon the socio-temporal and spatial aspects of 'revolutionary urbanism' in Barcelona. He argues that the experience of past class struggles and cultural 'sediments', communal beliefs and revolutionary ideas, in working-class neighbourhoods (*barrios*), structured and inflected this urban project. Such a project was advocated and refined by revolutionary organisations (the anarcho-sindicalist CNT, the anarchist FAI and the dissident-communist POUM) in the course of the struggle for social transformation. But it also grew spontaneously from the cultural politics of the *barrios* and was shaped by a collective identity that perceived 'proletarian Barcelona' as a moral, social and geographical entity. Charting the rise of revolutionary impulses on the streets, and the subsequent ebb and flow of popular protest during the war, the author challenges the interpretation of the revolution in Barcelona as a descent into chaos and barbarism. He stresses that, beneath the external appearance of chaos and disorder, a definable revolutionary project was at play that, although

neither wholly coherent nor peaceful, represented a collective desire to transform the meaning and function of the city in an anti-capitalist direction.

Pamela Radcliff (chapter 7) explores cognate themes to those of Chris Ealham within the markedly different context of the city of Gijón. The author begins by outlining the cultural motifs around which supporters of the Republic rallied to defend their city from the military rebels in July 1936, before charting the evolution of republican politics in Gijón during the civil war. As in much of the republican zone, there was a profound shift of power towards the trade unions. Radcliff emphasises how this shift was heavily conditioned by local political and social developments. In the case of Gijón, the history of the civil war was largely shaped by the nature of the local anarcho-sindicalist movement which, unlike the case of Barcelona, was more moderate in orientation and had a tradition of collaborating with republican groups in the struggle against the oligarchy. This pre-war culture of alliance endured into the civil war, when the Gijón CNT openly respected the survival of republican political structures and co-operated with other left-wing and liberal groups in fomenting a cross-class culture of empowerment that defies the oppositional analytical framework of 'war versus revolution'. In the civil war, these traditions of interclass community politics were acted out in commitment to a vision of an anti-oligarchic city, an urban model that promised an improvement in collective services and the social wage. Reconstruction of the Popular Front from below depended on the deployment of symbolic tools with significance for particular social and political environments and conditions. While Radcliff charts the transformation of the built environment, this is distinct from the revolutionary urbanist processes mapped by Ealham, insofar as the Gijón experience was inflected by an interclass language that placed the accent on urban reform and modernisation.

In chapter 10 Michael Richards assesses the political and cultural significance of the Holy Week processions in the city of Málaga in the 1930s and their relationship to the violence of the civil war. The baroque idiom of public devotions was politicised most clearly in the Nationalist construction of the conflict as a religious 'crusade'. This created a suggestive tension between the church and the triumphalist secular authorities. But the public rituals of *Semana Santa* also symbolised a range of collective understandings – developed historically – of various social groups' relationship to the lived environment. Although anticlerical feeling was a part of popular tradition, the 'para-liturgy' of the Holy Week street ceremonies seems to have possessed genuine potency and expressed fundamental elements of identity even for those

living in the most marginalised zones of the city. Ritualised devotion to the Passion-tide images reinforced fundamental collective concepts: recognition of sin, the significance of suffering, a need for family and motherhood, belief in redemption and purity. To the extent that images were in some ways 'shared', across the class divide, there was a cathartic element to the *Semana Santa* rituals. Increasingly, however, from around 1900 division and conflict were not channelled peacefully. With the fall of Málaga to the Nationalists in 1937, perceptions of the proletarian revolution were shaped by the need to recognise exclusively the sacrifice made by Catholic supporters of the 'crusade'. The programme of 're-christianisation', through the Nationalist monopoly of public devotional activity, reestablished pre-war boundaries. Collective acts of purification and reparation focused on the penitential exemplars of the crucified Christ and the grieving, stoical Mother of God. Popular participation seems to have reflected some continuity with the devotional tradition. But, in the context of fear, a mass fleeing from the city and widespread executions of republicans, 'purification' entailed a dual sacred process of redemption and violence.

The struggle over symbols of group identity were thus shaped by locality and, very often, by religion and ritual. In chapter 4, Mary Vincent argues that religious violence in the war cannot be explained by clerical authors' ahistorical discourse of 'martyrdom', which sees the purge of priests as only the latest episode in a long-established and unchanging persecution. She is also critical of the assumptions of many historians who see religious violence as essentially the product of class polarisation. As a corrective to the first position, it is argued that a distinction between secularism and anticlericalism needs to be drawn. Clericalism was indeed a problem in the pre-war era and a source of considerable antagonism addressed by liberal measures of secularisation. The proletarian anticlericalism characteristic of the first months of the civil war, however, was a largely new form worthy of historical analysis. This violence was an integral part of the Spanish revolution – not merely as fulmination against the old oligarchic order, but as a form of iconoclasm comparable to the popular violence of the European Reformation. The rituals of humiliation against priests revealed the cultural and ideological positions of the assailants. Many of the forms of social and sexual humiliation – parody, ridicule, humour, the carnivalesque – suggest how deeply the patterns of Catholic practice ran in Spanish society. The aim was to destroy the power of sacred symbols through inversion. Priests were targets of extreme brutality not because they were easy targets but because of what they represented. To the perpetrators of the violence, priests, claiming to be celibate, were 'both



men and not men', impostors who preyed on wives and children, luring women from the home into the sphere of the church from which men were excluded.

In chapter 8, Rafael Cruz analyses the competition between the various groups which supported the rebellion of July 1936 to have their symbols (flags, anthems and programmes) adopted as the reference points of political life and collective identity in the rebel zone during the first phase of the civil war. In a series of public mobilisations and rituals, old symbols were overlaid with new political meanings as the various rightist parties jockeyed with one another for position. Focusing on the Castilian heartland of Valladolid, Burgos and Segovia, the author concentrates on two symbols that emerged as particularly powerful mobilising tools in the Nationalist zone early in the civil war. The first of these was the identification of Spanish nationhood with Catholicism, enunciated in mass acts of reparation, in this case invoking the Virgin of the Pillar in Zaragoza.<sup>62</sup> The second was the red-and-yellow bi-colour flag, formerly representative of the monarchy. Although both were more than familiar to those who were subjected to political appeals, these symbols were invested with new meanings in the context of the mobilising effort. Thus, the already popularly legitimised association of 'Spanishness' with religion was reoriented politically by the rhetoric of the war as a religious 'crusade'. Eclipsing several other right-wing party flags and spreading throughout rebel territory in the summer of 1936, the monarchist flag became the 'national' emblem of rebel Spain. In the process, the unity of the 'audience' for the mobilisations was itself reformulated and reinforced as 'the (Catholic and Spanish) *people*'.

Areas of contestation also included the interests, material and spiritual, of small-holding Catholic *labradores* (farmers), and their understanding of 'tradition' and sense of identity.<sup>63</sup> Employing a methodology influenced by the 'cultural turn' in history writing, Francisco Javier Caspistegui (chapter 9) details the construction of a model of identity in the northern region of Navarre based on the virtually instantaneous domination by Carlism once the war began. This 'model' helps us to understand the shape and nature of individual and collective actions as 'traditionalists' (Carlists) clashed violently with Basque nationalists and with republicans. Polarisation, mobilisation and violence were brought into sudden interaction with pre-existing communities, networks and self-images as a result of the civil war. This redefined the identity of Navarre in a strongly ideological sense. The only understanding possible of the position of Navarre in relation to the conflict thus quickly became a Carlist understanding, making a call to arms around what the author labels a 'utopia of unitarian identity' virtually unavoidable.



A number of conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. The iconic status of the Spanish civil war within the liberal European imagination – lodged there following the sacrifices of the International Brigades and the Spanish working class, and reinforced by the notion of the conflict as the first concerted fight against fascism – has contributed to the strongly ideological bent of much of the historical production on the war. Indeed, we have argued here that the evolution of post-war historical consciousness in Spain has been shaped by ideological factors and the politics of memory more than elsewhere. Our focus, however, has been on the domestic conditions of this shaping because, in the end, they have had a more profound effect. Comparison with other post-war Western European states – Germany, Italy, France – without mentioning the traumatic cases of Eastern Europe, suggests that the problematic social legacy of the era of mid-twentieth-century warfare has had to be grappled with in most of the continent. The Spanish case, however, was unusual in several ways.

The civil war itself may well have had profound effects in terms of the general, popular understanding of Spain's past. In common with other such conflicts, constructions of 'the nation' and of 'the people', and coherent, persuasive, definitions of these terms were recognised as crucial to the struggle. But, because of the heterogeneous nature of the social and cultural composition of the leftist project, the forces of the republican side were less able to construct meaningful unifying symbols and discourses of mobilisation out of history than those who were known as 'the Nationalists'.

Historical understanding in the post-war era developed under the authoritarian conditions of a dictatorial power that ruled because of its victory in the civil war. It was not merely that there were 'skeletons in the cupboard', following episodes of 'collaboration' and truncated 'denazification'; in Spain, an entire political system and political culture were shaped by the experience of the war. While the official duality of 'Spain' and 'anti-Spain' could not endure indefinitely, it did possess some meaning for some of the social groups that had suffered the human and material consequences of the war. The repression and relative political stasis that followed on from this in the 1940s and 1950s were later combined with dramatic economic development, mass consumption and the 'arrival' of the middle classes from the 1960s. The vivid contrast between the widespread starvation of the early 1940s and the consumerism of the 1960s – a change taking place in little more than a single generation – has been overlooked as a factor in the shaping of post-war social memory, not only in Spain but elsewhere.

Economic 'normalisation' in the 1960s was accompanied by a restricted liberalisation of the official memory of the war. But there was no access to archives and there was no possibility of the development of a critical historiography. These conditions remained unchanged for most of the process of transition to democracy in the 1970s which was accompanied by a tacit, consensual, agreement to 'forget'. The first post-Franco historiographical 'rupture' was clearly significant though limited in its effects. Only from the mid-1980s did a 'second rupture' begin to overcome the weight of the past on Spanish historiography, stimulating a broad methodological normalisation where the aims of historical practice became more closely aligned with those in other comparable societies.

We have also argued that the distorting effects of the war on history and memory affected left-wing accounts once they became possible during the 1970s. The left was far from immune to peddling its own epic myths of the conflict. Methodologically speaking, the main problem related to the conception of social class as an undifferentiated category of analysis. This was a problem both in terms of an inability to reflect accurately the complexities of the social structure, and in terms of a theoretical inflexibility applied to the relationship of social class to other forms of consciousness and identity. Here, Spanish leftist history was facing superficially similar issues to Marxist history elsewhere, but the conditions of relative intellectual isolation from the key international debates meant that there was a considerable delay in drawing conclusions.

Whilst recognising the powerful conditions that have tended to produce a strongly ideological (and sometimes mythicised) element to explanations of the Spanish conflict, this volume synthesises recent research that moves away from the old framework towards cultural-anthropological, linguistic and spatial redirections. 'Normalisation' in this sense implies a historicisation of the Spanish civil war, that need not be framed by the methods of cultural history, but that does have to develop comparisons from the ground up, stepping back, as Pamela Radcliff writes in her chapter, 'from the binary categories drawn from political ideologies'. The term 'splintering' in the title of the book is not meant to imply that the conflicts of Spain in the 1930s are not explicable through analysis of collectivities that were in some sense structured. The chapters in this volume suggest that there was indeed a shape, coherence and rationality to lived experience in this period. Rather than being merely a story of unending fragmentation, for the most part, the subject of study here has been the interaction of repeated motifs and patterns that give clues about the manner in which this experience was understood.

*Part 1*

Overviews: violence, nationalism and religion



## 2 The symbolism of violence during the Second Republic in Spain, 1931–1936

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*Eduardo González Calleja*

One of the most provocative stances which can be adopted in the study of political violence is to interpret it as a specific type of communication that aims forcibly to modify certain modes of public behaviour. Contrary to what might appear to be the case at first sight, violence does not involve the complete rupture of all channels of contact and exchange. It can also be understood as a mode of interlocution which, in certain extreme circumstances, may end up being the only alternative in the absence of other more constructive means of interaction. It is a social relationship of an undoubtedly asymmetrical nature, but one which nevertheless still imposes the necessity of an exchange and presupposes some kind of response after an initial escalation of demands, pressure and threats.<sup>1</sup> Communication theory has acknowledged this peculiar characteristic of violence by defining it as a specific type of extra-linguistic communication, a 'system of social communication in which aggressive social interaction becomes an integral part of the expressive repertoire for codifying and decodifying mythical references of a political nature'.<sup>2</sup> Violence and language are situated at the opposite poles of a continuum. Language constitutes a pure and constructive mode of interaction: it presupposes an unlimited consensus and requires the comprehension of the message, the truth of what is said, the pragmatic relevance of the act and the authenticity of the communicator.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, in many situations, language has also served as a vehicle for the transmission of myths, symbols and values with the explicit aim of increasing polarisation and violence.

### **The role of the symbolic in the polarisation of political discourse**

As essential elements of culture and basic ingredients in all forms of communication, symbols occupy a place somewhere between reality and our perception of that reality. On a scale of increasing subjectivity, there appear different intellectual processes with a strong symbolic component

that might be permeated by specific ideologies and mentalities. These would shape *a posteriori* attitudes liable to result in action: first, we have *opinion* as specific, subjective, intellectualised and transitory knowledge of an event or group. Next, we have *image* as a diffuse, even contradictory, conception of the totality of the characteristic features of a process, object or human group. Then, we have the *stereotype* as a synthetic, generalising, simplistic or acritical concept, closer to falsity than to truth, of the features attributed to an individual, group or action. A stereotype is 'a specific reflection of reality with the presence of an additional subjective factor, which comes in the form of emotional, normative and volitional elements that confer upon it a peculiar and unique character regarding knowledge and human behaviour'.<sup>4</sup> As a preconceived opinion about the attributes of the outside world, it is usually no more than a cliché rather than something rooted in the direct experience of the reality it is meant to represent. It is also very resistant to change and to the assimilation of new experiences.<sup>5</sup> Finally, *prejudice* can be defined as an arbitrary conviction, categorical and unconditional, created from a number of stereotypes and based on the selective generalisation and exaggeration of certain favourable or unfavourable attributes.

Symbols, transmitted via language and other forms of non-verbal communication, are intellectual fabrications which remain fairly immune to historical change. This is due to their subjective and emotional content, which in turn stems from the permanent nature of social and cultural sensibilities, secular norms and values, links to family or community traditions, different forms of physical and intellectual isolation, etc. Once these symbolic forms have become crystallised, they tend to become embedded in political cultures in the form of key words, icons, hymns, chants and slogans. Thereafter, stereotypes and prejudices readily spill outside the context in which they first arose to transform themselves, in appropriate social circumstances, into attitudes which give rise to actions or reactions which can easily lead to hostility and to latent or explicit violence.<sup>6</sup> The possession of a particular prejudice, arising from or expressed through socio-political attitudes (like anti-Marxism, anti-fascism, anticlericalism, anti-Semitism or racism), serves to ennoble and lend prestige to the individual members of an extremist faction, thus allowing them to integrate more easily into the larger group.

The predominantly appellative, rather than reflexive, function of political discourse makes it particularly suitable as a vehicle for the transmission of images of confrontation. It is, after all, a matter of persuading the citizenry of the value of certain ideas and personalities, making an aggressive comparison between them and those of rival political groups. At this point political discourse stops being rational and becomes a

weapon, especially when the referential (denotative) meanings are abandoned and stereotypes (connotations) are brought to the fore.<sup>7</sup> The proliferation of negative political definitions which are not based on contrasted beliefs or opinions, but on the blunt rejection of the rival ideology, transforms public debate towards campaigns of disqualification and defamation of the adversary, or in the most extreme cases, its dehumanisation as an irreconcilable enemy, in the anti-Semitic Carl Schmitt's fundamentalist meaning of this term.<sup>8</sup> Such an irreversible polarisation of the symbolic field as a symptom of an acute political-ideological confrontation is a recurring element in the emergence and dissemination of political violence.

Francoist historiography has blamed the public disorder and violence of the republican period for precipitating the crisis that led to the civil war. However, it seems more appropriate to conceive political violence not as the cause of the war but as a partial manifestation of the diverse social conflicts that plunged the republican state into crisis. Marxist and modernisation theorists have stressed the structural nature of these conflicts and their connections with deficiencies in three spheres: the socio-economic (the agrarian question), the political-institutional (the democratisation and reform of the centralist structure of certain state institutions) and the cultural (secularisation). But other conflicts had a more immediate origin, essentially related to the worldwide political and ideological confrontation that followed the First World War. This situation gave rise to very important challenges, such as the growing popular demand for political participation and the spread of mass politics, the changes to the traditional liberal parliamentary system introduced by democratising movements, as well as the determination of authoritarian and totalitarian movements to limit or destroy these. Nor can we ignore the profound geopolitical convulsions of an expansionist, fundamentalist or secessionist nature in post-war Europe, the resurgence of philosophical irrationalism, and the scars inflicted by unemployment and downward social mobility prompted by post-war industrial restructuring and the Great Depression of the 1930s. All these complex lines of social fracture resolved themselves in an imperfect fashion, first in Spain and then in the rest of the continent, in the form of an armed confrontation between fascism and anti-fascism.

This is not the place to attempt to analyse, even tentatively, the way in which this polarisation of alternatives came into being, and neither is it the place to attempt a characterisation of the various tactics of violence which different political forces employed at this crucial moment in Spanish history. From my chosen perspective, I will focus on the study of the incidence of ideologies and violent symbolism in the organisation

of armed groups that were decisive in the spread of political conflict in the republican period.

### **The formulation of subversive projects and the channels of dissemination of the discourse of violence in the Second Republic**

One of the most outstanding characteristics of the Spanish Republic was the proliferation of projects of violence, including the use of violent language and symbolism that called for armed action as a valid mechanism of intervention in public life. This phenomenon was indeed present all over the continent, but in Spain it reached such proportions that practically no political group or party remained exempt from elaborating its own subversive formula aimed at achieving the triumph of its ideals through the use of force. It is true that theory and practice did not always go hand in hand, but their influence was felt in the dissemination of a varied rhetoric and an abundant vocabulary of confrontation, as well as the appearance of armed organisations prepared to impose their ideals through violence on the streets. However, the almost universal adoption of violent norms of behaviour was not accompanied by the development of a rigorous body of doctrine, except in a very few cases. At most, there appeared translations of foreign articles and studies that dealt almost exclusively with purely technical aspects. These included manuals of insurrection prepared by orthodox communists; Trotsky's revolutionary writings aimed at heterodox Marxists; or theoretical works on the coup d'état aimed at the extreme right and extreme left.<sup>9</sup> The 'classical' theories of subversion were also reinterpreted: in the case of the workers' movements this was done with works by Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Sorel; the monarchist right, on the other hand, concentrated on the *coup de force* of Maurras and the doctrine about the resistance to tyranny developed by Catholic public law.<sup>10</sup> In this regard, it is significant that no Spanish writer published any serious theoretical work on violence as a generic factor in political and social transformation. Moreover, foreign works had a rather restricted circulation, in most cases through semi-clandestine channels. It proved difficult to find advocates for Castro Albarrán's theories of rebellion, even within the Catholic Church, and the works of Maurras or Malaparte, Nin or Araquistain were nothing more than readings for the converted. There is no doubt that articles dealing with the use of force proliferated in the political press, but these were strongly influenced by the domestic and external political situation and were, therefore, unable to provide an effective theoretical justification for the violent initiatives of political



groups. There were only two exceptions, both emanating from extremist movements with a prolonged history of subversive activity. First, the anarcho-sindicalists' history of insurrection went back to the Blanquism and Bakuninism of the nineteenth century, and maintained an intense debate on the practical steps towards 'social revolution' throughout the 1930s.<sup>11</sup> And second, the Carlist traditionalists were less inclined towards a theorisation of violence, but accepted it as an indispensable element of their political-cultural heritage for over a century.<sup>12</sup> The political groups on both the left and the right may have disseminated their range of rhetorical calls to violent action in order to hide their general theoretical weakness, although these calls were often nothing more than slogans riddled with everyday images that did not always concur with the official strategy of the movement. In all these confrontational messages the same underlying psychological attitude can be detected: suspicion of the intentions of the adversary as a means of self-affirmation of the group and its values, and a recognition of the incapacity of the democratic system to settle these differences or challenges through strictly legal channels.

The study of the mechanisms of dissemination of the symbols employed to justify the use of violence (from the most complex and global theories expounded in works aimed at the initiated, to the speeches, proclamations or slogans found in mass propaganda) is almost as important as the analysis of their theoretical content. Political parties played a crucial role in the dissemination and filtering of this information via the speeches of their leaders or their subordinates as well as the slogans launched by their internal channels of communication: newspapers, bulletins, pamphlets, meetings, mass meetings, rallies, training and indoctrination courses, etc. Taking into account the very close bond established between a leader and the masses in societies with a weak tradition of civic participation, it is hardly surprising that the violent messages uttered by political leaders assumed such an important role and had such wide-ranging implications. Conservative newspapers highlighted the most impassioned paragraphs of the speeches pronounced by the workers' leaders (especially the socialist Largo Caballero in the months prior to the revolution of October 1934) as evidence of their violent intentions, inciting their readers to protect themselves against an imminent outbreak of revolution. In retaliation, the left-wing press drew attention to the frequent verbal excesses of right-wing leaders both within and outside parliament, as a way of justifying a defensive strategy which in 1934 took the form of a Workers' Alliance (*Alianza Obrera*) with an overtly insurrectional vocation, and in 1936 that of an anti-fascist electoral front with a broader social appeal.

In general, the ambiguous political affirmations of right-wing political leaders – for example, José María Gil Robles – were perceived by their most radical followers as an invitation to destroy democracy, and by their adversaries as a warning of the need to defend a regime that was in danger of being conquered by non-republican political forces. In any case, and thanks to this complex game of mutual distortion and misrepresentation, an ever-growing proportion of the population felt afraid and so, at least morally, supported the defence of their interests and ideals by means of illegal armed action.

Mass rallies were used, not just as a way to transmit a message of violence to sympathisers, but also as a warning to potential enemies. Political meetings, such as those celebrated in Mestalla and Comillas in 1935, rallies such as the one held by the JAP in El Escorial in April 1934, the religious-patriotic *aplecs* of the Carlists, the march of the *escamots* in Montjuïc in the presence of Catalan president, Francesc Macià, on 22 October 1933 and of the FJS militia and the UJCE in the Metropolitan Stadium on 14 September 1934, were taken by political enemies as a subliminally violent threat, an attempt at intimidation through the symbolic occupation of public space. This intention became particularly evident during the spring and summer of 1934, when mobilisations were perceived as a warning or a preventive action at the dawn of a ‘revolutionary period’.

Among the preferred channels for the dissemination and popularisation of the discourse of violence, the printed word occupied first place. General press and party newspapers exert an influence over the vision that people have of a given situation and their knowledge of the potential collective actions which, as Sidney Tarrow indicates, depend on the resources and the information that the group is capable of controlling.<sup>13</sup>

The press is not only the main point of contact between the organisations and the militants or sympathisers, but is also an efficient means of responding to their adversaries.

As in all revolutionary processes, the occasional publications of Spanish parties and trade unions had a considerable impact, particularly among the popular classes. Tracts, leaflets, posters and pamphlets were essential means of communication between the organisation and its members and sympathisers or the curious public, whether issued nationally or locally at election times, during labour conflicts or political crises, or inserted in newspapers as handbills and political manifestos, or posted on walls. But they were also the cause of constant street clashes, which left a bloody trail of victims throughout the life of the Republic. The numerous violent clashes that occurred during the sale of

party newspapers are a good indication of the vital importance this type of propaganda had for the different organisations.

In spite of the limited extent of conventional editorial production in a country that lacked a reading tradition, it is beyond doubt that the cheap editions of collections designed to stimulate political debate produced by popular publishers such as Cénit, Zeus and Javier Morata must have had a certain impact among the more or less educated sectors of the divided middle class. Yet the greatest notoriety was achieved by the most polemical and most shoddily written works, such as the demagogic and libellous works by José María Carretero Novillo (*El Caballero Audaz*), Joaquín Pérez Madrigal and Luis de Tapia, or the unsophisticated anti-republican allegations formulated by the eccentric neurologist and founder of the Partido Nacionalista Español, José María Albiñana.

The routine, everyday character of violent messages was clearly reflected in the media. One should not underestimate the vital contribution of the mainstream press to this atmosphere of political tension, particularly at key moments such as the summer of 1934 or the spring of 1936; after all, the press continued to be the most important of the mass media, in spite of the fact that at that time the radio was experiencing a spectacular increase both in its coverage and its audience levels. In general, the conservative press, like the monarchist *ABC*, the Catholic *El Debate*, or the extreme right-wing *Informaciones*, did not directly incite violence but rather broadcast and magnified problems of public order, especially in the spring of 1936, as a way of demonstrating the weakness of the Republic and justifying self-defence measures that would lead to an authoritarian political 'renewal'. A more visceral stance was taken by the satirical press (from the right-wing *Gracia y Justicia* to the anticlerical *La Traca*) and the small party newspapers, especially those closely linked to the youth sections: thus *JAP* (Catholic), *Arriba* (Falangist), *a.e.t.* (Carlist), *Mundo Obrero* (communist) or *Renovación* (socialist) were more aggressive in tone and more inclined to rely on personal insult than the doctrinal periodicals, such as *Revista de Estudios Hispánicos*, which was close to the accidentalist right, the monarchist *Acción Española*, the Carlist *Boletín de Orientación Tradicionalista* or the socialist *Leviatán*. Yet in general, the circulation of more theoretical publications such as these was too small to have much impact, their readers being mainly people already committed to radical thought. For example, *Acción Española*, considered by many commentators as the most polished example of an ideological organ of the counter-revolution, had a circulation of a few thousand. Discreetly read by the monarchist *intelligentsia*, its theoretical argumentation on anti-republican insurrection

never produced the general state of opinion which it was assumed was a prerequisite for the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty.<sup>14</sup>

For its part, the left-wing working-class press magnified or censored the violent actions and declarations of those counter-revolutionary groups generically branded as 'fascists', as can be seen in the headlines of, for example, *La Tierra*, *Mundo Obrero* and *CNT*, and, in more subdued fashion, in *El Socialista*. Censorship measures, introduced after the passing of the Law of Public Order of 28 July 1933, and contrary to the stipulations of article 34 of the Constitution, attempted to minimise the impact of this violent rhetoric by requiring prior approval of copy and the punishment and withdrawal of offending publications.<sup>15</sup>

One form of informal political communication which has been hitherto little discussed is rumour,<sup>16</sup> which served as a catalyst of political attitudes, either by acting as a brake on planned collective actions (viz. the rumour about imminent military support in the general insurrectional strikes of December 1930 and October 1934), or as a 'guiding rumour' which conditioned and shaped the development of collective mobilisation (viz. the inaccurate reports of the murder of a taxi driver on 10 May 1931 that sparked off the attack on a Madrid monarchist centre and the subsequent arson directed at convents, or, in May 1936, the recurring rumour that Catholic women were distributing poisoned sweets). Rumour played a significant part both in heightening the awareness of danger and in the negative characterisation of political rivals. But the formulation and dissemination of rumour always requires the existence of certain objective conditions, such as political instability or uncertainty, a state of tension or collective anxiety and the lack of credibility or poor functioning of the conventional channels of social communication, either because of their limited coverage or the unreliability of their information. Rumour encouraged violent action because political life in 1930s Spain was characterised by permanent insecurity, uncertainty and constant change, because the hostile perception of the political adversary was already very widespread, and because certain negative myths (that of the mass poisoning masterminded by clerics is a good example of the persistence in secular society of popular anti-clerical myths) were firmly embedded in the collective consciousness. Rumour spreads more quickly and appears more real if it is nurtured in a hotbed of stereotypes, clichés and prejudices which stir up mutual hostility. In such circumstances, it can detonate violent action with unforeseeable consequences.

To sum up, political or meta-political discourse, interspersed with allusions to violence, acted via these as well as other means on a population

lacking in political education, and for whom active participation in public affairs was still a novelty. Aggressive messages together with their channels of dissemination made a considerable contribution to the gradual crystallisation of the state of tension and mutual exclusion that was a prerequisite of civil war.

### **The vocabulary of political confrontation in the republican period**

It is evident that 1930s Spain witnessed a radical transformation in political language and symbolism, a process which accompanied the progressive escalation in verbal violence in all spheres of public debate. This coincided with the great political crises that heralded the demise of the regime, namely the loss of power by the republican-socialist coalition and the electoral victory of the right (September–November 1933), the revolutionary phase (summer–autumn 1934) and the period of the Popular Front government (February–July 1936).

The polarisation of meanings affected first of all the denomination of Spain itself as a historical political construct. The nationalist groups on the country's periphery preferred to use the term 'Spanish state'. The contamination of the words 'patriotic' and 'national' during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship led the republican-socialist government of 1931–3 to avoid these terms or to forbid their use by political parties. Thus, in April 1932 'National' Action was forced to change its party name to 'Popular' Action, though by the end of 1934 Calvo Sotelo's counter-revolutionary Bloque Nacional recovered the term. The first republican government also reinforced the use of the term 'Republic' as a kind of blanket term for the renewed national impulse which the regime was eager to champion. The continued pursuit of reform by the republican-socialist government, particularly with regard to the religious question and Catalan autonomy, led to a progressive rejection of the equation Spain = Republic on the part of the anti-republican, monarchist and fascist right. Two incidents serve to illustrate this growing dichotomy. First, on 27 June 1932, General Goded ended a harangue in Carabanchel with the phrase '¡Viva España! y nada más' ('Long live Spain! and nothing more'), to which another officer retorted with '¡Viva la República!' ('Long live the Republic!'). Second, on 4 January 1934, in the course of an event in the parliament dedicated to the memory of the recently deceased Francesc Macià, Doctor Albiñana branded the much-lamented president of the Generalitat an 'enemy of Spain'. The parliamentary record details the following exchanges:

A member of the house lets up a cry of 'Viva España!' The government rises to its feet. Republican and socialist deputies receive the members of the government with very enthusiastic applause and cries of '¡Viva la República!' . . .

President of the Chamber [Santiago Alba]: *I do not think there is much need to shout '¡Viva España!', as if Spain were in danger, because in order to love Spain, to keep Spain alive, to defend the Spanish fatherland, the Republic is enough* (Great applause. More '¡Vivas!' to the Republic).

Señor Landrove [Federico, socialist member for Valladolid]: *But those who shout '¡Viva España!' think that by doing so they are fighting against the Republic.*<sup>17</sup>

This symbolic confrontation between 'Spain' and 'Republic' became even more patent during the spring of 1936, to the point where both terms had become virtually incompatible. CEDA propaganda for the February elections asked people to 'vote for Spain', as 'The Right means Spain! The Left means Russia!'<sup>18</sup> Three months later, José Antonio Primo de Rivera complained from his prison cell that 'nobody has yet been punished for shouting "Death to Spain!", but there are hundreds of people in prison for crying "Long live Spain!"'<sup>19</sup> At this late hour in the political crisis, the rhetoric of 'two Spains' (the 'inquisitorial', 'dictatorial', 'rotten', 'absolutist', 'intransigent', 'fanatic' or 'intolerant' Spain, as opposed to the 'outward-looking', 'anti-Catholic', 'atheist', 'Masonic' or 'Marxist' Spain) was reduced to a basic and contrapuntal 'Spain and anti-Spain', a rhetoric that was to become all too common during the civil war. As a JAP poster stated: 'There is no possibility of dialogue or coexistence with anti-Spain. It has to be us, and not them.'<sup>20</sup> This linguistic tension, the result of the complete absence of political consensus about the nation-state and the nature of its political regime, was clearly visible in the different values attached to the term 'republic', and also in the polysemy of other fundamental concepts like 'freedom', 'democracy' and 'revolution'. For left-wing republicans, the latter term essentially implied a modification or restructuring of obsolete political and social structures. Azaña identified it as the 'reconstruction of Spanish society', or more specifically as 'the expulsion of the dynasty and the restoration of civil liberties'.<sup>21</sup> In contrast, for radical working-class groups or for the fascists, 'revolution' implied change which was necessarily violent. As one left-wing socialist publication indicated, '[the new society] will come about through revolution, that is, violence'.<sup>22</sup> Meanwhile, for the JONS, 'it is necessary . . . to make Spaniards feel on an everyday basis that the only guarantee against Bolshevik domination . . . lies, precisely, with the triumphal development of our revolution'.<sup>23</sup>

It should be pointed out that there were considerable differences in substance between the euphemistic 'red light'<sup>24</sup> behind which the

socialists, from the autumn of 1933 on, hid their ambiguous attitude of breaking away from the 'republican right', and the 'revolutionary gymnastics' championed by the anarcho-syndicalists, for whom 'taking to the streets' was the epitome of proletarian insurrectionism. From the fascist Falange's perspective, the republican revolution initiated in April 1931 was regarded as 'pending' and 'futile', due to its supposedly anti-national, demagogic and classist nature.<sup>25</sup> For the right, the term 'revolution' was inextricably linked to images of destruction, violence and barbarity (the 'invasion of the barbarians' was a recurrent image employed by the counter-revolutionary press), bringing sacking, pillage and murder in its wake, while the counter-revolution spread 'ideals of purity, glowing in love and sowing the seeds of tolerance. The revolution has as its symbols the sickle and the hammer. The counter-revolution has the Cross.'<sup>26</sup>

Parliamentary vocabulary also underwent a significant process of mutation. In the early stages of republican parliamentary life one could detect the predominance of technical terms which were ostensibly value free, such as 'majority', 'minority', 'opposition', 'trust', or the obsessive reiteration of the term *juridicidad* ('legality'). In addition, pejorative terms associated with the polemics of parliamentary or factional politics from the monarchist era were also used. In every legislature politicians resorted to insulting appellatives, such as 'jabalí' (boar/warthog), the term coined by José Ortega y Gasset in the debate on the Constitution on 30 July 1931 as a synonym for an extremist or sectarian belonging to the radical socialist minority, 'energúmeno' (madman, fanatic), 'fascista' (fascist), 'cavernícola' (cave-dweller or reactionary) or 'señorito jaque' (gentleman bully), an expression employed by Calvo Sotelo to address Casares Quiroga, the president of the government, in the tumultuous session of 16 June 1936.<sup>27</sup>

There was also a well-developed repertoire of vocabulary for referring to corruption. The term 'enchufismo' (stringpulling), which arose during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, had its second heyday in the spring of 1932 as a result of the denunciations in parliament of supposed administrative abuses by the government majority. 'Enchufismo' was defined by one of its greatest critics as 'seeking access to public money, in the form of multiple public posts, functions or commissions, usually quite generously rewarded, advancing oneself through personal influence and recommendations'.<sup>28</sup>

The rise of the phenomenon of growing civic participation in public debate was accompanied by an increasingly fragmented repertoire of social imagery. As Santos Juliá has pointed out, there was a shift away from the 'people', society as a whole as identified with the democratic will of the nation, towards the more indeterminate (and, in Ortega y

Gasset's view, more threatening) term of the (working, popular, proletarian) 'masses', and towards the use of the term 'class', defined politically in terms of economic function and organised politically in 'vanguard' parties.<sup>29</sup> Parties and trade unions made frequent appeals for these collective representations to converge around specific political projects. But the united people, protagonist of the 1931 revolution, ended up splitting into multiple opposed identities: the triumphant union of the people 'of order' at the end of 1933, the counter-revolutionary National Front set up to contain the revolution a year later, or the recurrent theme of the unity of the working class and the subsequent founding of the Popular Front, an interclass, anti-fascist alliance. Thus, with the escalation of political confrontation, the terms which in 1931–3 had symbolised compromise or connivance, such as 'pact', 'coalition', 'union', or 'confederation', gave way in 1934–6 to words which were more emphatic in their meaning of belligerent alignment, the 'front', the workers' alliance, or the national, anti-revolutionary bloc. The *ad hoc* unions of the masses, like the Workers' Alliance, the CEDA, the Bloque Nacional (National Bloc) or the Frente Popular (Popular Front), tended to give their leaders the sensation of a power that was in some respects illusory and, at critical moments, such as 1934 and 1936, almost impossible to control.<sup>30</sup>

This growing bellicosity was evident in the vocabulary employed by the political parties. From the start of the Republic, a rival political group could be branded as 'cábila' (Kabyle – a reference to north African tribesmen), as Azaña called the monarchists in the session in the Cortes on 18 August 1932, a 'cuadrilla' (gang), or 'secta' ('sect'). The Catholic right were sneered at as 'lacayos' (lackeys), 'secuaces' (henchmen) or 'catecúmenos' (catechumens);<sup>31</sup> the monarchists as 'cavernícolas' (cave-men reactionaries), 'fanáticos' or 'cerriles' (uncouth, dim-witted); and the socialists as 'socialfascistas', 'socialenchufistas' (socialist stringpullers), or 'socialtraidores' (socialist traitors). Between Hitler's rise to power in January 1933 and the CEDA victory in the November 1933 elections, the term 'fascist', used pejoratively to designate Albiñanism and Falangism, came to be applied as a reference to all of the right. In 1936, this denigrating epithet was already being used openly by a growing sector of the extreme right, after the monarchist leader Calvo Sotelo solemnly declared himself a fascist before parliament.

The personalism that prevailed in almost all the political groupings led to the name of the leader becoming part of the denomination of his followers, which is in itself another facet of the heritage of the factional politics of the Restoration. Thus, we have 'Azañists', 'Lerrouxists', 'Largocaballerists', 'Prietists', 'Portelists', 'Gilrroblists', 'Jaimists' and



'Alfonsines'. The supreme leadership *par excellence* was assumed by José María Gil Robles, transformed into an infallible 'Leader' by his followers, and who was ridiculed by the left-wing press as *jefazo* (big boss),<sup>32</sup> as a way of denouncing the form of government by 'a boss' or *caudillo* and the personality cult – such as the references to Largo Caballero as the 'Spanish Lenin' – which reigned unfettered in other political spheres.

After the revolution of 1934 an increasingly militarised political vocabulary came into use: party members became known as militants or even militiamen; notices of political meetings became mobilisations; demonstrations became marches or rallies; leaders became 'chiefs', and elections became electoral struggles, battles or fights. Chants and slogans as concise and ritualised formulae of political identification were an inevitable corollary of street action. There were expressions like 'Viva España' ('Long live Spain'), the Falangist chant 'España, una, grande y libre, arriba España' ('Spain, one, great and free, up with Spain'), the JAP motto 'España una, España justa, España Imperio' ('One Spain, a just Spain, Imperial Spain'), the republican calls 'Viva la República' ('Long live the Republic') or 'Viva la Niña' ('Long may she live'), the Carlists 'Viva Cristo Rey' ('Long live Christ the King') or the Workers' Alliance's 'UHP', 'Uníos, Hermanos Proletarios' ('Unite, Proletarian Brothers'), and electoral slogans such as 'against the revolution and its accomplices', 'against the October executioners' and 'let's go for the three hundred. . .let's go for him' (a reference by the CEDA to the objective of achieving an absolute majority through which they could remove the president of the Republic, Alcalá Zamora). These were all transformed into invective with a strong emotional overtone and a meaning close to provocation, whose 'verbal magic' became part of the world of prejudice and stereotype, brought to life by agitators who manipulated and abused these forms, symbols, *mots d'ordre* for political ends. As Lussu highlighted in the 1940s, slogans were valuable summaries of political projects and expressions taken from military language that served as a guide and inspiration of the masses in the revolutionary process.<sup>33</sup>

Political symbolism transmitted by non-verbal means became highly developed. An extensive imagery of confrontation was transmitted through party emblems such as the masonic triangle linked to republicanism, the book and the pen superimposed on the anvil of socialism, the yoke and arrows of the Falange, the Bourbon Fleur de Lys, the cross of Burgundy of the Carlists, or the hammer and sickle adopted by dissident and orthodox communist parties, and anthems such as the republican *Himno de Riego*, the Marxist *Internacional*, the anarchist

*A las barricadas*, the Falangist *Cara al Sol*, the monarchist *Marcha Real* or the Carlist *Oriamendi*. Even colours acquired unexpected political connotations, to the point of becoming an essential element of party garb: the white of Bourbon monarchism, the yellow of Catholic syndicalism, the blue of the Falange confronting the red of the socialists. In the spring of 1936, José Antonio denounced 'the vice-ridden "semi-señoritos" [would-be gentlemen of leisure] of the socialist militia [who] mimic martial marches in their red shirts', while Falangists wore 'our blue shirts, embroidered with the arrows and the yoke of past glory, [and were] seized by Casares' [the president's] henchmen'.<sup>34</sup> There was also the antithesis between the red of the workers' revolution and the black of the reactionaries, Jesuits and clerics, seen as the dominant elements in the CEDA–Radical governments of 1933–5. And, finally, the use of the word (and colour) 'green' as an acrostic symbolising monarchist restoration: in Spanish, the letters of the word 'green' (*verde*) spell the initials of the slogan 'Long Live the King of Spain', or 'Viva el Rey de España'. The proliferation of different coloured shirts, such as the dark blue of the communist MAOC, the pale blue with a red cravat or tie of the FJS, the sky blue of the Albiñanists, the navy blue of the Falangists, the khaki with a red beret of the *requetés* and the grey of the Alfonsine monarchists, together with their corresponding party-specific accessories, visibly marked the boundaries of each youth activist group in an increasingly polarised public arena. This became obvious during the frequent violent weekend clashes between Falangists and socialist *chibiris* (young hikers) in leisure spots on the outskirts of Madrid.<sup>35</sup>

The staging of mass political rituals (marches, rallies, processions, funerals) as mechanisms with which to generate social meaning became a common phenomenon in all political groups: the JAP rallies, the Carlist *aplecs* and the countryside meetings of the Falange, among others, had something of a religious component (the death cult of the 'fallen' heroes and martyrs) mixed with the mystique of combat, in their codified transmission of threats which did not go undetected by their political enemies. The Roman salute characteristic of Italian fascism was first adopted by the PNE and the JONS, later spreading to the Falange and other extreme right groups, like RE and the Bloque Nacional, before it became the official salute in Franco's Spain. The JAP salute, which consisted of stretching the right arm horizontally to touch the left shoulder – a gesture with a long tradition in Spanish military circles – enjoyed only relatively limited acceptance. The gesture of the raised fist, so widespread among left-wing workers' groups, gave rise to more regimented variations, such as the salute with the fist on

one's temple, characteristic of the German *Rotfront*, which was adopted by the MAOC and then, during the civil war, by the republican Popular Army.

Simple, manufactured symbols (emblems, flags, insignia, anthems, uniforms, etc.) are usually more noticeably invested with meaning than a carefully developed and complex programme. The public execration of symbols based on indivisible and thus non-negotiable values, such as those of a patriotic or religious nature, brought about a great deal of conflict. This was witnessed in the debate that arose over the withdrawal of crucifixes from schools; the protests against article 1.6 of the Law for the Defence of the Republic (21 October 1931) which prohibited the public display of monarchist emblems, insignia, etc.; the painting of graffiti on the walls of public buildings or on the premises of rival parties; or the ill feeling caused among large sectors of the army by the change of colours of the national flag.<sup>36</sup>

The process of polarisation was clearly evident in the evolution of the political antinomies which predominated at any one time. The classic duality between right and left went on to acquire absolute and mutually exclusive values: The 'right wing' – as denounced by the Popular Front press – 'means underhand dealings, hunger and misery in millions of proletarian homes, prison sentences and hard labour, bloody repression, martyrdom, the gallows'. The left wing, on the other hand, 'means freedom, justice, work'.<sup>37</sup> But this basic opposition was increasingly complicated by more subtle distinctions. In early 1933, the Bolshevik/fascist dilemma was more an image of combat than a socio-political or ideological reality, but a few months later it emerged as a strong mobilising force. From February 1936 onwards, the various lines of fracture (right/left, fascism/anti-fascism, revolution/counter-revolution, Marxism/anti-Marxism, etc.) irrevocably split to reveal a radicalised and complete opposition of the terms of primary identification, namely Spain/anti-Spain and fatherland/anti-fatherland.<sup>38</sup> Verbal violence reached its climax in the spring of 1936 by means of an absolute radicalisation of the usual terminology in political language. The clandestine Falange had no qualms in emphatically affirming that, at this stage, 'THERE CAN BE NO PACIFIC SOLUTIONS. War is declared, and the government has been the first to declare its belligerence . . . We are at war.'<sup>39</sup> A final expression of this verbal escalation was the dissemination of a vocabulary linked to death which on the right was chiefly characterised by numerous allusions to the Christian belief in life after death. An extreme case was, once again, that of the Falangists, whose elitist and aesthetic obsession for 'style' found expression in a wide-ranging death-loving rhetorical lyricism, where the figure of the paradox

predominated: the denial of physical absence through the cry '¡Presente!' or the conception of death, not as eternal sleep, but as a state of permanent vigilance.<sup>40</sup>

### **Networks of mobilisation and the arenas of political violence**

After the fall of a monarchy characterised in general terms by the apathy and manipulation of the masses, the Second Republic was characterised from the very beginning by a high level of political mobilisation, which affected in a very short space of time large sectors of the population, especially the young. Since the end of the nineteenth century, political participation by the younger generations had been increasing all over Europe, and this growth became more marked in the years immediately after the First World War thanks to the emulative nature of the ex-combatants' movements.<sup>41</sup> In Spain, the first symptoms of youth 'agitation' were observed at the turn of the century in parties such as the Carlists, Maurists and the Radicals, spreading during the final years of the dictatorship to students and Catalan nationalists. The politicisation of youth, with all its latent or patent generational conflict, had undeniably radicalising effects which were used by the various party leaders as a means of exerting political pressure. This sudden influx of new militants brought to all parties a general decrease in the level of political education, a greater danger of fragmentation and indiscipline and, consequently, the need for charismatic leaders (i.e. Gil Robles, Calvo Sotelo, Primo de Rivera, Largo Caballero) and simplistic and belligerent political messages, capable of immediately satisfying the aspirations and demands of these young activists alienated from the culture and methods of pluralist democracy. By repeatedly proclaiming the identification between youth and party, the leaderships of the PSOE, Falange, CEDA, PCE, etc. were quite explicit in their support or tolerance of violent actions. This led the electorate to interpret certain verbal excesses as logical and natural concessions to maximalist idealism of youths who, after all, bore the weight and the brunt of everyday political action.

The organisation of a violent protest requires a special cohesion, both on the part of the dissident group itself and of those sectors supportive of the existing order. Selznick uses the label 'organisational weapon' to describe the transformation of a movement or voluntary association into a management structure, which turns volunteer members into agents (and, in extreme cases, soldiers) of a political project, in whose defence they join the struggle and blindly follow orders.<sup>42</sup> During the Republic, the organisation (political party, federation or confederation of parties,

movement, alliance, bloc, or trade union) came to be a determining factor in forging activists. These were generally young city dwellers with a recently discovered passion for politics, a newly acquired economic independence and more radical political criteria, all of which brought them into confrontation with or distanced them from the traditional family sphere. The socialist *casas del pueblo*, the *círculo* (club, group or association, often political), the party headquarters, the local *casino* (political club), or the trade union centre came to be their second home, political or movement leaders serving as 'spiritual guides' and role models. Intense political activism became increasingly conflated with their private life, and leisure time and activities (excursions, sports, reading, meetings, campaigns, etc.) were determined almost entirely (or indeed in an almost totalised way) by the organisation to the point where young militants (often militiamen or women) considered political doctrine not only to be a tool for the objective transformation of society, but also a real creed of personal values for which it was worth dying or killing. The atmosphere of close comradeship that impregnated these youth organisations encouraged this fanatical attitude, in the same way as the leadership and its discipline imposed itself on party doctrine. Consequently, a firm conviction grew within this activist universe that the best militants were the most obedient and disciplined, those that scrupulously followed the directives of the organisation and subordinated their critical spirit to the dictates of the movement hierarchy and its charismatic leadership. An increase in dogmatism produces a correlative increase in the belief in the infallibility of a glorified and idealised elite, and strengthens the commitment to a single cause and the rejection of others. The orthodox communist obedience to one's immediate superior, the 'beatification' of the persecuted activist and of the victim of society in the anarchist media, the military comradeship of the Falangists, the Carlist cult of the 'martyrs of tradition' or the uncompromising JAP affirmation that 'the chief is never wrong', are all proof of the existence of this special world inhabited by the violent activist, where ideological 'false consciousness' had impregnated the activist's most intimate attitudes towards life in such a special way that one can confidently talk of a real subculture of juvenile political activism.

As political mobilisation intensified and the confrontation between parties turned more pitiless, it became necessary to embark on more organised and extensive violent actions. The consequence was the growing transformation of the more militant sector of the parties into 'shock groups', that is, organisations oriented towards carrying out intensive forms of confrontation, sometimes in close co-ordination with the parent political organisation, but often in a fairly independent

manner. These militia, guerrilla groups, revolutionary armies and terrorist organisations are characterised by the deployment of simplistic, rigid and dogmatic ideological systems, whose mission is to prescribe and justify the use of violence against a well-defined political adversary;<sup>43</sup> an intense and even exclusive commitment by their members which implies a self-imposed segregation from the rest of the population; a secret mode of organisation and largely clandestine activity; highly selective recruitment procedures, together with rigid internal checks on possible dissidents; the celebration of the movement's leadership, obedience to the leader and loyalty among equals; the forging of strong interpersonal links which allow for permanent close contact; and a feeling of blind loyalty to the cause that becomes efficient in direct proportion to its irrationality.

Essentially, there are two basic types of 'conflict group': those created *ex nihilo* and those forged through the growing radicalisation of groups already in existence. This second category has been the dominant type throughout history, and the Second Republic is no exception, which means that a rigorous analysis of the causes and dynamics of political violence should be reformulated in terms of the causes and consequences of the radicalisation undergone by organisations. Occasionally, radicalism helps some organisations to be more competitive in those sectors of the movement that are more prone to violence, but violence also tends to spiral and escalate, frequently with lethal results. In fact, when radicalised nuclei are created within legal organisations, they tend to develop their own particular dynamics, often leading to the generalised adoption of increasingly violent repertoires.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, the daily use of violence inevitably means a reformulation and radicalisation of the values at the core of the struggle, principles which are then imposed on the political organisation as a whole.

The most typical 'shock group' of the republican era was the political militia. This can be defined as a paramilitary formation (that is to say, with its own form of organisation, internal discipline, hierarchical structure, form of military instruction and paraphernalia without actually forming part of an official armed institution). Comprised of civilian volunteers, and inspired by specific political-ideological doctrines, these 'shock groups' were, to varying degrees, controlled by a party or similar organisation (movement, coalition, federation of parties, etc.), whose mission it was to engage in physical combat with its ideological rivals on all fronts, including the streets. Their ultimate goal, explicit or otherwise, was the assault on power by means of a coup or insurrection, or permanent armed struggle in any of its variants. In practice, however, they tended to be instruments of semi-legal political action, revolving

around the protection and defence of the organisation that legitimised them, and including occasional attacks on rival groups as well as propaganda activities on behalf of a movement that might, in certain circumstances, participate in electoral and parliamentary struggles. Their members met in very small groups that formed part of an essentially pyramidal and hierarchical structure with vertical links, which allowed for very rapid mobilisation and greater security in action. These groups could easily be drawn together into larger units, and were usually divided into an active army and a reserve entrusted with support tasks. Although the 'cell' is regarded as being an organisational unit of social-democratic or communist origin, and the militia was developed mainly by the fascists, both forms of organisation complemented each other in the 'civil' and 'military' mobilisation of those parties that renounced legal methods of struggle and carried out mass recruitment activities in secret.

A militia is not born in a vacuum; in the 1930s they emerged in a context characterised by the incapacity of governmental mechanisms of reform, control and coercion, to resolve a situation of crisis and social conflict and the inability to channel or contain intense political polarisation within legal channels. The Republic was excessively cautious and slow in its attempt to renew the coercive mechanisms of the state, adopting a philosophy that effectively preserved the militarised conception of public order of the monarchist era. In spite of the reforms, both organisational (such as the creation of a new police, the Assault Guards) and legislative (such as the Law for the Defence of the Republic, and the Law of Public Order), the deficient state monopoly of coercion and violence left the way open for their 'generalisation' and 'privatisation' by the many political-ideological groups that had opted for the creation of paramilitary groups. While some political-social groups did not have their own militia, their proclamations might still include references to violence. Some simply left this task to their youth sections, which, while they might not always form armed groups, often exercised a similar violent function.

The militia scene appears at its most confused in the peacetime years of the Republic. There are still doubts as to when some of these organisations were founded, obliged as they were to lead a semi-clandestine existence. The proliferation of political groups and their active confluence on the streets only contributed to confusion about their true nature and activities. In the same way, it is not always easy to classify some organisations dedicated to struggle on the streets as true militia, or to say with certainty that they represented some other kind of strategy of violent action. It is thus necessary to distinguish between true militia and mere armed groups, the latter being defined as minority organisations,

badly equipped, illegal and virtually useless in military terms. This was the prevalent type during the republican period, the traditionalist *requetés* being perhaps an exception, and these groups did not really achieve the status of militia until the outbreak of the civil war.<sup>45</sup> These paramilitary organisations usually originated in youth groups devoted to sports or excursions (e.g. the *mendigoxales* of Basque nationalism), conspiratorial or activist cells that acted under the guise of sports or cultural clubs (e.g. Estat Catalá's *escamots* or the socialist militia), and civic unions founded to meet the threat of a revolutionary general strike (e.g. the mobilisation section of the JAP) and in self-defence sections that developed in various social spheres: the communist MAOC and the CNT's *comités de defensa* (defence committees) in the workplaces, the Falangist squads of the SEU in the universities, or the JAP and the Carlist *requetés* at political meetings. The attacks carried out by these armed groups were far fewer in number compared with their other functions, all of which were inevitably associated with violent action, such as the protection of premises, meetings and leaders and, above all, propaganda activities (newspaper sales, fly posting, and other kinds of street propaganda). On special occasions, there was a minority from within the group of young activists capable of excelling in violent street action. Once the civil war broke out, many of these militants played leading roles in the armies and militia. Nevertheless, the chronic lack of activists prepared to carry out offensive or retaliatory missions made it necessary to rely on armed mercenaries who did not share the movement ideology, or on squads of thugs recruited from among the most marginal elements of society. This tactic had been used by the extreme right since the time of the Free Union (Sindicato Libre), and by the fascist and pseudo-fascist groups since their foundation: legionaries from the Foreign Legion were recruited by Doctor Albiñana to swell the PNE's 'band of cudgel-wielders', and by José Antonio Primo de Rivera to reinforce the Falange's 'Primera Línea' ('Front Line').

The degree of commitment shown by 'those who keep up the struggle' grew as street actions and insurrectional activities failed repeatedly, bringing an increase in repression. This did not lead, however, to an improvement in the technical training of armed groups in the republican period. There was only occasional and sporadic preparation by military instructors, except in the case of the Carlists, whose intense and traditional militarisation was enhanced by the training of some *requeté* leaders in Italy thanks to a secret agreement with Mussolini.

The everyday dynamics of armed struggle meant that these paramilitary groups, which had voluntarily placed themselves in the vortex of the violent strategy promoted by their political organisation, underwent a



significant process of ideological and functional emancipation. Violent organisations often break away from their political base, especially when the conflict is prolonged and it becomes necessary to tap increasingly scarcer and more remote resources to keep the struggle alive. This is what happened, for example, with the seditious attitude adopted by the Falange's 'Primera Línea' towards the national party leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, in mid-July 1934, or by the *requetés* of Navarre towards the 'Delegate Leadership' unveiled by Fal Conde on the eve of the 1936 uprising. In the case of the most fanatical terrorist organisations, the armed group can even entrench itself in such a way that it becomes the guiding force of the political movement, thus transforming itself into an authentic 'war machine'. By opting for a course of action dominated by the logic of violence, the movement distances itself from its social base and inverts its order of priorities, assigning greater importance to the self-preservation of the group, the price of which is an increasingly sectarian nature.<sup>46</sup>

Where was political conflict most commonly organised and acted out in material and tactical terms? Violent confrontation between political ideological options affected a large number of activities. From the late 1920s, secondary schools and centres of higher education underwent a process of greater democratisation which expressed itself in terms of increased politicisation. As a result, during the republican period, they became common spheres of conflict that paved the way for new actors such as the progressive FUE, the conservative and confessional AEC, and the Jesuit fraternities, the 'Luises' and 'Kostkas'. Thus the youth activism of the 1930s found its natural expression in the classrooms and on the campuses, which became the favourite recruiting grounds of the parties' minority activist groups and hence places of ideological and propagandistic tension.

The second arena of confrontation was the neighbourhood, the basic spatial unit for political organisation and action in larger urban areas. Here conflicts arose from propaganda and counter-propaganda activities ('conquering the streets' was the general cry of almost all the violent activist groups), aggravating the everyday interpersonal rivalries, which were unrelated to ideological struggles, and more associated with the particular social environment.

Finally, the workplace (farm, workshop, factory, office) was the usual battlefield where differences would be settled – and not always peacefully or apolitically – by the class-based and 'yellow' unions and the employers. According to the sources available to us, the circumstances in which violent actions usually occurred were also those in which rival political options concurred: meetings or talks 'broken up' by hostile groups and

street clashes between propagandists during electoral campaigns; confrontations in the course of labour conflicts; weekend violence between groups of excursionists of different political persuasions; provocations during demonstrations and marches on dates of marked political symbolism like 14 April, 1 May or 1 August (the 'Day of Communist Struggle') .

### Epilogue: civil war

The onset of the civil war gave rise above all to a complete change of direction in the violent political discourse employed by the different political forces during the Republic, as a more prudent rhetoric came to prevail. This was particularly manifest in the vocabulary of violence and death that was employed. The new caution can be attributed to the control of propaganda activity by the political powers on both sides of the war. In the rebel zone the word 'die' was replaced with prudish metaphorical and euphemistic alternatives, based on Falangist lyricism and the idiom of Catholic martyrdom. In this sense, the theatrical Falangist 'style', so classical in its rhetorical forms, so austere in its vocabulary and so death-embracing in its symbolical content, was a way of making people forget, or rather of proscribing by means of a *fait accompli*, the symbolism and forms of expression that had presided over violent political debate during the years of the Republic.

By contrast, violent death had fewer rhetorical overtones for the left, and politically it was evaluated in more diverse ways.<sup>47</sup> But in general terms, on both sides there was a proliferation of irony-laden rhetorical formulae that connoted fear of, or hatred and contempt for, the enemy, and which highlighted violence through pleasurable descriptions of death. A final irony is that the nineteenth-century expression 'alzamiento nacional' (national uprising), used by Azaña to refer to the democratic change that occurred on 14 April 1931,<sup>48</sup> was adopted unreservedly by the rebels, whereas the government spokesmen always referred pejoratively to the military uprising as a 'movimiento sedicioso' (seditious movement), 'rebelión' (rebellion), 'insurrección' (insurrection), 'intenta' (surreptitious attempt at insurrection) or 'militarada' (underhand manoeuvre by the military). The parties to the conflict were yet to recognise explicitly that it had in fact turned into a fully-fledged civil war.

### 3 Nations in arms against the invader: on nationalist discourses during the Spanish civil war

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*Xosé-Manoel Núñez Seixas*

Since the eighteenth century the development of European nationalisms has been directly linked to war.<sup>1</sup> Military conflicts create socio-psychological borders among ethnic and national groups, and delineate sharp contrasts between ‘us’ and ‘them’ by stereotyping the other.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, war provides at least two mutually reinforcing effects for nationalism. First, the wartime social environment and the cult of the nation in arms create internal cohesion, minimise dissent and reinforce a deeper sentiment of community based on strong emotional ties such as blood and sacrifice, common suffering and shared destiny.<sup>3</sup> Second, military action conclusively formulates a stereotyped image of the *other*, which is just as necessary for consolidating the national identity as the previous task of nation-building carried out by institutions, intellectual elites or social movements. Patriotic wars have strongly contributed to the consolidation of the variegated nation-building processes that were under way in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe.

The Spanish civil war was no exception to this European trend. It is paradoxical that this civil conflict was perceived as a patriotic war by most of the political elites on either side. Both sides excluded the other from being considered as true Spaniards and this exclusion persisted to some extent throughout the following forty years. The process of conveniently ‘forgetting’ the Spanish civil war during the transition to democracy, after Franco’s death, in order to avoid reviving the armed conflict and reawakening the ‘ghost’ of the permanently irreconcilable *two Spains* was the result of a political consensus among Francoist reformers and democrats.<sup>4</sup> However, in contrast with other West European countries after 1945, Spain did not build a new anti-fascist consensus as a foundation for present-day democratic patriotism, and this has been a constant obstacle to the relegitimisation of Spanish nationalist discourse. It has kept the country from achieving a shared constitutional patriotism that could be accepted by every section of

the political spectrum and has kept the political forces from reaching an enduring political agreement with the peripheral nationalisms.<sup>5</sup> The gap that emerged during the civil war between the two concepts of the Spanish nation, and the opposing concepts of substate nationalisms, have all lasted beyond the consolidation of democracy.

During the civil war both sides chose nationalism as a tool for mobilisation as a rational strategy to rally their respective supporters around a highly emotional appeal, and to cover up and dilute their internal divisions and political (or national) contradictions. The fact that there were Spaniards fighting on both sides of the conflict was obscured by presenting one's case as a *national* cause against a foreign invasion, thus reducing the enemy to the level of traitors. This allowed both sides to *reinvent* the basis for their legitimacy, opting for a discourse and a mythical repertoire that, as in all forms of nationalist mobilisation, offered a high degree of short-term efficiency at low political cost. Thus, nationalist appeals were highly instrumental in motivating collective action and defining the appropriate objectives of the common struggle.<sup>6</sup>

In this sense both opponents used similar discursive patterns to some extent. This phenomenon was especially evident as the opposing sides made use of common repertoires of historical myths and icons already present in Spanish nationalism since the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>7</sup>

The same instrumental efficiency that the national defence discourse acquired against the intruder was subsequently put into use by Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalists. Presenting the war as a foreign invasion of their homelands allowed the peripheral nationalists to undermine the good number of their alleged *compatriots* who were fighting on the opposing Francoist side. However, the outbreak of civil war reinforced two opposite trends. On the one hand, moderate nationalists were involved in the defence of the 'Republic' as long as it granted their home-rule objectives. Thus, a purely civic and not explicitly *ethno*-national identification with the republican regime emerged. But this depended on republican responsiveness to peripheral claims, and promises of generous treatment of substate governments after the final victory over the fascists. There were no clear limits to this concession. At this point a long-term contradiction emerged: the opponent was 'Castilian Spain' as represented by the Francoist troops, but this could be confused with 'republican Castilian Spain' which at times would also become evident by the republican government's attempts to centralise power. On the other hand, there was also a constant temptation to consider the war not as a Basque, Catalan or Galician matter, but as external to the peripheral nationalities, brought about by *Spanish* intransigence.

### **Nationalisms of the republican side: 'the Spanish people against the foreign invasion'**

Patriotism was used by the republican side as a mobilising tool during the early war months as a consequence of the fact that neither the main trade unions, which had taken over power (the UGT and the CNT), nor the left-wing parties involved in the resistance against the rebels could achieve their revolutionary goals by themselves. The republican institutions and the liberal republican parties were too weak to control the trade unions and militias in the trenches and the streets. But they all agreed on the need to win the war. Thus, the defence of the Nation (or *Patria*<sup>8</sup>) from foreign invaders gave a wide variety of actors the appropriate discursive repertoire to gather around a common effort, postponing the achievement of their own particular aims until a later moment.<sup>9</sup> The images evoked by the defenders of the Republic were not new. Whether consciously or not, republicans and communists reproduced certain stereotypes that dated back to the early nineteenth century.<sup>10</sup>

The instrumental use of nationalism on the republican side came from the source that one would least expect it – the communists. The PCE had maintained a rather elusive position in the domain of national identity since the early 1920s. Following the course recommended by the Third International, it had mechanistically offered the nationality principle to Spanish Morocco, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia in order to achieve the destruction of the bourgeois state.<sup>11</sup> Though before the outbreak of the war the Spanish communists had made some changes in order to adopt a more 'patriotic' vocabulary, it was not until August 1936 that the communist press published appeals wholeheartedly for the defence of Spain's independence. This was parallel to the emphasis on the liberation of Iberian nationalities from centralism and fascism.<sup>12</sup>

This discourse found historical parallels in the most well-known resistance myths of Spanish historiography. They were reinterpreted in a new fashion: the heroic Spanish people rise once again to counteract the foreign invasion directed by a few traitors belonging to the upper classes, the clergy and the army, now at the service of the 'fascist-imperialist world coalition'. In contrast, the *true* Spain, represented by the lower classes, those brave peasants, workers and sailors, heroic women and children who took up arms on 19 July 1936, became the upholders of national independence. Who was left outside this *nation in arms*? Obviously the bourgeois *traitors*, the fascists, the clergymen, and the so-called *false revolutionaries* (dissident communists, radical anarchists, etc.) 'serving fascism'. They were not considered worthy to be Spaniards. The

people, represented by a multi-class alliance from the peasantry to the middle classes, were therefore identified with the *nation*, which was emerging as the new subject of the war effort. This very nation had assaulted the military barracks in defence of Madrid without any weapons, as in the past 'the people fought again for their independence, while the *señoritos* helped the invaders, as during the Napoleonic invasion' of 1808.<sup>13</sup>

This discourse experienced a significant continuity throughout the war years. As a Valencian communist explained quite clearly to his fellow comrades, the conflict that began as a civil war soon became a national liberation war. He stressed that character would attract more supporters to the republican war effort, particularly among 'non-organised' people who were not members of a trade union or a party. Thus, even anti-fascist Catholics or young peasants recruited by the republican army could easily be mobilised to defend the nation. Once the war was won, these people would surely be attracted to the communist ranks. But meanwhile, the most emotional tool would be to appeal to 'those who feel a bit of national dignity, and . . . are ready to march side by side with us to fight the enemy'. Even those who remained politically indifferent should feel committed to join the patriotic cause:

to defend the patriotic past of their ancestors and families, the Nation's artistic and cultural heritage, the democratic and revolutionary traditions of this country which was capable of recording in its history splendid heroic deeds.<sup>14</sup>

Another party leader, the former minister of education Jesús Hernández, emphasised the same arguments in 1938. To discuss the political future of Spain made no sense while independence remained unsecured and the nation was being sold to foreign barbarians who would turn the Spaniards into slaves. 'We are the patriots. Confronted with a rabble of traitor generals and executioners trafficking with their country, we take the responsibility . . . to ensure Spain's independence and feel in our veins the pride of being Spanish.'<sup>15</sup>

Thus, the working class, that had previously been the exclusive protagonist in the mobilisation, was diluted in the wartime discourse of most of the parties and organisations. Enlisting in the popular militias meant rallying around the authentic *Patria* against the foreign hirelings. And the brave militiamen defending Madrid represented the best expression of the 'indomitable spirit of the Hispanic race, punished by religious infamies, tormented by all the class privileges, . . . coveted by all the foreign powers'. True Spaniards would cry 'death to Fascism, even as foreign and our own armies try to impose arbitrary and tyrannical regimes imported from Rome and Berlin'.<sup>16</sup>

Specifically, the historical myths of the Napoleonic war (1808–13) and of later liberal resistance to absolutism were conveniently invoked. Thus, the sieges of Zaragoza and Girona, the Spanish victory at the battle of Bailén (1808) and, above all, Madrid's popular uprising against French troops on 2 May 1808, were reappropriated in order to stress the parallels between those nineteenth-century representatives of the Spanish popular classes and the twentieth-century fighters belonging to working-class organisations.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, examples from the past of women fighting against the invaders were often pointed out, to underline similarities with both the republican militawomen and the mothers of fallen soldiers.<sup>18</sup> But historical parallels could be traced further back. Many wartime poems appealed to 'Mother Spain', shaped by its diverse landscapes and by its historical figures, from the heroic deeds against the Roman conquerors at Numancia, or the 'Iberian hero' Viriato, through the medieval El Cid, to the conquerors of America in the sixteenth century. Their descendants were now the peasants and sailors who wanted to defend Spain from the *foreign dogs*.<sup>19</sup> This was reinforced by pictorial and iconographic means. For instance, some propaganda posters portrayed Madrid's defenders as typical eighteenth-century villagers, dressed in the fashion that painter Francisco de Goya used to portray these sorts of people (the *majos*) (see figures 3.1 and 3.2).

The war propaganda also used in its appeals both the 'great' common *Patria*, represented by its best expression – the popular classes or simply *el pueblo* – and the various 'local *Patrias*'. The latter referred to the regions and provinces from which the militia came. For instance, poems and songs in the Catalan or the Galician language or even the Castilian dialect of Extremadura were constantly used to encourage the soldiers' fighting spirit, specifically when addressing the units composed of militia from rural social backgrounds. In these cases there was a strong appeal to local meanings and contexts, particularly to the *land*. To defend the patriotic peasants' land and familiar places and local liberties was equivalent to defending the nation and the revolution.<sup>20</sup> Local pride and traditional *tipismo* (the artistic and literary representation of Spain's variegated popular customs and practices) were put at the service of the national and revolutionary mobilisation, as seen in the appeals to shape regional militias along the Madrid front.<sup>21</sup> Every region of Spain threatened by foreign mercenaries headed by traitors should find its ultimate revenge in the act of joining the defence of Madrid, the act of fighting being in itself an integrating force.<sup>22</sup>

In communist propaganda a sort of dual patriotism emerged. Thus, the spokesmen of the Galician communist militias in Madrid constantly referred to the war of liberation of the Galician *and* Spanish nations,





Figure 3.1. Republican poster linking the popular struggle for independence in 1808 with the civil war of the 1930s (from Jordi Carulla and Arnau Carulla, *La guerra civil en 2,000 cartells*, Barcelona, Postermil S.L, 1997, vol. 1, p. 95).

without giving either of them a clear hierarchical priority from an ideological standpoint. As time went on, local anti-Napoleonic and pre-Roman myths tended to replace overall Spanish ones. But the objective was the same: to stress the peculiar character of the conflict as a revolutionary war for peripheral and Spanish national liberation.<sup>23</sup> Which nation was to be liberated remained cloaked under a calculated ambiguity. Thus, a poster issued by the Catalan Socialist United Party (PSUC) in 1938 appealed to the defence of the *Patria* against the foreign invasion: 'The foreign fascists shall not pass! The mercenary Moors shall not pass!' It invoked the threat to the existence of Catalonia as a 'free people', remembering the 'heroic deeds of 1640 and 1714', that is, the mythical moments when Catalonia supposedly lost its independence at the hands of Castilians. However, this time the *opponent* was not Spain or *Castile* but 'the mercenary hordes that have invaded Spain'.<sup>24</sup>

With the exception of the anti-Stalinist communists of the POUM, the nationalist rhetoric developed by the PCE soon extended to other left-wing and republican journals, which rapidly impregnated their 'defence of the Republic' discourse with a cloak of patriotism.<sup>25</sup> This was, for instance, the case with the liberal republicans of Izquierda






Figure 3.2. A defender of Madrid from 'the invader', constructed as a typical eighteenth-century villager (from Jordi Carulla and Arnau Carulla, *La guerra civil en 2,000 cartells*, Barcelona, Postermil S.L., 1997, vol. 1, p. 95).

Republicana.<sup>26</sup> The party's principal leader, president of the Republic, Manuel Azaña, considered the 'heroic gesture' of the 1808 uprising against Napoleon as the genesis of the modern Spanish nation. In a similar way this war should have led to the emergence of a new Spain. Though an internal Spanish dispute was the origin of the conflict, the 'foreign invasion' represented by the Italian and German troops on the rebels' side transformed the conflict into an 'authentic war to free our country'.<sup>27</sup> The war, according to Azaña, was not to be fought on behalf of pure ideologies. The foreign invasion brought in by the rebels had deprived them of any ideas, and had reduced them to mere traitors. The nation the republicans were fighting for was not 'a dogmatic unity'. On the contrary, it included a wide diversity of landscapes, languages and local customs: 'Whatever language we speak, we are all within this national movement.' Why appeal to patriotism? Azaña expressed it openly: the national idea was an efficient mobilisation tool. 'Only its historical sense and substance, along with its emotional pulse, gives meaning to what is happening in our country . . . We are fighting because we want to be free and respected Spaniards everywhere and always.'<sup>28</sup> A glorious past of popular resistance and the unforgettable list of Spanish virtues and values was the basis for an enduring fighting spirit both in the trenches and at the rear.<sup>29</sup>

Even the anarcho-sindicalists made use of a similar kind of patriotic rhetoric, and resurrected some arguments sporadically expressed in the 1920s. Posters edited by CNT-FAI in 1938 announced: 'The invader will hit the human wall formed by the Spanish people.'<sup>30</sup> At times the traitors who collaborated with the foreign invasion were depicted in the libertarian vocabulary of the anti-Spain that is manipulated by the obscure conspiracies developed by German and Italian political elites.<sup>31</sup> Spanish history and the racial virtues of the Spanish people were also used in the mobilisation appeals. Thus, the anarchist Federica Montseny described the Valencian *Germanías* movement of the fifteenth century as the first social revolution, preceding that of the Paris Commune due to its blend of social demands, proto-federalism and reaction against foreign domination. Since Spaniards were alone in their struggle against international fascism, the first and most urgent need was to drive back the invaders. The 'indomitable spirit of our race', as demonstrated in 1808, would enable Spaniards to win the war by making use of an instinctive 'racial unity against the invader'.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, the CNT minister, Juan García Oliver, made an appeal for 'national unity in arms' as a stepping stone on the road to revolution. In spite of their internationalism, the anarchists had a sense of national dignity and commitment. They could not allow Spain to be divided, so 'reconquering Spain'

constituted the most urgent task for the organised proletariat. In 1940 the FAI leader, Diego Abad de Santillán, insisted on the same argument, as he looked back to the war.<sup>33</sup>

The argument that anarchism had its roots in ancient Iberian history was used in the propaganda against Soviet intervention in Spanish politics, particularly after May of 1937. 'Russian' communism was considered to be another foreign invader that attempted to transform Spain into a 'colony of the Kremlin', the International Brigades being sometimes depicted as a Trojan Horse of Moscow.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, the whole history of Spain could be reinterpreted as a continuous battle of native Iberians who fought for freedom from foreign invaders. Both the pre-Roman resistance leader, Viriato, and the anarchist militia commander, Buenaventura Durruti, were included in the same 'racial lineage'. The militiamen of 1936 were simply remaining loyal to 'the course marked by our ancestors'. Spanish commitment to freedom was intrinsically linked to internal plurality, from the anti-Napoleonic provincial *juntas* to the regional anti-fascist committees of 1936–7. Centralism was antithetical to the most authentic Spanish tradition, which was oriented towards federalism 'by virtue of its racial instinct'. A final victory was required to maintain the 'traditional federation of [Spanish] regions and provinces, and the freedom for them to have fruitful initiatives'.<sup>35</sup> To some extent this was coherent with the initial appeals by the anarchists that all Iberian peoples and municipalities be freed from fascism.<sup>36</sup> However, this federalist tradition should not be confused with the 'petty-bourgeois federalism' advocated by substate nationalists. The CNT's federalism was said to promote solidarity and association with all Spanish peoples.<sup>37</sup>

For republicans and socialists, as well as for the communists, certain basic tenets of Spanish patriotism were beyond discussion. One of them was the central state's monopoly of sovereignty. Since the war had given rise to exceptional circumstances, the central government had to be given supremacy in all matters, both to counteract the supposedly revolutionary impatience of the anarchists and to undermine the Catalan and Basque power demands during wartime. Counteracting the claims of regional governments became a sort of cohesive force among different factions of the republican camp from 1937 on. First the Largo Caballero government and later the Negrín government attempted to regain control of all the mechanisms of power in the midst of peripheral nationalisms and regional councils dominated by revolutionary trade unions. The tendency to emphasise Spain's unity increased after the middle of 1937. According to the fifth point of the thirteen objectives proclaimed by Negrín's 'National Union' government in April of 1938, regional

liberties were to be granted in a way that reinforced the historical ties among Spain's peoples and did not provoke the disintegration of Spain. But, the first point explicitly emphasised the republican government's commitment to ensure 'the absolute independence and complete integrity of Spain'.<sup>38</sup>

To define the war as a struggle for national independence required a negative image of the foreigners fighting on the other side of the trenches. Republican propaganda made use of pre-existing icons depicting opponents in several ways. The Italians were presented as effeminate, cowardly and presumptuous, particularly after their defeat at Guadalajara in March 1937. The Germans were shown as militaristic and arrogant. The Foreign Legionnaires were an international mob of criminals and thieves.<sup>39</sup> The Spaniards who had helped the invaders were constantly portrayed as puppets of foreign dictators, and the internal contradictions of the Francoist side were highlighted in a similar fashion. How could an army composed of foreigners call itself 'national' when the red-and-yellow flag was first unfurled by the 'foreigners of the Moroccan Foreign Legion', who 'stink of brandy and hell'?<sup>40</sup> Many cartoons published in the republican press during the war pointed out the contradiction by depicting the rebel army as a multinational gang of foreign mercenaries.<sup>41</sup>

The presence of Moorish troops on Spanish soil was exploited by republican propaganda from the very outbreak of the conflict. Negative stereotypes, which dated back to the Middle Ages and had flourished during the Spanish–Moroccan war (1907–27), were now reawakened. In iconographic propaganda the Moorish troops were depicted as black-faced, barefoot, hungry, and eager to steal and kill.<sup>42</sup> The Moors were supposedly wild and cowardly, uncivilised and anxious to rape white women, and some anarchist poems remembered the failed Asturian revolt of October 1934 that was repressed by Moorish troopers from Spanish Morocco.<sup>43</sup> But historical parallels went much further back. As during the Arab 'invasion' of 711, the barbarian Moors would run up against the true Spanish people. One of the most publicised poems among the republicans called for a new leader like Pelayo, the mythical Christian captain who expelled the Moors from Covadonga in 718, who would seek revenge for the betrayal by the fascist generals who had helped the Moors to cross the straits of Gibraltar just as other traitors had done in 711.<sup>44</sup> Only a few appeals during the first months of the war were aimed at convincing the 'Moorish proletarian brother' to desert.<sup>45</sup>

The presence of foreign anti-fascist volunteers fighting on the republican side was presented in a different light. They were simply international allies, friends that fought side by side with the Spanish people

against the foreign invaders. And they did it in the name of international anti-fascist solidarity with the Spanish people.<sup>46</sup> In this way the foreign volunteers became a species of honorary Spaniards. Spain's independence would find its best friend in the Soviet Union because it suffered in 1918–22 what the Spanish people were now experiencing, that is, a war of national liberation.<sup>47</sup>

### **Nationalism of the right: 'the national crusade against Bolshevism'**

It is not surprising that the rebels used Spanish nationalism as their most efficient and extensive mobilising tool, since it also provided a common legitimising discourse. Already explicit in Spanish conservative and counter-revolutionary thought, this discourse continued to display similar contents after 1936 in contrast with liberal-republican nationalism. Since the rebels fought against the established state, their legitimacy had to be based on the *nation*, an eternal entity that was not dependent on the existing political regime. Spanish nationalist sentiment was the element that all the political sectors backing the rebels agreed on most unanimously.<sup>48</sup> Sufficient justification for the rebellion from a *moral* and even a *legal* standpoint could be found in the defence of the *Patria* and its Catholic essence, supposedly under the threat of becoming a 'Russian colony' due to internal traitors and 'international agents' who propagated anti-Spanish values.<sup>49</sup>

During the war years the social and political groups involved in the rebellion did not form a coherent ideological synthesis, but certain elements shaped the bulk of the doctrine later labelled 'National-Catholicism'. Traditionalist-conservative thought developed during the 1930s around journals such as *Acción Española*, presenting an apparently new concept that reemerged throughout the war years and consolidated itself after 1940. This 'new concept' was designed to blend a 'militarised state', which was labelled as totalitarian based on Spanish fascist thought, with the traditionalist concept of nation. According to the latter, Spain had been shaped by the Catholic religion during the Reconquest of Spain from the Arabs, and had reached its peak under the aegis of the monarchy during the imperial expansion of the sixteenth century.<sup>50</sup>

Native fascism needed to be purely Spanish, and should not imitate Italian or German models – hence it would be profoundly Catholic. Catholicism, particularly from the glorious sixteenth century, reputedly lay at the very core of Spanishness. In order to be authentically Spanish, the New State had to be confessional. According to the doctrinal constructs published during the war, the nation should not be subordinated to the

state, since historically the nation precedes the state. The latter would have a supremely Christian role to play, but in service to the nation. Similarly, individual loyalty to the nation should not be absolute, or placed above other spiritual concerns, because the most important factor in the formation of nationality was religious belief, which should not be replaced by atheistic 'mystical patriotism'.<sup>51</sup> This thesis was best incarnated in the traditionalist and monarchist thinking of the mid-1930s, such as Víctor Pradera's writings, which were considered by Franco to be a forerunner of the New State as long as Pradera and José Antonio Primo de Rivera advocated a corporative and Catholic concept of the nation.<sup>52</sup> This view was reinforced by several brief treatises written by prominent ecclesiastic authors. The bishop of Tenerife, for example, advocated a kind of 'Christian and totalitarian state' permeated by an organic social order.<sup>53</sup>

Totalitarianism meant a return to the best Spanish traditions of the sixteenth century. According to Catholic writer José Pemartín, only a 'religious and military monarchy' could give Spain its most intense form of national existence. This old concept needed to be infused with the most modern form of fascism, a truly Spanish – Catholic – fascism.<sup>54</sup> Several doctrinal manifestos issued by members of the church during the war contained explicit criticism of 'bad' materialistic nationalism, which under the influence of Hegel's philosophy created the new myths of culture, race and state, placing them above God. In contrast, 'good nationalism' had been shaped in reaction to the Napoleonic wars and was based on 'constructive' love of the *Patria*, as theorised by Saint Augustine.<sup>55</sup> The cardinal primate of Spain, Isidro Gomá, explicitly condemned the 'pagan materialism' elevated in the fascist concept of patriotism.<sup>56</sup> 'Good nationalism' also renounced 'separatism', for in the present circumstances peripheral nationalism, even Catholic Basque nationalism, served as a vehicle for the red revolution by favouring the balkanisation of Spain. An exalted love for the 'region' was to be considered heretical.<sup>57</sup>

There were frequent disputes up until the early 1940s between traditionalist-conservative intellectuals backed by the Catholic hierarchy and Falangist leaders over the role to be played by the state and the nation in the new Spain.<sup>58</sup> But this did not keep even the most Falangist intellectuals from considering Catholicism as a fundamental element of Spanish national tradition. Only a few doctrinal writings from 1938–9 attempted to revitalise a Falangist concept of the nation based almost exclusively on the idea of a 'community of destiny', presented by José Antonio Primo de Rivera. But the *spiritual*, that is, *Catholic* ingredients of his national idea were also conveniently emphasised.<sup>59</sup>

Catholicism went hand in hand with a rejection of the 'anti-Spain' incarnated by its main enemies: liberalism, atheism, freemasonry, international Jewry and regional separatism. The terms 'communism' or 'Marxism' were used to include all of these, and a conspiracy against Spain by these elements was constantly invoked.<sup>60</sup> This creed was characteristic of nineteenth-century traditionalist nationalism. But now it was given an aggressive emphasis, which corresponded with the authoritarian nationalism incubated in the Spanish army since 1898. According to the writer José María Pemán, the military virtues of discipline, sacrifice and unity of command should impregnate the whole national body.<sup>61</sup> Fascist touches were also added by the Falangists, especially the emphasis on imperialist claims.<sup>62</sup>

Wartime rebel propaganda also traced parallels with the most well-known resistance myths from prior Spanish historiography: the siege of Numancia, Queen Isabella 'the Catholic', the conquest of America, and the golden age of the sixteenth century. Spain had been able to resist foreign invasions in the past and it was important to remember that at present, when Spaniards were accomplishing a 'New Reconquest, and new Independence'.<sup>63</sup> Catholic writers admitted that there were Spaniards on both sides. But the communist invader was a new dehumanised foreigner – the 'wolves of the Russian steppes' that occupied parts of the Spanish territory.<sup>64</sup> A legionnaire officer emphasised very simply that this was 'A war of Spaniards against Russians!' including 'Lenin's heirs' who burned churches and no longer deserved to be Spanish.<sup>65</sup>

The war against Napoleon was the historical analogy most beloved of Francoist propagandists, from the very outset of the war. The notion that certain Spaniards had helped facilitate an invasion of foreign ideas and troops, just as in 1808, was maintained in 1936. Communists and republicans were equivalent to the Spanish collaborationists (*afrancesados*) of the French occupation, only now the collaborationists were Russianised (*arrusados*).<sup>66</sup> Thus, in 1939 the Falangist writer Ernesto Giménez Caballero celebrated the 'victory of the Second of May', arguing that the historical betrayal committed on the Spanish people by the foreign-influenced liberals had finally been avenged by the Falangist and Carlist militias.<sup>67</sup> Unlike republican propaganda, the rebels' emphasis was not predominantly on the *people*, but on the *nation*, and on the *traditional values* by which Spaniards took up arms. According to the rebels, the concept of a Spanish people, the authentic patriots, did not include the 'illiterate and rough masses of Marxists and communists' manipulated by Russians, freemasons, Jews and separatists.<sup>68</sup> The Francoist war propaganda thus presented the enemy as an invading army, or as a puppet of foreign powers. The relevance of the International



Brigades was constantly overemphasised, and their members were presented as instruments of Russian expansionism that sought to control all loyalist soldiers.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, the rebels' press depicted the international volunteers as war criminals, a foreign horde composed of 'dirty, smelly foreigners with monstrous faces'.<sup>70</sup> The loyalist militiamen were usually painted wearing a typical Soviet military hat, while all military loyal to the Republic were considered masked Russians.<sup>71</sup> Similarly, the very popular broadcast speeches of Joaquín Pérez Madrigal described the republican militiamen as ignorant men manipulated by a privileged group of foreign communists who even purportedly discriminated against Spanish republicans.<sup>72</sup>

But how was the Francoists' *own* national heterogeneity to be justified? The involvement of Moorish troops in a Catholic crusade was explained by invoking their condition of defenders of religion in the face of the godless, the unfaithful, the anti-clerical, the anti-Islamic, and a common religious rival (the Jews). At the same time, they were forced to ignore the previous Moroccan war propaganda that had presented Moors as brutal, uncouth and savage. The rebels elaborated a new icon of the 'friendly Moor'. This image included some paternalistic aspects: Morocco was considered to be a backward 'extension of Spain', where civilisation was now being instilled. To some extent the Moorish soldiers were considered to be Spanish, though generally regarded with disdain.<sup>73</sup> But the good Moor reached the peak of his process of transformation into a 'Spaniard' either when he had killed 'Russians' or when he was among the heroically fallen.<sup>74</sup> Paradoxically, the pre-existing icons used against the Moroccans, which depicted them in a dehumanised way, could be transplanted and applied to the 'red' Spaniards, who in this way lost the category of fellow countrymen.<sup>75</sup>

In contrast, the presence of Italian and German troops was hidden as much as possible. Sometimes it was justified through 'sophisticated' historical arguments. Thus, José María Pemán wrote that German and Italian aid to 'national' Spain represented the reawakening of the old imperial brotherhood which once united the Hapsburg Empire and Rome during the glorious sixteenth century.<sup>76</sup>

Anti-separatism was another important argument. The first war manifestos issued by the insurgent generals did not mention the defence of religion, but insisted on the need to maintain Spain's unity against the challenges presented by separatism, communism and social unrest.<sup>77</sup> For many rank-and-file volunteers of the Francoist army, who came from a conservative or middle-class milieu and felt that their social status had been threatened by the five years of 'republican anarchy', the defence of Spain's unity was a primary reason for political militancy. This



constituted one of the most influential motives for joining the insurgents, since in their view anarchy and disorder had been historically linked to territorial dismemberment. A monarchist student from a pueblo in the Salamanca countryside, who joined the uprising in July 1936, expressed it very clearly:

I had nothing but ideals: to end the chaos caused by the left and the CEDA; to restore law and order, authority and a national spirit. It had become a crime to cry *¡Viva España!* The Catalan and Basque autonomy statutes were the last straw. They simply led to independence and the end of Spain's unity. Every time there's a revolutionary situation in Spain, 'cantonalism' spreads like fungus. First Catalonia wants its own independence, then the Basque Country, next Galicia – and in the end a village like Morasverdes too. Committees and *juntas* in every pueblo.<sup>78</sup>

Even for Navarrese and Basque Carlist militiamen, who were supposed to preserve a certain regionalist commitment based on a traditionalist concept of Spain as 'unity in diversity', Basque nationalists became the most hated enemy, as they were considered traitors both patriotically and religiously.<sup>79</sup>

The unifying and cohesive role of Castilian Spain was constantly emphasised in the nationalist discourse of the rebels. Castile, in the most typical tradition of the literary movement of 1898, was presented as a metaphor of Spain's traditional essence, often expressed in mystical images.<sup>80</sup> However, this Castilian pre-eminence was also mitigated by a frequent use of local and regional motives at other territorial levels in the wartime Francoist propaganda, due to the urgent need for rapid mass recruiting during the first months of the war. It could even display a certain degree of cultural and regional diversity, although care was taken to avoid having these elements of local vindication enter into conflict with the overall Spanish nationalist discourse. Thus, for instance, village-based solidarity and Navarrese identity were instrumentalised by Carlist volunteers to mobilise local populations for the new crusade.<sup>81</sup> Similarly, local Aragonese pride was invoked to counteract the 'Marxist-separatist hordes' coming from Catalonia.<sup>82</sup> Some patriotic wartime propaganda was even expressed in non-Castilian languages, appealing to the ancestral role of those regions in ensuring the authentic character of Spain. Local pride and regional stereotypes were thus turned into an efficient mobilisation tool.<sup>83</sup>

But this tolerance tended to fade away over the war years. Criticism of the oral use of non-Castilian languages was relatively frequent in the rearguard press from 1937, though it was possible to publish folkloric and popular literature in vernacular languages.<sup>84</sup> The official creed

during the first years of the Franco regime stated that all languages other than Castilian were merely dialects, inappropriate for administrative or professional domains but tolerated in minor literary genres. After mid-1938, the multiple exhortations of the rebel press encouraging only the use of Castilian were followed by an openly repressive linguistic policy.<sup>85</sup> This took place in conjunction with a rapid symbolic homogenisation process.<sup>86</sup> Cultural, symbolic and linguistic *uniformity* of the Spanish nation were to constitute key objectives in Franco's New State during the 1940s.

### **Regional nationalisms: 'a new coexistence sealed by blood'**

For Basque, Catalan and Galician nationalists, the insurgents' victory would mean the end of their recently achieved autonomy statutes. Even so, certain Catholic-conservative-oriented currents within the peripheral nationalist movements joined the rebel side. For them the Spanish right was certainly not a beloved ally, but it was preferable to the revolutionary left. Forced to choose between Catholicism and order on the one hand, and national identity on the other, a large part of the conservative Catalan nationalists represented by the Lliga Catalana joined the insurgent camp.<sup>87</sup> Many middle-class Catalanists were frightened by the social revolutionaries, reputedly not 'true Catalans' but unassimilated Castilian-speaking immigrant workers.<sup>88</sup> For many Catalanists this terror became more decisive than fear of the unitary state designed by Francoist nationalism, whose extremely repressive nature was still hidden.<sup>89</sup> Something similar could be said about the few Galician nationalists who in 1935 split from the mainstream Partido Galeguista (PG) to set up a small Galician nationalist right wing. They did not welcome the military uprising, since it represented the end of any claim to Galician home rule. But they clearly preferred it to 'disorder'.<sup>90</sup> Many Basque nationalists joined the rebels in the provinces of Navarre and Alava, where the Carlists were dominant. As in the military fall of Galicia, terror played an important part in their decision.

There was just one noteworthy exception. After some hesitations, the firmly Catholic and conservative Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) opted for the republican side. This was done not in the name of Republican ideals, which the PNV did not share, but because of the party's exclusive commitment to achieving home rule, which would only be granted under the republicans. In spite of this choice, most Basque nationalists displayed very little enthusiasm for the cause of the Republic or the left-wing organisations, since their strong Catholicism and their

reluctance to become involved in a non-Basque and purely 'Spanish' conflict created a barrier that distanced them from the rest of the loyalist parties. But for the radical Basque nationalist press the conflict was like a war for Basque independence from *Spanish* fascism.<sup>91</sup>

The permanent rivalry and disputes between the several powers that emerged in the republican zone after July 1936 also contained a strong territorial component. Basque and Catalan nationalists claimed their own independent spheres of action and sought to run the war effort. The exceptional wartime circumstances were seen as a new opportunity. Thus, the common effort to defeat fascism was proof that a new federal or confederal 'agreement' was being forged between the Iberian nationalities. In practice, 1936 represented a kind of return to the political expectations they held in 1931, as they pressed to achieve a (Con) Federal Republic.<sup>92</sup>

However, there was also a temptation to interpret the war from a more simplistic angle: as a Spanish/Castilian war with effects that reached the peripheral nationalities. The failed coup was seen as a new Spanish aggression. 1936 presented a 'great opportunity' that should be taken advantage of pragmatically in order to achieve independent statehood for the peripheries. For many Catalanists, 19 July 1936 could be interpreted as the next step in the Catalans' long-term struggle for collective and individual freedom, after the failed uprising of 1640 and the defeat of 1714.<sup>93</sup> Thus, during the first months of the war the independence card was played by radical groups, with the support of the first prime minister of the Catalan Generalitat, Joan Casanovas, who unsuccessfully attempted to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the international uncertainty about the future development of the Spanish conflict.<sup>94</sup> Even the anarcho-syndicalists were at times sympathetic to the idea of declaring Catalan independence, though for a different reason. Only Catalonia could offer an example of revolutionary war politics that would serve as a model for the rest of Spain after the victory.<sup>95</sup>

These first expectations turned out to be in vain. But Catalan nationalists, supported by the regional PSUC and the anarchists, tried to exploit the war circumstances in order to expand the competencies of the Generalitat over railways, industry, police and military affairs. This was regarded as a step forwards in the *de facto* enlargement of regional self-government, which would enable Catalanists to play with a new deck of cards once victory over the rebels was achieved. In January 1937 the Catalan president, Lluís Companys, even declared that 'in reality we are already a confederation . . . In the future it will be impossible to deny the achievements of federalism [in Spain], since they

will have been the foundation for resistance and the factor that led to victory'.<sup>96</sup> Enlarged self-government would make it possible, in theory, to transform the Spanish Republic into an asymmetric federal republic in the near future, composed of four nations (Castile, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia).<sup>97</sup> The war against fascism should give rise to a new concept of the relationship among Iberian peoples, sealed by blood and solidarity rather than by Castilian 'paternalism'.<sup>98</sup> Similar positions were held by the Galician leader, Alfonso R. Castelao, exiled in Barcelona, who argued that once 'fascist Castile has fallen', the blood and sacrifice of the war will have established the legitimate foundation for announcing a 'new concept of the state' based on a federal agreement among the Iberian nationalities.<sup>99</sup>

The Basque regional government, dominated by PNV ministers and constituted in October of 1936, also expanded its power competencies. It managed to enlarge its autonomous self-government to a virtual semi-independence, with the aim of achieving a consolidated position from which to press for a new agreement with the Spanish Republic when the war was over. The Basque government had barely seven months of active life span and only ruled over the province of Bizkaia. In spite of this, Basque nationalists rapidly developed a complete administrative apparatus. They hoped to demonstrate their ability to rule their own land while attempting to conduct the war effort on an independent footing.<sup>100</sup>

The balance of power within Catalonia was less favourable to peripheral nationalists. The actual coercive power was in the hands of the working-class organisations and their militias. During the first months of the war the regional government had to coexist with the parallel power exercised by the committee of anti-fascist militias. Moreover, the left-wing parties were also given a portion of the institutional power. In sum, the Catalan nationalists were not the only ruling force within Catalonia, but were tolerated by the communists and anarchists who also used the regional sphere of power for their own revolutionary purposes, in order to increase their presence.

Thus, the regional governments, whether controlled by peripheral nationalists or by a nationalist/communist/anarchist alliance, were considered by the republican government as power 'usurpers' that exploited the exceptional circumstances created by the war for selfish ends. They were reprimanded for not participating loyally in the common war effort. Manuel Azaña's wartime writings are clear evidence of this perception, as he even claimed that the Basque nationalists were half responsible for the republican defeat on the northern front in April 1937. Similarly,

Azaña depicted Catalanist leaders as powerless marionettes in the hands of anarchists and communists, whose attempts at preserving autonomous rule were 'pathetic'. He argued that peripheral nationalists were not fighting for *Spain* or the *Republic*, but 'for their autonomy and semi-independence'.<sup>101</sup>

Disputes with the regional governments, and a mutual lack of trust were constant features of the war years. The republican elites increasingly felt that the war should progressively create a new sense of solidarity among anti-fascist Spaniards, with regional claims gradually subsiding. This contributed to awaken Spanish *reactive* patriotism, which had always been present in the Spanish left. Azaña's views were openly shared by the prime minister, Juan Negrín.<sup>102</sup> When at the end of October 1937 the republican government moved to Barcelona without conceding the demands for equal treatment aired by the Generalitat,<sup>103</sup> one of the tactical reasons for this move was Negrín's interest in recovering political and administrative control over Catalonia. From that time on the autonomous powers of the Catalan government were severely curtailed. The republican government's desire to centralise authority in order to win the war ran in tandem with the view that Spanish patriotism should end up reinforced by the wartime experience. Negrín was clear in pointing this out:

I'm carrying on the war in the name of Spain and for Spain . . . There is just one nation: Spain . . . Spain is above all [regional] peculiarities . . . Instead of allowing nationalist campaigns to lead us to dismemberment, I would rather give Franco free access with the sole condition that he got rid of Germans and Italians.<sup>104</sup>

This view was clearly counteracted by a contrary perception among the peripheral nationalists. They intended to fight for their autonomy and for a multinational republic, and could not share the bulk of the republican neo-patriotic war discourse. This became particularly evident after the new left-wing 'Spanish populism' message was launched as part of the thirteen-point programme of April 1938. Catalan nationalists considered it to be just another expression of 'Castilian' intolerance towards the periphery. Even a former minister of the Republic such as Lluís Nicolau d'Olwer lamented the way the Spanish republicans reproduced 'the unitary and assimilationist imperialism of the monarchy' and forgot that, for Catalonia, unitary Spanish nationalism was 'synonymous with fascism'.<sup>105</sup> Similarly, the mayor of Barcelona, Carles Pi i Sunyer, felt that 'the republican sentiment was steadily abandoned, and replaced by an ideology that was increasingly similar to what we were fighting against'.<sup>106</sup>

The radical demands for independence by Basque and Catalan nationalists during the first years of exile can also be partially interpreted as an outcome of the *national* confrontation within the republican side during the war. In June 1939, Nicolau d'Oliver held that Catalonia had no future within Spain, and that the defeat of 1939 was comparable to that of 1714. Catalonia had undergone several different 'invasions' coming from Spain during the war years: that of the 'FAI's *muricians* [non-Catalan anarchist militiamen]', that of 'Negrín's policemen', that of 'the communist army', and finally that of 'Franco's Falangists'.<sup>107</sup>

It is difficult to know whether the increasing reluctance of peripheral nationalist elites to participate in the republican war effort was shared by Basque and Catalan rank-and-file soldiers. Some military units were certainly under the authority of substate nationalists, and their allegiance was to the regional cause rather than to the overall Spanish republican cause. Thus, after the fall of Bilbao in April 1937, the Basque nationalist military units rapidly lost interest in fighting for a territory that was not considered their own, and for a republic that did not correspond to their model of social order and Catholic observance. Despite the fact that most prominent Basque leaders joined the republican side until the end of the conflict, for a majority of mid-rank commanders and fighters, beyond the Basque Country's freedom there was no other reason to take up arms.<sup>108</sup> That attitude does not seem to have been prevalent among Catalan military units, most of whom were placed under the political direction of communists and anarchists, with only a few companies controlled by Catalan nationalists.<sup>109</sup> Some fragmentary evidence suggests that Catalan patriotism and a strong commitment to the Spanish Republic as a whole went hand in hand.<sup>110</sup>

### Some conclusions

Wartime nationalist discourses had certain apparent similarities, particularly the Spanish 'patriotic' appeals developed on both sides of the conflict. But this does not mean that both messages were identical. The use of certain common symbols and historical myths served different purposes. Much depended on the concrete value ascribed to those myths and symbols.<sup>111</sup>

On the republican side, nationalism constituted just one legitimising argument alongside others. Defending Spain's independence was not the only discourse used in mobilisation. Class solidarity and revolutionary goals were constantly promoted by the left-wing organisations as alternative or complementary slogans.<sup>112</sup> In fact, it is possible to

differentiate several discursive levels, each of them targeting specific social constituencies. Appeals to the international solidarity of all workers, to the workers' and peasants' worldwide revolution, or to a defence of liberty, were themes that were just as prominent as appeals to nationalism. Nevertheless, one must admit nuances in this general statement. As the war went on the patriotic appeal was increasingly used by republicans in order to attain higher emotional commitment from the masses, particularly when addressing segments of the population and conscripted soldiers that were not deeply influenced by republican and left-wing ideas. In contrast, the propaganda directed at highly politicised units such as the communist-influenced Fifth Regiment clearly emphasised revolutionary and working-class slogans.<sup>113</sup>

Nationalism played a much more important role on the rebel side from the very beginning. Its crucial function as a mobilisation tool was only matched by the call to defend Catholicism. An apocalyptic clash between Christian civilisation and the communist kingdom of Satan was often the way of depicting the war, which gave the 1936 uprising more of a religious emphasis than a patriotic one.<sup>114</sup> But since wartime National-Catholicism held the Catholic faith at the core of the Spanish historical essence, both mobilising arguments could easily be merged.

Preserving Spain's unity in the face of regional separatism was also a key element of the wartime discourse of the insurgents. Neo-patriotism steadily grew out of the constant disputes with the substate nationalists, even among the republicans. The accentuated neo-patriotic discourse of the republican side made the peripheral nationalists perceive the end of the war as a double defeat, both at the mercy of Spanish fascism and of the new centralism of Spanish republicans.

Nationalism served to undermine and dilute internal contradictions on both sides. The nation was placed above everyday party quarrels, but it also became a rhetorical instrument that could be used as an argument in internal disputes. Thus, for instance, after May 1937 anarchists condemned the communists for not being a pure Spanish movement due to their dependence on Moscow. Similarly, exalted Falangists accused Catholic monarchists of being 'slaves of the Vatican', and not wholeheartedly devoted to the cult of the Spanish nation. Conversely, Falangist nationalism was considered by its opponents to be merely an imitation of German and Italian models.

Both Francoists and republicans appealed to history as a basis for legitimising their rhetoric. And a repertoire of myths and icons had been made available by Spanish nationalist historiography since the nineteenth century. Some common myths like the pre-Roman Viriato and

the medieval hero El Cid were used by both sides, each giving them a different meaning. However, some continuity with the pre-war dichotomous interpretation of the Spanish past remained among the traditionalist-conservative and republican nationalists. So, republicans paid no attention to the 'glorious' imperial centuries, relics of the invasion of a foreign dynasty, while Francoist nationalists emphasised this as an example that combined Catholicism with Spain's grandeur. The War of Independence received the bulk of the republican and Francoist propagandist attention. But common myths were given divergent meanings. Thus, the rebellion of *the people* against the invader was emphasised by communists and republicans, while the anarchists highlighted too the reaction of *the people* against the official government. The insurgents put emphasis on the defence of purely Catholic *Spanish traditions* against *foreign influences* represented both by mercenary troops and anti-Spanish ideas, just as the guerrilla fighters had reacted against the invading French liberalism during the Napoleonic War.

A question remains concerning the level of social impregnation of wartime nationalist propaganda and patriotic discourse. The main core values propagated by the rebels (defence of Spain's unity, Catholicism, a return to 'order' and tradition) had an effective impact, motivating many volunteers to take up arms against the Republic. It is, however, more problematic to determine to what extent patriotism, either Spanish or non-Spanish, constituted an effective motivation for republican soldiers and militiamen to enlist and fight on until the end. The fact that nationalism was soon incorporated into the wartime discourse of most loyalist parties indicates that political leaders were convinced of their short-term efficiency. In this respect, the rapid appeal to patriotic slogans may also constitute indirect proof for the existence of an expanded sentiment of belonging to the Spanish nation among the lower classes. This may suggest that by 1936 Spanish nation-building was not as weak as has been supposed.<sup>115</sup> Appealing to wartime patriotism presupposes the widespread diffusion of a pre-existing sentiment of national identity, of a *banal* nationalism, shared more or less explicitly even by those who were considered as less enthusiastic patriots (urban workers, peasants).<sup>116</sup> However, the opposite thesis may be also suggested, that is, that both republican and insurgent political elites took advantage of the new opportunity that the war offered for reinforcing the sense of national community by constructing a threatening *other* (the foreign invaders), which became more real than prior foreign *others* and whose image was partially built upon pre-existing icons of *otherness*. For example, American war correspondent Louis Fischer pointed out to Azaña that 'the war has produced a Spanish nationalism, which is of a superior and



different quality from the feudal nationalism of the Basques, and from the demagogic one of Catalonia'.<sup>117</sup>

More detailed empirical research on the social dimensions of the 1936–9 wartime mobilisation in Spain may contribute to further clarify what usually remains the most difficult facet of nationalism to be settled by historians: the social impregnation of nationalist discourse and the resulting diffusion of national identity among the 'common people' living at the rear as well as among the soldiers on the front. This might provide a deeper understanding of what nationalism and patriotism specifically meant for the anonymous protagonists of the war.

## 4 'The keys of the kingdom': religious violence in the Spanish civil war, July–August 1936

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*Mary Vincent*

The Child Jesus lay on one of the altar steps, a sky-blue ball spangled with silver stars. . . topped by a two-pronged stick. . . One of the prongs ended in the papier-mâché head of a fair-haired child with blue eyes, the other in a chubby pink hand. . .

[T]he *miliciano* shouted from the height of the altar. 'Imagine all the money they got out of the silly, bigoted old women with the help of the little angel! But if one of them had lifted the petticoats and seen that broomstick underneath, she would have fainted, don't you think?'

Arturo Barea, *The Clash* (London: Fontana, 1984 [1944]), p. 168.

The Spanish civil war was the occasion of the greatest anticlerical bloodletting Europe has ever seen. This extraordinary outpouring of violence claimed the lives of 4,184 priests and seminarians, among them twelve bishops, 2,365 monks and brothers and 283 religious sisters.<sup>1</sup> In recent years the Catholic Church has beatified hundreds of the victims, 233 of them on 11 March 2001. This spectacular ceremony, the largest single number of beatifications in the church's history, emphasised the scale of the violence, which began immediately after the generals' coup d'état on 17–18 July 1936. In the remaining days of July, 861 priests and religious lost their lives, 95 of them on 25 July, feast day of St James, patron saint of Spain. August took the lives of a further 2,077 clerical victims, killed at an average of nearly seventy a day. After a scant two months of civil war, 3,400 priests, monks and nuns had been murdered.<sup>2</sup>

Both the volume and the chronology of the killings show that anti-clerical violence was a prime constituent of the Spanish revolution. While this is widely accepted, the most familiar representation of violence involving clerics is that of priests firing from bell-towers, not least because of its dramatisation by Ken Loach.<sup>3</sup> Yet, the only documented account of a priest firing from a religious building has him defending his parish church against requisition and the threat of arson.<sup>4</sup> The image was a staple of civil war propaganda, but it is a fiction, reflecting official republican disquiet at popular violence rather than any historical reality.

Nevertheless, clerical authors customarily take some trouble to refute this particular myth, maintaining that the violence was a particular manifestation of an assault against religion, or even against God, which began with the secularising impulse of the 1931 republican constitution.<sup>5</sup> Such an interpretation is contentious, but the killings carried out on St James's day, for example, demonstrate how anticlerical violence mirrored liturgical forms, and that it was iconoclastic as well as murderous. Certainly, in Manuel Delgado's words, during the civil war, 'like it or not, the temples were burned because they were temples and the priests were shot for being priests'.<sup>6</sup> For Delgado, this shows the religious nature of Spanish anticlericalism, which provided the counterpoint to Spanish Catholicism just as Protestantism had done during the religious wars of the Reformation.<sup>7</sup>

The sheer number of deaths, and what clerical commentators called 'the martyrdom of things', meant a purge, an extirpation of religion in the republican zone. Anarcho-syndicalist papers proclaimed the people's liberation from under 'the military-religious-capitalist boot' and published atrocity stories which talked of 'the barbarities of *requetés* and priests' or claimed that 'rosaries and scapulars are commonly found among the fascists' rifles'.<sup>8</sup> But it was in response to the church's consistently reactionary stance, and its powerful social position, that the same paper defended and encouraged anticlerical violence.

The Church must disappear for ever. The churches must never again be used for the most squalid pimping. . . We've finished with holy water stoops . . . Parish offices [*covachuelas católicas*] no longer exist. The people's torches have razed them. In their place a free spirit is reborn, which will have nothing in common with the masochism incubated in cathedral naves.<sup>9</sup>

Such statements, while relatively rare, lend themselves to a categorisation of violence as ideologically inspired. Julio de la Cueva argues, for example, that twentieth-century violence could be seen as 'Marxian, Nietzschean, Sorelian violence: a violence [that was] midwife to history, liberator of slavery, instigator of true progress'.<sup>10</sup>

The violence also drew on a millenarian anarchist revolutionary tradition dating from Bakunin and Kropotkin. Although it hinted at much older customs, the tradition had, as de la Cueva suggests, been rewritten in the twentieth century. The experience of the First World War and, particularly, the Russian revolution, appeared to have broken down those cultural and moral boundaries that had previously limited the extent and nature of violent acts within society. This breakdown of Durkheim's 'collective conscience' meant that episodes of savage violence which had seemed anachronistic in the nineteenth century became recurrent in the

twentieth.<sup>11</sup> The combination of modern firepower and the palpable brutalisation of both politics and warfare that occurred in the aftermath of 1917–18 also meant that such episodes became both more sustained and more systematic.

In the wake of the Bolshevik revolution, terror had a political purpose and violence a social function. ‘Terror does not have to be an abyss’ argued the CNT paper in Murcia. It could be rather ‘a bridge between yesterday’s monstrous injustices and tomorrow’s perfect world, a dark night between a bloody sunset and the creative joy of dawn’.<sup>12</sup> This aspiration, towards both a new, egalitarian society and the ‘new man’ who had achieved it went alongside a recognition of the extraordinary violence which he had employed. In Mexico – linked to Spain through language, emigration and even the international structures of many religious congregations – as well as in the Soviet Union, a new society seemed to have been wrenched from the old.<sup>13</sup>

The identification of the church as an ideological enemy thus went far wider on the revolutionary left than the chiliastic ideology of anarcho-syndicalism.<sup>14</sup> This was demonstrated after the outbreak of civil war, when some regions dominated by socialist organisations experienced similar levels of violence to anarcho-syndicalist areas of the Levante. The dioceses of Toledo and Ciudad Real, for example, lost a higher proportion of their diocesan clergy than did Barcelona or Valencia.<sup>15</sup> The crucial actors in all forms of revolutionary activity were the local committees, which ranged from constituted Popular Front committees to ad hoc bodies, but which were left-wing, class-focused organisations in a much clearer sense than they were party-political ones. Given the collapse of the regime in the wake of the military coup of 18 July, this is hardly surprising. Despite the Popular Front’s electoral victory in February, the regime was fragile, its government staffed solely by representatives of the republican parties, all of them devoid of mass following or trade union affiliation. On 18 July itself, the government’s paralysis reduced it to issuing desperate assurances of public order even as crowds gathered in the Puerta del Sol calling for the distribution of arms to the workers.<sup>16</sup> By 20 July, the prime minister had changed three times.

During the first months of the war, the republican government proved completely unable to stop the killings, although it was profoundly disquieted by them. The lack of due judicial process or even of any legal basis for the executions of many priests betrayed the regime’s constitutional basis. Small wonder, then, that the republican authorities fell back upon the clichéd image of rifle-wielding clerics, soutanes flapping on their way to fire on the people. However unsubstantiated, this was a means both of denying and of justifying anticlerical violence.<sup>17</sup> It also

endorsed the identification of the church as a class enemy which lay behind much proletarian violence in the first place.

The Spanish revolution, like all others, was incoherent, often contradictory and could not have occurred save for the fracturing of central authority. The circumstances and opportunities which determined revolutionary violence varied according to locality. Much of the material on which this chapter is based is taken from eastern Andalusia, a latifundia region with a long tradition of *Jacquerie*. The events of 1936 were, though, no simple peasants' revolt. Ideological struggle was embedded in the outbreak of civil war, part of its actual process. News of the military coup unleashed a concerted attempt at social revolution and no republican region escaped revolutionary and anticlerical violence, even if in the Basque Country these were minimal. The possibilities for revolutionary violence were, however, conditioned by the power structures of the Republic.

Despite the plethora of local studies of the civil war, variations in the nature of revolutionary violence have been underplayed. They are not of interest to clerical investigators who see the anti-religious violence, by definition, as a generalised phenomenon. Yet, other scholars have also commonly depicted the violence as an essentially external phenomenon. Local investigations have discerned another pattern to village violence, in that the perpetrators tended to come from the surrounding area and not from the *pueblo* itself.<sup>18</sup> But it is clearly implausible to claim that violence always came from outside the *pueblo*. In Totalán (Málaga), for example, 'elements' from the provincial capital burnt the images in the parish church but two local men occupied the building on behalf of the CNT.<sup>19</sup> A similar pattern is recounted by the postwar parish priest in Cabra de Santo Cristo (Jaén). Here, on 22 July, 'a pack of scoundrels burst into the *pueblo*' and maltreated the local clergy. This 'gang' was aided by some from the *pueblo* and 'the local Marxists' began acting on their own initiative that same day. Apart from 'persons of order', the people 'approved of such displays of vandalism and enjoyed them', even if a proposal to remove Christ's name from that of the village failed after a plebiscite.<sup>20</sup> Despite the Francoist frame of reference which the parish priest is quite obviously employing, this account suggests more interconnection between internal and external agents of violence than some would allow.

Violence against the old regime was not simply a case of identifying class enemies, although such an argument has been offered as an explanation for the anticlerical manifestations of the revolutionary violence of 1936.<sup>21</sup> One of the consequences of the experience of political polarisation under the Second Republic had been to 'fix' the church as the

ideological enemy of the left. In 1936 priests were not simply killed as class enemies. Rather, they were singled out to bear the sins of the old order. Many of those executed were known right-wingers, but many others had no political affiliation or public role, such as the Brothers of St John of God who cared for the mentally infirm in the asylums outside Madrid. Yet, when they were taken for their *paseo*, a voice from the crowd was heard to say that 'only they' were responsible for the military coup. Similarly, one man who admitted to killing a parish priest in Aragón said that he 'was a very good man. But we had to kill all the priests.' In another Aragonese pueblo, the revolutionaries spared the landowners but not the priest, as to do so would have been too conspicuous.<sup>22</sup>

The identification of the church as *responsible* for the sufferings of the people – and, indeed, the assault on the Republic – effectively made its representatives into scapegoats in the sense identified by René Girard. As Julio de la Cueva has pointed out, genuinely persecutory mechanisms were employed against the church in 1936. Despite the events of October 1934 – which presaged the violence of the civil war on a small, local scale – this could only occur after the military coup of July as only then could the violence be legitimised. Some catastrophic event or action was needed, one in which the church was popularly, if not actually, implicated, before anticlerical violence could break its customarily established bounds. In 1931, resentment against the church resulted in torched buildings; in 1936, that same anger spilt clerical blood on a massive scale.

This reading of anticlerical violence as a revolutionary phenomenon, bound up with the power structures of the Republic as well as with the utopian (and dystopian) visions of the proletarian movements, has its critics. Clerical commentators, among them the historian Vicente Cárcel Ortí, are among the most prominent dissenters. Citing those priests, seminarians and religious brothers killed before the July military rising – seventeen earlier in 1936 and thirty-three in Asturias during the October rising of 1934 – Cárcel Ortí depicts the blood-letting of the civil war as the culmination of a longer anticlerical persecution.<sup>23</sup> Proponents of what might be called an official church historiography make no distinction between secularism and anticlericalism. The efforts of republican intellectuals and legislators to realise the Enlightenment vision of lay rationality is thus one side of the coin; the vulgar and murderous anger of the proletarian mob is the other. Such a schema sees the former as a vanguard, thereby plotting a causal link between secularising legislation and anti-religious violence. The works of clerical historians<sup>24</sup> thus acknowledge, at least to some extent, that

anticlericalism is a political movement. Yet, by denying its reactive nature they assign an essentially passive role to the Catholic Church. Clericalism simply did not exist.

Those who deny the existence of clericalism as a political force see the Spanish Church as the victim of an unprovoked assault, as demonstrated by its lack of involvement in the military coup and the innocence of the clerical victims. Exonerating either the institutional church or, more specifically, the victims of the massacres from any political role serves another, theological, purpose, that of beatification. This is in many ways the culmination of the official ecclesiastical history of the anticlerical violence of the Spanish civil war. The campaigns for canonisation – campaigns in which Father Cárcel Ortí has been much involved – have informed this history from its very beginnings, not least because it has been written according to the church's analytical concepts, principally that of martyrdom. As 'national patrimony' and 'living examples', martyrs represent eternal truths, as 'our witnesses', they embody 'the essence of the Christian religion'. Martyrdom is understood as a grace from God, 'crowning a holy life', but it is also the supreme test, 'the most perfect human act as a sign of greater love', the result of Christian fortitude in resisting evil.<sup>25</sup>

One recent publication presents seventy-four cases in identical fashion: biographical notes, persecution and death, holiness and martyrdom.<sup>26</sup> Such martyrologies dwell on the victims' vocations and the exemplary nature of their lives as demonstrated in their pastoral, charitable or spiritual work. The manner of their deaths is even more important. The Christian virtues of fortitude and acceptance of the will of God are shown through physical suffering; at the moment of death they are stoic, unwavering in the defence of their faith, supportive of others who may be faltering, and forgiving of their killers. The suffering of martyrs is redemptive; it echoes that of other saints and martyrs and, ultimately, the passion of Christ himself. The martyr is thus the central focus of a transcendental drama which is enacted throughout and outside historical time. The Spanish civil war is simply a venue for an eternal symbolic struggle between good and evil. Indeed, the perpetrators of the killings become curiously redundant. Martyrologies treat the killers as anonymous agents of evil; their cruelties are recounted as a catalogue of barbarity which accentuates the suffering of the victims. The explanatory framework is that of satanic fury. Murderers are the unwitting tools of Providence, for martyrdom is a special gift from God.

Hagiographers therefore make no attempt to understand, interpret or contextualise religious persecution except within predetermined

theological parameters. But this cannot be the position of the historian, whose delineation of cause and context is fundamental to an understanding posited upon specificity, in terms of both time and place. The revolutionary context of July and August 1936 cannot be ignored, nor can the civil war or the other forms of violent struggle which were being waged in Spain at that time. Yet revolutionary violence, particularly anti-clerical violence, is difficult for the historian to approach. Many prefer not to recall it: oral history reveals those who exonerate themselves from the violence rather than confront it.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, extra-legal violence leaves few records particularly when, as is the case here, it embarrassed the official regime.

The only body which was really interested in compiling evidence of the atrocities was the church, and the victory of 'the Catholic arms of Franco' gave it a free hand. In 1940, the dictator established by decree the *Causa General*, which is in effect an archive containing evidence for a prosecution of the Second Republic for crimes against Spain.<sup>28</sup> Public prosecutors were sent into all the provinces that had formed part of the republican zone, with authority to collect documents, conduct interviews and compile witness statements. Over 1,500 files were compiled to complement the military and political repression carried out in Spain before 1943–5. The archive was ostensibly to have a purely informative or exemplary character, part of Franco's vainglorious ambition to be answerable only 'before God and history'. Legal standards of proof were not observed and the quality of the information varies considerably from province to province.<sup>29</sup>

Information on the religious persecution was provided by the ecclesiastical authorities, the bishop, or his vicar general, for the diocese, and the heads of religious houses for those monastic communities which did not come under diocesan authority. The similarities between the depositions in the *Causa General* and the martyrologies is thus pronounced. As the *Causa* is the principal source for the numerous diocesan martyrologies published since the 1940s – and which have been revived by the beatifications – the problem is rendered circular.

In Franco's Spain, this was also overlain by a conception of the republican rearguard as a desperate and dangerous place where barbarity and torment ruled. The language of the *Causa General* creates a Manichean duality, with 'the republican image of "anarchy, chaos, destruction, violation, death, pillage, torture" against the "authority, order, respect, fatherland, hierarchy" of Francoism'.<sup>30</sup> Depositions from survivors of the violence bear eloquent testimony to how this duality was perceived as, or at least presented as, a real division. One of the priests who survived the assault on the community house of the Claretine fathers



in Jaén on 20 July 1936 gave an account which reduced the assailants to a subhuman, almost bestial role. This was a mob action: not only were priests killed, but their bodies were also ill-treated, thrown into ditches and rubbish-carts, and paraded through the streets. The priest who survived describes the crowd as 'the savage horde', an 'armed mob' and 'Marxist furies' 'drunk with blood', portraying how those fleeing for their lives were hunted down and, once captured, were treated as a prize: 'If they are to be killed, I will kill them. . . because I caught them. . . and they're mine.'<sup>31</sup> In this account, and in innumerable others, the victims of the anticlerical fury – whether human, material or, in the eyes of the narrators, divine – serve as scapegoats for the satanic passion of the 'reds'. The suffering of the church thus justified the retribution meted out to these same reds, who were themselves scapegoats only now disguised as villains.<sup>32</sup>

As explanations, the narrative patterns of the martyrologies are clearly inadequate, but few scholars would actually expect them to offer explanations other than in the religious sphere.<sup>33</sup> More problematic is their monopoly of the source material: very little evidence of the anticlerical violence comes to us unmediated by the church. The effect of this is to occlude. Not only is scant attention paid to the perpetrators in a social or political sense, but even the nature of the forms of anticlerical violence is disguised, despite the emphasis on individual and collective suffering. Evidence of barbarity is recounted, but often in a general, undifferentiated way. Similarly, an insistence on the satanic purpose of the reds meant that the violence is neither contextualised nor compared to other kinds of violence taking place at the same time. Finally, the mores and the morals of clerical culture made it almost impossible even to recount certain kinds of violence, specifically sexual violence.

Some of these difficulties cannot be redressed. Historians can only work with the sources they have. But it should not prevent us posing the questions. Recently, as the 'linguistic turn' shook the foundations of structural-functionalism in the social sciences, so those who work on violence have become as interested in its performance as in its effects.<sup>34</sup> Throughout republican Spain, disproportionate force was used to kill clerics; torture was common before death, and the corpse remained a focus of punishment even after death. The killings were often accomplished in highly ritualised, theatrical ways, as was the destruction of ecclesiastical buildings and liturgical objects. The forms of anticlerical violence in 1936 are integral to its definition. Yet comparatively little attention has been paid to the possible meaning of those forms, except to show the extent of the phenomenon or to establish it as a genuine purge and/or a genuine persecution.

It is a central contention of this chapter that the forms chosen by anti-clerical assailants revealed their own cultural and ideological positions. One of the performers in the anticlerical violence of 1936 – as in all instances of revolutionary violence – was the mob. The inchoate anger of a crowd differed from the strangely unemotional destruction instigated by militia groups, though this did not mean that it was simply atavistic, even if it is mob violence which seems most reminiscent of *Jacquerie*. In the mountain village of Mijas, outside Marbella, for example, the presbytery was sacked, as was another house belonging to a local notable: furniture and possessions were piled into the street and burnt. The parish church was also sacked as were all the shrines in and around the villages. Their images were burnt, the altars destroyed. The parish archive, which dated from 1559, also perished.<sup>35</sup> In another incident, a known rightist was pursued by ‘two to three hundred locals from Mijas and Marbella’ who set fire to the scrubland where he was hiding. When the body was recovered, it was riddled with bullet holes.<sup>36</sup>

The class violence of *Jacquerie* reasserted itself in Andalusia during the summer of 1936. In the *pueblos* around Marbella, for instance, assaults on private property were heavily concentrated in this phase of the civil war, when the destruction and burning of land registers were relatively common throughout the region.<sup>37</sup> These traditional forms of protest represented the vengeance of the landless and the illiterate, striking against instruments of their oppression. At an ideological level, parish registers of births, marriages and deaths may also have represented the church’s hold over the ordinary lives of ordinary people, at least to committed anarchists, who rejected marriage in both its civil and its religious form. In many local villages, as in Mijas, the anticlerical violence followed a pattern, with private possessions, religious artefacts, and municipal and ecclesiastical records piled up and burnt in the street. In Junquera, for example, the church and shrine were sacked on 1 August. Some of the images and liturgical objects were burnt in the streets, others thrown off a bridge into the river. The parish archive and all the religious objects recovered in searches of private houses were burnt in the *plaza mayor*. On 5 August the municipal archives were burnt, the presbytery sacked and the priest’s clothes and furniture made into a bonfire.<sup>38</sup>

The cumulative effect of the different kinds of violence which were being carried out in these *pueblos* in 1936 – class violence, anticlerical violence, mob violence, militia violence – was to destroy the old order. This Sorelian annihilation destroyed what was antithetical to the revolution. The new society would be built upon a new foundation, uncontaminated by the vestiges of outworn creeds. Such visions could be

apocalyptic, as one English observer discovered as the city he lived in went up in flames:

An old Anarchist of my acquaintance was standing beside me.

'What do you think of that?' he asked.

I said: 'They are burning down Málaga.'

'Yes,' he said: 'they are burning it down. And I tell you – not one stone will be left on another stone – no, not a plant or even a cabbage will grow there, so there may be no more wickedness in the world.'<sup>39</sup>

More often, though, such violence was a catharsis. The choice of fire as a weapon was not a random one. Rather it was the most common means of purification. Arson was admittedly the quickest and cheapest way to destroy a building, but the cleansing properties of fire would have been well known from animal husbandry and ordinary housekeeping.<sup>40</sup> Bonfires are also central to many Spanish fiestas, driving out evil spirits on St John's Eve or burning images such as the traditional *ninots* set ablaze in Valencia for the *fallas*.<sup>41</sup> Fire has the capacity to destroy something utterly, to reduce it to ashes and dust which blow away on the wind. In Fuengirola, the parish church was ignited as early as 19 July. It was completely razed: those walls which were left in ruins were pulled down so that not a stone was left standing. Similarly, in the nearby pueblo of San Pedro Alcántara, the parish church was torched three times, with many local people involved in the burning.<sup>42</sup>

Utter destruction may also have been the intention in burning bodies, such as that of parish priest of Fuengirola, shot on 26 July. Such cremations were extremely common, but bodies are notoriously hard to burn. In Huercal de Almería, for example, the bodies of two priests were found in a village by a group of seven men and three women, all distinguished by the derogatory nicknames common among proletarian members of Andalusian pueblos. They profaned the corpses, paraded them around the pueblo and finally covered them in petrol and burnt them by the side of the river. They then still seem to have required burial, in the river itself, according to one account.<sup>43</sup>

The attempts at burning, like other forms of post-mortem assault, may be better understood as a gesture of contempt towards the victim, or perhaps the deliberate disposal of the corpse in a way forbidden to Catholics. Many more bodies were abandoned on roadsides, left for birds of prey or tossed into communal graves, than were burnt. In some areas the executions took place among mineshafts, which made recovery of the bodies almost impossible. One of the most famous examples is that of eight de la Salle brothers killed in Almería in August and September, whose bodies were thrown into unused wells. The same

use was made of the Coto Minero outside Lorca (Murcia) where some of the bodies were never recovered.<sup>44</sup> Christian victims were thus denied Christian burial, sometimes in perpetuity.

The punishment of the cadaver also took other forms. In Murcia, one parish priest's body was 'shamefully mutilated', dragged through the city and finally hoisted up the bell tower of his own church, where it went up in flames with the rest of the building.<sup>45</sup> The corpses of priests were found without eyes, tongues, or testicles. In several cases, the body had been castrated, either pre- or post-mortem, and the genitals stuffed in the victim's mouth.<sup>46</sup> These litanies of terrible human suffering are customarily recounted by clerical authors to demonstrate both the existence and the redemptive purpose of martyrdom. Non-clerical authors have seen them rather as 'rites of violence' which humiliated and dehumanised the victims, so enabling their massacre while escaping guilt. The 'morbid fixation with genitals' was simply a local peculiarity, the product of *machismo*, which was in turn reflected in the anticlerical obsession with the sexuality of the cloister. The function of ritual violence was to enable killing by denying the victims any empathy, or even sympathy.<sup>47</sup>

Central to this analysis is the idea that the victim was 'now not a human being but an animal'.<sup>48</sup> This has led to an emphasis on the severing of ears – the traditional accolade for a matador – and of those occasions where the ritual of the bullring was used in the execution of priests in public squares. But, while it is clearly the case that 'the symbolic value of the victim did not disappear with his death', bullfighting is not the only ritual tradition at work here.<sup>49</sup> Soldiers also mutilated the bodies of their enemies, particularly in colonial wars such as those Spain had been fighting in north Africa throughout the twentieth century.<sup>50</sup> But there were also older patterns involved. Sacerdotal and sacramental practice in the Catholic Church depended on the tactile transmission of grace. Priests used their hands to bless, their ears to hear confession, their tongues to grant absolution, their eyes to survey and, in anticlerical fantasy, to pry and to peek. That they should have been deprived of these in death may be another form of anti-religious catharsis. A fascination with confession, for example, was common. One Valencian priest who lost his tongue was ordered by his torturers to reveal the sins of the mayoress, while a chaplain from Denia (Alicante) was shot after refusing to reveal what he had heard during the confession of a fellow prisoner. In Madrid, confessional boxes were taken from the 'shadows' of the churches to the 'light' of the crowded street.<sup>51</sup>

The phrase 'rites of violence' is Natalie Zemon Davis's, and the similarity in form between the violence enacted during the French wars of religion and that of the Spanish civil war has struck many historians.

Yet, while the ritualised brutality of the Counter-Reformation denied full humanity to its victims, it also enacted competing eschatological claims upon their bodies, anticipating the torment of the damned and the proximity of the apocalypse.<sup>52</sup> Ritual acts, even if the same in form, cannot have the same meaning in 1936 as they did in the seventeenth century, and many historians of the Spanish civil war would deny any eschatological or thaumaturgic intent on the part of the perpetrators. For Julián Casanova, then, acts of profanation 'were not an attempt to destroy the power of sacred symbols – as to the iconoclast they did not have any – but to demonstrate their "uselessness" and, at the same time, their impotence in the face of attack'.<sup>53</sup> This was certainly often an overt claim: villagers in Huelva province, for instance, remembered being told the statues from the church were only 'the carved limbs of olive trees'.<sup>54</sup>

Casanova's statement is intellectually logical, but it is not necessarily emotionally true. The patterns of Catholic practice ran deep in Spanish culture, even if Catholic belief was less pervasive. As Mary Douglas put it, 'the Sacred can be engraved in the hearts and minds of worshippers in more ways than one'.<sup>55</sup> It is notable that militants felt required to *demonstrate* the powerlessness of religious images rather than simply proclaim it.<sup>56</sup> The violence enacted in republican Spain in 1936 may not have had any eschatological intent other than a purely negative one, but the forms that it took and the patterns that it followed were often religious. The assault on the priests' cadavers in Huercal de Almería, for instance, parodied sacred forms: in parading the corpses around the pueblo in a trajectory that ended at the river, the perpetrators were reenacting a religious procession.<sup>57</sup> The same burlesque occurred with statues, images and even live priests. In the church of St Sebastian in Almería, a statue of St Joseph was brought out of the burnt church, paraded around with a spittoon on its head and battered into pieces.<sup>58</sup>

The religion that was being parodied in Spain in 1936 was the popular religion of the streets, not the eucharistic religion of the churches. This was not purely folkloric: the architectural and liturgical idiom of Spanish Catholicism is the Baroque, with its intense physicality and elaborate public rituals.<sup>59</sup> The extravagant dramaturgy of Holy Week took place on the streets, organised by lay confraternities who would pay non-members – and non-believers – to carry the monumentally heavy floats. In their intermingling of sacred and secular forms, these celebrations were essentially ambivalent. Even the Holy Week solemnities, which ended Lent, were a clear counterpoint to the profanities of Carnival, which began it.<sup>60</sup>

The carnivalesque parodies, which characterised at least some of the anticlerical violence in 1936, centred on public forms of Catholic

practice, particularly processions. Pueblos in Aragón saw burlesques of Holy Week, with living men taking Christ's place in the holy sepulchre or processing around the streets dressed as Jesus on his way to Calvary.<sup>61</sup> In contrast, the profanation of consecrated hosts or parodies of the Eucharist were far less common, not because of any greater respect for 'Jesús sacramentado' but because in areas of extremely low Catholic practice it meant little or nothing to the assailants. In Cartagena, for example, the diocesan report commented that burlesques of Catholic rite took place in a good number of places, but the profanation of the host only in a few.<sup>62</sup>

The parody of Baroque liturgy may have been fun, at least for some, but it was neither frivolous nor a simple manifestation of alternative folkways. The ritual destruction of images was an assault on the public presence of Catholicism, on the emotional power of religion as well as the institutional power of the church. The 'execution' by republican firing squad of the towering statue of the Sacred Heart at the Cerro de los Angeles just outside Madrid is the most famous example, but more common, and perhaps more surprising, was the violence against patronal images, which seem to have been singled out for destruction.<sup>63</sup>

The shrines which housed them, though lost in the countryside and seemingly long since incorporated into the natural as well as the spiritual landscape, were also destroyed. In Lorca, for example, between fifteen and twenty shrines were assaulted and sacked. According to the official report, this included every shrine in the vicinity; the uncertainty over the exact number suggests that some were obscure even in 1936.<sup>64</sup>

The desire to purge religion from even the private sphere stemmed from a recognition of its power over hearts and minds, and not only over the hearts and minds of believers. House searches to recover religious artefacts such as medals and prayer cards were relatively common, as in Junquera (Málaga), where all such objects were burnt in the main square. Burning was, as argued above, a purifying rite, used to destroy objects. But the treatment of images was, in many cases, more akin to assaults on people. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the Baroque tradition of hierophany, which had statues, particularly those associated with the Passion, becoming temporarily human as they wept, bled, or sweated.<sup>65</sup> These icons had thaumaturgic power and, just as their followers treated them as living beings, so did their attackers. Many were shot. In Lorca (Murcia) all the statues in one church were beheaded; in Toledo statues were 'blinded', hacked into quarters and the pieces hung on church walls. In Montizón (Jaén) statues of Christ and the Virgin had their eyes gouged out before being paraded around

the local taverns; in Alcázar de San Juan (Ciudad Real) militiamen 'married' the statue of the patroness, the Virgin of the Meadow.<sup>66</sup>

The case of the patronal image of Valencia, Our Lady of the Forsaken, was among the most famous. Stripped of its jewels and garments, the image was found by a priest, its hands and face battered, the accompanying statue of the Child Jesus discarded.<sup>67</sup> Like many Baroque Spanish images, the Valencian Virgin was not a complete statue, but a head and arms mounted on a wooden frame. Dressing such images had been an important devotional practice for centuries. Devotees would donate richly embroidered mantles, often handworked, which were used in the ritual dressing carried out by confraternities, particularly before processions. The same practices were observed with many Holy Week images, and the donation of jewels was common, including the pearls used as tears on weeping madonnas. The assault on these images was thus an obvious attack on the wealth of the church. But their stripping also inverted a well-known devotional practice, just as the rituals of shrine-destruction did the legends of their founding.<sup>68</sup>

As the drawing by Carlos Saénz de Tejada (figure 4.1) shows, the removal of the image's garments left it hollow. Stripping a wooden frame of liturgical trappings transformed an icon into an artefact, an object both man-made and mundane. When the image was mounted on a pole, usually with a crosspiece to form the arms, the phallic shape suggested another worldly origin, this time an explicitly sexual one. Such exposure led to jeering and laughter, as is shown in the quote from Arturo Barea which began this chapter. Saénz de Tejada's illustration echoes this, even though it evokes pathos rather than mockery. The title, 'Profanation and ridicule', refers directly to the actions of the iconoclasts, particularly as *escarnio* also means 'shame'. As the Virgin's upper half is intact, the image still has noticeable human qualities: indeed, the curve of the neck and the expression on her face suggests that she really is weeping, presumably in atonement.<sup>69</sup> The beauty of the figure is also undiminished, in contrast to the account given in Barea which suggests that the stripped image was grotesque as well as sexually suggestive.

The ritual violence of the iconoclasts was an exposure of 'things hidden' which revealed their true nature, in both physical and symbolic terms. Hence the display of mummified corpses in cities such as Madrid, Toledo, Valencia, Almería and, most famously, Barcelona. In a gesture which both contemporaries and historians have puzzled to understand, the bodies of nuns were disinterred from closed convent graveyards and exposed to public view.<sup>70</sup> At one level, the motivation for the exhumations is simple: convents all over Spain were rumoured to have buried children. A Madrid newspaper reported the discovery of fetuses




Figure 4.1. Carlos Sáenz de Tejada, 'Profanación y escarnio' ('Profanation and ridicule') (from Joaquín Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española*, Madrid, 1939–43, vol. 1, p. 357, reproduced by permission of Carlos Sáenz de Tejada Benvenuti).





Figure 4.2. Mummified human remains displayed in the church of San Miguel, Toledo (from Joaquín Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española*, Madrid, 1939–43, vol. 7, p. 216).

in two churches in the capital, in one case situated between the legs of two adult female cadavers.<sup>71</sup> In Toledo, the corpse of a child was among those arranged on the high altar in the church of San Miguel (Figure 4.2). In a continuation of the sexual symbolism, the adult male corpse at the foot of the altar was positioned in such a way that the genitals were prominently displayed.

The rumours which ignited the exhumations had to articulate some widely held popular sentiment. Rumours of nuns giving poisoned sweets to children, for instance, led to arson attacks on a convent in Madrid on 14 May 1936. More common tales of violence against children were those of sexual transgression: the attack on the de la Salle monastery in Asturias in October 1934 was sparked off by rumours of paedophilia.<sup>72</sup> Here, the strength of the taboo which was being broken seemed to legitimate extreme violence. But poison also had a particular resonance: baleful, invidious and invisible, it was the contemporary equivalent of the evil eye, a crime fitting the secrecy of the cloister.<sup>73</sup> Rumours thus mobilised the stock images of a widespread and often pornographic anticlerical culture. Supposed discoveries such as those of 'indecent sanitary implements of a sexual nature' in a Madrid convent, the display of instruments of penance as those of torture, or of corpses claimed to be the raped and murdered victims of monks, provided 'evidence' of these crimes, at least for those predisposed to believe in them.<sup>74</sup>

And people did believe them, but not because they were true. Rather, both rumours and actions acted as metaphors for the social and ideological power of the church which could capture children by converting them, and interfere in the life of the family, not least through the supposed hold that priests as confessors had over their female flocks. Once exposed, the convent cadavers both revealed the iniquities of a corrupt church and, in their decay, themselves became powerful symbols of that corruption.<sup>75</sup> Mummified corpses were grotesque, recognisably both human and non-human, once a person, now an object. Similarly, the desecration of statues revealed icons to be bits of wood. In both cases, the transformation was based 'on laughter', which freed the original from solemnity, mysticism and piety. The grotesque was funny, particularly in a society which perceived physical deformity in this way, but the laughter it provoked was that of Carnival: a triumphant, proletarian time, when derision ruled and bodily realities satirised and transformed the world.<sup>76</sup>

In Bakhtin's words, 'laughter degrades and materialises'.<sup>77</sup> In Almería, militia caps were put on mummified corpses as they went on display, just as the statue of St Joseph had been crowned with a spittoon. In

Barcelona, those who were children during the revolution remembered going to laugh at the exposed cadavers of Salesian nuns.<sup>78</sup> Their laughter was directed at the actual corpses and not, as Lincoln claims, at 'the pretensions of the Church'.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, this claim is particularly hard to sustain given the assaults on living priests, who were not only physically hurt but also humiliated. Taunting and insults were ubiquitous and while in some cases the humiliation was social – in a clear reversal of class position, the bishops of Almería and Guadix swabbed decks on the prison ship *Astoy Mendi* – it was equally likely to have been sexual.<sup>80</sup>

Revolutionary violence was directed against institutional power, but it was also directed against individuals. There was a breaking of chains, a revolt of the oppressed. 'Here, we are the only God' replied one group of militiamen when asked to release the parish priest 'for God's sake'.<sup>81</sup> This was a world turned upside down, in which men who had lacked power now exercised it, and those who had suffered could now inflict suffering. Assaults on the living demonstrated the extent of this new-found power, which often manifested itself as cruelty, but they also confronted the perpetrators with the humanity and even the individuality of their victims. The notion of the priest as predator was therefore crucial in denying these individuals the empathy or sympathy which would have hindered their killing. Those who preyed on the humble and the innocent, who tortured novices, stole and abused children, and broke up families, were no longer men, but scapegoats and villains.

The understanding of priests as both men and not men pervades the very rituals of killing. For it was not only the wooden 'bodies' of statues which were covered by voluminous wraps and triangular skirts. The human bodies of priests were too. Clerical dress was not a denial of anatomical sex; after all, only men could be priests. But clerical status depended upon celibacy as well as upon ordination, and it was this refusal of sex, signified by the wearing of the soutane, which set the priest apart. When one Valencia priest asked why he was being shot, he was told 'for the clothes you wear'.<sup>82</sup>

Religious dress had become a kind of cross-dressing: in common speech, priests were 'crows', 'frocks' or 'skirts', all terms which referred to their ankle-length, long-sleeved cassocks, buttoned from neck to floor.<sup>83</sup> The soutane both covered and *denied* the body and, in a clericalised culture which regarded celibacy as a distinct civil state and chastity as the ultimate religious virtue, this was a potent signifier. So it was in popular culture, which was much more likely to see the denial of sex as a denial of masculinity. The voluminous folds of clerical dress paradoxically focused attention on what they concealed, turning the human body underneath into a site for sexual and scatological fantasy.

Both types of fantasy had long featured in popular anticlerical discourse.<sup>84</sup> On the outbreak of civil war, however, the scapegoating of the church allowed these fantasies to be acted out, on real rather than fictional bodies. The de la Salle brothers gaoled in Almería, for example, were only allowed to perform 'their necessities' once a day. Seven of them were eventually killed. The Adoratrice sisters held in the same city went unharmed, though they were guarded by 'truly vulgar' militiamen and quizzed as to the location of the underground passages which connected their convent to the bishop's palace.<sup>85</sup> These non-existent passages were an anticlerical cliché, part of the erotic fantasy woven around the secluded spaces of the cloister. Yet, despite the fact that convents were the archetypal site for this kind of fiction, in Almería the gaolers' interest seems to have been in the sins of the bishop, who was killed, rather than those of his cloistered 'concubines', who were freed.

This would suggest that, on some level, convent fantasy was recognised for what it was.<sup>86</sup> Certainly, the anticlerical violence of the Spanish civil war was overwhelmingly male on male. The gender disparity in the number of victims – 283 women as against 6,549 men – is stark. Artefacts, buildings and corpses were the object of assault but women were not. Nuns were protected by their sex to the extent that they too were seen, if not as victims of the church's crimes, then not as perpetrators either. Again, in terms of anticlerical fantasy, this makes little sense. Nuns were also accused of torture, kidnapping and holding young women against their will, as was shown by the revolutionary exhumations. But, in a culture which tolerated wife-beating but severely disapproved of other forms of violence towards women, the taboos against killing nuns were very strong. Even to those who disbelieved in God, the 'brides of Christ' belonged to no man. The association between femininity and innocence may also have helped these women, who were easily portrayed as duped by the rational, intellectual, masculine power of the priest.

Some nuns were, of course, abused. Invariably, they were expelled from their convents, taunted, and forced to wear secular dress. A sister detained in her family home in Vélez Rubio (Almería) was manhandled in the public square and subjected to 'phrases which couldn't be heard without blushing'.<sup>87</sup> She was gaoled and held in awful conditions but suffered neither sexual assault nor execution. Indeed, there is no documented case of the rape of a nun during the Spanish civil war, although there were cases of brutal gang rape against laywomen.<sup>88</sup> Rape is, of course, an expression of power. Yet, not raping women utterly at the mercy of their assailants is also an expression of power, not only a sign of

masculine self-control but also a recognition that militiamen had their own codes of honour. When Cardinal Gomá returned to his diocese of Toledo to find his crucifixes mutilated, his cellar drunk and his bed despoiled by *milicianos*, he reported that they had nevertheless respected his nun-housekeepers.<sup>89</sup> Spanish men were the protectors of their womenfolk, both in law, at least until 1931, and in the pueblo. The frequent references to the rape of nuns in Nationalist war propaganda were fictions which depicted the victimhood of the Spanish church and the inhumanity of its assailants. Stories of rape served as a metaphor for the violation of sacred space, a reminder of the calls of anticlerical politicians to 'lift the veils of novices and raise them into mothers'.<sup>90</sup>

In contrast, the sexual assault to which priests were subjected was real as well as metaphorical. Respect for female virginity was apparently counterbalanced by contempt for male virginity, as the genitals of priests became a main focus for assault. Just as images were stripped, so were priests, whose genitalia were already an object of fascination, with numerous proverbs and sayings referring to their inordinate size.<sup>91</sup> Exposing testicles which were rumoured to hang to the floor thus revealed both priests' ordinary maleness and their lack of it. When the elderly parish priest in Cheste (Valencia) was paraded through the pueblo, the clothes torn off him as he went, pious women were invited to come to witness the spectacle. Lewd spectacle, masquerading and mockery, not least of the unwilling, made the events in Cheste into a cruel carnival, a display of proletarian male power and a celebration, not simply of the transgression of sexual norms, but of their reaffirmation.<sup>92</sup> Carnival modes were used to reaffirm the power of the phallus, of men over women and, in 1936, of men over priests.

The stock anticlerical image of the priest was a composite of vices: slovenliness, avarice, gluttony, sloth, bigotry and lust. But by the 1930s, lust and covetousness had almost entirely eclipsed the others. Priests killed during the civil war had their eyes, hands and genitals removed, but none their guts.<sup>93</sup> Popular anticlerical tradition, both printed and oral, focused overwhelmingly on the sexual transgressions of the clergy, and in particular on the parish priest as 'shameless seducer', mounting women in the seclusion of the confessional.<sup>94</sup> The posing of priests' corpses in a 'shameful' way thus revealed their real, material, masculine, nature.<sup>95</sup> Men's social power rested on their sexual potency: at least in southern Spain, male celibacy was not a source of spiritual power, but a transgression, an unnatural and unbelievable state. That some priests would refuse to remove their 'frock' to dress as other men was an affront as well as a refusal to comply with those wielding weapons. Yet, many priests wore the soutane for as long as they could, some refusing to

remove it even in the face of death. It was emblematic not only of their clerical status but also of the vows they took on being ordained. One young priest who refused to abandon clerical dress was promised his freedom if he married. Rejecting all such offers, he was castrated before he was shot.<sup>96</sup>

When David Gilmore conducted fieldwork in Fuenmayor (Seville) in the 1970s, he found that people routinely said priests should 'be married or castrated'.<sup>97</sup> In 1936, the use of sexual temptation in the torture and humiliation of priests was widespread. Half-naked women were brought to tantalise and to mock a 27-year-old curate from Banyeres; a prostitute named 'Nona' was brought into the gaol to 'tempt and to mortify' the deacon of Junquera; another priest in his twenties, in Barcelona, punched the face of a woman who caressed his cheek, promising him marriage and freedom.<sup>98</sup> Marriage in these cases was clearly a euphemism for sex. In the case of a Clarettine brother from Cervera (Lleida), though, euphemisms were abandoned as he was stripped and then taken around local brothels where: 'both curious and sadistic, the militiamen tried every moral and physical means to take his virtue.' In an interesting inversion of the St Agnes story, the prostitutes themselves eventually told the militiamen to let him be.<sup>99</sup>

In this horrible search for the tumescence or ejaculation which would have 'proved' his masculinity, the brother's own words are telling: 'I am as much a man as you. But I am a religious.' To his assailants, however, the latter denied the former. True proletarian men were materialist, rational, egalitarian beings, who told tales of the ineffectiveness of divine intervention, of communicants falling dead, of statues powerless to prevent catastrophe.<sup>100</sup> The forms of vulgar speech were used repeatedly when tormenting priests, who were frequently threatened or offered inducements to force them to blaspheme.

This was not simply an additional humiliation, such as those doled out to prisoners found praying or reading devotional books.<sup>101</sup> Scatological blasphemy was an established way of speech among proletarian men, as forms of swearing invariably invoked shitting on the sacred, most commonly on God.<sup>102</sup> As revolution erupted in July 1936, so swearing came out of the taverns. Scatological references, particularly when applied to the divine literally turned the world upside down, reducing even what was most lofty to the level of the sordid.<sup>103</sup> In a shocking way, this was a true leveling, a truly egalitarian mode of speech. In its emphasis on the lowly, material side of life, so blasphemy reflected the materialism which underpinned so much proletarian anticlericalism in 1930s Spain. Clearly and profoundly influenced by Marxian thought, anticlericals insisted that what was real lay below, grounded in nature, economic relationships

and lived experience.<sup>104</sup> Hence the systematic and repeated insistence that captured priests and nuns blaspheme.<sup>105</sup> Rather than an insult, blasphemy was a crude way for priests to deny the existence of the spiritual realm to which they had dedicated their lives.

The proletarian anticlericalism of the Spanish civil war thus made claims that were both political and metaphysical. It was a modern creed: the forms it took were reminiscent of older struggles, but their meanings were not. It was extraordinarily cruel, but its violence was that of catharsis. Such violence befits a revolution, when not only does an old order end, but a new one comes into being. In this liminal period, for a while, established forms and hierarchies are inverted as the old oppressions are swept away. This was the kind of purging which extirpated Catholicism from republican Spain. 'We want to eliminate the race of priests' one Catalan militiaman cried.<sup>106</sup> Comparisons with ethnic cleansing are tempting here, and there is clearly a sense in which the church was treated as an alien group in the civil war. Yet, such comparisons falter given the comparative leniency shown to nuns, who would have been among the first to be killed in a genuine ethnic cleansing. Not only were they capable of biological reproduction, but as most of them worked as teachers, nurses and social workers, they were spiritual reproducers in a very obvious sense.

The anticlerical violence of the civil war was a social, a political and a metaphysical inversion. The numerous photographs of the physical damage done by iconoclasts are presented by their ecclesiastical collators as evidence of sacrilege, but they are most striking for their representation of empty space.<sup>107</sup> A Baroque reredos with vacant niches appears almost hauntingly empty, testimony to the existence of the material once the spiritual has been expunged. Empty space may of course be filled, and surviving churches were put to new uses, as theatres, warehouses, barracks and even prisons. Revolutions do not only destroy the old, they also create space for the new. The 1936 revolutionaries were not nihilists, bent on destroying all; they also looked to create and to recreate. The new world which was glimpsed in Spain during the summer of 1936 was one in which social and religious hierarchies were destroyed, but it was still based upon male power. Now, though, it was the power of the materialist proletariat and not of the Catholic bourgeoisie, and it was this vulgar, masculine, working-class power which targeted its seeming antithesis, the priest.





*Part 2*

Republican political and cultural projects



## 5 Catalan populism in the Spanish civil war

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*Enric Ucelay-Da Cal*

### **The origins of Catalan populism**

Despite the dubiousness of most Spanish discourses of exceptionalism, Catalan politics in the 1930s *was* different. From the birth of the Spanish Republic in 1931, this difference was testified by the existence of a subsidiary political system – an autonomous regional government which acquired its own parliament and law-making powers in 1932. Within this institutional framework, the interacting pressures of leftist Catalan nationalism, a strong anarcho-syndicalist movement, and the eventual appearance of Marxist parties generated an original political demand which may be called populist.

Starting with its overt politicisation in 1901, Catalan nationalism introduced the ideal of a new kind of regional administration. This administration was born of devolution and was carried out in the Catalan language. It was capable of substituting the failing central bureaucracy with the offer of better services (such as education) and of serving as a means of social promotion. Barcelona was the centre of the rise of modern rival corporativisms in Spain, as well as the debate surrounding the viability of civil society (and therefore of civic culture) in the face of state intervention. This had a surprising potential for peculiar (and often contradictory) understandings between the ideological and organisational polarities that developed and matured in the years during and after the First World War. The cultural protectionism of ‘Catalanism’ was offered especially to internal Catalan immigrants from the local countryside to the big city. But this enraged army officers of a militarist leaning, who considered that Barcelona should grow as an explicitly Spanish city, and who, as of 1905, erected themselves as the guardians of the interests of functionaries coming from other parts of Spain. As a response to Catalanist pretensions and as relative rivals to the militarists, in 1907, the Radical democrats (of the Partido Radical), followers of Alejandro Lerroux, became spokesmen for lesser functionaries (such as schoolteachers), ambitious professionals, in terms of a broad meritocracy in which language and rank were not to be considered. Additionally, the CNT, founded in 1910 in the Catalan capital, arose in defence of

manual workers and, by extension, through the networks of family, dependancy and sociability, of poor immigrants in general, and proposed a drastic reorganisation of the economy in their benefit, while claiming entry into the local civil society until then tightly monopolised by the Catalanists. Size mattered, as small craft associations were a part of recognised social networks, but a large and bellicose syndicate was something threatening, to be excluded.

The dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, from September 1923 to January 1930, annulled all the alternatives – Catalanists, the republicans of the Radical Party, anarcho-syndicalists – by imposing an army-led provincialist coalition based on existing public institutions, backed up by the *Capitanía General*, the headquarters of the military administrative region. As a result, during the 1920s, anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists joined with the Catalan separatists of former officer Francesc Macià, who at one point actually financed the underground movement of the CNT. Anarchists would discover the sense of local identity in a confederal future, while Catalanists could tune into hitherto unexplored libertarian tendencies. Both could share with republicans the conviction that the monarchy was something negative and that the appropriate kind of republic – with syndical representation and regional devolution – could generate a broad consensus. The fall of Primo brought the corresponding collapse of the militarist option and created a situation where, for the first time, the other three could coexist or cooperate. The formation of the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) in March 1931, as a platform for the approaching municipal elections under the monarchy, proved extraordinarily successful.

The *Esquerra* initially had as its charismatic head the outstanding Catalan opponent of the military dictatorship, Macià, who had attempted a revolution together with the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists, as well as with Italian exiles, by invading Catalonia from the French side of the Pyrenees, only to be stopped by French police.<sup>1</sup> Macià's undoubted prestige concealed an improvised party, more like a loose movement, which brought together the multiple strands of Catalan republicanism and radical nationalism in an unwieldy union.<sup>2</sup> To lead the new party, Macià had to give up his separatism, which he claimed was not directed against a *republican* Spain. On 14 April 1931, after a sweeping electoral victory in municipal elections, first the head of the republican wing of the *Esquerra*, Lluís Companys, then Macià himself, proclaimed the Republic in Barcelona, but the uncomfortable relation between the Spanish and the Catalan republics had to be adjusted thereafter. Once established, the dynamic of the relationships that constituted this peculiar Catalan situation tended to drive forward unimpeded, especially

after the Spanish parliament formally recognised the autonomy statute of Catalonia the following year.

The triumphant ERC thus seemed to give life to the very contradictions that were then the background mix of Catalan politics. Its mood connected easily with the new urban consumer culture, born out of the 1920s and built around male tastes and activities that transcended class distinctions, such as sport (especially football) and films (including 'swimsuit cheesecake' and beauty contests), all reflected in an inexpensive illustrated press with great popular appeal, written in both Catalan and Castilian. Female participation was channelled through this somewhat narrow viewpoint (the first 'Catalan girl' to fly an aeroplane, to win a motorcycle race, and so on).<sup>3</sup> With this backdrop, the new party fused two currents, nationalists and republicans, and had hoped to base itself on a steady collaboration with the anarcho-syndicalists. It had to settle for peasant support and an intense appeal to youth, but it was far more hesitant about attracting women, who in any case, given the time it took to establish a census of female voters, did not participate until the general elections in November 1933.<sup>4</sup>

Having obtained landslides, first in the municipal voting that brought about the Republic, and then in the legislative elections in June 1931, the Esquerra effectively became a governmental party, guaranteed its majority by the new electoral law that encouraged large coalitions. What had been merely implicit until the approval of the Catalan autonomy statute in 1932 became a fact in the hegemony of the ERC in the new Catalan parliament elected in November of that year.<sup>5</sup> This lopsided situation can be compared to the single-party models that began to abound in the 1930s, especially in the Latin American context, where such domination did not necessarily eliminate rival parties and looked to worker unions for backing. It is even possible that the Catalan political system, quite visible within the autonomies or subsidiary 'statelets' of Europe for being on the left, could have served as an example for such Latin American experimentation.<sup>6</sup> By analogy, therefore, the Esquerra in Catalan politics – and the more general trend of the Catalan left – could be considered as a *populism* (or, more correctly, a political response to a new sort of populist demand from Catalan society), comparable to such contemporary experiences as the Mexico of Lázaro Cárdenas.<sup>7</sup>

Populism is notoriously hard to define.<sup>8</sup> Today, social analysts are fond of somewhat carelessly cataloguing populism as an exclusively right-wing phenomenon.<sup>9</sup> In fact, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, populism was probably more important as a formative trend of the left, expressing doubt about the oligarchic tendencies of classic liberalism, about suffrage restrictions and about selective public office.<sup>10</sup>

Certainly, in this sense, it has been interpreted as a characteristic of radical democracy in Barcelona in the early twentieth century.<sup>11</sup> In formal terms, populism can be understood as a reliance on ‘the people’, a distrust of representative institutions, and the appeal to a generic participation that would de-emphasise the *form* of such involvement.<sup>12</sup> In the Catalan case, the externals of parliamentary rule were preserved through the convenience of the permanent tension with Spanish politics, which could assume all the negative roles, while the *Catalan* ‘people’ flourished in its own organisation, deemed to be truly representative. Furthermore, populism can be understood as a cohesive *moment* in which new realignments could force the reconception of a determined political space with long-term effect.<sup>13</sup> And this is what happened in Catalonia in 1931, when the sudden triumph of an improvised party fusion served to proclaim the Republic and establish an autonomous government in Catalonia, as a revolution of sorts amid much rejoicing, thereby fixing the idealised pattern in which Catalan politics was perceived for the rest of the century.<sup>14</sup>

### Populist choices

The ERC had as its emblem a triangle within which the Catalan four-bar flag was enclosed. Most appropriately, this design serves to symbolise graphically the maximum ambition of ‘Macianism’: a tripod of party, labour syndicates and agrarian unions. Above, at the apex, stood the party, composed of a mosaic of historic local groupings, including republicans, federalists, ‘workerists’, radical nationalists, socialists, in all imaginable combinations.<sup>15</sup> In effect, the party became almost consubstantial with the Generalitat, the Catalan autonomous government. The Esquerra’s structure of indirect affiliation hoped to repose on an enduring alliance with the unions, which perforce meant the CNT. But the anarcho-syndicalists were divided on the issue of collaboration with Macià. While some leaders, like Pestaña, more or less favoured such a relationship, the more militant among them – impelled by the group of Durruti, Ascaso and García Oliver – preferred to recover the old ‘revolutionary alliance’ of the 1920s and force the creation of a virtually confederal republic (equal autonomy for ‘all the Iberian Republics’) with union participation in its legislative organs.<sup>16</sup> When Macià, in August 1931, obviously having accepted the more standard democratic parliamentary approach, abandoned federalism in exchange for a circumstantially unique autonomy for Catalonia (at the expense of Basque or Galician aspirations), it also signalled that he was ditching his erstwhile libertarian connection. Accordingly, the anarchist extremists moved

from the sustained pressure of street actions (the 1 May shootout in front of the Generalitat, the mid-May church and convent burnings in Madrid and the south, the Andalusian campaign of 'incidents', in collusion with 'extreme republicans') into active opposition against the rapidly consolidating republican situation, marked, in October, by the governmental alliance in Madrid of Azaña and the socialists.<sup>17</sup> As a direct result, starting in the autumn of 1931, the CNT split, the internal opponents of the insurreccional option (as well as the communists) being expelled from the syndicates.<sup>18</sup> In armed revolts during 1931–3, the anarchist insurreccionalist faction lost repeatedly, but its street pressure and terrorist tactics were a permanent reminder that this option was far from defeated or forgotten.<sup>19</sup> Anarcho-syndicalism was rent between the insurrectionists and those willing to strengthen the unions under existing conditions, who gravitated towards rival 'workerist' parties, like the dissident communist Bloc Obrer i Camperol (BOC) and the Catalan socialist Unió Socialista de Catalunya (USC) that preached unity of action.<sup>20</sup>

The BOC and the USC were, respectively, the positive and negative satellites of the Esquerra, unable to successfully challenge its hegemony, but also its simultaneous rivals and allies (especially the Catalan socialists). Social conditions aside, the open rift between the Catalan governmental left and the anarcho-syndicalist unions led to a strike wave in 1932–3, which was answered by Catalan nationalist paramilitary activism, as well as a 'gangbusters' approach by the police, in nationalist hands after 1933.<sup>21</sup> Without its syndical leg, the ERC tripod tended to topple over: this encouraged the over-representation of the affiliated tenant farmer union, and, to a lesser degree, of the nationalist youth militia of the Esquerra.<sup>22</sup> The defence of peasant issues (also a big BOC issue) eventually led the Esquerra in 1934 into a disastrous convergence with Spanish socialism against the centre-right coalition which had arisen out of the November 1933 general elections.

The apparently sweeping success of 'Macianism' in 1931–2 had made everything seem very simple, but, by late 1933, the Catalan government party was a shambles, seriously damaged by internal faction fighting.<sup>23</sup> On all sides, there were howls about the 'fascism' of the Esquerra and particularly of its nationalist Estat Català youth wing.<sup>24</sup> The highly opportune death of President Macià on Christmas Day 1933 permitted a new balance to be formed behind the outpouring of grief. In a paradoxical deal, the nationalist wing backed Companys, the head of the republicans, for president. The new Catalan president accordingly reached out to the rest of the Catalan republican and nationalist parties in a cabinet coalition to counter the recognition he granted to

the ERC nationalists. This coalition policy, with a strong institutional or 'officialist' tone, allowed the newly conjoined left (as opposed to the 'workerists') to achieve a landslide victory in the Catalan municipal elections of January 1934, and so become a shining example of unity to a European left badly shaken by the February events in Paris and Vienna. Barcelona seemed the spiritual focus of the new popular front line uniting communists, socialists and 'committed' democrats.<sup>25</sup> More or less at the same time, the 'workerist' parties and the libertarian syndicates expelled from the CNT joined together in a pilot Workers' Alliance which, with a critical attitude, backed the Generalitat against the 'fascist threat' in Madrid.<sup>26</sup> For its part, the CNT and the insurrectionists showed both the Catalan government and the Alliance an unrelenting hostility.

But the October 1934 revolt of the Generalitat and the Spanish socialists against the new, more right-wing, central government, in which the Generalitat was crushed in-gloriously by the army after a night of bluffing, changed everything.<sup>27</sup> In the October revolt the nationalists burned themselves out as a serious force in Catalan politics, although their subliminal social role remained alive.<sup>28</sup> The CNT also went too far in its enmity towards the official Catalan left and its 'workerist' allies. When, on the eve of the revolt, the police, under Generalitat decree, ordered shopkeepers to shut down in response to a licensed general strike, anarcho-syndicalist pickets followed closely, forcing the stores to reopen, as the 'confederal organisation' denied the validity of the strike call.<sup>29</sup> This comical reversal of roles began to look ludicrous after news arrived of the Asturias revolution, where the Workers' Alliance had been successfully formed (in the face of much protest by the Durruti-Ascaso-García Oliver group). Even then, the Catalan CNT still opposed the general strike in support of the Asturian rebel miners.<sup>30</sup> An extremely violent social explosion, soon harshly repressed with colonial troops, the events in Asturias completely superseded the previously exemplary Catalan dynamic, and became a central theme in Soviet propaganda in favour of 'popular unity'.<sup>31</sup>

Defeat and the new unitary popular front climate changed the Catalan nationalists, who were forced to choose between fascism and communism as an ideological framework for their claims. The distinction was nowhere as clear as it might become later: in the summer of 1935, for example, the 'Bukharinist' BOC, soon to fuse with the Trotskyists to become the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM) at the end of September, were deeply attracted by Doriot and his 'independent' option. *Doriotiste* 'national liberation' was still openly tempting to the left of the ERC as late as July 1936.<sup>32</sup> On the whole, however, as the pressure



of Popular Front unity appeals increased (there was a distinct Front d'Esquerres for Catalonia), the nationalists opted for communism, which seemed to be the going thing. Still, a good portion of the nationalists in the BOC opted out, rather than merge with the Trotskyists. They were caught up in the alternative flow towards 'worker unification' which joined together the USC, the Catalan section of the Spanish socialists, the Catalan Stalinists (Partit Comunista de Catalunya), and the left-wing separatists, the Partit Català Proletari, deemed an acceptable 'national-revolutionary party' by the Komintern. In April 1936, the youth organisations of the USC and the PCC merged, as had the white-collar syndical fronts of the PCC and the PCP, two years before. By June, the 'unified socialist' youth of all four parties had converged.<sup>33</sup> Tedious negotiations went on during the spring and into the summer, until the fusion was hurriedly put together on 23 July after the military revolt had been defeated in Barcelona. Following the line established previously for the youth wings, the new entity was called the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), a 'unified socialist' rather than a formal communist party, although it was 'adhered' to the Third International.<sup>34</sup> There has been much Catalan historiographic interest in stressing the autonomous nature of this process, which in its day apparently provoked a certain degree of Soviet bemusement.<sup>35</sup> As a reflection of the power of local trends, a part of the nationalists, essentially the leadership of the Estat Català Youth of the ERC which in June had not merged into the new nationalist party (similarly called Estat Català), preferred to enter the PSUC in August.<sup>36</sup>

While the POUM stretched itself to become a Spanish party, the PSUC was exclusively Catalan, having 'fraternal' relations with the Spanish Communist Party. While the communists pursued an ultra-leftist line, backing Largo Caballero and the leftist socialists against President Azaña and his republican prime ministers, the PSUC did not have a clear political position. But after September 1936, with the formation of the Largo cabinet (and with the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union in August), the shift in the Komintern attitude towards 'popular democracy' and support of the official republican government logically also affected the PSUC.<sup>37</sup> Although this has not been thoroughly studied, it is probable that the influence of the French Communist Party on the Soviet position may have reinforced the reorientation of the Catalan 'unified socialists'.<sup>38</sup> In any case, the PSUC, as a moderate but simultaneously revolutionary force, was poised for superseding the Esquerra as a mass party which could express the political will of a nationalist and socialist synthesis – a sort of higher

populism. But it is worth remembering, nevertheless, that the ERC formula was still not exhausted.

### **Revolutionary choices and the survival of populism**

The revolution began in Catalonia as a direct consequence of the failure of the military coup. Despite the persistent rumours of an impending revolt, the ERC was caught off-guard, expecting to hold a party congress while, simultaneously, hosting the 'Popular Olympics' being held in the Catalan capital against the official Olympic Games in Hitler's Berlin.<sup>39</sup> Once the immediate fighting died down, some unitary attempts were made by the sum of political forces with a potential for organising militias to seize Mallorca and Ibiza, all with a relative lack of success.<sup>40</sup> In July 1936, the peculiar mix of Catalan politics was caught by the unexpected outbreak of civil war in Spain like a steamship hit amidsthips by a torpedo but not sunk; things kept going forward with an anxious optimism, but nothing was the same as before the explosion.<sup>41</sup> Catalonia in general and Barcelona in particular formed a rearguard area, far away from the tension of the first months of the struggle, focused on the taking or the defence of Madrid. This made the idea of war seem relatively easy, as well as far away. The great popular support which the CNT boasted of having in the summer of 1936 may have been more apparent than real.

The revolution also had natural confusions of design. Much of anarcho-syndicalist thought – both local and imported – had been devoted to an essentially technocratic programme of 'industrial democracy' by which unions were to be in charge of overall administration, production and distribution.<sup>42</sup> In addition, the collapse of normal government made all sorts of proposals seem plausible. In sum, the immediate leaders of highly localised initiatives – new committees that replaced municipal or local authorities – found themselves in charge. The neighbourhood or the small town became the space of power. The very 'localness' of the revolution made it seem more real, more true to 'class', but this was really a mirage. The same was true for the committees handling each individual company, who could function as long as stocks of raw materials existed, but which could not find markets for the manufactured stuff, nor get new materials, as the distribution network had broken down.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, it was unclear to the rank and file if the purpose of revolution was increased production, heightened by the war effort, or its opposite, to ensure better conditions on the shop floor.<sup>44</sup>

Even the distant origins of the libertarian movement were rent by a bitter argument between anarcho-individualists and anarcho-collectivists,

never wholly resolved: right up to the summer of 1936, there were anarchists who disapproved of the CNT as an oppression of personal will.

At the same time, behind a convenient wall of 'bourgeois' respectability and old-time Catholicism, which meant considerable hypocrisy, Catalan civil society was distinctly libertarian (in the generic sense of the word), if not exactly tolerant. Personal desires – be they ideological or sexual – were accepted and allotted their proper sphere, as long as they did not challenge dominant trends. This meant that 'Catalanism' suffused much of political association, and that Marxist organisations were literally the extension of formerly radical nationalist initiatives. Marxist groups were dominated by former schoolteachers in either the old state educational system or the new 'reformed' Catalan schools. Anarchists formed an autonomous libertarian 'counter-culture', which mimicked 'bourgeois' social associations from neighbourhood schools on up, and which had its own 'class' or 'revolutionary' mechanisms for social promotion.<sup>45</sup> What the revolution of 1936 meant in substance was that 'Catalanist', republican and libertarian options within civil society were merged into one single whole, at the expense of what was left of the traditional religious structure, which was literally sacrificed since priests were the social group singled out for wholesale murder.<sup>46</sup> Wherever possible, in towns and villages, the dismembered local representations of the ERC could make deals with the CNT and the anarchists, or with the POUM in those areas of the Girona or Lleida countryside where the dissident communists were predominant. Such accords were always at the expense of the church and Catholics, which the Esquerra republicans claimed to be unable to defend. The republicans, thus, were often in the local committees as a kind of minority loyal opposition, while the nationalists of Estat Català – having picked their fight with the ERC with notorious bad timing – were left out in the cold.<sup>47</sup>

In these circumstances, the Esquerra wilted away, its local cadres incapable of facing situations which were solved in showdowns with CNT gunmen.<sup>48</sup> The political fat of the ERC was melted down to the relatively hard structure of the Generalitat, which did have police forces at its disposal, even if Catalan authorities did not dare utilise them for maximum political effect.<sup>49</sup> The two Catalan cabinets organised by Joan Casanovas between July and September 1936 were incapable of making the decision of taking on the disorder, as it meant challenging the apparent domination of the libertarians, who (at President Companys's suggestion) had agreed to establish a 'Committee of Anti-fascist Militias' in parallel to the Generalitat.<sup>50</sup> Companys did not give Casanovas full backing. Rather, his attitude was that if the revolutionaries were given enough rope they would hang themselves, or at least end up involved

with the Catalan government's legislative function, which was implicitly recognised by the anarcho-syndicalists. Finally, in late September, with Companys's complete support, Josep Tarradellas brokered a compromise, by which the rival Militia Committee was dissolved in exchange for the entry of CNT representatives into a new cabinet (cosmetically considered, thanks to Catalan usage, as the 'council' of the Generalitat). The anarcho-syndicalists acceded to legal recognition of their new multiple functions, as well as the design of a 'new economy', for which a kind of covenant was drawn up between the union and the Catalan government (the Collectivisation Decrees of October 1936).<sup>51</sup>

From the viewpoint of Companys and Tarradellas, the adverse circumstances of the summer of 1936 could be turned to advantage, if the Catalan government – now without the backing of the much-weakened governmental party – could still achieve the old ambition of 'domesticating' the CNT. Such an approach was possible as the problem hobbling the libertarian movement was its lack of some kind of political nucleus which could establish sustained and convincing leadership. The best the 'confederal organisation' got was a kind of generic direction by means of daily newspapers – especially the masthead paper, *Solidaridad Obrera*, which served as a common coordinating voice for the National Committee, with other press organs also expressing essentially institutional roles. This was not much of a substitute for focused political initiative, as dissidents could turn to other dailies, such as the ultra-left Madrid paper *La Tierra*, which ended up specialising in this alternative role.<sup>52</sup> By preferring to hold to anarchist principles, the diverse groups who more or less ran the CNT – and to a much greater degree the FAI – were incapable of doing much more than sustaining internal consent, or, when things turned disagreeable, blindsiding challengers or objectors. Ultimately, this meant that dealing with outside forces – private or public – was a complicated business for both sides (a fact of life familiar to ERC 'populists'), as any initiative agreed upon with 'bosses' or 'politicos' could be disavowed by another faction, which had an easy job embarrassing official spokesmen who had given their word.<sup>53</sup> The main practical principle that held up the CNT was the conviction that pressure from the streets (demonstrations, strikes, terrorist violence, even full uprisings) was an efficient substitute for electoral and parliamentary participation. This was the logic behind the succession of revolts in 1931–3, all of which failed in imposing the anarcho-syndicalist legislative programme.

The institutional hollow at the core of anarcho-syndicalist union meant it could never succeed in doing what it claimed it meant to do: parley its large rank-and-file base into an effective corporative voice,

capable of imposing its will on industrialists and on the regional government it admitted as being doctrinally acceptable (since it was not exactly 'the state'). It could never carry out a functioning 'clientele exchange' with the Esquerra and its rival support.<sup>54</sup> Lack of political will, confusion, and the bitter arguments between contending factions allowed the Catalan authorities to come back into action and even draw CNT representation into classic institutional play. Once in the Catalan executive, there was no good reason to stay out of the central government, and so three CNT members joined Largo's ministry in early November 1936.

The evaporation of the Catalan nationalists – made definitive when a clumsy plot against Companys, allegedly sponsored by Casanovas, was uncovered at the end of November – was all the advantage the 'unified socialists' needed to present themselves as the inheritors of Esquerra populism 'before the revolution'.<sup>55</sup> The head of the party, after all, was Joan Comorera, formerly the leader of the USC and a longstanding cabinet member under Companys. Starting with the traditional socialist base, the 'unified socialists' accrued the component syndical sections of the member parties, as well as of the POUM, a serious tactical error on the part of the leftist communists.<sup>56</sup> In fact, the PSUC led a progressive take-over of nationalist and ERC political space. The broad front offered by the united Catalan Stalinists gradually acquired control of the peasant's union, the Unió de Rabassaires, of the white-collar association, the Centre Autonomista de Dependents de Comerç i Industria, and, later still, of the republican-nationalist student union, the Federació Nacionalista d'Estudiants de Catalunya.<sup>57</sup> The PSUC thus effectively centralised a broad socio-political sector in a way that was comfortable for Catalan mesocratic habits, pushing the ideals of coordination and reasonableness against the 'endless chatter' (*xerrameca* in Catalan) of the anarchist-led committees: 'More Food and Less Committees' became the 'unified socialist' line. The main instrument of their assault on the apparent but fragile hegemony of the libertarians was the issue of supplies to the civil population – food, soap and oil, coal – the distribution systems of which had been disorganised in the initial months of confusion and which were not being improved by the anarchists' tinkering as winter came. The PSUC certainly succeeded in embarrassing their rivals, but, although distribution remained poor, increased intervention by the central government after the spring of 1937 assured more effective censorship and policing of opinion.<sup>58</sup>

The attack on the libertarians began with the isolation of the POUM in the Catalan government crisis of mid-December 1936, in which the issue of the July military plot was ably turned around by Comorera into

an attack on the 'Trotskyite danger'.<sup>59</sup> The anarcho-syndicalists settled for the comfortable fig-leaf that the new cabinet was a 'syndical government', without political parties. At this crucial juncture, libertarian spokesmen found it convenient to accept the general picture of the revolution that was the working model of the revolutionary socialist POUM, as it offered a synthesis which favoured the anarcho-syndicalists as the representative organisation of the working class. Such a model served to paper over internal disputes within the CNT, as well as giving the libertarians a unitary gloss and a generic discourse at a higher level of sophistication than had been their wont.

Soon the discourse of the 'working-class unity' became indispensable to the CNT-FAI as its inner battles spilled out into the open with the drawn-out collapse of the Tarradellas cabinet throughout April. Facing cabinet shakeups in both the central and the Catalan governments, CNT 'governmentalists', considered as 'centralisers' of a kind, were challenged by those anarcho-syndicalist sectors that had gained some measure of particularist power – in localities, in the improvised 'Control Patrols', or in militia units – during the revolutionary summer of 1936 and now were fearful of losing its last traces. The famous 'May Days' of 1937 in Barcelona and other Catalan cities, usually portrayed as an emblematic struggle of 'bourgeois' Stalinists, with their Soviet handlers, against the revolutionaries of the POUM and the worker cohorts of the CNT, was virtually an internal fight between anarcho-syndicalist factions, which embroiled the left-wing communists and which the 'unified socialists' were quick to use to their advantage. Ultimately, both sides of the CNT quarrel lost, as did the Esquerra 'populists', since the republican government effectively took over Catalonia. Only the PSUC seemed to have gained from the confrontation, although not even that success was clear.

### **A Spanish imitation of populism?**

Although it is an unpalatable truth, well-planned repression, with a clear political design, can be very efficient. Undirected or 'uncontrolled' repression – such as had been going on in Catalonia in the summer of 1936 – had an extremely high political cost in the short term, even though, in the long run, it permitted everyone involved in one way or another to wash their hands of responsibility.<sup>60</sup> In immediate terms, it projected abroad an image of horror that made any Catalan nationalist hopes of independence impossible, as diplomatic opinion (with the relative exception of the Soviets) was in agreement regarding its non-viability.<sup>61</sup>

Tolerating what could be interpreted as the privatisation of public order, with rival organisations running their own jails and carrying out arrests, sapped the will of the ERC, delegitimising the mix of energies that fed populism and sustained support for the Generalitat. Such toleration isolated the nationalists, who appeared as soft on Catholics, since Estat Català financed itself by running escape routes to them for payment. As the number of executions reduced, the tension and the shoot-outs between the older police corps and their officially recognised revolutionary competitors increased, such killings becoming a dangerous source of political friction as winter moved into spring. Local figures who had come to power in villages, smaller cities, and even Barcelona neighbourhoods, whose position was untenable in the long term, joined with those discomfited by the cost of war and the increasing pressure of coordination.<sup>62</sup> Naturally, such advantage was questioned by those promoted later by events in late summer or in the autumn to positions of higher responsibility with the Catalan or republican governments. The fight, accordingly, was largely a face-off between the national and Catalan regional committees of the CNT, on the one hand, and the local syndical federation of Barcelona and the Libertarian Youth, on the other. The former were implicated in the decision to participate in the republican and Catalan governments and, furthermore, had the backing of libertarian military commanders integrated in the republican army. The flow of events overcame the complaints of the losers (coalesced into the 'Friends of Durruti', a hero who was by then conveniently dead), and the anarchist militias resistant to full militarisation.<sup>63</sup>

The POUM, as it was relatively small, was made the universal scapegoat, as nobody could seriously contemplate purging the CNT. Disgracing the POUM was a handy sop for the Stalinists – Spanish and Catalan – who were being egged on to fight 'Trotskyite fascism' by their Soviet backers.<sup>64</sup> Without offering any practical assistance, the anarcho-syndicalists could commiserate with the crushed leftists while borrowing the *poumista* argument for their own.<sup>65</sup> But with the 'May Days', the CNT-FAI had shot its bolt. After waiting for the anarcho-syndicalists to get their act together and present their representatives to his cabinet, Companys gave up and excluded them. Nothing happened. Never again would the anarcho-syndicalists participate in running the Generalitat.

The apparently unstoppable ascension of the PSUC turned out to be as weak as had been the transitory hegemony of the CNT-FAI. The internal quarrels within the libertarian movement played into the hands of the 'unified socialists', who were able to eliminate their leftist communist rivals, and present themselves as the viable alternative to the withdrawn or wilted ERC. By mobilising its support on the side of the



Esquerra and the Generalitat against a leftist unity much more apparent than real, the Catalan Stalinists were able to identify with the trend towards the recovery of central republican government, just as the Largo Caballero coalition fell apart in mid-May 1937, and a new balance coalesced around Negrín. Largo had based his success, such as it was, on what could be termed a coalition of particularisms (i.e. the recognition of local situations such as they evolved at the end of the summer, which were then granted legal status). The 'unified socialists' were therefore in an optimal position. The situation, after the spring of 1937, gave the PSUC the possibility of presenting itself simultaneously as the party of responsible government, as the practical expression of local nationalism, and, at the same time, however paradoxically, as the most efficient collaborators of the war effort identified with the alliance of pro-Negrín socialists and the Spanish communists. But that was as good as it got. To begin with, there were hidden costs: the confrontation between PSUC and POUM broke the background unity of 'Catalanist' socialism, alive since the heady days of francophile enthusiasm during the First World War, and which had carried on from Macià's separatist movement in the 1920s, through left-wing nationalism in 1931–2, and, from there, to most of the Marxist parties.<sup>66</sup> Accordingly, with the purges after the 'May Days', lifelong friendships were shattered, wrecking the social network that sustained Catalan-style 'national Marxism' and kept fascism at bay. The social capital of the movement, its neighbourhood underpinnings, were split, which ensured that 'unified socialist' expansion had reached the limit of future growth.<sup>67</sup> Finally, worst of all in the short term, the political space that the PSUC could have assumed, through more or less rightful descent, as heir to the old populism of Macià and Companys, was blocked by the increased intervention in Catalonia of the new central government, which, as the military situation worsened, tended to increase the patriotic content of its appeal.

It has been suggested that Negrín's policies (or their ideological justification), most especially after the government transferred from Valencia to Barcelona in October 1937, could be understood as a kind of Spanish 'neo-populism'.<sup>68</sup> Recently, this idea has been challenged, with the proposition that no such movement took form in ways really comparable to the social characteristics of the Catalan phenomenon.<sup>69</sup> Certainly nothing in Spanish republicanism was comparable to the mass appeal of the Esquerra, and to the personality cult of Macià which Companys managed to manipulate. The most outstanding mass leader in Spain, Azaña, never achieved the attraction of the founder of Catalan autonomy, whose adoring followers would have miniature candle-lit



altars to his memory in their humble homes.<sup>70</sup> Nor, it should be admitted, was 'populism', as such, a recognised phenomenon, either in Spain or Catalonia. The term was a proprietary reference – then and now – to the Spanish Catholic right, Acción Popular in the 1930s and the Partido Popular today. Still, the fact of the mass response of the Esquerra and the glaring contrast with Spanish politics requires some analytical format, and 'populism' would seem the best comparable term.

An adequate explanation requires a certain amount of backtracking. The paradox of Spanish left-wing republicanism in the 1930s was that its major force – the PSOE – was not strictly a *republican* party, but a 'workerist' movement, combining party and union, that could and did – after the February 1936 elections – argue that it could not in all conscience participate in a 'bourgeois' government. The most important aspect of their political role was that the socialists were badly split between the revolutionist *caballeristas*, the followers of Largo Caballero, and the more conventional *prietistas*, behind Indalecio Prieto. The *caballeristas* monopolised the new growth of both party and union in rural areas of the Spanish south (Andalusia, La Mancha, Extremadura) which were far from the urban working-class ideal of socialist doctrine; their spearhead was the new peasant syndicate of the UGT, the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra.<sup>71</sup> Unable to give much beyond social assistance and the slow application of an agrarian reform law to the demands of their new social base, the *caballeristas* offered an abundance of radical ideology, proposing the 'bolchevisation' (as it was then called) of the Socialist Party with Largo as the 'Spanish Lenin', and courted the small Spanish Stalinist Party with the hope of thereby winning absolute control of the socialist movement against other sectors. Largo pressed hard against Azaña in 1936, pushed him upstairs into the presidency of the Republic in May, and blocked his attempts to gain control of the situation in the face of the July coup, insisting on a premiership that the socialist leader finally obtained in September. But the shift of his communist allies left Largo isolated against the workings of his enemies in his own ranks. Largo's finance minister, Juan Negrín, a known *prietista*, who had obtained an understanding with Soviet representatives by shipping the Spanish gold reserves to Moscow, could present a common front (Prieto in a unified defence ministry) with the Stalinists and the republicans, and, significantly, without the anarcho-sindicalists.<sup>72</sup>

After the major battles of early 1937, which shifted the tactical direction of the war progressively away from Madrid and towards the periphery, Negrín wisely retired the republican capital to Barcelona, fearing the isolation of Valencia and what became known as the 'central zone', as



Figure 5.1. Catalan poster of 1938 invoking the popular defence of Barcelona against the Castilian siege of 1714 (from Jordi Carulla and Arnau Carulla, *La guerra civil en 2,000 cartells*, Barcelona, Postermil S.L., 1997, vol. 1, p. 121).

indeed took place in the campaigns of the spring of 1938. The presence of the republican government in Barcelona had already made itself felt after the 'May Days', as Negrín took control of public order in Catalonia. Despite the protest from all sides in Catalan politics, Catalonia was a political vacuum waiting to be filled, as nobody was willing to impose a clear, undisputed control on the disordered context. Impelled by the pressure of the war, Negrín took more and more steps, such as the seizure of the local armament industry. In mid-March of 1938, Negrín used a communist-led show of both popular support and military and police force in Barcelona to oblige Prieto to retire (and to stress the loyalty of the armed forces to his own personal option of unflinching resistance). To broaden his support, after the cabinet crisis played out in early April, Negrín readmitted the anarcho-sindicalists, in marked contrast to their continued exclusion from the Companys cabinet. In effect, with the fall of Prieto and the increased seclusion of President Azaña, Companys became the head of the loyal opposition to the central government.<sup>73</sup>

At this point, Negrín needed an ideological offer that could cover his position adequately, and serve as much to convey credibility abroad as within the beleaguered republican areas. He required that such an offer might function as an appeal to resistance at all costs (in the hope of a generalised European conflict caused by naked Hitlerian expansionism in 1938), but also make sense in covert bargaining that might bring a negotiated end to the Spanish war. The new discourse had to disguise the primacy of the military in internal republican politics, and gloss over the increasing visibility of the communists, all in the name of 'the government of national unity'. What fitted all these desiderata was the invocation of the Spanish struggle against Napoleonic invasion, and, accordingly, the current conflict was officially dubbed 'the Second War of Independence' (after the traditional Spanish name for the Peninsular War). With all the propaganda in favour of the Republic, since the fall of 1936, surrounding the theme of a foreign (Nazi and fascist) attack on a legitimately elected Spanish government, this reformulation of popular and collective resistance to external aggression made sense both in relation to past arguments and to future options.<sup>74</sup> The call to the memory of 2 May – the date of Madrid's revolt against the French in 1808, the outstanding patriotic reference of nineteenth-century Spain – made everything coherent, and where allusions to Madrid might discomfort touchy Catalan particularist sensibilities, appropriate historical images of *Catalans* fighting against the invaders were recalled.

This enormous publicity campaign was systematic, and produced a vast repertoire of materials, covering every possible social angle, from

handbill cartoons or posters to learned studies in books (the participation of intellectuals then being highly valued). But, perhaps by being produced in Barcelona, this 'new patriotism' was a mimicry of Catalan populism and interacted with its ideological clichés, which were built on the idea of a *Catalan* national unity and on its necessary defence. This discourse of 'Spanish populism' (the ongoing combat of the Spanish *people* for their freedom) filled a political gap, a space which the Esquerra had abandoned or was not able to fill, which the CNT–FAI had never successfully vied for, and which the PSUC was ultimately incapable of occupying, given its increasingly 'fraternal' relation with the Spanish communists, which Soviet handlers (such as the Italian Togliatti) strongly backed.<sup>75</sup> 'Spanish populism' was designed to appeal to the horde of Spanish officers and officials who had followed the central government to Catalonia, and bridge the 'central zone' with Catalonia, without offending the Catalans more than was imperative. Barcelona, with a population of a little over a million inhabitants before the outbreak of war, was now stretched to some three million, between staff and their families, military personnel and refugees. But this heterogeneous amalgamation of people, tired and poorly fed, was not a *people* in an activist sense, with an aggressive identity. 'Spanish populism', accordingly, never developed an effective mass base, and failed the crucial test of achieving the will to resist that Negrín preached. Barcelona, unlike Madrid, was not another siege for the Franco forces, but fell without much ado at the end of January 1939, marked by an immense flight of hundreds of thousands from the city. Once the Spanish War was over, Stalin characteristically showered his favour on the PSUC, which became the only exception to the Communist International's 'one state, one party' rule. While Catalans logically make much of this, even today, it reflected little more than the Soviet dictator's limitless expediency, willing to gain an especially subservient organisation, while laying his responsible agents open to criticism.<sup>76</sup>

The longevity of the Franco regime kept the different justifications of a Catalan populism that succeeded each other during the civil war smouldering for many years under the smooth surface of police control and censorship. But, as the events themselves moved further back in time, memory has tended to merge into a retrospective synthesis that reinforced common elements and reduced the contradictions. The accidental aspects of 1930s populism were taken for granted and served to facilitate the democratic transition of the 1970s and condition Catalan politics for the following decades.

## 6 The myth of the maddened crowd: class, culture and space in the revolutionary urbanist project in Barcelona, 1936–1937

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*Chris Ealham*

As if vomited out of a hellish cavern, they spring forth everywhere: the most terrifying-looking whores, the former men [*ex-hombres*] who drown their failure with the explosive alcohol of the taverns, the wrong-doers who aggravate and profit from every chaotic situation, subhuman beings full of psychopathic defects and resentments against society. This mad and maddening humanity, which ordinarily lives hidden from and extraneous to the city, only comes into the light of day in moments of profound revolutionary upheaval and only then can its terrifying size be witnessed.<sup>1</sup>

Authorities and thoughtless historians commonly describe popular contention as disorderly. . . . But the more closely we look at that same contention, the more we discover order. We discover order created by the rooting of collective action in the routines and organisation of everyday social life, and by its involvement in a continuous process of signalling, negotiation, and struggle with other parties whose interests the collective action touches.<sup>2</sup>

In this chapter I examine the socio-temporal, symbolic, practical and spatial aspects of revolutionary urbanism in Barcelona and how these were structured and inflected by the experience of past class struggles and by the sediments of culture, communal belief and ideology that had developed in the *barrios* during the preceding 100 years. While revolutionary urbanism was theorised and formally articulated by the main revolutionary organisations (the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, the anarchist FAI and the dissident-communist POUM) in the course of their struggle for the democratisation of social life, on another level it grew spontaneously from the cultural politics of the *barrios* and was shaped by a series of cultural frames of reference that enabled a strong working-class identity to be expressed, a perception of ‘proletarian Barcelona’ as a moral, social, geographical and aesthetic entity.<sup>3</sup> In this respect, the urban transformations and creative destruction in revolutionary Barcelona were the continuation of a much longer anti-capitalist struggle by workers in

defence of their 'right to the city'.<sup>4</sup> Of great importance here were local traditions of street mobilisation and the culture of direct action collective protest that dated back to the 1830s and which were transmitted to successive generations of workers, among other means, by a strong oral tradition and what James Fentress and Chris Wickham call 'social memory'.<sup>5</sup> This culture, which constituted an organising principle in the *barrios*, provided enormous continuity for the revolutionary urbanist project, endowing it with both structure and discipline.

Like all revolutions, the revolution of July 1936 in Barcelona was accompanied by social upheaval, collective mobilisation and the frenetic intervention of the masses in the streets. A range of contemporary commentators of varying political perspectives – fascist, monarchist, republican, *catalaniste*, socialist and Stalinist – employed a common language of denunciation to depict the revolution as the irruption of dark social forces as represented by the 'rampant mob' of the 'lumpen-proletariat' which, unfettered by all authority, embarked upon a period of frenzied disorder and irrational vandalism that transformed Barcelona into an 'anarchic city'. Devoid of any political objectives, these 'savage hordes' sought only 'destruction for the sake of destruction', a 'great red orgy' of 'pillage' and 'genocide', particularly of the clergy.<sup>6</sup> Though, for the most part, uncontrollable, this 'bloodlust' was periodically channelled, or so it was claimed, by a small clique of Svengali-like provocateurs, the 'gangsters of the revolution and war', a self-interested 'minority of agitators' and 'anarchist executioners', who orchestrated a 'satanic red revolution'.<sup>7</sup> Despite the advances in historiography in recent decades, the 'myth of the maddened crowd' still finds an echo in the discourse of historians, a number of whom sustain a moral historical-geography that emphasises the irrational violence of the Barcelona 'mob' during the civil war.<sup>8</sup>

Regardless of the radical differences in their political intonation, both right- and left-wing narratives of the 1936 revolution testify to the profound urban transformation in Barcelona.<sup>9</sup> Thus, 'the entrails of Barcelona have been removed. Barcelona is changed. . . the city of fat millionaires and gluttons'<sup>10</sup> becoming 'the theatre of the revolution',<sup>11</sup> 'a new city', 'an unknown Barcelona', 'a red city',<sup>12</sup> in which the 'recently born children of the revolution',<sup>13</sup> the armed workers of the militia, were 'the new masters of the street'<sup>14</sup> and 'the sole master of the city'.<sup>15</sup>

For the supporters of the revolution and of the old system alike, it was clear that the state apparatus that had previously regulated access to public space had been displaced by the coup and that the armed proletarian power appeared supreme, that 'a river of proletarian humanity has broken the dikes'.<sup>16</sup> Following years of defeat and repression at

the hands of the state and the employers, many workers exuded a deep sense of triumphalism, a feeling that they and their class had finally seized control of their history. Activists, in particular, were intoxicated by their new feelings of power in the street, factory and working-class neighbourhoods (*barrios*): '[G]roups of men and women revealed in an obvious, almost scandalous, form, the joy of victors; as if everything was done and completed, when in reality the most difficult and important work had not yet even begun.'<sup>17</sup> Yet militants trusted in the invincibility of the 'people in arms' which had defeated the insurgent army in the July streetfighting and they ostentatiously flaunted their newfound arms and the cars that had been confiscated from the well-to-do in what was the biggest revolutionary fiesta in twentieth-century Europe.

Beneath the external appearance of chaos and disorder, a revolutionary urbanist project was at play in Barcelona during the period from July 1936 until the strengthening of central state power after May 1937. Imposed by force of arms, the revolutionary urbanist project represented a desire to transform the meaning and function of the city in an anti-capitalist manner; it was, to borrow a phrase coined by the Situationists, the 'critique of urbanism', an attempt to establish a revolutionary city without alienation and hierarchy.<sup>18</sup> There were various dimensions to this project. Firstly, urban space and the built environment were re-organised in ways that championed communal social and economic goals. Secondly, the dominant structures and collective symbols of bourgeois power and rank, such as money, ties and suits, were supplanted by new motifs, social practices and urban rhythms amidst a general proletarianisation of everyday life. Finally, in an attempt to disrupt the traditional circuits of urban power, the political and social enemies of the revolutionary city, particularly representatives of the organised church, the main ideological structure of the old urban order, were physically eliminated. Despite these profound energies and impulses, the revolutionary urbanist project was undeveloped, undermined by the dilemmas of war versus revolution that dominated the republican camp during the civil war.<sup>19</sup>

The most fundamental element of revolutionary urbanism was the construction of barricades during the struggle against the military coup during 19–21 July. On 24 July, *Solidaridad Obrera*, the CNT daily, reported that 'Barcelona consists of barricades populated by the defenders of proletarian liberties. . . Hundreds of barricades defend the proletarian city from its enemies.'<sup>20</sup> Barricade building was firmly inscribed within the protest culture of the Barcelona working class and it coincided with periods of intense social conflict in the city. According to one

revolutionary, many of the barricades were essentially symbolic: 'the logic of their existence rested in the fact that they had been raised by a collective impulse, which had invested the goal of social and political change in each and every one of the stacked paving stones'.<sup>21</sup> As a mobilising symbol, the barricades were an affirmation of the spirit of solidarity and community autonomy in the *barrios*, while in practical terms they were central to the popular victory in the July streetfighting: they impeded the movement of the military rebels and their civilian supporters and protected the *barrios* from possible attack by the insurgents. The barricades also played a decisive role in the revolution: not only did they interrupt the rhythms and circuits of power within the old bourgeois city but, in the days of revolutionary euphoria and general strike that followed the defeat of the military coup, armed workers extended their power across Catalonia through a network of check-points. Moreover, when, on 27 July, the Barcelona CNT issued a manifesto calling for a return to work, only those barricades which impeded the circulation of trams and buses were dismantled, the rest remained as a signifier of the new power of the workers.<sup>22</sup>

The barricades were the spatial tool of a nascent power: the myriad armed local or neighbourhood revolutionary committees who controlled movement to, from and within the city and which constituted the most basic cell of revolutionary power.<sup>23</sup> The committees were a grass-roots response to the power vacuum that followed the fracturing of the republican state in July. During the first days and weeks of the revolution, nearly all power emanated from and flowed through the local committees. In the words of one union manifesto, these new organs wielded 'an authority [that] carrie[d] the stamp of the barricades'.<sup>24</sup> Notwithstanding the anti-statist sentiments of the anarchist leaders and their supporters, the committees were, in *de facto* terms, a locally articulated armed and executive power that imposed a kind of dictatorship of the proletariat on the streets of Barcelona.<sup>25</sup>

This new working-class power was exercised through a variety of locally recruited armed groups, such as the *milicias de retaguardia* (rear-guard militias), *grupos de investigación y vigilancia* (investigation and surveillance groups), *patrullas de control* (control patrols) and the militia groups, which went to the front to fight in the civil war. Formed by the local revolutionary committees for community defence, these armed squads imposed 'class justice' in their own neighbourhoods and launched punitive raids into bourgeois residential areas, frequently in cars requisitioned from the rich.<sup>26</sup> The various armed groups pursued the goal of community purity, of a neighbourhood purged of reactionaries, and the construction of a revolutionary city through the violent



eradication of the social networks that perpetuated the old city. Criticised for the swift and exemplary form of justice that they administered, the local knowledge possessed by the armed defenders of the revolution gave them a real and lethal advantage over a distant bureaucracy in determining the loyalties and past conduct of detainees.<sup>27</sup>

The supporters of the myth of the 'maddened crowd' have suggested that the 'terror' was a chaotic period of bloodletting that was bound to follow the collapse of law-and-order. However, most of the killings in Barcelona during the civil war were carried out in an organised manner under the tutelage of the republican authorities at the Montjuïc military fortress<sup>28</sup> and were therefore not the work of the *incontrolados* (uncontrollables) that were caricatured and demonised in the republican and Francoist press, in the same way as the *petroleuses* of the Paris Commune had been vilified some sixty years earlier. Nor was there a drive to eliminate the bourgeoisie as a class. Employers and senior management remained in many workplaces, earning salaries equivalent to those of their workers, and on several occasions members of the district revolutionary committees protected capitalists, even intervening to save the lives of some.<sup>29</sup> Industrialists, meanwhile, like the middle classes, enjoyed the political protection of republican groups and, increasingly, of the Catalan communists in the PSUC, the new champion of intermediate and petit-bourgeois elements in the city.

Doubtless the fact that workers were armed and that they were no longer contained by the old state apparatus encouraged many to take justice into their own hands, yet the 'terror' was anything but a 'wave of blind violence' by socially uprooted 'vandals'.<sup>30</sup> While, of course, there is no census or register of the members of the armed revolutionary groups, anecdotal and autobiographical evidence suggests that the groups included skilled workers in their number. They were also comprised of activists from the main anti-fascist organisations from before the civil war, who therefore had some level of political education and experience. Indeed, many of the district revolutionary committees were fashioned through the transformation of existing organised working-class social and political spaces (the armed CNT defence groups responsible for picketing and security at meetings and marches, union workplace committees and community groups, such as the workers' educational centres (*ateneos*)), the very autonomous proletarian para-society threatened by the July 1936 uprising. Moreover, the *patrullas de control*, the closest body there was to a revolutionary police force, were normally recruited from the districts they policed;<sup>31</sup> they drew strength from local networks of solidarity, friendship, kinship and neighbouring and assumed many of the functions of a community police force.<sup>32</sup>

Although there were no simple causes of the repression, what is of most interest here are the cultural determinants of popular violence.<sup>33</sup> There was a very strong normative component to the violence, which was inseparable from the cosmology of working-class society and the way people in the *barrios* interpreted the world. The cultural universe of the local working class was formed through the dynamic interaction of experiential and cognitive processes over a long period of oppression, contestation, violent conflicts and repression, resulting in what Pierre Bourdieu described as 'spontaneous sociology'.<sup>34</sup> The proletarian identity of the *barrios* nurtured a profound feeling of 'us', while simultaneously defining a series of social and political enemies as 'outsiders'.<sup>35</sup> This rich working-class culture and earlier residues of social memory were distilled and politicised by the discourse of the CNT, which identified enemies as an immoral and parasitic 'Other' that lived from the sweat of the labour of the workers and which had to be 'cleansed' for the 'good of public health', in other words, for the sake of the community.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, if we remember that the cultural frames of the local working class were shaped by a collective memory of injustice, it is easy to see how most of the victims of the 'revolutionary terror' of 1936–7 were considered in the *barrios* as legitimate targets of repression or, as it was expressed in the *vox populi*, as the 'settling of scores' (*ajusta de cuentas*).<sup>37</sup> It was precisely this structure of feeling that was noted by the Catalan anarchist Joan Peiró at the height of the revolutionary violence:

Revolution is revolution, and it is therefore logical that the revolution brings in its wake bloodshed. The capitalist system, the temporal power of the Church and the rule of the *caciques* (bosses) over the centuries have all been sustained and fed by the pain and blood of the people. Logically, then, following the victory of the people, the blood of those who for many centuries maintained their power and privilege by means of organised violence, unnecessary pain and unhappiness and death will be spilt.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, popular violence can be located in the context of a culture of autonomous working-class action, one of the shibboleths of which was a pronounced distrust of state agencies of law-and-order, which were perceived as the agents of the old elites and which, during the Second Republic, had revealed themselves to be incapable of dealing with the enemies of democracy.

Though rooted in the rough democracy of the *barrios*, the district revolutionary committees were never as democratic as many of the Soviets and workers' councils that emerged during the Russian Revolution of 1917 and in the post-First World War revolutionary crisis in Germany: they did not practise genuine direct democracy and delegates,

who often attained their positions due to the respect they enjoyed among the community, were not subject to immediate recall. Nevertheless, while most of the members of the district committees were CNT members, they were nominally independent of the formal working-class organisations and often did not follow the orders of the confederation;<sup>39</sup> instead, the overwhelming majority of the committees practised a radical form of neighbourhood democracy that drew heavily on Catalan popular federalist traditions and on Barcelona's working-class culture, with its emphasis on community self-reliance. Indeed, the localism of the committees was affirmed spatially by the barricades through which they demarcated their sphere of influence in the *barrios* and by the variety of different names they adopted.<sup>40</sup>

The district committees constituted the basis of the only genuinely revolutionary body formed in July, the ephemeral Federación de Barricadas (Federation of Barricades), that was founded by base activists in the heat of the struggle against the military.<sup>41</sup> Mirroring the 'district federations' of the Paris Commune or the councils established during other major urban working-class insurrections in Paris (1848 and 1871), Petrograd (1917), Berlin (1918–19) and Turin (1920), the Federation of Barricades represented, in embryonic form, a revolutionary alternative to state power. Like the old state, the Federation of Barricades had an armed power, which was based in the 'Bakunin Barracks', formerly the Pedralbes Barracks, an important recruiting station for the anarchist militias.<sup>42</sup> Yet the Federation of Barricades simultaneously highlighted one of the central shortcomings of the revolution: the absence of a new institutional form that could give expression to the popular desire for revolution and the objective need to prosecute a civil war. For while the Federation of Barricades employed revolutionary tactics in the battle for the streets in July, it had the essentially short-term aims of crushing the military uprising and of securing control of urban space. Moreover, neither the CNT–FAI nor the POUM advocated transforming the Federation of Barricades or the local committees into a revolutionary government or assembly.<sup>43</sup> While this unwillingness to forge a coordinating revolutionary authority can, in part at least, be attributed to the ideology of the anarcho-syndicalist leadership, it also reflected a working-class culture that was anti-power, heavily conditioned by the popular experience of repressive state power.

Clearly then, with regard to the classic debate of war versus revolution, the revolution side of the equation was extremely weak. From the very start of the revolution, the anarchist leaders committed themselves to a Popular Front policy of cooperation with the republican authorities for the sake of the war effort, a stance that signalled the political limits of

the revolutionary urbanist project. Having accepted the principle of 'democratic collaboration', the CNT-FAI leaders embarked on a series of compromises that resulted in the emergence of rival poles of power and which culminated in the reconstitution of the old state and, simultaneously, the erosion of the power of the local committees. The first such compromise came on 21 July, when CNT-FAI leaders agreed to share power in the *Comité Central de Milicias Antifascistas* (Central Committee of Anti-fascist Militias – CCMA), a body which had the appearance of a revolutionary government but was in fact an inter-class entity in which all the Popular Front parties, including the bourgeois-republicans, were represented.<sup>44</sup> In the few weeks of its existence, when the revolutionary fervour was at its height, the CCMA assumed overall responsibility for food distribution, the administration of justice, law-and-order and military defence, areas that had previously fallen under the jurisdiction of the local revolutionary committees.<sup>45</sup> On 26 September, the CNT-FAI hierarchy accepted a plan to replace the CCMA with a reconstituted *Generalitat*, the Catalan home-rule government, in which anarchists were to be represented. Finally, on 16 October, barely three months since the July revolution, the *Generalitat* issued a decree dissolving all the local revolutionary committees in Catalonia.<sup>46</sup>

Yet in keeping with the cantonalist traditions of the Catalan working class, the centralising decrees of the *Generalitat* were effectively ignored in areas of revolutionary strength and/or where republican groups and the Popular Front parties were weak. Power, thus, remained atomised and fragmented, allowing for an array of local initiatives. Consequently, until the 'May Days' of 1937, when the last remaining local committees were confronted and subsequently abolished by the central republican state, the revolutionary socio-spatial power of the *barrios* survived.

Between July 1936 and May 1937, therefore, the district revolutionary committees allowed working-class communities to take charge of the built environment and exercise new power over everyday life. As the committees set about addressing the immediate problems facing working-class communities, the topography of the city was changed and a new set of social relations and solidaristic practices instituted. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the coup, with the shops closed and with industry and commerce paralysed, the district revolutionary committees founded *comités de aprovisionamiento* (distribution committees) to organise food distribution in the *barrios*. In practice, armed groups expropriated essential foodstuffs and clothes from shops and warehouses whereupon they were distributed in the neighbourhoods by the local revolutionary committees. In a further attempt to simplify food provision, a network of *comedores populares* (communal eating

houses) was formed by the local committees and the city's unions, who distributed vouchers that entitled recipients to meals.

The revolutionary urbanist fiesta began in earnest in the streets on 21 July (ironically the very day the anarchist leaders opted to share power with the other Popular Front parties): groups of workers, frequently organised through the local revolutionary committees, occupied elite neighbourhoods, church property, business offices, hotels and the palaces of the rich.<sup>47</sup> As spaces that had previously been bastions of elite privilege, power and ideology were opened up to the community, workers' organisations seized some of the most prestigious buildings in the city centre.<sup>48</sup> This pattern was repeated across the city, with anti-fascist groups, and even small groups of anarchists, occupying the houses of the well-to-do.<sup>49</sup>

The new geography of power was epitomised by the transformation of Via Laietana, a north American style avenue that symbolised elite power and which can be regarded as Barcelona's Wall Street owing to its concentration of business offices. After the July revolution, Via Laietana (later renamed Via Durruti, in honour of the most famous of all Catalan anarchist leaders who died in November 1936 defending Madrid from the nationalist army) became a signifier of the new power of the revolutionary organisations – the Banc d'Espanya building was occupied by the CNT<sup>50</sup> and Casa Cambó, formerly the head office of the Federació Patronal Catalana, the main Catalan employers' association, became known as Casa CNT-FAI, the nerve centre of the Barcelona anarchist and union movements. Via Laietana also reflected the changing nature of repressive power in Barcelona – before the revolution it was the location for the city's main police station in the city, where working-class activists were routinely detained, beaten and tortured. After July, armed working-class bodies, such as Barcelona CNT's Comité de Defensa Confederal (Defence Committee) occupied an office block on Via Laietana, while the Servicios de Investigación (Investigation Services), a kind of workers' police, was based down the street in the Casa CNT-FAI. Besides epitomising the triumph of the *barrios* over the bourgeois city, the occupation of Via Laietana was also significant since the road had been built through the ruins of one of Barcelona's earliest working-class settlements. The July revolution therefore allowed for the reclamation and reoccupation by the working class of a space from which it had been expelled in the 1900s in a brutal slum-clearance programme that formed part of the conscious strategy of the city's elders to push the workers to the margins.<sup>51</sup>

Yet such exclusionary socio-spatial practices were untenable after July, as workers exalted in their new-found power and in the decline of the

old. According to one worker, 'life developed in the streets', while another remarked that 'the streets belonged to us'.<sup>52</sup> It was the spectacle of revolution in the streets that most impressed foreign visitors to Barcelona:<sup>53</sup> 'at every instant the revolution offers a new image. Life here is a thousand times more intense.'<sup>54</sup> Arms, one of the most important symbols of working-class power, were paraded openly, particularly on the Rambles, Barcelona's central promenade, amidst a carnival-like atmosphere that was fuelled by a popular feeling of liberation.

Amidst a general proletarianisation of dress, the signifiers of power and bourgeois respectability, such as suits, ties and hats, were displaced.<sup>55</sup> During and immediately after the July days, the relaxation of dress codes extended to the republican state security forces, many of whose members adapted to the new revolutionary fervour by dispensing with elements of their uniform and combining what remained with civilian clothing.<sup>56</sup> The new revolutionary dress code, which, according to one middle-class republican represented 'the realisation of the Spanish revolutionary ideal: general and obligatory poverty',<sup>57</sup> was typified by the sartorial egalitarianism of the *mono*, the normally blue dungarees that were a metaphor for the revolutionary project of obliterating social divisions and which briefly became the unofficial uniform of the



Figure 6.1. 'The people armed': rifle-toting workers walking along the Rambles in central Barcelona (from Alfonsa Carrasco, *Barcelona con el puño en alto! Estampas de la revolución*, Barcelona, 1936).

workers' militias. Indeed, one of the classic images of the Spanish revolution was that of the militiawomen wearing a *mono* and thick leather belt.<sup>58</sup> The extent of this proletarianisation of dress underlined the power of the initial revolutionary thrust, when bourgeois apparel incited hostile reactions from workers in the streets; there were several instances of hats being violently removed and of individuals wearing ties being confronted by crowds.<sup>59</sup> Consequently, prudent members of the elite and the clergy adopted proletarian chic, borrowing clothes from servants and sympathetic workers, in an attempt to evade 'revolutionary justice'. In extreme cases, bourgeois types emulated the dress of radical anarchists and *milicianos*.<sup>60</sup>

Another important symbol of working-class power was the red-and-black of the CNT-FAI which appeared on huge flags draped over occupied buildings or which hung from balconies, was painted on collectivised trams, or which figured on caps, scarves and badges sold on street stalls on the Rambles.<sup>61</sup> In an attempt to give a new and human appearance to the urban landscape, palaces and hotels were adorned with banner slogans and the portraits of revolutionary leaders. Similarly, the walls of the revolutionary city were decorated with propaganda, graffiti, fly-posters and manifestos. Recognising the importance of walls as a vehicle of communication, the Catalan anarchist youth movement brought out *Esfuerzo*, a poster-sized, one-page, weekly 'mural newspaper' designed to be fixed to the city's walls.<sup>62</sup>

As far as the material and economic achievements of the revolutionary city are concerned, these really began after 27 July, when the CNT called for a return to work, prompting a second wave of occupations of factories and workplaces, as workers seized control of the means of production.<sup>63</sup> Around 3,000 enterprises were collectivised.<sup>64</sup> No revolutionary group called for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie; rather, workers' control was a grassroots response in the many workplaces where managers and owners had either fled the city or been assassinated.<sup>65</sup> Consequently, at the very moment that the CNT-FAI leadership committed itself to collaborating with democratic forces, it was confronted by a revolution of its grassroots supporters.

The transformation of workplaces followed the anarchists' organic view of social relations, according to which the end of alienated labour presupposed harmonising the social and economic aspects of everyday life and transcending the artificial frontiers between work and leisure previously erected within the capitalist city. While this project was rendered problematic owing to the war and to the reluctance of the anarchist leadership to advance the revolution, several attempts were made to eradicate the physical separation of work and community.



Highlighting the new social priorities of the revolutionary city, crèches were introduced in big factories, allowing women to emerge from the domestic sphere and participate in the workplace. In some factories ambitious educational programmes were introduced, including day classes in general education and foreign languages, which coincided with breaks in production. Libraries were also established in factories. However, as has been demonstrated by Michael Seidman, the CNT–FAI leadership’s acceptance of a productivist ideology in pursuit of a war economy seriously undermined these initiatives and resulted in continuing workplace alienation.<sup>66</sup>

One of the central objectives of the revolutionary urbanist project was the expansion of the city’s urban services, which had failed to keep pace with Barcelona’s vertiginous urban growth from the 1880s. After July, longstanding demands for new forms of collective consumption were addressed in the revolutionary city by organising welfare, housing and urban social services. Even hostile sources acknowledged that the revolution brought an increase in social services.<sup>67</sup> Spaces that had been constructed for the exclusive use of the bourgeoisie were collectivised and placed under the control of armed local revolutionary committees and



Figure 6.2. Hotel Ritz, Barcelona (from Josep Lluís Martín Ramos, *Historia Gráfica del Movimiento Obrero a Catalunya*, Barcelona, 1989, p. 314).



the unions and were used for solidaristic, non-hierarchical ends. The Barcelona Ritz, which became Hotel Gastronómico no.1, a communal eating house under union control, provided meals for members of the militia, the urban dispossessed from the inner-city *barrios*, cabaret artists and factory workers.<sup>68</sup> A canteen serving meals to members of the local community was created in a former office of the employers' association.<sup>69</sup> Private homes of members of the elite were also converted into public restaurants or into housing for the homeless, refugees, the aged and those who lived in overcrowded accommodation. Meanwhile, special committees were founded at neighbourhood level to provide work opportunities for the unemployed, particularly in building programmes, while the remaining jobless were entitled, under the new system of distribution, to foodstuffs from neighbourhood stores and to eat in public canteens. This assistance to the unemployed ensured that begging was largely eradicated after July.<sup>70</sup>

The new priorities of the revolutionary city also transformed 'idle' bourgeois space into socially useful space: in terms of health care, by July 1937, in addition to the many local medical centres located in mansion houses, six new hospitals had been founded, including a maternity hospital located in a former hotel.<sup>71</sup> There was also a huge expansion of educational provision.<sup>72</sup> While the CNT Construction Union built some new schools, most were located in confiscated buildings. In a radical resumption of the process of disentanglement and civil utilisation of church property that started in the first part of the nineteenth century, church schools and convents became places of secular learning: one seminary became the Workers' University, while some churches were adapted as schools by the CNT Construction Union.<sup>73</sup> Public libraries and schools were founded in the houses of the rich and private book collections were routinely socialised and amalgamated to form new public or school libraries. Reflecting the moral stance of the CNT, a former dance hall was converted into a school.<sup>74</sup> In a continuation of the pre-civil-war cultural initiatives of the CNT-FAI, the anarchists extended their adult education classes in the neighbourhood *ateneos*, many of which were able to increase their activities and reach growing numbers of people either by moving to buildings once owned by the rich or the church or by expanding their former premises.

On a symbolic level, urban reference points, such as the street names that previously honoured aristocrats, bankers, monarchs and saints, were changed to acknowledge revolutionary heroes, such as Engels, Kropotkin, the Chicago and the Montjuïc Martyrs and Spartacus, popular literary figures like Dostoyevsky, or, in the case of Carrer de Revolució Social, simply as a tribute to the revolution. Other spaces were named

after those who fell in the fight against fascism, such as the Square of the Unknown Militiaman. While street renaming generally took place at a formal level, with ceremonies staged by local authorities and popular organisations and the unveiling of new signage, it was occasionally more informal, such as the case of Magdalen Street in the Gràcia district, which was renamed Rebels Street by anarchist activists who destroyed the old signs and painted the new street name in tar.<sup>75</sup> Other symbolic reference points of the old urban order, such as bourgeois monumentalism, were similarly destroyed in a radical reform of the built environment. Following the July streetfighting, the monument to Count Güell, one of the most illustrious members of the Barcelona bourgeoisie, was 'redecorated' with paint and given a new graffiti dedication *Victimes 19 Juliol* ('To the victims of the military rising').<sup>76</sup> Other statues with elite significance were removed, such as the monument to the monarchist General Prim, which was taken by members of the anarchist youth movement and melted down for use in the war industries.<sup>77</sup>

The motor car was another bourgeois icon that was joyfully appropriated by revolutionaries. In what was the first revolution in the motor age, nearly all hostile accounts of the revolutionary period emphasise the irrationality of the workers who seized the cars of the rich, crudely daubing the vehicles with the initials CNT-FAI before destroying them – and occasionally the lives of the occupants – in traffic accidents caused either by dangerous driving of 'mad' or 'crazy' men or by lack of driving experience.<sup>78</sup> This car abuse narrative has been accepted uncritically by some historians.<sup>79</sup>

A more analytical approach enables us to tease out the logic of revolutionary motoring. First, though there may have been much reckless driving during the revolution, traffic accidents were hardly new and before and after the revolution poor motoring skills and road safety in the city were the cause of much concern. On another level, the destruction of cars reflected a desire to usher in a new set of spatial relations. Earlier in the Second Republic local workers had rebelled against attempts by the local and central authorities to impose a new urban order of controlled consumption, consisting of new rules of circulation and traffic lights designed to improve the flow of capital and goods.<sup>80</sup> That many sets of traffic lights were destroyed during the July streetfighting, along with the readiness of revolutionaries to ignore the remaining ones, can be interpreted as a reaction to the rhythms of the capitalist city. This protest was anchored in a working-class culture that had long defined itself in terms of its hostility towards mechanised and capitalised forms of transport, such as trams and cars, which threatened the intimate social geography of the *barrios*.<sup>81</sup> Indeed, in contrast to members of the

elite, workers had a more direct relationship with the streets and they experienced urban life very differently: not only did most workers walk to work, but the streets were also an important space for sociability, solidarity and memory.<sup>82</sup> Meanwhile, once the rising began, it was sensible for armed workers to seize cars, which afforded mobility in the urban struggle against the insurgents and simultaneously prevented them from being used by counter-revolutionaries.<sup>83</sup> It seems most likely that cars were marked with the initials CNT–FAI not for purposes of identification at barricades, since it was easy for counter-revolutionaries to do the same, but as a symbol of the workers' victory over the old order. For revolutionary motorists, cars were a demonstration of their new power over their everyday lives and it was inevitable that some would derive pleasure from that power through play. Such games, in the words of one observer of revolutionary urban behaviour, made revolutionary Barcelona an 'improvised driving school', 'a cemetery for cars'.<sup>84</sup> The destruction of cars also reflected the ascetic thrust of the Spanish revolution, a proletarian anti-consumerist iconoclasm directed at an important element in the nascent system of consumer capitalism.




Figure 6.3. 'A cemetery for cars': Sants bullring, Barcelona, at the start of the revolution (from Alfonso Carrasco, *Barcelona con el puño en alto! Estampas de la revolucion*, Barcelona, 1936).

More than anything, though, the condemnations of revolutionary motoring underscored the anguish of the elite at the demise of bourgeois control of the city.<sup>85</sup> Hence the trepidation caused by 'the cars of fear and death'<sup>86</sup> used to transport many former car owners on *paseos*, one-way trips to deserted roads on the outskirts of Barcelona organised for suspected and proven counter-revolutionaries, was utterly comprehensible.<sup>87</sup>

The logic of revolutionary urbanism presupposed the destruction of elements of the architecture of state repression and spaces that contained memories of the repression. Such creative destruction flowed from the myriad pre-civil-war conflicts and was informed by a culture of working-class resistance to the spatial logic of bourgeois control in the city and a repertoire of militant anti-capitalist, anti-militarist and anti-statist practices (strikes, riots, insurrections, prison uprising and bomb attacks on police stations and army barracks).<sup>88</sup> One poignant example was the women's prison on Amàlia Street, in the Raval, Barcelona's oldest working-class area. Built on the site of a convent that had been burnt by an anticlerical crowd in 1835, this was the city's main gaol and the venue for public executions until the opening of the Model gaol in 1904, whereupon it became a prison for women, many of whom were poor workers who, through economic misfortune, had turned to prostitution. Staffed by nuns with a reputation for brutality and inquisitorial practices, for many workers the women's prison was a particularly despised symbol of the tyranny and obscurantism of the old order. Inevitably, then, on 19 July, when the streetfighting had barely ended, the prison was stormed by a crowd that led the detainees to freedom. Once empty, members of the local community demolished part of the gaol. In an attempt to humanise the building, the red-and-black CNT flag was flown over the gaol and a sign outside announced: 'This torture house was closed by the people, July 1936'.<sup>89</sup> Yet the logic of revolutionary urbanism had not run its course. An assembly of the anarcho-feminist group, *Mujeres Libres* (Free Women), resolved to demolish the gaol and, on 21 August, this initiative was effected by members of the CNT Construction Union.<sup>90</sup>

Some acts of creative destruction betrayed signs of earlier protest repertoires, such as when crowds punished those deemed responsible for the military coup by wrecking their property.<sup>91</sup> As one supporter of such violent spatial practices observed, 'the districts where the monied people live have been left ruined, dead'.<sup>92</sup> While the outward appearance of this behaviour inspired right-wing commentators to talk of the 'plunder' and 'street crimes' by an alliance of 'murderers, anarchists and thieves',<sup>93</sup> more reliable sources, including several hostile eye-witness accounts, attest to the orderly nature of these protests.<sup>94</sup> There was also

a normative element to these actions. For instance, following an attack on the offices of an Italian shipping company on the Rambles, property and furniture were emptied onto the street along with a sign that read: 'This furniture is the property of foreigners who disgraced themselves. Don't you disgrace yourselves by taking it.'<sup>95</sup>

Perhaps the most controversial example of creative destruction was directed at church property. The repression of the church was a uniquely widespread aspect of the Spanish revolution and requires a more detailed consideration. In most parts of Barcelona the local revolutionary committees organised the initial offensive against the church. Previously closed religious communities and restricted spaces were stormed by crowds that imposed 'days of smoky justice'.<sup>96</sup> To hostile eyes, this appeared as violent looting and mob rule by 'the sacrilegious horde'.<sup>97</sup> For members of the elite and right-wingers, this amounted to the destruction of memory spaces: 'We saw the burning of the churches where we married, where we baptised our children and buried our dead; we saw the burning of the convents and the schools run by the sweet nuns where our children went. . .'<sup>98</sup> Yet a succession of observers, both foreign and native, have, from diverse political perspectives, highlighted the deliberate and selective nature of the crowds which transformed religious spaces. Thus, the Austrian sociologist Franz Borkenau described a church burning in central Barcelona as 'an administrative business', with the fire brigade on hand to prevent fire spreading to adjoining buildings.<sup>99</sup>

There was a strong politico-moral element to the assault on the organised church: a member of an anticlerical crowd invited Stansbury Pearce, a Barcelona-based English businessman, to join an attack on a church in the name of the 'humanity of the people'.<sup>100</sup> As one anarchist later explained, many people wanted to burn churches because they were 'the expression of exploitation'.<sup>101</sup> That crowds were not motivated by personal gain was borne out by their indifference towards money and valuable items, which were frequently burnt or discarded. We can also assume that the crowds were fully conscious of their actions, since on 21 July the CNT forbade the sale of alcohol.<sup>102</sup> There is, furthermore, evidence that the fate of some churches was decided at community assemblies.<sup>103</sup> Moreover, once it was agreed that churches were to be protected, efforts were taken on the ground to ensure they were not attacked and on the walls of some it was written: 'Respect this building! It belongs to the people!'<sup>104</sup> While many religious buildings were stormed, few were therefore destroyed (a 1937 republican government report concluded that only thirteen of 236 ecclesiastical structures had been demolished in Barcelona).<sup>105</sup> There is also evidence that

revolutionary groups made a concerted effort to save items of artistic value and 'technical commissions' were formed to assess the contents of churches.<sup>106</sup> Religious art previously confined to the catacombs was placed in public museums, while the libraries of religious settlements were dispatched to schools and other educational establishments. Although confiscated church gold was used to fund the republican war effort and church bells were melted down by the war industries, efforts were taken to preserve items of cultural or historic value.<sup>107</sup>

The invasion of the churches was frequently accompanied by a popular sacrophobic fiesta. In what might be described as a set of anticlerical counter-rituals, workers donned vestments and robes and carried liturgical objects to burlesque religious practices in mock masses, ceremonies and processions, all of which caused much hilarity among the large crowds that gathered to view such spectacles.<sup>108</sup> Statues were a particular target for derision; some were decked out in militia uniforms, while others were publicly destroyed, decapitated and even executed by firing squads. On a more macabre level, tombs were frequently profaned. Mummified bodies were displayed outside churches for public scrutiny and ridicule and skulls were used to adorn altars and for games of street football.<sup>109</sup> There was also an effort to eliminate references to religion in everyday life, the farewell 'Adios' being replaced by 'Salut'.<sup>110</sup>

The reallocation of church property was eminently rational: it responded to a plan to overcome deficits in the built environment by converting what anticlericals looked upon as spaces of darkness and obscurantism into spaces of light and reason. Most church property was expropriated by local revolutionary committees, trade unions and political parties and then designated for new secular purposes, such as community and refugee centres, warehouses, workshops, militia recruiting stations and detention and interrogation centres.<sup>111</sup> In one *barrio* the local church became a cinema. Elsewhere, confession boxes were used as newspaper kiosks, market stalls and bus shelters. Later in the civil war, when air attack became a real threat to the urban population, church crypts were used as air-raid shelters.<sup>112</sup>

For revolutionaries, the 'religious problem' required emphatic and definitive action to 'purify' society of the 'plague of religion' by destroying the church as a social institution.<sup>113</sup> In this way, apparently petty or vindictive acts of profanity, such as the mockery of icons and the radical subversion of the ecclesiastical ritual on which Catholic practice was based, stemmed from the desire to demonstrate that the church had been conquered by a new power and that human beings could take control of their lives and destroy the alienating force of religion. Revolutionary iconoclasm was part of a long history of popular blasphemy in

Spain, which had long found an echo in the *vox populi*.<sup>114</sup> Equally, church burning and other subversive practices had figured in the protest repertoire of the Barcelona working class since the 1830s and, right up until the civil war, were nourished by the liberal-proletarian secular culture propagated by republicans, socialists and anarchists.<sup>115</sup>

One explanatory factor that has generally been overlooked in analysis of anticlericalism is the cultural frames of local workers.<sup>116</sup> In the popular mind, the church, which was the principal transmitter of elite ideology, had long justified the *status quo* and called on the lowly to accept as divine will the suffering that accompanied their social position, was a hated structure of oppression, synonymous with reactionary causes. Furthermore, as a major landowner and financial power, the church was closely identified with the state and the urban and agrarian elites.<sup>117</sup> Many workers, meanwhile, had direct experience of the 'persecutory religiosity'<sup>118</sup> of the clergy in a range of institutions, such as schools, hospitals, workhouses, orphanages and borstals, in which the inefficient central state allowed the church to play a prominent role. For instance, as we have seen, the church was involved in the detention of prostitutes in Barcelona, staffing the hated women's prison on Amàlia Street.<sup>119</sup> There, as in these other institutions, the clergy validated a set of authoritarian practices, such as the dragooning of hospital patients into mass, all of which fostered a visceral anticlericalism. Further resentment stemmed from the fact that the church organised a system of forced labour in workhouses and borstals which was anything but charitable and which operated as a downward push on wages.<sup>120</sup>

In other areas of everyday life the impact of revolutionary urbanism was more muted. The cultural work of the revolution provides one such example. Far from creating a new autonomous revolutionary culture, the tendency was towards the democratisation of bourgeois culture and its adaptation to the new revolutionary period. Thus, the Liceu, Barcelona's opera house on the Rambles, became the Catalan People's Theatre. Access to 'high culture' was also increased by a range of musical and theatrical productions and classes organised across the city.<sup>121</sup> Similarly, works of art previously held in private or church collections were exhibited for the benefit of the whole community.

There are other examples of older urban rhythms and cultural traditions being accommodated within the nascent revolutionary city. After 9 August, when Barcelona's newly collectivised cinemas reopened, the recently instituted People's Cinema Industry and the Oficina de Información y Propaganda, the media department of the CNT-FAI, ensured that a steady quota of revolutionary films was shown, although these proved less popular than commercial movies, which differed little



from those shown prior to the revolution. By mid-August the theatres had reopened and the city's nightlife was soon vibrant, with restaurants and cafés open until very late.<sup>122</sup> In early September the new football season started in Catalonia and by the end of October the music halls reopened, having been socialised, under union control.<sup>123</sup>

The survival of some urban rituals caused consternation among the more puritanical revolutionaries. This was the case with bullfighting, which the more idealist anarchists deemed a sign of Spanish backwardness, even when linked to revolutionary ends, such as the charity bullfights organised on behalf of the anti-fascist militias. The endurance of other local traditions, such as the siesta and the obsession with lottery, stupefied foreign revolutionaries.<sup>124</sup>

Although Spain's first female cabinet minister, the anarchist Frederica Montseny, ensured that women attained formal legal equality with men, as well as the right to divorce and abortion on demand, male attitudes were slow to change. Many of the daily impediments to the full participation of women in social and political life continued during the revolution: cafés and bars remained male spaces; even by day women faced sexual harassment on the streets and when using public transport and many young women still went chaperoned in public.<sup>125</sup> In part, this reflected the logic of Popular Frontism, which relegated profound social transformation to an indeterminate date in the future. Yet equally relevant was the adherence to traditional gender values by many within the democratic camp, such as the Generalitat, which drew on sexualised images of women to mobilise men for the militias.<sup>126</sup> Similar criticisms can be levelled against the main – male-led – revolutionary groups. A foreign female revolutionary noted the sexual segregation at POUM meetings as well as a residual level of *machismo* among *poumistas*, who openly mocked *milicianas*.<sup>127</sup> For all their efforts to break with the culture of the 'old Spain', anarchists were not averse to rallying women to the anti-fascist cause in ways that reaffirmed traditional female roles, such as 'making socks, scarves and winter clothes for our militiamen'.<sup>128</sup> Ambivalence was also witnessed in the failure of the anarchist movement to close Barcelona's brothels after the July revolution, something that was easily within its power. While the more radical sections of the anarchist movement insisted that the revolution lacked all meaning if prostitution were allowed to continue, other anarchists, including some of the CNT–FAI leadership, who were known to visit prostitutes, acknowledged the importance of an outlet for the sexual energies of male factory workers and militia-men on leave. A similar pragmatism prevailed among the CNT–FAI



rank-and-file and anarchist militiamen were regularly spotted in the queues that formed outside the city's remaining brothels.<sup>129</sup>

### Conclusion

The period from July 1936 to May 1937 was an incomplete revolution that became problematised from the outset by the absence of a political structure that could coordinate the war effort and simultaneously oversee the revolutionary urbanist project. Nevertheless, so great was the change in urban rhythms and so triumphal was the display of workers' power in public spaces that the containment and erosion of the revolution was imperceptible to many at street level until the spring of 1937.

It was those who travelled to and from Barcelona, however, who were most sensitive to the gradual disarticulation of the revolutionary city. Cedric Salter, for example, the strident anti-appeaser and journalist on the pro-Francoist *Daily Mail*, noted how: 'It was a different Barcelona to which I now returned. I had been away only six weeks, but the passion and fire seemed to have died out of Catalonia.'<sup>130</sup> Inevitably, those who sympathised with the revolution charted this trend most accurately. As early as September 1936, Benjamin Péret, who had arrived in the revolutionary city at the start of August, noted after a trip away from Barcelona: 'Here things are quietly returning to a more bourgeois order. . . the revolution is being shelved.'<sup>131</sup> That same month, Borkenau observed how 'the revolutionary fever is withering away'.<sup>132</sup> Consequently, by December 1936, when George Orwell arrived in Barcelona and so famously (and mistakenly as it turned out) described a city in the throes of revolution, with the 'working class in the saddle', the Trotskyite Mary Low was already lamenting 'the changing aspect' in the city: the growing reassertion of bourgeois dress codes, the absence of armed women in dungarees and the waning power of the revolution.<sup>133</sup> A month later, in January 1937, Borkenau commented again on the decline of revolutionary urbanism: 'No more barricades in the streets; no more cars covered with revolutionary initials and filled with men in red neckties. . . ; no more workers in civilian clothes with rifles on their shoulders; as a matter of fact, very few armed men at all. . . '. Coinciding with the PSUC's campaign against the revolutionary committees and in favour of the revival of the middle-class public sphere, exclusive restaurants had reopened and 'the petty-bourgeois element, merchants, shopkeepers, professional men, and the like, have not only made their appearance, but make a strong impression upon the general atmosphere. . . '<sup>134</sup> From May 1937 onwards, a reconstituted republican state extended its power over the cityscape and old privileges and urban rhythms were

reasserted.<sup>135</sup> The Ritz reestablished itself as ‘the best hotel in town’<sup>136</sup> and proletarian chic was definitely passé.<sup>137</sup> Cars and other trappings of wealth, such as designer suits, were increasingly visible.<sup>138</sup> This trend was grasped by Orwell, his judgement by now more in tune with local developments, who observed, after a spell at the front: ‘A deep change had come over the town (sic!). . . [T]he normal division of society into rich and poor, upper class and lower class, was reasserting itself’ and beggars were on the streets once more.<sup>139</sup> Yet this was merely the beginning of a counter-revolutionary urbanist project that would reach its apogee during the Franco dictatorship and, while this authoritarian project was far from totalising, it nevertheless commingled with other factors, such as economic changes and developments in consumer and working-class culture, to break down the cultural certainties on which the revolutionary urbanist project was based.

## 7 The culture of empowerment in Gijón, 1936–1937

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*Pamela Radcliff*

The civil war began in Gijón as it did in many other ‘red’ cities and towns across Spain. When the military leaders declared their support for the rebellion, supporters of the Republic poured into the streets, brought out by factory and port sirens and the urgent calls by trade union leaders to meet at the Casa del Pueblo to plan the defence of their city. Those who gathered, mainly working-class men of the union movements, elected a defence committee which proceeded to procure arms for ‘the people’ and, with the support of loyal police, to engage the rebel soldiers in battle. By the end of the day, the rebels had to retreat to their barracks, from where they continued their struggle, aided by warships shelling from the harbour. The rebel hold-outs were finally defeated on 21 August 1936, leaving Gijón and much of eastern and central Asturias (with the exception of the capital city, Oviedo) in republican hands until the nationalists took the city in October 1937.<sup>1</sup>

However, the Republic that was saved from the rebels had itself been transformed, as political power shifted from the republican parties to the trade unions. As formal institutions collapsed, at both the national and local levels, the vacuum of power was filled by whichever local groups had the best capacity to mobilise and organise masses of people – especially militiamen – in a crisis situation. As Antonio Elorza has put it, ‘given the heterogeneity of the political and labour union map of the country, as well as the disparity of strategies that overlay the calls for unity, a plurality of spaces emerged, whose evolution responded to the logic of the dominant political or union force’.<sup>2</sup>

In Gijón, as elsewhere, many of the republican parties were recent in origin and ephemeral in structure, with few informal resources to fall back on once the tools of the state lost their authority. The older republican parties had deeper roots but more profound problems of legitimation. The most powerful republican organisation of the 1910s and 1920s, the Reformist Party (renamed the Partido Reformista Liberal Demócrata, PLRD), was no longer a player, having completed its long evolution to the right by allying with the rightist CEDA in 1933. The

other 'historical' party, the federalist republicans, had lost its crucial role as intermediary between the apolitical anarcho-sindicalist movement (CNT) and the municipal government once the state collapsed.

What remained in the vacuum left by the collapse of formal authority was the dense fabric of informal networks built by the trade union movement over the previous three and a half decades. Both of the major trade union movements, the UGT and the CNT, were represented in Gijón, but the city had been a CNT stronghold since the origins of the union movement around the turn of the century. Anarcho-sindicalist culture, therefore, ran deep into the social geography of the city, especially in the peripheral neighbourhoods where most workers lived.<sup>3</sup>

As a result, the ringing of the factory bells on 18 July not only summoned bodies to defend the Republic. It also mobilised the political culture of working-class Gijón which descended on the city centre to fill the vacuum opened up by the coup. Within twenty-four hours, the republican parties which had controlled formal politics in the city since 1931 (and since the 1910s under the Restoration monarchy) were displaced by the CNT-dominated Defence Committee. Even when formal city government was reestablished in October 1936, the CNT retained a majority in the new municipal council, led by the anarchist mayor, Avelino González Mallada.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the civil war unleashed a restructuring of power relations in Gijón, as it did in many areas of republican Spain. What, then, did this transformation mean for the people of Gijón?

While historians have analysed in great depth the political struggles and their economic impact at the local level, they have paid less attention to this question of meaning in its broader cultural sense. For ordinary Spaniards, the civil war was not only or even mainly about their identification with a particular political ideology, but the way in which the opportunity provided by the war held the promise of redefining (or conserving, in the case of many nationalists) their relationship to their lived environment in ways that made them feel empowered. While we cannot access the ways in which millions of individuals linked their own life projects to the larger process of transformation going on around them, we can examine the collective attempts to define the meaning of what was at stake. From this perspective, we can see the civil war as a cultural battleground, a struggle to negotiate the basic symbolic constructs of one's place in the world. In simple terms, the cultural forms, representations and artefacts that make up a symbolic system became weapons in the hegemonic struggle against the 'fascist' enemy, just as the nationalists mobilised religious iconography and myth to legitimise their cause.<sup>5</sup> Well before contemporary cultural theorists articulated the

Gramscian idea that culture is a site of struggle, participants on both sides of the civil war understood that culture was an important 'medium through which social antagonisms are negotiated'.<sup>6</sup>

While it is easy to assert that culture was a site of struggle during the civil war, it is much more difficult to sort out the nature of the cultural projects articulated by different groups and the heterogeneity of symbolic representations, given the variegated political constellations that emerged after July 1936 at the local and regional levels in the republican zone. Not only did different groups or alliances control political power, each group had distinct local profiles, depending on the political setting. Even during the peacetime Republic, the boundaries of political culture rarely extended beyond the local level, but in many areas the outbreak of war only exacerbated this localism. The central government did try to reestablish national political authority after its recomposition in Valencia in early November 1936, but its control was always incomplete, hindered by the war effort, the political infighting on the republican side and its own acute lack of resources occasioned by the hostile international context.<sup>7</sup> While this heterogeneity does not negate generalisations about republican culture during the civil war, it means that any framework has to be constructed from the ground up, through grassroots comparisons, not through formal policies dictated from central government.

The articulation of a common republican cultural project was further undermined by the political infighting, which generated competing symbolic systems under the loyalist umbrella.<sup>8</sup> While everyone on the republican side shared a hatred of the traditionalist Catholic Spain of the Inquisition, not everyone agreed on how 'modern' Spain should be conceptualised and represented. On the one hand, there was the classic liberal modernising project of the republicans, rooted in the Enlightenment and developed in nineteenth-century Spanish cultural institutions like the Instituto Libre de Enseñanza. This cultural project sought to integrate the masses into a liberal modern nation through the dissemination of a non-religious high culture. Popular education and access to cultural artefacts already enjoyed by the elites were the key to building a cohesive national community.<sup>9</sup> In contrast to this integrationist model of cultural diffusion was the proletarian model of cultural transformation, often taking as its point of reference the alternative modernity of the Soviet Union. Rather than fighting for access to 'bourgeois' culture, some groups argued for its replacement by a new proletarian culture that rejected the nationalist and hierarchical structures of traditional high culture. Instead of accepting the gift of national cultural products granted from above, they sought to use the tools of education to create their own sense of community based on class solidarity.

In schematic terms, these two cultural idioms have often been matched up with the political divisions on the republican side and the fierce struggle encapsulated in the 'revolution vs. war' debate, or between revolutionary transformation and liberal order. While the CNT and some socialists argued that the civil war had opened up the opportunity to make the 'revolution', in political, cultural and economic terms, the republican parties, the PCE and, increasingly, the conservative wing of the PSOE sought to mute the language of transformation, at least until after the war was over. Thus, they emerged as *de facto* defenders of the liberal modernising project, despite their apparently revolutionary principles.<sup>10</sup>

Once the meaning of 'revolution' is problematised, it makes little sense to distinguish between clearly juxtaposed 'revolutionary' and 'liberal' cultural projects in the republican zone. In any case, cultural production and symbolic meanings were not simply derivative of specific political ideologies but existed in a complex dynamic with distinct political agendas. One of the insights of the 'cultural turn' in historical studies is that cultural formations are not strictly dependent variables, reducible to more fundamental material and political categories, such as, in this case, the political debate over war vs. revolution or the economic debate over collectivisation vs. the protection of private property. In order to decipher what the transformations brought by the war signified to ordinary loyalist Spaniards, we must step back from the binary categories drawn from political ideologies and analyse the symbolic tools used in the reconstruction of local environments. What such an analysis reveals, in the case of the republican city of Gijón, is a symbolic language of popular empowerment that drew freely from different ideological sources in its effort to transform the identity of the city and its relationship to its inhabitants.

At first glance, Gijón seems an unlikely subject from which to launch an analysis of republican culture. Asturias has always played a marginal role in the narrative of the republican side. The neglect of Asturias can be partly explained by the fact that it fell to the nationalists after fifteen months. Furthermore, even while it was in the republican zone it remained geographically isolated from the heart of the Republic, which ran along the eastern coast of the country (see map 1, p. xxiv above). But perhaps equally important, Asturias was not a major battleground in the revolution vs. war conflict or in the related struggle around collectivisation.

Ironically, it is this isolation from the dramatic political and economic confrontations in the eastern republican zones that makes Gijón an ideal subject for a cultural analysis. Because the formal political struggle was muted, cultural politics had more room in which to develop and were

less likely to be reduced to one-dimensional stereotypes. Although Gijón was a CNT-dominated city, the familiar narrative of Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia* did not play itself out here, because there were no May 1937 events to impose ideological polarisation. Instead, the CNT, with the city's mayor in the lead, remained at the centre of a diverse coalition that grew out of a strong grassroots relationship with the UGT unions but which also included the subordinate support of republican parties and, at times, the PCE. The cultural politics that emerged from such a coalition defied the simple opposition between liberal and proletarian culture, and instead reflected a hybrid that drew from different symbolic languages and forms. Thus, the cultural politics of republican Gijón helps us to deconstruct the binary war vs. revolution approach to the home front.

The reason such a hybrid coalition was able to work together also had roots in the pre-war political culture of the city. Although there were plenty of power struggles between republicans, anarchists and socialists over the loyalties of a diverse working- and lower-middle-class population, they had all participated in the creation of a mass political culture based, in general terms, on the empowerment of the 'little man/woman'. In particular, republican groups and CNT unions had formed an ongoing informal working relationship linked to the pragmatic defence of popular interests in the face of a highly organised and aggressive business elite. The relationship was born in the process of constructing a network of popular institutions, from *ateneos* to neighbourhood improvement associations, to lay schools, in which republican and anarchist influence overlapped and intersected in complex ways. It was further consolidated through the informal division of political space, in which republicans competed for formal political power while the CNT focused on direct mobilisation, with each group utilising the resources of the other at key moments of confrontation with the business elites. The dynamic had been established soon after the turn of the century, when republicans made their first electoral inroads into city government and continued, although more problematically, when republicans took control in 1931.

Not only did this dynamic define the political culture of the 'left' in Gijón, it shaped the local configuration of both the CNT and the republican parties. In particular, it marked the local CNT with a pragmatism and an investment in local government that contrasted with its counterparts in Catalonia and elsewhere. The socialists and, later, the communists, could not fit into this political dynamic since they competed for direct political power with the republicans. Because neither party in Gijón had the power to reconstitute political power on its own

terms, they operated, for the most part, on the margins of the existing framework.

What changed with the coup of July 1936 was the balance of resources held by the CNT and republican groups. The CNT's capacity to mobilise in July 1936 suddenly made it the dominant partner in their informal relationship. While the attitude of the various republican parties to their new subordination is complex, all their public pronouncements displayed a deferential tone that reflects the acknowledgement of their secondary status. As one prominent leftist republican said at a Popular Front rally in January 1937, 'If the revolution is a consequence of this civil war that they carried us into, then we will have to accept the revolution.'<sup>11</sup>

In Gijón, the CNT's historical, if informal, investment in local government led it to a different assessment of the stakes involved. When city government was 'normalised' with the creation of a city council in October 1936, it came as the result of a 'bottom-up' initiative of all the local Popular Front forces, with the full participation of the CNT. As the future mayor said, a few weeks earlier, the anarchists were not going to help the fascists by staying out of the 'political fight'.<sup>12</sup> As a result, the new town council in Gijón legitimised and formalised the new configuration of power established in July 1936 at the local level, rather than overturning it, as occurred elsewhere. Significantly, the process of reconstructing local government contrasted with what occurred in many other places, where councils were created through a top-down initiative of the national government (beginning in December 1936) seeking to re-establish chains of authority and eliminate situations of dual power. In Gijón, dual power was not an issue because the CNT accepted the framework of formal institutions. The CNT's local dominance was further consolidated through its control of the important daily newspapers, *El Comercio* and *El Noroeste*, whose offices were seized after the coup and run under their old mastheads until the end of 1936, when the CNT workers replaced them with *CNT*, which continued until October 1937. No other political group in the city had this kind of daily stable influence on public discourse.

Once the political facts of the transfer of power are laid out, the more important question for our purposes is to discern their broader symbolic meaning for the loyalist inhabitants of the city. Specifically, did July 1936 signify the end of the 'liberal' Republic and launch the 'revolution' in the minds of the mobilised population? What is once again clear from the analysis of local discourse and the projects undertaken by an ambitious city council, is that the opportunities opened up by July 1936 were not defined by this polarity. Instead, they were shaped by the strong



tradition of community politics, defined by localist populism, a fluid alliance between lower-middle-class and working-class inhabitants (the 'little man' against big business), and an identification with the city whose geography set the limits of the community. In basic terms, July 1936 offered the opportunity to claim Gijón for the popular community and to secure access to all the goods and services, whether economic, social or cultural, that had been denied to poorer residents, especially those of the peripheral neighbourhoods where most lived. This agenda was revolutionary, not in the sense that it directly opposed the liberal project but in that it implied a transformation of power relationships at the level of everyday life. Still, it followed no coherent ideological model and drew on a variety of symbolic supports from the proletarian and liberal repertoire to construct the image of the new Gijón.

It is in this more ambiguous sense that we can talk about the economic revolution that followed July 1936. The economic policies adopted by the authorities followed no clear ideological blueprint, but represented some common terrain on which all parties could agree. If the common terrain was a community-based political framework, then one way of reading the economic 'revolution' in Gijón was as an attempt to materialise community solidarity, integrating those at the bottom shut out of the free market, but also including the modest producers, like the farmers, who were crucial to the effectiveness of the new 'cooperativist system'. Whether the economic reorganisation actually worked on a material level to redistribute resources or to integrate the popular community, it performed the symbolic function of evoking and building on a familiar set of relationships while pushing them in new directions. The fact that this cooperativist policy was also well suited to the demands of wartime unity does not negate its roots in these pre-war relationships.

This same analysis can be applied to other aspects of the local revolution, which utilised existing common territory on which to build a 'new' city. Perhaps the most fundamental principle of the pre-war leftist political culture was secularisation, which all parties agreed was a cornerstone of a modern city. As an editorial in *CNT* argued, religion was at the centre of the present conflict, as was so often the case in Spanish history. 'Without denying that many conflicts have economic causes', it asserted, 'in our country these conflicts still have a religious influence and it is fanaticism that has caused most problems.'<sup>13</sup> The project of secularisation had been the lynchpin of republican culture since the First Republic of the 1870s, and anticlerical fervour had formed one of the nodal points of congruence with the revolutionary left, especially the anarchists. Since the early twentieth century when republicans began to take control of city councils in major cities, they had worked to unravel the web of

religious iconography and rituals in which municipal identity was intertwined. In Gijón after 1910, they cut official subventions for religious public rituals, changed street names, and either secularised or created alternatives to existing festivals.<sup>14</sup> Instead of the religious cycle of festivals around which people measured the passage of time, the republican groups tried to create their own cycle, commemorating important events like the First Republic or the Paris Commune, or local heroes like Jovellanos, Spain's most prominent Enlightenment *philosophe*.

In November 1936, soon after taking office, the mayor made a speech in which he underscored the task of discarding outmoded religious symbols and replacing them with vibrant new images that would capture the city's (modern) aspirations. In particular, the iconography of Gijón and Asturias was enmeshed in the legacy of the Reconquest, with all of its religious and monarchist significance. According to historical legend, the Moorish advance had finally been halted in Asturias at the battle of Covadonga in the ninth century by the Christian king Pelayo, whose kingdom provided the foothold from which the Catholic Reconquest was launched. Asturias's role as 'cradle of the Reconquest' was embodied in the provincial seal, which featured a cross flanked by two angels, and in the municipal seal, which contained a drawing of the crowned Pelayo.

The conservative symbolism of the Reconquest had been consecrated by the nationalists in the civil war, but Mallada was probably responding to a more local symbolic challenge. During the anniversary celebration of the founding of the Republic the previous April (1936), the local military commander Colonel Aranda had evoked Pelayo as he (Aranda) led the 'army of repression' that had (re)conquered the city in October 1934 on a parade through the city centre to end at the statue of Pelayo. The parade was intended to demonstrate the strength of the 'forces of order' and to intimidate the working-class organisations which had been recently legalised after more than a year of forced closure. In front of an audience of local dignitaries, he had called on 'Asturias, cradle of the Reconquest' to defend against the 'enemies of Spain'.<sup>15</sup> Against this interpretation of Asturian history, Mallada argued that both seals should be redesigned to reflect Gijón's and Asturias's modern identity as an industrial power. In particular, he proposed that the city employ the figure of a ship with its sails open, adorned by a gear wheel instead of a crown. He further suggested that the city plaza containing Pelayo's statue be renamed the 'Plaza of Progress', and decorated with a statue of Liberty.

Mallada also recommended what had become the standard practice for representing a political transition, that is, the close scrutiny of street

and plaza names to remove all traces of the previous regime, especially Catholic or fascist symbols.<sup>16</sup> The list of streets to be renamed was fairly straightforward, but the choice of new names reflected a mixed pantheon of heroes and ideologies that drew in an unsystematic way from liberal and proletarian symbology. A proletarian ethic was reflected in the displacement of the Marqués de San Esteban and Rodríguez San Pedro, both elite city fathers, by Buenaventura Durruti and Francisco Ascaso, the Catalan anarchist war heroes. But some names were drawn from a broader liberal universe, like the new schools named after Ramón y Cajal, the Nobel Prize-winning scientist, García Lorca, the assassinated poet and playwright, Jovellanos, or Benito Conde, the federal-republican teacher who inspired many working-class boys during the first two decades of the century.

Many other examples reflected a non-sectarian vision of modernity, such as the new Plaza del Progreso, or the names given to Catholic charitable institutions, all of which convey their 'scientific', meaning 'modern', affiliation. Thus, the Hospital de la Caridad became the Casa de Salud Popular, while the Asociación de Caridad was reopened as the Consultorio Público.<sup>17</sup> The result was a heterogeneous mix of cultural images that shared a vague commitment to 'modernity', 'progress' and populism, as well as a rejection of the religious iconography that evoked the old Spain. In fact, this mix of images drew heavily from the deeply embedded 'rationalist' milieu that incorporated anticlericalism, secular education and cultural pluralism, and in which republicans and anarchists, and later communists, had mingled since the late nineteenth century. It was this milieu that contributed an intellectual framework for a cross-class political culture.<sup>18</sup>

There was also a violent side to the anticlerical culture. During the civil war, most of the religious buildings in the city were destroyed, sacked or transformed for profane purposes, like the church of the Corazón de Jesús which was used to incarcerate priests and other clergy. Many of these were brought from smaller towns, so that Gijón held the largest collection – about 130 – of religious prisoners in the province. About half of these were taken out and shot, some of them on the beach, some by the river, some at the cemetery and others under circumstances unknown, most during the summer of 1936.<sup>19</sup> What is not clear is the role of this violence in the unfolding cultural project, as the deaths were not framed within an articulated culture of violence, as was the case with the nationalists.

A common rationalist culture was more clearly articulated in the official celebrations that were staged to bring the republican city together over the course of the war. Thus, everyone could unite behind a secularised

version of the traditional *Reyes Magos*, on 6 January 1937. To replace the religious holiday, in which the 'Three Kings' brought presents for children, the minister of education in Valencia proposed the idea of instituting a 'Children's Week' that would celebrate the desire of all children to 'grow up in a better world'. Local cultural organisations took up the idea enthusiastically, and held a series of benefit concerts to raise money to give toys to orphans and children of unemployed breadwinners.<sup>20</sup>

Two other important festivals that were staged during the civil war demonstrate a different kind of cultural syncretism. Both of these, the homage to Jovellanos and the May Day celebration, were pre-existing secular festivals that were infused with new meaning in the revolutionary situation. In the case of Jovellanos, a classic spokesman of the liberal cultural project was invested with proletarian significance, while in the second case, the traditional proletarian holiday incorporated the liberal nation into its discourse. The result, in both cases, was a deliberate intermingling of liberal and revolutionary cultural projects.

Jovellanos was one of the most striking cultural icons to be mobilised for the local revolution. He combined two important symbolic attributes, as a native of Gijón and a leading figure of the Spanish Enlightenment. In his speech on symbolic renovation, Mayor Mallada included the need for a prominent new Plaza de Jovellanos, where his statue should be installed. Even before his speech, the school where Jovellanos's remains were located was opened for public visitation, and local cultural organisations used the opportunity of a visit to educate themselves on the significance of the man and his writings. Thus, with approval from the local public education committee, the 'Remains of Jovellanos Commission' organised informal chats on his life and work for those who wanted to pay their respects.<sup>21</sup>

It was the November celebration of the 125<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Jovellanos's death, however, that produced a full articulation of his symbolic significance in the present context.<sup>22</sup> Jovellanos's imprisonment at the hands of the Inquisition made him a fellow traveller in the ongoing struggle between progress and barbarism, and his rise from Gijón to 'universal man' brought this struggle home for the audience. The speakers at the event crossed the political spectrum, from the anarchist mayor and the socialist provincial governor, to the communist education adviser and a republican lawyer with a close association to the Instituto Jovellanos, the flagship of Gijón's secondary schools. The common lineage of religious fanaticism that linked Jovellanos's enemies and the nationalists was repeated by various speakers, but the most powerful evidence cited was the recent destruction of the Instituto's library by nationalist bombs.

While the annual homage to Jovellanos, usually held on 6 August, the day of his release from prison and his return to Gijón, had been a staple of the local republican calendar before the war (with an active role played by the Farmers' Association), the active participation of the revolutionary parties invested him with new layers of meaning. In their speeches, both Mallada and the socialist governor, Belarmino Tomás, stressed the economic radicalism of Jovellanos's ideas. Tomás argued that Jovellanos accepted the need for class struggle but did not believe the time was ripe for revolution. Mallada reminisced about the impact of his first exposure to him as a boy while studying in the Instituto Jovellanos (where his son now attended). More importantly, his recent convalescence (after being wounded in the battle against the uprising) had given him the opportunity to reread Jovellanos's ideas on the collectivisation of agriculture and his strong defence of farmers. Jovellanos's work, he said, like that of the French revolution and the Republic of April 1931, had been deprived of meaning (*desvirtuada*), and had to be reinvigorated.

The ecumenicism of the symbolic references was most clearly demonstrated in the celebration of May Day, in 1937.<sup>23</sup> In May 1936, the celebration had been staged as a dramatic general strike to signal the power of the trade union movement as it reconstituted itself after the repression of October 1934. It also came as a direct response to the militaristic celebration of 15 April in which Colonel Aranda had made clear that the Republic he conceived did not include the working-class movement. In contrast to the demonstration of proletarian power in 1936, in 1937 the fiesta was celebrated in conjunction with 2 May, the day commemorating Spain's resistance in the Napoleonic War, and analogies were made between the earlier war of independence and the present war against the invading fascist enemy. Instead of a workers' holiday, this year workers stayed on the job, to participate in the reconstruction of the 'Spain that is being born'. Thus, the focus of the May Day rhetoric was the 'cause of national independence' rather than workers' revolution. At the same time, however, the event was staged with traditional proletarian regalia, with the UGT-CNT revolutionary alliance occupying centre stage as the representatives raised fists to the strains of the International while adorned with the customary red bandanas. The mingling of the first and second of May created, as in the case of the Jovellanos homage, a heterogeneous symbolic message.

The heterogeneity of symbols was clearly employed in a deliberate attempt to promote loyalty across a diverse ideological base, but there was also an underlying implicit acceptance of cultural pluralism that harked back as well to the 'rationalist' discourse of anarchists and

republicans. After October 1936, the city council formed a central control de espectáculos (entertainment committee), run by the appropriate union, that could have exercised strict ideological censorship over symbolic and cultural expression, but the committee demonstrated more interest in expanding popular access to cultural forms than in linking culture to specific ideologies. In other words, the committee reflected the classic Enlightenment faith in the liberating influence of culture in and of itself.

As the CNT propaganda commission said simply, 'a cultured people (*un pueblo culto*) is a free people, while lack of culture is the base of all tyranny'.<sup>24</sup> There is some confusion embodied in such statements, given the lack of a clear distinction in the Spanish language between 'educated' and 'cultured'. Thus, *un pueblo culto* could be either (or both) a literate population or a people with knowledge of what we might consider 'high' cultural artefacts. However, there may have been no clear conceptual divide between these two meanings, so that the goal of a *pueblo culto* conflated both of them. In any case, access to 'culture' in either meaning was the best defence against fascism, which represented *incultura*, or lack of culture. A note from the Asturian branch of the Federación Universitaria Escolar, the university student association, entitled 'To all lovers of culture and progress', explained that to support the Popular Front was to defend culture and progress against the *incultura* and barbarism of fascism, as illustrated by the executions of two prominent cultural leaders, García Lorca and the head of the University of Oviedo, Leopoldo Alas.<sup>25</sup> If culture and fascism were incompatible concepts, then culture was always positive and the key issue was getting it, not censoring it.

The concern with access was reflected in the commitment to free cultural events that the entertainment committee maintained and proclaimed. Thus, in a CNT editorial about the weekly concerts, the author declared that they had succeeded in 'opening the road to art' that had been limited to the few. The audience left the concert hall, the author enthused, 'with the strong desire to be cultured'.<sup>26</sup>

The concern with popular access to culture and the faith in what it could achieve are not surprising, given that, like secularisation and 'rationalism', it had been part of the community-based political milieu since the turn of the century. Gijón had a venerable tradition of self-improvement associations which comprised the sinews of the anarchist and republican populist network, and which were directed towards a largely working-class audience. The first and most prominent was the Ateneo Obrero, founded in 1886 in direct imitation of the venerable Ateneo of Madrid, but with the aspiration to provide the same sort of

intellectual milieu for workers. It had been organising adult courses, lectures, concerts and excursions for its members for more than fifty years, and had been one of the first symbols of working-class presence in the wealthy city centre.

By the 1910s, the Ateneo was only one of a whole network of working-class cultural centres, many of them located in the outlying neighbourhoods where most workers lived. There were neighbourhood improvement organisations (Associations of Culture and Hygiene – ACH), libraries, branch *ateneos*, lay schools, choirs and trade union cultural associations. In particular, the ACH fabricated an inclusive demand for popular access to all of the benefits of modern society, framed from the perspective of the marginalised neighbourhood community. Founded in the physically peripheral and poorer neighbourhoods that lacked municipal services like sewers, pavement, street-lights, or parks, these associations lobbied the city government to institute urban reforms but they also pursued an agenda of cultural self-improvement, providing a forum for the educational/cultural events that the Ateneo Gijón offered for those who lived closer to the centre of the city. Although they had different specific goals, most originated as part of the essentially liberal project of bringing ‘culture’ (meaning both basic literacy and high culture) to the masses as a way of integrating them into the democratic nation.

While these popular cultural associations did experience ideological radicalisation after October 1934 and especially after July 1936, their primary purpose of promoting participation in, and access to, a broader cultural universe did not seem to alter significantly. As a note from the ACH of Cimadevilla put it, ‘for thirteen years we have worked for the moral elevation of our residents and the physical improvement of the neighbourhood’.<sup>27</sup> Once again, the ideological divisions masked what was essentially a shared cultural milieu based on the common terrain of secularism, rationalism and popular access. The intermingling of liberal and proletarian cultural idioms was not always seamless, as reflected in the power struggles, but underlying the conflict was a shared investment in this type of cultural empowerment. The fact that different groups judged the associations worth fighting over is, in a sense, an indication of how much their values overlapped. In some ways, these associations brought together all of the cultural aspirations discussed so far, embodied in the demand for an inclusive urban culture that transcended peripheral neighbourhoods and classes. Significantly, then, the fact that their aspirations for cultural uplift were usually organised geographically through the neighbourhood associations reinforced the urban framework of residents’ community identity.

During the civil war, the ACH and the Ateneo, as well as the trade union cultural associations, like the libertarian *ateneos* or the PCE's choral society, continued to pursue these broad goals of empowerment, with the help of government subventions. After the first few months, they all revived, filling the newspapers with their normal activities, their benefit concerts and their lectures.<sup>28</sup> They reopened their libraries, revived their theatrical troupes, rescheduled adult education classes, and issued new petitions for sewers and streetlights. In addition, they officially participated in citywide cultural events like the homage to Jovellanos, where they were invited to sit together under their respective banners in visual representation of the city's new social geography.

Regardless of the different context, the content of the programmes and activities, as well as the petitions delivered to the city hall, did not change dramatically, although this time their activities were coordinated through the *control de espectáculos*. There were certainly more references to revolutionary proletarian culture in the lecture titles and theatrical productions.<sup>29</sup> However, the broader problem of 'redeeming the people from their intellectual poverty' was still at the heart of their mission.<sup>30</sup> In this vein, the editorial celebrating the construction of a cultural centre in Porceyo on land once owned by the church contrasted the culture of illiteracy that was formerly cultivated there with the intention to build a 'temple to knowledge (*templo al saber*), from which a new generation would emerge'.<sup>31</sup>

The aspiration for cultural uplift was expressed in one of the most elaborate cultural events, a homage to García Lorca sponsored by the Ateneo. Since his assassination, Lorca had come to symbolise the equation between fascism and *incultura*, and this relationship was of course highlighted in the review. But it was the awesome privilege of being exposed to great art that most inspired the author. 'The intention is to use the best of our poetic talent to begin to inculcate in the masses a sensibility and discernment for the exquisite. Show them how to differentiate, for now, and later they will learn how to choose.'<sup>32</sup>

If one of the underlying themes of the revolution was the idea of popular access to culture as a path to empowerment, this path did not necessarily include everyone. While all the local loyalist organisations understood that 'class' was a key factor in redefining access to cultural resources, they paid less attention to the way that gender structured access, whether to the city or to the broader cultural milieu inhabited by the largely male popular associations. Both republicans and the trade unions had been ambivalent about mobilising women and trusting them with empowerment. Despite the exigencies of the war and the reconstruction of society which propelled greater




incorporation of women, this task never made the regime's list of top priorities.<sup>33</sup>

Gijón was no exception. As late as April 1937 the CNT newspaper felt obliged to publish an article about opening the unions to women, 'overcoming our past neglect, and facilitating their path with our advice and experience', rather than greeting them with hostility.<sup>34</sup> The resistance to incorporating women into the workforce, a policy which presumably would have helped the war effort, demonstrates how difficult it was to imagine women as subjects in the reconstruction of society. Thus, the PCE newspaper, *Boletín del Norte*, ran a series of articles in September and October of 1937, just before the fall of Asturias, lamenting the lack of incorporation of women.<sup>35</sup> Even more frustrated were the women activists fighting for women's participation to be taken seriously, as demonstrated by the discussions of the Anti-Fascist Women's Committees who were taking on all sorts of rearguard activities only to be ignored by the unions and parties.<sup>36</sup> More germane to this chapter is the fact that the gender barriers encoded in the language of popular empowerment were also part of the common cultural milieu of the revolutionary and liberal left.

When women were represented as part of the revolution it was in their traditional roles as wife and mother. Thus, in the dozens of wedding announcements printed in the newspapers under the heading 'Weddings of Militiamen', the husbands were identified by their political or military status, as militiamen, union comrades or party members, while the brides were modified by adjectives like 'young', 'beautiful', or, at the most, as daughter of a CNT *compañero*. While this section cleverly turned the traditional society page on its head from a class perspective, it rendered the women invisible, no more than shadowy spectators in the main drama. Likewise, when women appeared explicitly in editorial commentary it was in their role as reproducers. Thus, in response to a proposal for a women's educational centre in the city, one author, who was in fact female, suggested that the focus of its cultural programme should be hygiene, in particular the politics of repopulation. In the language of the time, the heart of women's education should be the basic principles of eugenics.<sup>37</sup> While none of these gendered representations is surprising in the history of modern revolutions, it is worth underscoring that all of the cultural projects on the table were imagined in terms of masculine subjectivity and empowerment.

Within these limits, the symbolic language of popular subjectivity and empowerment was nowhere more clearly expressed than in the redefinition of peoples' relationship with the physical space of their community.



Map 7.1. The two faces of Gijón: plan of working-class settlements (from Pamela Beth Radcliff, *From Mobilisation to Civil War*, Cambridge, 1996, p. 79).

On a basic level, the urban landscape that defined the routines of everyday existence and the social geography of the city was a cornerstone of residents' symbolic universe. Given the local framework of political culture and the native origins of most of the population, the city provided most residents with the basic frame of reference for establishing their collective identities.<sup>38</sup> As a result, it was through the alteration of their immediate physical, visual and social environment that most residents would experience the transformation in power relations that followed July 1936.

For decades Gijón, like most other modern industrial cities, had maintained two faces, the clean and well-tended central neighbourhoods, marked by wide avenues, commercial and banking services, and bounded by the city's greatest attraction, its beach promenade, and the other face of the working-class *barrios* of the periphery, filled with dilapidated and haphazardly built tenements and lacking in basic social services (see map 7.1). The social geography of the city provided a visual map of the economic hierarchies and increasingly, of the political divisions of the city, as epitomised in the image of a 'red belt' of radical suburbs surrounding a conservative city centre. It is no accident, then, that the redrawing of this map was one of the first tasks of a revolution defined by its tangible pursuit of popular empowerment. Still, the new map expressed a distinctly hybrid vision of the new city that cannot be reduced to the label 'proletarianisation'.

Elements of proletarianisation certainly formed a part of the urban transformation. This process began spontaneously, with the physical occupation of the city centre by those from the periphery. Even before the anarchists took their seats in the city hall, leftist organisations moved from the outer neighbourhoods into offices in the centre once occupied by large businesses and conservative groups. Thus, the PCE set up residence in the exclusive yacht club (Club de Regatas) near the city hall, the UGT moved into the Catholic Centre, most of the CNT unions opened individual headquarters in abandoned businesses, the sub-committees of the Defence Committee installed themselves in the banks on the main thoroughfare, the Calle Corrida, and the fishermen's militia took over the palace of the Revillagigedo family. Later, the CNT food industry union decided to reopen the elite Dindurra and Oriental cafés, once gathering places for local high society to see and be seen, which now welcomed a clientele of the popular classes who had previously felt more at home in their neighbourhood bars and taverns. The Dindurra carried a special meaning: since during the December 1931 general strike it had remained open, sparking a riot when angry CNT strikers tried to storm the café. Following the occupation of

buildings was the process of changing street names, which served a similar function of announcing and visualising a new popular identity for the city centre. Not surprisingly, most of the streets renamed were located here, not in the periphery, where there was no need to certify a change of ownership.

The sense of physical occupation took its most poetic expression in two printed photos of the beach, the most vivid symbol of the old elite Gijón. The first showed the private bathhouses of the exclusive Club de Regatas being overrun or, as the caption put it, 'seized' by '*el pueblo*', or the common people. The second, taken on the first day of the war, was a picture of the beach with bags of sand lined up, ready to be used in the defence of the city. As the accompanying article put it, 'this time, our beach will serve as something other than a playground for the leisure class'.<sup>39</sup>

In addition to the project of popularising Gijón's city centre was the parallel intention of finally completing the urbanisation and modernisation of the peripheral neighbourhoods. As one editorial put it, 'it was time to create a city that didn't have so-called peripheral neighbourhoods, not in the geographical sense, but in the sense of urban quality of living'.<sup>40</sup> This old implicit framework, and its acceptance by former city governments, had created, according to another writer, 'third-class citizens'.<sup>41</sup> Following this critique, the projects to sanitise the *barrios* and make them habitable were one method of turning their residents into fully first-class citizens. Just as important as the sewers and street lamps themselves was the process by which such projects were undertaken. While there was a long tradition in the city of local groups of residents or formal neighbourhood organisations like the ACH presenting the city council with requests for urban services, this participation took on new meaning with the changed attitude of the local authorities. When the Libertarian Youth of the working-class neighbourhood of El Llano brought a proposal for urbanisation it was approved with great fanfare by the mayor, who spoke eloquently about the urgent need to improve the lives of working-class residents.<sup>42</sup>

The idea that the popular classes not only belonged to the city but that the city belonged to them is revealed in the initiatives taken by popular associations to enforce community respect for their environment.<sup>43</sup> A sense of popular entitlement was reflected in the large number of residents who visited the mayor's office with their requests and suggestions. The mayor was so overwhelmed by their numbers that he had to set limits on private visits. In January 1937, and again, several months later, he warned the population that, in the future, the many items having 'nothing to do with city business' would not get a hearing.<sup>44</sup>

While this narrative of the working class wresting ownership of the city from the elites is reminiscent of Orwell's evocation of Barcelona as a proletarian city in 1936, in fact the symbolic transformation of urban identity in Gijón was more complex. Thus, proletarianisation was only one of the threads informing the process of urban transformation underway. A different language of local empowerment was embodied in the municipalism of the federalist tradition of local republicanism. Federalists advocated a decentralisation of political power located in the municipalities, while anarchists supported this decentralisation as a step towards the abolition of political power. More broadly, municipalism implied a sense of collective identity shaped around the city and its empowerment. As Mayor Mallada said in an anarchist rally, 'in contrast to seeking a dictatorship, even a class one, we should look to history to see how the Spanish cities demonstrated their capacity, although they were defeated by Carlos V. It is necessary to return to the municipality, which, without being either anarchist or libertarian, appears as an autonomous agent.'<sup>45</sup>

As a result of the configuration of anarchism and federal republicanism in Gijón, localism provided yet another piece of the common cultural terrain of the left. In contrast, most of the national republican parties had showed little interest in augmenting municipal power before July 1936. The municipal reform law of 1935 was conceived more in terms of efficiency than empowerment, and contained several important centralising features, like the authority of the central government to remove mayors. Gijón had been one of the cities involved in the debate over the law, and in fact the city had hosted the Seventh National Municipalist congress in August 1934, where amendments to the government's draft proposal were formulated by the 1,500 municipalities represented. In addition to measures to provide more financial independence, the congress declared its support for the principle of municipal sovereignty, in the sense that city council decisions could not be revoked by the central government. None of their principal demands made it into the final law.<sup>46</sup> In this context, municipalism, like secularisation, rationalism and popular access, was a project already on the table before July 1936.

The idea of the city as the locus of power took concrete form in the council's campaigns to municipalise decision-making in various arenas. As the central government was attempting to regain greater control over the regions, Gijón's city government was enlarging its own claims for authority, over major services, like gas and electricity, over distribution of consumer products, and over medical assistance. In one of the most interesting internal discussions of the council,

members disagreed about who should decide how confiscated property ought to be utilised. The decisions had up to then been made by the state, in the form of the provincial administration, but some of the councillors proposed the municipalisation of these decisions, leading to a broad debate about the benefits of municipalisation versus nationalisation. The prevailing federalist position was taken by *CNT*, in its coverage of the debate: 'on the road to constructing a new Spain, it is necessary that the city governments make their voice heard by the legislators'.<sup>47</sup> In their minds, it was the city, not the nation, that was to be the heart of the new Spain.

The coexistence of the languages of class and municipal empowerment was nowhere better expressed than in the string of urban reforms that was formalised in the first comprehensive urban planning document ever adopted by the city, the *Plan de Reformas*.<sup>48</sup> The plan was supported by everyone in the revolutionary coalition but was spearheaded by the anarchist mayor. While it might seem the height of naïveté to mount such an ambitious plan in the midst of a gruelling war, it is also an indication of the importance that such a project held for the city's progressive forces. The very concept of urban planning had been viewed as a threat by the powerful business community, for which it evoked the subordination of private property to community interests. Business interests had successfully resisted every systematic attempt by republican city governments to claim control over urban development and to dictate the use of space according to the principle of municipal collective interests. Given this historical context, the *Plan de Reformas*, in and of itself, marked the first major victory in the progressive forces' ongoing battle to define the city's interests as more than simply the sum of its individual residents.

In terms of content, the plan defined the visual transformation that would prepare the city for its exalted role in the new society. In doing so, it followed the tradition of earlier republican proposals, with its focus on beautification and modernisation, especially of the city centre and beach areas. The municipalist tradition, extended into the cultural realm, is clearly evident in the words of Mayor Mallada:

the urban projects now underway mark a new social era, and deserve the utmost support from those who love Gijón and want to see her converted into a beautiful city, a model of hygiene, art and public comforts. We won't be satisfied with a few adjustments, but have committed ourselves to a vision of the future.<sup>49</sup>

The new 'modern' city would have broad streets, larger and more numerous plazas, a single rail and bus station, a major park and a bypass road for more efficient traffic management.<sup>50</sup>

The images of decongestion, beauty and efficiency conjure up the modernist utopia of Le Corbusier and Sant'Elia, and indeed, the goals of urban transformation were expressed through the language of the modernist aesthetic. Thus, in an editorial supporting the city's decision to destroy the balconies that extended into the public street, the author argued that they were anti-aesthetic impediments to the 'harmony and beauty that ought to exist in modern buildings'.<sup>51</sup> In this wholesale embrace of modernism, it was 'bourgeois' aesthetics that was evoked as the symbol of the new Spain, wide avenues instead of public housing projects, harmony of design instead of functional utilisation.

Significantly, the buildings which were chosen for demolition reflected these aesthetic demands, not those of class or political vengeance. The main exceptions were the three central churches, which were all slated for destruction, but this decision can be attributed to the broader anti-clericalist culture, not to a class-based agenda. The other buildings followed no political or social pattern; both workers and elites were moved out of their homes.<sup>52</sup>

When the urban reforms were justified, the interests of the city as a collective entity, i.e. a kind of municipalism, were raised more often than were specific class interests. More broadly, there was an embrace of *gijonismo* – of the city as a locus of identity and community as well as pride. In another editorial about the urban reforms underway, the CNT author enthused about the extent of physical transformation which would, in a few years, catapult Gijón into the ranks of a 'great city'. Not a day went by without new initiatives to report, all of which stemmed from this desire to make Gijón great.<sup>53</sup> Such an expression of local pride could scarcely be distinguished from those emanating from the pro-business *El Comercio* before the civil war.

And yet, the different context in which those statements of local pride were made, before and after July 1936, suggests a more nuanced reading of this discourse of 'bourgeois' municipalist aesthetics. Rather than juxtapose this aesthetic to an alternative proletarian aesthetic, each of which were competing to define the soul of the new city, once again the line between the two cultural projects was less clear. On the one hand, proletarianisation was always mitigated by the cross-class tradition of community politics which continued in the mobilisation around neighbourhood and municipal empowerment. On the other hand, the application of 'bourgeois' aesthetics must be seen in a context in which symbolic ownership of the city had changed hands. As the popular classes claimed the city as their own, they adopted the traditional discourse of urban empowerment and improvement to describe their vision of the future. Moreover, the progressive discourse of rationality and

modernisation had never been exclusively 'bourgeois', but had formed part of the common cultural milieu in which anarchists and republicans had mixed. Within this framework, the *Plan de Reformas* represented a mixture of aspirations, rooted in pre-civil-war political culture but combined in a way that created a new urban identity.

What, then, were the parameters of the cultural project launched in revolutionary Gijón? Aborted in midstream and crippled by problems outside local control, it is impossible to predict how it would have continued to evolve, especially given the deteriorating conditions of the Republic. What is clear and consistent is that the main target of this project was the identity of the city itself, and the attempt to transform popular residents' relationship to their urban community. Rooted in a long tradition of popular mobilisation and struggle, the civil war was in many ways a continuation rather than a dramatic break. The revolution that unfolded contained both revolutionary and liberal symbolic language, but what seemed to drive it was not any specific ideology but the familiar struggle for community empowerment. From this perspective, which was sharpened by the isolation of Asturias, the experiment of 1936–7 was both the culmination of and the response to a long tradition of struggle over the identity of the city and to whom it belonged.

If the struggle over the city and the community set the parameters of the cultural project of the civil war, what was the new Gijón supposed to look like? On one level, of course, the new Gijón was a hybrid creature, a heterogeneous symbol that evoked both liberal and revolutionary images of modernity. It was a city in which centre and periphery were to be turned inside out in symbolic representation of the class revolution. But it was also a city that aspired to be admired in its bourgeois finery, dressed up in beautification projects that had little to do with the basic needs of its workers. At the same time it was a soberly secular city, proud of its industrial functionalism. Its new patron saints were liberal intellectuals like Jovellanos and García Lorca, but also revolutionary activists like José María Martínez, who died leading the October revolution in Gijón. From one angle, it was a proletarian city, while from another, it had simply become modern.

How do we interpret such symbolic heterogeneity in writing the cultural history of the civil war? From one perspective, this diversity could exemplify the lack of political unity on the republican side and the symbolic confusion it created, simply more evidence of the internal weakness of the republican side and the ideological divisions that tore it apart.<sup>54</sup> But from the vantage point of Gijón, this explanation seems inadequate. While there were certainly conflicts over the nature of the



urban transformation underway, they did not fall neatly along revolutionary vs. liberal democratic lines. Furthermore, the same groups seemed to draw freely from symbolic languages associated with opposing political views, as in the anarchist enthusiasm for both urbanisation of peripheral neighbourhoods and beautification of the city centre. In fact, what appears as a contradiction from the point of view of binary political categories may be artificially drawn. If those categories are pushed to one side, it is possible to identify a diverse but shared cultural milieu, informed by localism, secularism, the French Revolution, some of the achievements of bourgeois modernity and the rights of all male citizens to equal access to the fruits of that modernity. In this reading, the heterogeneous cultural project of the civil war was a sign of strength, not weakness, a solution to the 'war vs. revolution' conundrum, not its apotheosis.



*Part 3*

**Identities on the Francoist side**



## 8 Old symbols, new meanings: mobilising the rebellion in the summer of 1936

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*Rafael Cruz*

The bombing of the *Basílica del Pilar* has not been just another episode in the struggle; it was a criminal and cowardly attack against the two most sacred and holy values in Spain; against the two postulates that support and encourage us, to the point of making us invincible, in the struggle to the death we are engaged in . . . a religious struggle, a true crusade of a people humiliated and offended due to their beliefs.

Thus read part of Martín Hernández's long article, published on 8 August 1936 in *El Norte de Castilla*, the day following a series of mobilisations and rituals held in the Castilian rebel heartland of Valladolid with, according to the newspaper, thousands of citizens participating. The cathedral was filled with people and the great majority of them, unable to enter the temple, remained in the adjacent streets. On 3 August the statue and dwelling in Zaragoza of *Nuestra Señora del Pilar* had been bombed by a plane belonging to the Catalan Generalitat. 'Miraculously' no great damage had been done. In the interior of the cathedral of Valladolid a few days later, the local authorities – the civil governor, the mayor and the president of the *diputación* (local council), all headed by Major General Andrés Saliquet – presided over the solemn act in homage to the *Virgen del Pilar* in an act of reparation.

As one of the rituals of public litanies, 'making amends' through acts of reparation had been strongly rooted in the Catholic world since the eighteenth century, invoking celestial mercy to reduce the pernicious effects of the action of nature, such as earthquakes and droughts, and the action of man, such as wars and revolutions. At the same time, some saints were attributed a role as political or military co-participants in collective triumphs against enemies.

Together with the principal authorities were the civilian militias, the political organisations, the clergy and 'the people' who, 'with tears in their eyes', displayed 'overwhelming enthusiasm' when they sang the popular *Salve Regina*, the anthem of the Virgin, and, forgetting the dignity of the setting, burst into an ovation to the Virgin, to religion and to Spain. At the end of the liturgical act, as those present left the

church, the public cheered the authorities who 'now represent(ed) the people because the people consider them their safeguard'.

After proclaiming their Catholicism and their love for the Holy Mother Church and for Spain, the people and the authorities moved towards the calle Cascajeres and there a further 'spontaneous' and 'grandiose' demonstration began, headed by the *balillas* (the children's section) of Falange Española, who carried an enormous 'red-and-yellow' flag. All those gathered cheered unceasingly 'Spain', 'the institutions' and the 'saviour army', and could barely move forward, due to the throng of people lining the route. Once the demonstration broke up, the Falangists paraded 'so orderly, so martially and so full of national spirit', accompanied by 'the enthusiasm and the admiration of the people of Valladolid'.

Since the Plaza Mayor (the main square of the city) was still filled with a tremendous crowd at the end of the parade, the mayor, a Falangist, a representative of the CEDA and an army official delivered speeches from the *ayuntamiento* (town hall) balcony, exalting the patriotism of the people of Valladolid and assuring them of Spain's prompt victory 'against Marxism'. Following the speeches and the usual applause and cheers, the Falange's anthem sounded and hundreds of arms were raised in the fascist salute. As if there had not been enough action, when the people saw Major Doval – famous due to his prominence in the October 1934 repression in Asturias – they carried him on their shoulders from a central café to the *ayuntamiento* where, with the mayor, he was persuaded to address the congregated people.

This series of mobilisations and rituals described in *El Norte de Castilla* in early August 1936 is saturated with the symbols and most fundamental reference points of the political life of the citizens of Valladolid in the summer of that year. In addition to Martín Hernández's interpretation of the symbolic significance involved in the bombing of the Basílica del Pilar, conferring the status of a crusade on the civil war, in the act of reparation for the sacrilegious act one can see the mobilisation of symbols familiar to the city's inhabitants. Thanks to the mobilisation itself, those attending, and the newspaper's readers, conferred a specific meaning on these symbols, such as the Virgin's political role – and by extension, that of the Catholic religion – in times of war, and the 'nationalisation' of the red-and-yellow flag, until then exclusively monarchist.

In order to enhance and endorse these symbols with a patriotic and religious meaning, *El Norte de Castilla* points particularly to the *magnitude* of the mobilisation. The coming together and enthusiasm of thousands of people, their *unity*, regardless of their social and political

diversity, and the *coherence* of their proposals, were all unprecedented in the city. Thus, this mobilisation exemplifies the process of giving meaning to and legitimating specific political symbols, like 'banners' of a collective identity, which begins to take shape among the followers of the rebel faction in the summer of 1936.

### **Political symbols and mobilisation in the civil war**

The political symbols which accompanied the mobilisation in Valladolid did not arise or become consolidated immediately after 18 July 1936 in the territories controlled by the rebels. Given the military nature of the rebellion on 17–19 July, it was impossible to predict the triumph of any of the existing political tendencies, nor the implantation of a regime other than that of a republic. The primary objective of the military rebels was to bring down the government of the Republic and substitute all the political authorities of the state, at a national, provincial and local level. Beyond the military dictatorship following the success of the rebellion, there was no consensus as to imposing a different political system, among other reasons because the army was expected to assume all the responsibility in the new situation and the civilian collaboration was to be strictly subordinate to this.

The first thing the military did in those places where it rebelled was to declare a state of war, remove the local and provincial authorities, and substitute them with people allied to the rebellion; often, in practice, these were army officers. In the majority of the rebels' proclamations and in the editorials and chronicles disseminated in the newspapers published in the towns and cities where the rebellion was successful, a struggle with a government in 'foreign' and 'anti-national' hands was all that was contemplated. This government had allowed disorder and chaos, having abandoned the principle of authority. These proclamations highlighted the 'honour', 'conscience' and 'patriotism' of the rebels, who had risen in order to achieve a national reintegration that would restore order and 'civilisation', and free the country from servitude and from the clutches of Russia or Moscow. This amounted, therefore, to a patriotic rhetoric with an exclusively prophylactic motive. Only in the case of Pamplona did the Carlist rhetoric interpret the struggle begun with the republican government as a religious and patriotic fight to restore the monarchy.<sup>1</sup>

Several other declarations made by the 'director' of the conspiracy, General Emilio Mola, were also not connected with partisanship. The political postulates of other leading rebels were spread over a diverse range and contributed to the initial lack of political definition: Queipo de

Llano and Miguel Cabanellas's republicanism, Sanjurjo and Varela's Carlism, Franco, Saliquet and Goded's political indifference. Sanjurjo's death in a plane crash meant that the new military *junta* was deprived of its expected figurehead.

Logically, all of this contributed to the military rebels' initiative being unaccompanied by political symbols identified with a particular political tendency or form. In their stead, generic terms, void of any concrete political content, such as 'Spain', '*Patria*' ('Nation' or 'Fatherland'), were used during the first days of the rebellion. Besides this, in the majority of the rebellious towns and cities, the republican tricolour flag (red, yellow and purple) continued to be used as the official emblem and in some of the military addresses, 'Long live the Republic!' was cheered along with 'Long live Spain!'

But from the summer of 1936 the immediate failure of the military uprising (as a coup d'état) and the declaration of war generated a process in the rebel faction which, among other consequences, enhanced and gave a new meaning to existing political symbols. That political process – including an intense mass mobilisation – took place in different cities and provinces with their own characteristics and pace. Due to a variety of circumstances, these differences lessened as the summer went by. The political process in each territory depended on the circumstances of the war, the military authority's political influence, and, above all, on the correlation of political powers in each locality. Although the rebel army held political power in each locality in the Nationalist zone, Carlists, Falangists, Renovación Española monarchists, Acción Popular Catholics and the church argued over the nature of the political support to be accorded the army, while at the same time they tried to influence military policy.

During the days immediately following the rebellion, the leaders of these parties and organisations undertook an intense political activity which consisted of setting up communications among their supporters in every city, distributing instructions, using the media to disseminate their initiatives and propositions, holding meetings, and organising the participation of their militia in different army units, as well as coordinating the rearguard. The national leaders of these groups, Goicoechea, Fal Conde, Lamamié de Clairac and even Gil Robles (to a lesser extent) visited the different cities and pueblos conquered during the summer months.

The competition among these political powers greatly contributed to the exposition and the choice of symbols, since each organisation contributed its own flags, anthems, principles and political programmes, and each of them had its own perception about the events. It can be said



that there was an authentic struggle to influence the military authorities, to impose symbols and interpretations.

There are few traces left of this competition and, in some cases, the political contention during the summer of 1936, because the press barely made reference to them. However, the essays and the memoirs of some of the most important political leaders on the rebels' side have compensated for that absence. In any case, Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena makes an explicit reference to the contention between such leaders when he pointed out in *ABC* on 9 September that 'small divergences and minute clashes from behind their newspapers' were aired. From Salamanca, the leaders of Acción Popular complained that they were not held in sufficient esteem and that the Falange was excessively prominent. There were also complaints about the coercion employed by the FE militia to sign up 'volunteers' from other organisations and to obtain donations to pay for their activities. The Renovación Española monarchists wanted to create their own organisation among the military in order to compete with Carlists and Falangists, whom they accused of concealing many upstarts. Cardinal Gomá, primate of Spain, also feared FE's suitability when it came to defining the nature of the new regime and did all he could to drape the rebel side with the obscuring cloak of the Virgin and to persuade the rebels to consider the war a crusade. The fears of the cardinal and some of the other organisations were not an invention, as the Falange sent thousands of militiamen to the front lines during the summer and, through the press, made itself felt in the rearguard and in the street. The Falangists themselves explicitly highlighted and demanded this prominence.<sup>2</sup>

The political struggle was most visible in the continuous parades of the different parties' militia during this period. The most important of the militia were those of the FE and the Carlist *requetés*. But there were also those of the youth movement of Acción Popular, of Doctor Albiñana's Legionarios de España and of Renovación Española. Each was organised in its own garrison, wearing its own distinctively coloured uniform and hoisting its own flag. They paraded around different cities on Sundays, after going to mass, or more frequently in the evening, when their marching could be seen by people returning from the traditional *paseo* or from social gatherings. These parades represented genuine occupations of the city centres, in a manner similar to the funeral processions for those 'fallen' at the front. If the deceased were members of a party, its militia acquired political capital by identifying the particular 'martyr's' sacrifice with the whole organisation. Blood shed for ideals constituted another and very important resource for acquiring political legitimacy.<sup>3</sup>

The parades in the city centre and those held by the militia in the continuous mass funerals, in some cities almost daily during the first two months of the war, were part of a concentrated mobilisation. Along with other political activities, this dynamic of mobilisation was part of the political process initiated by the failure of the military rebellion and the beginning of the civil war. In general, it is necessary to evaluate the political relevance of the mobilisation because it contains a series of ingredients that confer power to the groups that call for, lead or participate in it.

In the situation of 1936, the shops' closing as the funeral cortège or demonstration passed by was a symbol of the power wielded by the protagonists. So it occurred, as an example among many others, during Onésimo Redondo's funeral in Valladolid on 25 July, or during the demonstration on 3 August, in protest against the bombing of the *Basílica del Pilar* in Zaragoza, when the closing of establishments contributed very obviously to the success of the act. The rebels highlighted the shops' closing because it was comparable to the complete standstill in the workers' activity, and that of the general population, achieved by the strikes the labour unions convened. Months before, the Catholic newspapers had emphasised how work had stopped during the Holy Week processions of that same year, and they saw it as a sign of support for their political postulates, as well as of the religious fervour of the people.

The participants' unity of action in public demonstrations, founded upon a common purpose, can also be considered a symbol of power because it dilutes the heterogeneity and diversity of the political forces and of their social origins, with no distinction between classes. Civilians and the military were momentarily fused. The demonstration also makes visible the unity of common emotions, appeals and claims.

The capacity for filling the streets, especially those at the centre of the city, manifests the protagonists' power and that of their arguments. It symbolises the cessation of routine interactions and, in political terms, represents control of the city, in much the same way as military dominance is represented through curfews, or the 1 May demonstrations represent a 'siege' of the bourgeois city.

One indication of the act's coherence, respectability and identification with the participants' deep-seated feelings can be seen in the demonstration's degree of improvisation and, therefore, spontaneity. There was no need to plan deceptive tactics in order to convince people of the need for action. As *El Noticiero*, in Zaragoza, stated: 'For some time now, great crowds are improvised and truly important acts arise without being prepared.'

Finally, even before they become official or widespread, exhibiting certain symbols in demonstrations can contribute to having them boosted above others – precisely because they have been profusely used in demonstrations. In the summer of 1936, in rebel territory, one can observe two symbols which were not consolidated as strong symbols until the first weeks after the uprising, when they defined the war in which they were participating. These two symbols are the two-colour flag – the red and yellow – and the rhetoric of religious crusade.

**‘¡Salve, bandera de la patria, salve!’  
The red-and-yellow flag**

The flag’s sad purple once again disappears under the vibrant red that lines the sun-like yellow on Spain’s glorious ensign. Hail, the flag of the *Patria*, hail!’<sup>4</sup>

General Mola’s personal secretary wrote that in those towns and cities conquered by the rebels ‘everything seemed new: the anthems, the flags, the clamour, the greetings. . .’. He mentions novelties, not in the sense that they did not exist before, but rather that there was a possibility of publicly exhibiting certain symbols after several years of prohibition and clandestinity.<sup>5</sup> And, specifically, one of them was the red-and-yellow flag. Why did a symbol which was neither exhibited nor given publicity during the conflictive spring of 1936 and the military rebellion – except in Pamplona – and that had until then been only a monarchist flag, become a powerful symbol in the weeks following 18 July, when it was transformed into the institutional and national flag of rebel Spain?

The flag displayed by the Renovación Española monarchists during the months prior to 18 July was the Cross of Santiago; the one displayed by the Carlists contained the X-shaped Cross of Burgundy; Acción Católica and Acción Popular also had their own flags, while the Falangists used the red-and-black flag. However, it is possible to trace some antecedents in the use of the red-and-yellow flag. For example, and although it is not mentioned in the press, Calvo Sotelo’s coffin was probably covered with the flag of the monarchists. General Sanjurjo’s coffin was covered with ‘the Spanish flag’, according to the 22 July chronicle of the newspaper *ABC* of Seville. The same newspaper on 18 July serves as an example of one of the rare occasions that the press mentioned its public exhibition: ‘One day recently, a two-colour flag appeared on the clock’s tower in the village of Cacabelos.’ Aside from this, there are few illustrations to be cited concerning the use of the monarchists’ flag prior to 18 July.

Following the military rebellion, the Carlists in Pamplona were the first to hoist the two-colour flag, and its use spread throughout the rebel territory during the summer thanks to a varied, intense and mass mobilisation, thus converting an exclusively monarchist flag into an official national symbol.<sup>6</sup>

The first time the two-colour flag appeared publicly in Pamplona was in the afternoon of Sunday, 19 July, when it was raised on the balcony of the *diputación*, and hours later on that of the *ayuntamiento*, by the Carlists, who had taken the city, attacking the Izquierda Republicana offices, destroying street signs associated with the Republic, and removing republican flags from public buildings as well as the remains of the tricolour bunting from the recently concluded San Fermín festival. Perhaps because he wanted to avoid a confrontation with the Carlists in Navarre, so necessary for the success of the rebellion, General Mola, leader of the rebellion and military governor of Navarre, though visibly surprised and irritated, gave his consent to what was a *fait accompli*.<sup>7</sup>

However, it did not occur in the same way in Burgos where, at six o'clock in the morning of 19 July, a two-colour flag was raised on the balcony of the *ayuntamiento* by a few Carlists participating in a spontaneous demonstration that afterwards congregated at the cathedral doors to dedicate a *salve* (anthem) to the Virgin Mary. The military governor of Burgos, Fidel Dávila, ordered the flag removed and for it to be substituted by the flag of the city. In the same manner, on Mola's arrival at the Castilian city on 20 July, the two-colour decorations on balconies along the route from the airfield to the city were removed and the general reviewed the troops saluting the tricolour flag of the Republic.<sup>8</sup>

When 1,600 Carlists arrived at Zaragoza from Navarre on 24 July, they carried a two-colour flag, but there is no information about their being able to raise it on official buildings until the end of July. In other cities, the Republic's flag either remained raised, as in Córdoba and Cádiz, until mid-August, or was withdrawn but not substituted, or, in other cases, such as Salamanca, the 'fascist' (red-and-black) flag was raised by Falangists from Valladolid, amid the cheers of the people congregated in the public square in front of the *ayuntamiento*. In Seville, Falangists were still displaying their flag on a fountain in a city square on the last day of July. In Vitoria, the flag was not raised and no bunting was placed on the balconies, despite the Carlists' entering the city. Elsewhere, where there is no information regarding the flag, the flag-raising rituals took place at a later date.<sup>9</sup>

This confusion, or at least initial disparity, concerning the value conferred on the two-colour flag disappeared progressively as the flag was

incorporated into the most significant mobilisations held in the rebel territory throughout the summer.

The funerals of the rebel zone assembled great crowds and, on many occasions, the participation of all the city's armed forces and militia.<sup>10</sup> During the first days, the coffins of those killed in combat, honoured in the mass funerals, were covered with each militia's own flag or simply with wreaths or black crepe. However, although these ornaments might have remained in each city with varying consistency until the end of July, the two-colour flag was beginning to be used at funerals. One of the first examples was in Valladolid at the funeral held on 25 July for Onésimo Redondo, whose coffin was covered with the two-colour flag and the ensign of the JONS. On the following day, at the funeral for a soldier in Ávila, the red and gold was again used. In Burgos, on 22 July, the coffin of a member of the monarchist Renovación Española was also covered with the new flag. There are not many more cases of this procedure at this time. However, from the beginning of August, nearly all funerals included the two-colour flag amongst their symbols.<sup>11</sup>

Besides the funerals, the two-colour flag also appeared in the two series of acts of reparation held in each city and town for the bombing of the Basílica del Pilar on 3 August and the 'execution' of the Sacred Heart of Jesus on the outskirts of Madrid on 7 August. In the first case, the plane itself that had dropped the bombs on the temple of Nuestra Señora del Pilar had borne red-and-yellow colours, a way of sowing confusion about its origin and objective among those below. Aside from decorating half the city with red-and-yellow bunting from the balconies, at the beginning of the act of 'reparation' held the following afternoon in Zaragoza, a great two-colour flag was deployed as a spatial focal point at the head of the demonstration, enabling the enormous multitude gathered to know where the demonstration began. In Valladolid, as in León, the two-colour flag was placed at the head of the demonstration. A different method was introduced in Palencia, at the act of reparation for the Sacred Heart of Jesus, when the red-and-yellow flag was encompassed by the canopy placed beneath the image displayed on the altar of the parish church of San Miguel.<sup>12</sup>

The red-and-yellow flag's presence is observable in other types of demonstrations, such as the mass demonstration held in Salamanca to celebrate the rebel army's conquest of Toledo, where the mayor himself hoisted the flag. In all the rebel cities during the month of August and the beginning of September, the two-colour flag was the ultimate protagonist of the demonstrations. In each case the flag was solemnly raised on the flagpole of the *ayuntamiento*, witnessed by the civilian



Figure 8.1. 'Execution' of the Sacred Heart of Jesus by militiamen at Cerro de los Ángeles, August 1936 (from *Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana*, 1936–1939, vol. 1, Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1967).

population, the militia, and the civil, religious and military authorities. These political rituals represented one of the most obviously mass civilian–military symbolic acts of that summer in the rebel territory and they followed one another, like a cascade, in all the capital cities of each province, with greater or lesser solemnity and power of popular attraction. Similar acts took place in the smaller towns of each province. On many occasions, another flag was hoisted along with the two-colour one, most frequently the Falangist one. In most cases, the clergy witnessed the two-colour flag's hoisting, either because it took place after an

open-air or field mass in the Plaza Mayor, or because the flag had previously been blessed by the bishop. The two most outstanding examples were organised in Seville and Salamanca.<sup>13</sup>

In Seville, a city that had fallen almost straightaway to the rebels, the festival of the Assumption of the Virgin on 15 August was the day of celebration of the city's own advocacy of the Virgin, Nuestra Señora de los Reyes. Queipo de Llano ordered that a solemn flag-raising act at the *ayuntamiento* be added to the religious festivities. All morning long, the population took part in several consecutive mass acts that followed one another in order: mass at the cathedral, a street procession with a parade of the militias, the flag-raising, a political meeting and, lastly, a second military parade. By mid-August the war was already considered a struggle for the *Patria* and for religion and, thus, these rituals represented the consummation of the crusade's political mobilisation. As well as Cardinal Ilundain, archbishop of Seville, Generals Queipo, Millán and Franco appeared on the balcony of the *ayuntamiento* to gaze skywards when a small plane flew over the Plaza de San Fernando to drop leaflets with patriotic proclamations on a red-and-yellow background. Afterwards, Queipo spoke to those assembled and went as far as to recite a number of poetic verses about the flag. Then the general raised the red-and-gold colours and, amid cheering and applause from the people, the three generals fervently kissed the flag. The newspaper *ABC* described the moment emotionally: 'There is no pen capable of describing the moment. Tears, trembling, hearts beating rapidly and one cry in the throats of everyone: Spain, Spain, Spain.'<sup>14</sup>

In Salamanca, the Day of the Flag was celebrated on 8 September to coincide with the festival of Nuestra Señora de la Vega, patroness of the city. A mass in the cathedral, attended by all the civilian and military authorities was accompanied by the *Salve*, after which the congregation made its way to the Plaza Mayor, site of the *ayuntamiento*. With the square bursting with people and in the presence of the militia and the armed forces, the bishop blessed the flag on the balcony of the *ayuntamiento* and then the military commander's daughter, who was the patroness of the act, exclaimed before the microphones: 'I kiss this glorious and beautiful flag with the love of a Christian child, with the love of a Spaniard; a kiss in which the army and the people are forever merged, with the greatest love.' Following more speeches, the flag was raised, as the militia stood at attention and the civilians bared their heads, before bursting into cheers to Spain. Finally, the militia, the armed forces, and the women and children's sections of the parties began their parade and a hundred young ladies prepared for the selling of little flag pins in aid of charity.<sup>15</sup>

The two-colour flag was permanently mobilised in the rebel cities from August, consigning other flags, such as the red-and-black Falangist flag, to second place. Despite the fascists' insistence on using this flag, exhibiting it in demonstrations, by mid-August it could not compete with the two-colour flag, initially hoisted and disseminated by the Carlists.<sup>16</sup> The leaders of Renovación Española were enthusiastic collaborators in spreading its use but, unlike the Carlists, they barely had a militia or members to support it. They insisted on it through conversations with members of the military themselves.

Due solely to the mobilisation in the rebel territory an exclusive symbol, until then used only by monarchists, was able to take hold and become a collective symbol. Its public display and its prominence in political rituals and mobilisations allowed the two-colour flag to become the national flag – an alternative to the tricolour flag of the Republic, symbol of the enemy. The military rebellion on 18 July had no flag. However, on 29 August, the National Defence Junta issued a decree 'admitting' that since the people had in fact already done it, the flag would be legally 'reinstated' as the national banner. The rebels now had a symbol of cohesion in the face of the enemy.

It took other symbols longer to appear or to be officially recognised. Some, on the contrary, became less popular. Iribarren, Mola's secretary, relates that the first time he heard the *Marcha Real* anthem, after the beginning of the war, was on 1 October of that year. Until then, the rebel faction had not perceived what would later be the official anthem, and different songs were sung. During the summer of 1936, amidst the most important mobilisations, one could hear patriotic *pasodobles*, traditional *jotas* from Aragón, religious hymns, such as that of Nuestra Señora del Pilar, or the Carlist *Oriamendi*, and the Foreign Legion's anthem, *Yo tenía un Camarada*. Even more frequently, one could hear the 'fascist' anthem *Cara al Sol* which, along with the roman salute, constituted the two outstanding Falange contributions to the rebel symbolism during these two early months. For example, it was almost habitual to observe the majority of the participants in a unitary mobilisation paying homage to the red-and-gold flag by raising their arms and singing *Cara al Sol*.<sup>17</sup>

The word 'reds' to identify the enemy was another symbol which began to be used in the rebel territory within a few days or weeks, after the rebellion. At the beginning, the term used was 'Marxists', 'revolutionaries' or 'anti-national sects'. Something similar occurred with the word 'crusade' to name and give a particular meaning to the war which emerged from the initial failure of the military rebellion.



### **‘God wishes it’: the crusade**

Heart of Jesus, executed by degenerate and monstrous sons of Spain! In truth He was for them the enemy. No doubt, that is why they have executed Him. How evil they are! In one moment and with one shot they have wounded the heart of Jesus and the heart of Spain!<sup>18</sup>

The extensiveness of the idea of the crusade gives rise to the same question as the two-colour flag: how could the concrete meaning of the civil war as a crusade, as a holy war, have spread, when at the beginning it was neither the most obvious nor the most widespread, and prior to 18 July had been used only sporadically to define political contention in times of peace?

On some occasions, the Catholics had considered the political rivalry embarked upon during the election campaign in February 1936 as a crusade, and the concept was fully integrated in the political theory of Carlism to define the historical struggle between tradition and liberalism.<sup>19</sup>

As we have seen before, the rhetoric of the military rebellion was patriotic and prophylactic, with no reference to religion. The only exception was the discourse of the Carlists in Pamplona where, from 19 July, there was talk of a combined struggle for the *Patria* and religion. They began very quickly to use the concept of crusade, as a battle carried out by Spanish crusaders, in an attempt to restore the kingdom of God in the *Patria*.<sup>20</sup>

It is true that the term ‘crusade’ would soon appear in the odd radio broadcast or in newspaper articles. General Franco himself used the term to describe the rebellion as a ‘general crusade’, a ‘crusade for a great Spain’, in two statements broadcast on Radio Ceuta and Radio Tetuán, on 21 and 25 July. But in neither case does Franco refer explicitly to a religious war. In an editorial in *El Noticiero* of Zaragoza, José María Valente in Burgos, Miguel Iscar and José María Gil Robles in Salamanca, the civil governor of Valladolid, and other figures later on in other cities, speak about a ‘national crusade’, a ‘crusade for the *Patria*’ or a ‘great crusade’. That is to say, with a patriotic sense of the war that does not include explicit religious characteristics, either in form or in content.<sup>21</sup>

During the conflict over the church and religion during the Republic, Catholics had on some occasions defined their clash with the anti-clericals as a crusade. But despite the fact that the concept had already been enunciated by nineteenth-century Spanish traditionalists, a series of events were necessary before the term crusade, used from the first days of the war, could be extended and generalised in a new concept

from mid-August 1936. From then on, the majority of the rebel faction defined the war not merely as a patriotic crusade, but also now as a religious one, a holy war to restore the kingdom of God in Spain.

The events to which I refer can be arranged in two groups. On the one hand, the bombing of the *Basílica del Pilar* on 3 August, and the 'execution' of the Sacred Heart of Jesus which, though it occurred on 7 August, was not extensively known about in the rebel faction until ten days later. On the other hand, the constant mass demonstrations, in which the relevance of the religious symbols, spaces, rituals and officiants, along with the armed forces and the civilians, was fundamental, resulted in a sacred representation of the rebels' war effort.

The rebels began to know about the anticlerical repression in republican territory from the end of July, thanks to the press spreading the news of the confrontations emerging from the rebellion in some cities – such as Seville – and, above all, to the news from people who had escaped from republican territory. However, there was no general reaction to this because the information was neither plentiful nor specific. The first detailed references to the attacks against the *Basílica del Pilar*, considered a providential miracle because no serious damage was inflicted, and the *Cerro de los Ángeles*, interpreted almost as a second crucifixion of Christ, merited a great deal of comment and, as we have seen, much mobilisation. It reached a point where these attacks were considered a sacrilege that deeply wounded the hearts of all the 'good' Spaniards. From that moment on, ceremonies to return crucifixes to schoolrooms, exaltations of the Sacred Heart, and mobilisations of Virgins, were added to the acts of reparation, funerals, multitudinous processions, and other manifestations we have already described. Through all of these gatherings, the majority of the clergy, the militia and the civilian population jointly conferred a sacred significance on the war.

In all the acts of reparation, officiated by the religious authorities, the parties' militiamen and the soldiers of the Nationalist army prostrated themselves, lowered weapons and paraded before the Virgin or the image of Christ. The cry 'Spain is down on its knees',<sup>22</sup> shouted by the men, women and children taking part in the demonstration, manifested support for the army in the exaltation of God. These acts were widely covered by the press, and in the majority of the next day's newspapers one frequently found comments about the combination of religion and patriotism as the main meaning of the act of reparation.<sup>23</sup>

The funerals in honour of the fallen on the rebel side played a fundamental role in transforming the war into a religious crusade. In the same

way that Onésimo Redondo died on 25 July for 'the cause of order and justice' and a civil guard died on 31 July, 'defending order, society and the *Patria*', from August the funerals became homages to the fallen 'for God and Spain'. They became martyrs of the crusade who exemplified the suffering necessary for achieving collective redemption. General Mola explained on Radio Navarre that the blood spilled to redeem the 'people of Spain' was like that of Christ on Golgotha. The funerals for those killed in the war, as well as those commemorating the deaths of Calvo Sotelo and Sanjurjo a month before, were collective representations of those interpretations. In the funerals that covered the main streets of the city up to a point near the cemetery, the parties' militia went behind the clergy, who carried the raised cross. Soldiers blessed by God were transported toward eternal life on carriages, cars or their comrades' shoulders: death for the salvation of the living.<sup>24</sup>

'Christ returns to the schoolroom' was the comment made by *El Noticiero* of Zaragoza on 11 August reporting the return of the crucifix to a pre-eminent place in the Joaquín Costa school building. During the months of August and September, prior to or at the beginning of the 1936–7 school year, the crucifixes were returned to the schools of all the cities conquered by the rebels until that moment. The measure was a direct response to the removal of the crucifixes by the Republic's government in 1932.

As in the case of the two-colour flag and the holy war, the initiative came from the Carlists in Navarre. Specifically, Pamplona's city government agreed to the reinsertion of the crucifixes as early as 24 July, in response to a proposal by the local Carlist council. The idea spread across the rebel territory as, again, Carlists – like Lamamié de Clairac – recommended the 'solemn' replacement of the crucifixes in each school 'since they are already doing it in other places', referring to Navarre. Falangists also carried out some of the ceremonies to mark the recovery of the crucifixes. Mobilisations around the crucifix took place in Castilian towns and villages from mid-August to the beginning of September; in La Coruña at the end of August, and on 15 September – and not before, save in Cádiz – in the Andalusian provinces controlled by Queipo de Llano.<sup>25</sup>

The main military, civilian and religious authorities in each city, always accompanied by the militia, the teachers and the children, as well as the civilian population in general, participated in the numerous replacement of crucifixes. Very often, a priest blessed the crucifix after a mass and a parade of the militia and troops. Then several authorities delivered speeches exalting the confluence of the *Patria* and religion and

mentioning the holy war, while the people applauded and cheered. The flag was hoisted at the school and a donation was made to the pupils. The press coverage of these mobilisations was extraordinary, since it not only informed readers about the ceremonies in the main cities, but also in great detail about those in many villages.

Once again, the rebels mobilised a series of symbols in these rituals in the summer of 1936. The ordinary people of the Nationalist zone showed their support for religion as a fundamental element of the *Patria*, through a combination of religious and military rituals and forms of civil protest.

Other types of mobilisations joined those already discussed. Above all, Álvarez Bolado calls our attention to the 'mobilisation of Virgins' in September, consisting of taking the image of the Virgin from its habitual setting to the cathedral or an urban church, a process only ever carried out in times of danger.<sup>26</sup>

The solemn blessings can be recalled in the same manner. There was the blessing of flags, like the two-colour one, because 'it has been the banner of all our crusades', but also the Falangist and Carlist flags and those of their youth movements. Also reported was the blessing of weapons, like the armoured truck captured by the Carlist militiamen in Tolosa, around which congregated on its arrival in Zaragoza 'a great crowd that fanatically applauded the Christian ceremony', officiated over at the doors of the Basilica.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, we must mention other religious-civilian-military rituals, like the tumultuous field masses, as in La Coruña, in which all the aforementioned groups participated; the processions, like that of Nuestra Señora de los Reyes in Seville or that of Santa María la Real in Pamplona, a model of planning and organisation, with the entire city participating; the three-day Novenas and *Te Deums* for the rebel forces' victory in the war.<sup>28</sup>

Some very expressive symbols used in different mobilisations and rituals and in daily life in times of war also deserve mention. These included church bells ringing to announce planes nearing the city skies; clergymen working as military chaplains at the front lines; the Carlist or Falangist 'altar boys' at the multitudinous masses; the ritual of hearing the Falange or Legion's anthems at the moment the Host was raised at Consecration; the scapulars, medals, crosses and protective sacred emblems hung on the soldiers and militia's clothing; the touching of the cloak of Nuestra Señora del Pilar with the red beret or the legionnaires' hat in the hope of protection.<sup>29</sup> All of these are symbols of the symbiosis between war and religion, whose presence in the mobilisations maintained the war as a crusade.

While this great number of mass acts was taking place, the rhetoric of a religious crusade expressed by the clergy, as well as by the military and civilians, became generalised. From then on, the 'meta-narrative' of the war was defined in relation to the notion of the 'crusade'. This narrative of the 'holy war' was, aside from the Carlist rhetoric, most clearly initiated in the discourse of *El Noticiero* of Zaragoza, of the magisterial canon of Salamanca and publicist of the Catholic justification of the rebellion, Aniceto de Castro Albarrán, and to a lesser degree in that of General Mola.

On 9 August, the *Noticiero* editorial declared that 'in essence, the current struggle, observed from a political or social point of view, is a war about religion'. On 15 August, Castro Albarrán proclaimed on the radio that, 'we must be as God and Spain would wish. Let us all be that way and then we will be able to say that our war is a holy one. Our cry will be that of the Crusaders: God wishes it. Long life to Catholic Spain! Hail the Spain of Isabel la Católica!' At the end of his disquisition Emilio Mola beseeched all believers 'to utter a prayer for the souls of those who have died in the Holy Crusade to save Spain'. By the beginning of September this rhetoric had become generalised, to such a point that the war was hardly spoken of in any other terms in the Nationalist zone.<sup>30</sup>

### Conclusion

A political process was opened after the military rebellion of 18 July and in the first weeks of the civil war. This included the incorporation and selection of certain symbols that identified the rebels collectively. The assorted political powers and social organisations that supported the coup, as well as the rebel military themselves, embarked upon a symbolic struggle to that end.

Along with other political procedures, and especially after August 1936, these groups sponsored mobilisations that selected and highlighted these symbols – such as the two-colour flag, the crucifix, the martyr-soldier, the Virgin and the Sacred Heart of Jesus – more than others. The most 'mobilised' symbols contributed to giving the various insurgent factions, and the war itself, from their point of view, a different meaning to that spread during the rebellion and the first days of the war. This new meaning separated the rebel faction from the Republic at a symbolic level much more obviously than previously.

By means of a process of mobilisation, a flag different from the republican one was institutionalised. Having lost its monarchist

reference, in spite of the Carlists and the leaders of Renovación Española, the 'new' two-colour flag identified the rebel soldiers with those covered by the flag in previous crusades, martyrs in the struggle for God and the *Patria*. Simultaneously, the mobilisations around the crucifix, the Virgin – particularly Nuestra Señora del Pilar – and the Sacred Heart of Jesus, spread a definition of the war as a religious crusade, that placed God at the centre of the origin, legitimacy and purpose of the rebels' fight.

Beginning with a Carlist initiative, and thanks to the massive mobilisation of symbols deployed from August 1936, the rebels in unity began to consider themselves as modern crusaders fighting to conquer Madrid – the new Jerusalem – occupied by Moscow, home of the new infidels.

## 9 'Spain's Vendée': Carlist identity in Navarre as a mobilising model

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*Francisco Javier Caspistegui*

A readiness to pass judgement on the adversary became a key element in the deployment of propaganda in the Spanish civil war. With respect to Navarre, this was made clear by Arthur Koestler in 1937: 'The Pyrenean valleys of Navarre had remained a stronghold of medieval tradition; it was Spain's Vendée and the birthplace of the Carlist movement.'<sup>1</sup> The French counter-revolutionary rising of 1793, became a mythical point of reference for all those subsequently in active opposition to revolutionary processes. The Vendée was an ideological point of contact for diverse movements characterised by religious, traditionalist, anti-modern, rural, dynastic and localist claims. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Vendée should serve as a historical marker for Koestler through which he sought to find an explanation for the 1936 events in Spain.

In 1936 the image of Navarre had long been associated with the particular political, social and ideological views which constitute the Carlist variant of traditionalism.<sup>2</sup> The role of Navarre during the civil war was to become decisive, resulting in a reconfiguration of the rules of Carlism's self-understanding as the movement's elites searched for a definition more in accordance with the new situation.

Navarre was an essentially agricultural region (agricultural labourers accounted for 61 per cent of the workforce in 1930), with a pronounced religious tradition. In the north and centre of Navarre, there was a relatively egalitarian model of property distribution and, although the more unbalanced pattern of land ownership in the south provoked social conflict during the first part of the twentieth century, overall there was little tradition of class-based trade unionism before the Republic, the labour movement being dominated by Catholic unions. The fifth wealthiest province in 1930, the average income was high by Spanish standards.

The process whereby the defining elements of Navarre's identity were revised was rooted in pre-existing characteristics. As Miguel Ángel Cabrera has pointed out, 'all new social phenomena are always learned by individuals through a body of existing concepts'. The material reality of the civil war in Navarre interacted with *existing ideas* that provided a

sense of collective awareness, leading to a review of Carlism's identity and its relationship to Navarre and, ultimately, to Spain. This sense of identity suggests the importance of discourse. While language may not materially constitute social reality, it does construct it as a significant entity. By using these discursive categories, individuals define themselves, attribute themselves with a social role and convert themselves into historical agents.<sup>3</sup>

From this point of view, during the civil war in Navarre, there was an interaction between the categories present during the preceding years and the new historical circumstances, resulting in a process that re-defined the identity of Navarre in a more clearly Carlist sense, although still not so markedly as would later be the case during the Franco dictatorship. There was little harmony between this reshaped identity and opposed and minority viewpoints, especially those of left-wing and Basque nationalist inspiration, which used radically different arguments and concepts drawn from their own traditions. This resulted in a further reformulation of categories, greater emphasis on certain components of identity and the configuration of a model that serves as a formula to enable us to understand both individual and collective actors. The starting point was formulated during the first days of the war by the *Diputación Foral* of Navarre, the most important regional institution, referring to the years of the Second Republic and the rebellion in 1936:

During the last few years of uninterrupted ignominy, Navarre has felt its conscience acutely outraged, its beliefs derided, its character shackled. By making an unlimited contribution to [the] redemptory movement, in terms of the blood of its sons, the property and generous effort of its people, Navarre is striving for a moral and material restoration of its own values.<sup>4</sup>

This constituted the extension of the traditionalist, anti-liberal and anti-republican model over the whole of Navarre where, despite being dominant, it was not unanimously accepted. It was the first step in the construction of what I have called the utopia of unitarian identity.<sup>5</sup>

The aim of the pages that follow is, therefore, not so much to review the events of the civil war in Navarre but, rather, to outline aspects of the models through which Navarre's involvement in the civil war was characterised, focusing on a rereading of the most significant elements in the process of adaptation to the war situation.

### **Carlist identity as a model**

Although since the nineteenth century there had been a tendency to associate Navarre with Carlism, it was evident that, even within the ranks of traditionalism, there existed other, diametrically opposed



worldviews. With the outbreak of the civil war, however, Carlism established itself as the only way to understand the situation in Navarre. What had, until then, only been a part now became the whole. In the implementation of this ideological synecdoche, the basic elements that had previously been present in the conceptual framework of republican Navarre were reinforced and extended during the war in an apologetic and propagandist reformulation. The wartime mobilisation was a consequence of 'communities and networks, of a particular kind of self-image, of a certain emotional state and of memories that were channelled to this end'.<sup>6</sup>

This identification came about as a result of geographical, historical and even psychological factors, all of which moulded the constructed character of the people of Navarre.<sup>7</sup> El Tebib Arrumi (V́ctor Ruiz Albéniz) thus joined together the three main geographical zones of Navarre in a single ideal in one of the short works which made up his wartime 'Children's Library': 'a farm labourer weather-beaten by the north winds of the Roncal (valley), just like a market gardener blackened by the fumes of the valleys bathed by the famous Arga (river), a nobleman from Estella or a landed bourgeois from Pamplona'.<sup>8</sup> This image of a united Navarre was applicable to the whole country, it was a reflection of all Spain, 'because when Spain looks at (Navarre), its own physiognomy is reflected back'.<sup>9</sup>

Such an image of unity transcended geography to embrace morality: 'Spain has a gigantic heart, because Navarre is the heart of Spain!'<sup>10</sup> Through a multitude of pathways, the ideological and political image was transmitted to the Carlist community, potentially enlarged due to the pressure of events, in what was an extraordinarily effective capillary process. The relatively high level of literacy ensured that the written word was the preferred instrument for spreading this message, provided that the reading matter was 'not contrary to morality and patriotism'.<sup>11</sup> This resulted in a proliferation of discourses in which the texts, beneath their instructive and moralising veneers, repeated the main messages:

You are the providential guide that God has chosen as an example for your compatriots, and I have the good fortune to be able to tell you that today the whole of Spain, the whole of our Spain, which is the only one worthy of bearing this name, is one vast Navarre, in which homage is paid to old traditions, beneath the protective gaze of our Saviour.<sup>12</sup>

Navarre, region *par excellence* of the only Spain possible, was raised to the altar of sacredness:

For me . . . there are now two sacred lands. One is Palestine, where Christ suffered passion and death. The other one is Navarre, where this summer – when Spain might have disappeared – everything was put at risk and caution thrown to

the wind, in order to save her. In my house there has to be, in a phial like a reliquary, a handful of Navarrese soil because the land which gives rise to such men is to be treasured as a relic.<sup>13</sup>

A significant aspect of this reordering was its popular transmission, as demonstrated by the well-known song *Navarra siempre p'alante* ('Navarre always to the forefront'), by Joaquín Larregla:

Navarre carries in its bosom  
The blood of all Spain,  
And he who doubts this  
May come to see it any day.<sup>14</sup>

This absolute unanimity of purpose and action excluded any hint of half-heartedness: 'The exploits of Navarre pertain to the whole Province. In no part of its homelands [*lares patrios*] was there a failure to respond, nor even the slightest trace of hesitation or wavering.'<sup>15</sup> For this reason, it was considered to be at the vanguard of the process of reconquest, not only of Spain, but of the whole Christian universe.<sup>16</sup>

To all this was linked the bellicose attitude and the ode to the redeeming violence of Carlism and its troops – the *requetés* – because, as has been pointed out, Navarre was the shrine of tradition, preserved untouched throughout the centuries, unlike other regions such as Asturias, which had, it was argued, broken their traditional loyalty. In this providential vision, Navarre

was eternally predestined to accomplish great things over time. Because, given the reigning order . . . , it would be an insult to . . . Providence to suppose that the great historic mission of Navarre is the product of chance or accident . . . Navarre has been summoned and chosen by God since the beginning of time . . . Navarre has, undoubtedly, a prominent part to play in the Divine Plan; an honourable position throughout history, exalted to the zenith. This holy Crusade is a true National Reconquest in which Navarre holds the seat of honour.<sup>17</sup>

A historical dimension was added to this image of a single character and geography in order to create a more complete teleological vision. Navarre's traditional character was projected back to the most remote times. Thus, in Cardinal Gomá's words, Navarre, 'mother of kingdoms, has today been the heart from which the emotion and impact of the pivotal moments of history has irradiated over our entire land'.<sup>18</sup> Antonio Pérez de Olaguer also invoked this medieval past in discussing Saturnino Lasterra, a man from Artajona in Navarre, who 'at the height of the Middle Ages, in the year of our Lord 1097, in the First Crusade, was a *requeté*'. And, perpetuating the historical cycle, adds: 'Many years have passed. Even centuries have passed. The wheel of the Crusades keeps turning. There is now a heroic Crusade against unbridled

communism. When the moment of truth came, Spain could not fail and the same is true of the land that produced Saturnino . . . and his small home town.<sup>19</sup>

The Reconquest of Spain from Islam offered a historical analogy *par excellence*, applied to the fight against the new enemies, the demonised revolution. And, in this conflict, Navarre played the part that the kingdom of Asturias played in the eighth century: 'the undefeated Covadonga where the Saracens of today would clash'.<sup>20</sup> The solemnity with which St James's day was celebrated in 1936 in Pamplona is indicative of this attitude, 'a significant demonstration of the transubstantiation which, prompted by the popular climate, meant that in a very few days the uprising went from a military coup to a crusade'.<sup>21</sup> St James's day commemorated the assistance given, according to myth, by the patron saint of Spain in the fight against Islam: 'Of course, the patron saint of Spain . . . won't fail to offer his valuable assistance to this Spanish crusade against the Marxist Moors who have tried to remove the blessed sign of our redemption from the Spanish Nation, which had freed itself from the Saracen yoke with the Cross as a shield.'<sup>22</sup>

There existed only one Spain which received help from the saint in its fight against the infidel, though the army of *this* 'true' 'national' Spain was itself, in part at least, *reliant* on 'Christianised' Moors. One of the Navarrese *requetés* offered this description of events: 'In these mountains, we fought a great battle against the enemy, in which we emerged victorious . . . The battle took place on St James's day.'<sup>23</sup> From here to the proclamation of war as a crusade, there was a small step.<sup>24</sup> From the beginning of the nineteenth century 'until 1936, in each civil war in Spain . . . there had been talk, on the part of the Carlist or fundamentalist side . . . of *bellum sacrum* . . . It is not that the ecclesiastical hierarchy promoted this reading . . . It was the people themselves and a large part of the clergy who lived through that time in accordance with the spirit of religious rebellion.'<sup>25</sup> The uprising was likened to that past in which one was said to be fighting for survival, and which provided those points of reference on which to base their own identity, 'linking, through time, the battle of the Navas de Tolosa and the 19th of July'.<sup>26</sup> The past and the present united, the Middle Ages and the modern era justifying the situation which led to war. In order to reinforce the religious component, it was decided that the fiesta of St James should serve as an occasion for the consecration of the *requetés* to the Sacred Heart of Jesus in a multitudinous and solemn service: 'Like our grandfathers, like our fathers, driven by the same religious and patriotic ideals, arms at the ready to defend our eternal and absolute rights over people's consciences and over society.'<sup>27</sup>

As well as immemorial references, there were those that referred to an earlier Carlism in Navarre, and the association between the two provided the arguments on which to base a redefinition of the Navarrese character. The *Ordenanza del Requeté* (ordinances) made clear: 'You are . . . the pride and heir of your glorious forefathers.'<sup>28</sup> Thus, it was recalled that preparations for the uprising began with the 1931 proclamation of the Republic.<sup>29</sup> On 19 July 1936, in Pamplona's Plaza del Castillo, 'the red berets . . . have an anachronistic flavour, an appearance which is reminiscent of another century'.<sup>30</sup> 'It seemed to me to be a scene from the time of the Carlist War and the priest Santa Cruz',<sup>31</sup> declared Pío Baroja upon seeing them, because continuity was the fundamental distinguishing mark:

This is Navarre . . . and these young men are following on from those other crusaders for the Cause, who gave their blood and lives for the banner of Tradition . . . When the time came, Navarre has risen as it did in 1834 and 1872 and the same red berets have offered themselves to form battalions of young fighters.<sup>32</sup>

History had to be present, as it was in history that the essence of Carlism was found: 'PEOPLE OF NAVARRE! Think of your history and, without cowardice, obey the voices of your consciences',<sup>33</sup> cried the editorials. Carlism had chosen the past, a place where it could recognise itself and be recognised; it was 'the ancient Navarre of God, King and Country, legendary and heroic'.<sup>34</sup>

Religion was already an ever-present theme in the allegorical symbolism created by the Carlist camp to oppose the Republic, the birth of which had inspired a series of apocalyptic prophecies.<sup>35</sup> But religion also figured prominently in vindictory discourses.<sup>36</sup> When the socialist Indalecio Prieto presented Navarre as a Vatican Gibraltar, and the Navarrese as 'cave dwellers', traditionalism converted this insult into a compliment, talking about 'the great cave that prevented the entry of the Marxist plague . . . This "cave" was a repository of religious faith, of good customs, of uprightness, of patriotic spirit, of everything decent, healthy and honourable . . . To be a reactionary meant, in short, to be a decent person.'<sup>37</sup> Within traditionalism, the relevance and the role of this overall religious phenomenon were stressed. The Carlist children's magazine *Pelayos* published a series called 'History of the National Movement'. Its image of Navarre can be summarised in one of its vignettes: 'The Navarrese soul, whose religious sentiments were outraged during the whole period of the Republic, wanted to make amends immediately to Jesus Christ. Impressive processions were organised presided over by the redemptory Cross.'<sup>38</sup> This was not an



Figure 9.1. Civil war postcard showing men of Navarran brigades advancing behind the crucifix (from Luis Bolin, *Spain: the Vital Years*, Cassell, 1967). These postcards were often produced with a representation of the Sacred Heart of Jesus in one corner.

impetuous response, but something which had been patiently incubated and which was latent in the spirit of Carlism and, therefore, of Navarre.

Alfonso Carlos, the Carlist pretender to the throne, wrote to the Carlist council of war of Navarre in August 1936, confirming this historical aspect of identity: 'We were singularly pleased to hear that our *requetés* have the banner of the Sacred Heart and are fighting this war to save Religion. God will grant us the final victory.'<sup>39</sup> The symbolic use of religious elements reinforced a deep-rooted component of identity, something which translated into multitudinous public ceremonies, such

as the aforementioned St James's day, and the habitual use of *detentes*,<sup>40</sup> prayer books, Sacred Hearts,<sup>41</sup> medals and scapulars: 'They wore the bright berets and dress shirts as mementos of their mothers [and] their sweethearts . . . : *detentes* edged with bright red and embroidered with great patience; cheap little medals with Carlist blue and Monarchist bicolour ribbons; big scapulars, rough like hair shirts.'<sup>42</sup> And, together with this, a religiousness closely tied to community practices, such as saying the rosary or confessions *en masse*. As was customary in Carlism, there was intense concern for the social transmission of the most significant of these elements of self-understanding, for example, through songs:

We are the brave Navarrese champions  
Of Christ the King, our Redeemer;  
With great courage unto the death  
We swear to defend Him in fierce combat  
Navarre has always been  
The defender of our holy religion;  
So now let us go brothers  
To defend it to the death.<sup>43</sup>

Evidence that these messages reached those to whom they were addressed is provided by a letter that one of them wrote to his brother: 'I also want you to remember the poor boys whom we call "Reds", and pray for them, so that God may touch their hearts and enlighten them and so that they may open their eyes to the light of the truth and lay down their arms – which serve the interests of Moscow – and make them available for the service of our Holy Ideals.'<sup>44</sup> In the midst of the festive enthusiasm of the departure from Pamplona, the dissemination of these elements and the general atmosphere meant that the exalted spirit of the volunteers became infectious. The *Devocionario del Requeté* (*Requeté's* Prayer Book) published in August 1936 reveals this: '*Requetés!* Attention! Before God, King and Lord of the people, as the soldier of his Cause . . . The Cause that you are defending is God's cause. Consider yourself a soldier of a crusade whose goal is God, and entrust victory to Him.' All this prepared those who faced death to accept this sacrifice and, moreover, to make it a tribute to the salvation of Spain:

When the shrapnel wounds your flesh and when your blood runs and when you see your life deserting you, your cry of *Viva España!*, made supernatural by the mystical sweetness of this ideal, short intense prayer is tantamount to an act of willing surrender to God, a small part of the price to pay for the acquisition of such a grace: the salvation of Spain.

One of the combatants described it thus: 'on ascending the mountain, in order to take possession of it, I said three Hail Marys to the Holy Virgin

and repeated, over and over again, the beautiful brief prayer: "Sacred Heart of Jesus: in thee I trust".<sup>45</sup> This reflected obedience to the advice given in the *Devocionario del Requeté*: 'During the day: Life of prayer, during your activities as a fighter, short prayers are perfectly possible . . . Sacred Heart of Jesus, in thee I trust; Hail Immaculate Mary, conceived without original sin.'

This informative elaboration of the fundamental principles was broadcast and commented upon in the mass media and reached a large part of the population. Possibly the most striking example of this was children's magazines, which attempted to simplify the most significant references of Carlism and make them accessible. A mother explained to her son the scope of 'tradition':

it comes from God, because you know that the Gospel was preached by the Lord on the Earth, it was heard by his disciples, and some of them wrote it down exactly as they heard it, for those who would be born after them. And Tradition is what I sang to you when I had to get you off to sleep, and heard my mother say in my dreams when I was a girl . . . [E]verything which is conserved, even as time passes.<sup>46</sup>

Initial socialisation was carried out by mothers, although when the time came this impulse would be reinforced by a complex associative framework, which in wartime was the military organisation itself.<sup>47</sup> This is what led to a proliferation of texts which emphasised heroism: a Navarrese mother, after bidding her volunteer husband and two of her sons farewell, went back home with the youngest son and there refused to give him food to eat 'because I don't want any idlers or cowards in my house, and you should be ashamed of staying at home when your father and your brothers have left to defend Spain. A mixture of fury and shame seized the boy and that very same afternoon he left to go to war.'<sup>48</sup>

The woman, who did not cry even over the loss of a loved one – considered as a martyr of a holy cause and, so, to be envied on account of his final destiny – was presented as an example of sacrifice and abnegation: 'They have killed my beloved Andresico and it has cut me up terribly . . . But God knows perfectly well that I am not crying for him . . . but because I have nobody else to take his place.'<sup>49</sup> Those who remained were considered less pure for not having attained martyrdom and would be responsible in the long term for making sure that what had happened would not be forgotten; this applied particularly to women:<sup>50</sup> 'This is the most important moment of my life because I have given some of my blood to God and to my Country. My son has been martyred in flesh and blood and the pain is beginning to make a martyr of me.' And, without shedding a tear, she watches the cold earth fall on the





Figure 9.2. 'Navarre at war' from the 'Monument to the fallen' in Pamplona, by Ramón Stolz (photo by J. Galle, 1950. Municipal Archives of Pamplona).

martyred body of her son.<sup>51</sup> Only one reference point was valid for this maternal figure: 'Mary, at the foot of the Cross, unmoved while watching her son die for the salvation of all Humanity.' In the same way that the Carlist combatants were a reflection of Christ, their mothers were a reflection of Mary: 'for the mothers of Navarre . . . their sons are the fruit of their souls, not of their wombs'.<sup>52</sup> The women stayed in the rear-guard, praying for the volunteers,<sup>53</sup> without going to the front themselves, 'because their fragile, delicate, loving fingers are not made for firing guns, but for weaving gentleness, applying honeyed gauzes to the wounds of those brave, heroic, marvellous Navarrese men'.<sup>54</sup>

The sublimation of religiousness and of sacrifice consecrated almost all everyday acts, introducing them into a vindictory ceremony in which even the slightest gesture was filled with meaning. For this reason, from 19 July 1936 onwards, the departure of the troops was interpreted not as a military expedition, but as a religious and rural celebration, a reconquest: 'The cheerfulness of the young men . . . gives the impression that the objective of the journey is a peacetime pilgrimage rather than the battle-fronts.'<sup>55</sup>



This ensemble of traits became more concrete and specific in the psychology of those who embodied the ideals. The volunteers served as an endorsement of postures that were hostile to the liberal-style, democratic and revolutionary volunteer movement: 'the best proof of National enthusiasm, which does not need compulsion'.<sup>56</sup> So, the response in 1936 to 'Aux armes, les citoyens!' was 'To arms, volunteers!'<sup>57</sup> This counter-revolutionary character meant that the protagonists were not primarily 'citizens', but 'volunteers', those who most clearly embodied Carlist ideals, the chosen few, the soldiers whose recruitment was most selective. 'Only the utterly irreproachable are allowed to enter the ranks, men who offer cast-iron guarantees.'<sup>58</sup> The desire to become a *requeté* was not enough: 'We demand a certain class of conscience above and beyond mere good will.'<sup>59</sup> Consequently, there were criticisms when the selection criteria became more relaxed: 'the last ones who came . . . are neither *requetés* nor even Catholics, and there are even some Marxists who have pulled a Basque beret (*txapela*) down over their foreheads in order to escape justice.'<sup>60</sup> There were particularly harsh criticisms of the Falange, which was accused by the Carlist traditionalist camp of being a refuge for left-wingers.<sup>61</sup> One participant insisted on this: 'Some joined the Falange straight away, others went to the front as volunteers – volunteers but running, eh? Running for fear of being caught and led to the abyss.'<sup>62</sup> And, as Antonio Izal declared from the front, upon hearing of the growth of Falange: 'This party is a motley crew and is going to be worse than the CEDA. What riffraff it harbours!'<sup>63</sup>

Apart from the numbers, which provided a quantitative legitimacy, the quality and motives of the *requetés* were praised, beyond purely material reasons: 'On the day Navarre rose 14,000 of them volunteered. They joined without expecting pay, and those who could provided their own equipment.'<sup>64</sup> In his pastoral letter *El caso de España* (November 1936), Cardinal Gomá pointed out: 'One has to have lived through those days of the first fortnight of August in this Navarre where, out of a population of 320,000 inhabitants, more than 40,000 volunteers signed up, almost all of those who were able to fight . . . leaving the grain on the threshing floor, while the women and children gathered in the harvest.'<sup>65</sup>

In a climate of war, as of ancient times, 'almost the whole of Navarre, the land of the admirable *requetés* was with Franco from the beginning, and with heroic fervour'.<sup>66</sup> The traditionalist point of view allowed no room for an exception to the rule, as it assumed that every village in Navarre was bound by an overarching consensus:

Do you know how many inhabitants Uterga had on that famous day? Uterga had 250 inhabitants . . . Do you know how many men aged between sixteen and seventy there were in Uterga on 18 July? Forty-four! Yes, that is the number. . .

Do you know how many eligible men departed for the front on that same 18 July? Also forty-four!<sup>67</sup>

Traditionalism conferred a homogenous physical and moral characterisation on these combatants, drawn from the traditional clichés about Navarrese people. Being Carlists, their physical appearance reflected the ideals that they were fighting for. So, first and foremost, they were peasants, with all the positive traits that this term connoted,<sup>68</sup> especially bearing in mind that Spain had 'never been a metropolis. Spain has been, and still is, Fields, Village, Region. Modern urban conquests are encroaching upon Iberian land at the expense of Spanishness', which had never been cradled in a city.<sup>69</sup> For this reason, there was constant recourse to the countryside, and to the rural milieu, as a redemptive focus:

In holy brotherhood with the army, one historic day it [rural Spain] uttered its war cry and set off to march on the metropolis . . . The furrows, forever fertile, filled with voluntary combatants . . . Tired of humiliations, the countryside wanted something more than just to continue paying taxes . . . It proposed to remind its adversaries, by means of blood and fire, of the utter failure of their principles – contrary to natural law. Its aims were to re-establish its beliefs . . . and to avenge the abduction of its men.<sup>70</sup>

The moral superiority of the peasants conferred a certain wisdom on them: 'It is possible to read Ortega and behave like an illiterate person or, rather, like a simple beast. An illiterate person could be considered cultured as long as he knows how to pray.'<sup>71</sup> Essentially, as Federico García Sanchiz wrote, in their wise simplicity, without knowing it, 'they were fighting for Aristotle himself'.<sup>72</sup> This rural element was extolled as a distinctive element and always translated into its most popular version.<sup>73</sup>

Furthermore, their untamed character and attachment to the mountains was stressed. Rural Navarre, a flat land, was converted into craggy mountainous country as a way to justify better its isolation and purity. Franco expressed this with clarity: 'Navarre burst the dam of the reservoir which had doggedly accumulated over a period of two centuries of Spanish tradition . . . which had been conserved in the midst of those impregnable crags, awaiting an opportune moment to intervene and spill out.'<sup>74</sup> Harold Cardozo affirmed, with evident poetic licence: 'They had gone out at night, these surefooted, fair-haired, red-faced mountaineers, keeping in touch with each other by blowing their hunting horns'; reinforcing the bucolic mood, he added: 'With such moral discipline and with the physical excellence which comes from an open-air life, and, for the majority, life in the high mountains of Navarre, it can hardly be wondered that the *Requetés* of Scarlet Berets . . . hold such a privileged place in the Spanish Army.'<sup>75</sup> The image was invented, embellished and

recycled, to highlight this open-air purity which was so far removed from urban wickedness, ‘people from the open countryside and the mountains, . . . men in nature, healthy in body and soul and free of affectation.’<sup>76</sup>

This peasant character was made explicit in certain recurrent traits, such as equality, forthrightness of manner, simplicity, kindness and nobility, bravery, the reckless courage that led volunteers to request front-line action, integrity and humility, and even their dress, with the omnipresent red berets and espadrilles. A novelist describes one of the combatants like this: ‘he is as strong as an ox, passionate, impetuous . . . and very good natured. A full-bodied Navarrese man and a Carlist, who feels Spain coursing through his veins with indomitable energy.’<sup>77</sup> A list of qualities that was summarised by the attribution ‘epic athlete’:

Of strong constitution, robust, representative; agile and aristocratic gestures and manners; a slim and handsome figure, a firm, resolute step; high-mindedness and strength of character. The Navarrese combatant can proclaim as his the outstanding quality of a healthy mind in a healthy body . . . His manner is the most dignified and elegant that is known; pleasantness of word and high-minded ideas . . . He inspires, at the same time, respect, affection and attraction; to try to find his equal it would be necessary to search among the highest ranks and social strata. In the human species, I don’t know if his equal can be found.<sup>78</sup>

These individual traits formed a compact whole, whose principal characteristic was to be ‘a people’. The equality which existed between all those who joined up was an outstanding element for those who defined Carlist Navarre as inhabited by ‘a humble people, an authentic people, a long-suffering, modest people. The legitimate people, the true Spanish people, which confesses before the fight, which prays and cries; the people who respect the King’s anthem and his red and gold flag, the traditional and monarchist people.’<sup>79</sup> This image was widely broadcast, even via newsreels, which enhanced the popular character of the uprising:<sup>80</sup> ‘Within the volunteer army of Navarre, to approach a captain did not require any great audacity. We were united by a link that served to solidify our brotherhood.’<sup>81</sup> A prominent role was also played by the image of the three generations depicted in a painting by the artist Carlos Sáenz de Tejada, in which an old man, his son and his grandson represented a continuity of ideals (Figure 9.3). This popular essence and egalitarianism did not arise from revolutionary principles, but from religion, and it was this that justified an attitude which was presented as exemplary.

And, within this simplicity, a further common trait was music. Hymns stood out in particular, especially the one dedicated to the battle of Oriamendi (1837), during the first Carlist War.<sup>82</sup> Popular folksongs were also omnipresent and were a useful means for the transmission of messages: ‘the people of Navarre do justice to their reputation of being



Figure 9.3. Painting of three generations of Carlists and flags by Carlos Sáenz de Tejada (Courtesy of Carlos Sáenz de Tejada Benvenuti).

good singers and dedicate the craziest folksongs to their enemies, with the laudable intention of robbing them of what little peace of mind they may have.’<sup>83</sup> Jaime Izal gave an account of something similar in one of his letters:

The Captain made a cardboard funnel and putting it to his lips, as a loud-hailer, shouted out in the silence of the night: 'Attention, a Spaniard is going to sing!' Accompanied by a guitar, . . . a lad from Alfaro, who has a very powerful voice, sang a series of traditional songs, one of which goes as follows: 'I tell you now, all you communists and Marxists, nobody can resist the drive of Navarre.' And there were many more like this, all with a very Navarrese flavour.<sup>84</sup>

The red beret was a defining element, completing the attire which, more often than not, was picturesque: 'so gay and dashing with their scarlet *boinas*, or berets, rather like the tam-o'-shanter but without the tassel, worn hanging down over the right ear, their khaki shirts, wide open on the chest, their buff equipment, and their white socks neatly rolled round the ankle over their *espartagatas* [sic], or cord-soled shoes.'<sup>85</sup> The red beret was frequently identified with the popular character so often attributed to Carlism; it was also a significant element in peasant traditions and provided historical continuity. All of this offered an exterior and an interior definition of the *requetés*; the beret represented what Carlism meant for them – an element of continuity – and was, therefore, a garment of great sentimental value: 'Above my beret, only God'.<sup>86</sup>

All this shaped the most popular image of Navarre in the civil war. But, alongside this utopian image constructed from the traditionalist identity of Navarre through propagandistic forms, there were other opposing perspectives that reached different conclusions.

### Other perspectives on civil war Navarre

Without the influence of propaganda or the enthusiasm of the first few days of the uprising against the Republic, other standpoints analysing Carlism and Navarre acquired distinctive tones. This reflected a desire to qualify the arguments put forward by traditionalist revisionism and to underline those aspects most at variance with the worldview of groups which rejected the hegemonic construction of Navarre at this time. Firstly, it is striking that there were comparatively few references to Navarre or to Carlism from the left-wing parties. The fascistic Falange, the object of much republican invective, was a target more suitable for voicing the anti-fascist struggle. Furthermore, the few references to Navarre or Carlism in left-wing discourse actually reveal certain common ground with the traditionalist perspective. Secondly, not surprisingly, the most fiercely critical anti-*Carlist* stance, one which rejected *Carlist* identification with Navarre, emanated from the ranks of Basque nationalism. Repressive violence was one of the recurrent issues raised by Basque nationalists, the issue that most radically separated them from the *Carlists*.

Among republicans, the religious component of consciousness was not viewed so positively as it was among the traditionalists, although

most recognised the importance of this factor in the mobilisation of the Navarrese *requetés*: 'My mother was also a farm labourer, a daughter of farm labourers. And Catholic. And Navarrese. That means doubly Catholic.'<sup>87</sup> Nevertheless, religion was often judged with severity by republicans, as it was seen to involve a manipulation of people's consciences ('religious fanaticism' according to Dolores Ibárruri, *La Pasionaria*<sup>88</sup>).

Often referring to Catholicism's 'inquisitorial' or 'hypocritical' past, Navarrese devotion was said by republicans to profess faith in 'the Church of Torquemada, the quarrelsome and worldly Popes of the Middle Ages, the militant Church'.<sup>89</sup> Koestler summed up with lurid imagery: 'the shadows of the Middle Ages appeared to have come alive, jets of blood gushed forth from gargoyles; once more, mercenary hordes, the legionnaires of the *Tercio*, killed, looted and caused devastation in the name of a holy crusade, while the air was thick with incense and burned flesh'.<sup>90</sup> This perspective of shadowy obscurantism contrasted with the positive image of the Middle Ages offered by traditionalism. Indeed, the intellectual, ideological and legitimising message of traditionalism led many to the point, not only of discrediting the 'villains' (republicans), but of feeling obliged to sweep them away.<sup>91</sup> But it was counterposed against a popular religiousness which had rather shallow roots or which, at least, was not very developed.

This argumentation was qualified in the stance of the Basque nationalists, according to whom Carlist militancy was not so much the responsibility of the church, as of the priests. Thus, it was asserted that 'the most effective part of these preparations for war was undertaken by the clergy, making use of the armed forces wherever they could'. It was they who attracted the *requetés*, in spite of their leaders, for 'they regarded Carlism as a powerful auxiliary of religion . . . The main thing was to overthrow the secular Republic with its odious religious and social legislation.' This argument concluded with the assertion that 'in Navarre, Carlism was what the priests wanted . . . For this reason the day the Navarrese priests opted for war against the Republic was a day of true historic importance for the whole peninsula'.<sup>92</sup> It is clear that the Basque nationalists, who were as Catholic as the traditionalists, needed to establish some line of demarcation in order to legitimise their own posture. To hold a part of the clergy responsible for the influence of Carlism permitted a better understanding of what had happened in their own ranks and circumscribed the problem to the sphere of politics and not religion as the traditionalists wanted: 'Unlike the priests of Navarre, we were not their electoral agents!', protested a Basque nationalist priest.<sup>93</sup>

Republicans also viewed Navarre as an agricultural land. Carlism was considered almost the only option possible for rural dwellers: 'If they are from the city – employees or labourers – they become Falangists; if they are peasants they go with the *requetés*', affirmed the Dutchman F. G. Stork.<sup>94</sup> The peasantry also had something of hill dwellers about them; inhabitants of mountain homes whose customs had been adopted by the traditionalist discourse. And this perspective accepted the unambiguous identification of Carlism and Navarre, demonstrating that this image was deeply rooted both in the traditionalist camp and among their adversaries.<sup>95</sup>

Arthur Koestler recognised that only in Navarre, 'the traditional cradle of the Carlist wars, the only district where the broad masses of the people had clerical and Monarchist sympathies, were the people informed of the true reactionary character of the insurrection'.<sup>96</sup> There remained, however, a difficult question for republicans. How was it that humble peasants could support the forces of tradition and the insurrection against the Republic? Two answers were offered: on the one hand, as Palmiro Togliatti argued at the time,

fascism has succeeded in driving a wedge between the proletariat and the peasantry. And in order to achieve this goal, it has not hesitated in exploiting the extreme backwardness and obscurantism that exist in the rural areas of Spain, aware that the liberal Spanish bourgeoisie . . . would not dare to support the fight of the peasants against feudalism.<sup>97</sup>

On the other hand, there is the argument made by Juan Goytisolo in which a picture is painted of coarseness and lack of cultivation, resulting from generations of backwardness and linked to an 'official Spain and learned from masters and servants, the uncouth people of the *fallas* and *sanfermines*, bullrings and Easter processions.'<sup>98</sup> The image is significant because it serves as a counterpoint to a model of traditionalism which compared the explosion of 19 July to the fiesta of Sanfermín in Pamplona, and the bravery of the *requetés* to that of the young men who ran before the bulls.<sup>99</sup> In any case, it was recognised that the peasants, exactly as they were represented in their traditionalist image, sang and behaved with a simplicity which was not without a certain ingenuousness.<sup>100</sup>

History also served to trace elements of continuity, although in the case of republicans recourse to the past took on clearly negative hues. Koestler seized on the discredited connection, as he saw it, between past and present: 'In some respects the Carlist wars of the nineteenth century were a prelude, providing many analogies, to the civil war of 1936.' To this he added that '[t]he spirit that inspires these retrograde hordes is that of the Carlist wars, the spirit that existed under the fanatical and



intolerant régime of Ferdinand VII. Once more the red caps of the "Requetés" have risen up from the blood-drenched Spanish soil.'<sup>101</sup> Dolores Ibárruri echoed this more laconically: '[e]verything was practically the same as in 1876. The only thing that had changed was the weaponry.'<sup>102</sup>

However, the central element of the arguments put forward from non-traditionalist positions was that of repression. In a statement on the theme, made at the height of Franco's regime, José María Gironella provoked a storm of heated protests from the traditionalists: 'in Castile, in Navarre, in the south, the Falangists, the *requetés*, not to mention the Moors!, were committing the same atrocities, at the same time and with the same bloodthirstiness as their adversaries . . . Oh, no doubt in Pamplona the armed squads fell in invoking Christ the King!'<sup>103</sup> A Basque socialist leader insisted on the differences between Basque and Navarrese combatants in this respect: 'in Navarre the rebellion was a success from the start and, with its authority widely recognised, the blood flowed in streams, whilst the fanatics threw themselves into an orgy of revenge-taking. And in Eibar, how long did we Republicans hold the same power as those of the rebellion in Pamplona, without a drop of blood being spilt . . . ?'<sup>104</sup>

In any case, it was Basque nationalists who devoted most attention to the issue of repression, to no small degree a reaction against what they considered to be a betrayal by Navarre: 'they have been disloyal to the Basque cause'.<sup>105</sup> One such testimony comes from a Basque nationalist priest, who was explicit about the overriding objectives of the repression: 'the persecution by the *requetés* was principally aimed against Basque nationalists and social-Catholics', before mentioning, also, the use of the Basque language: 'I spoke about the workers too much; I spoke too much in Basque!' All this did no more than increase the bloody repression: 'Every day, for over four months, [Basque] nationalists and supporters of the left in Pamplona were shot to pieces. This spectacle . . . was cheerfully witnessed by ladies of the Pamplona aristocracy.'<sup>106</sup>

In short, all of this constituted an attempt to demonstrate how republicans' own positions compared with those of their opponents, focusing on those aspects which were sufficiently differentiated to ground arguments in support of republican legitimacy.

## Conclusions

The construction of a Carlist image of Navarre was founded on highly diverse elements intended to legitimise Carlism's new situation. Some of these elements had already been developed by the traditionalists in the



preceding years, others were shaped in the heat of conflicts with the Republic, forming an image of a prototypal 'Navarrese man' that was generally accepted from a number of ideological standpoints. *Carlism* and *Navarrism*, both of which were rooted in traditionalism, came together and shaped a characteristic identity that firmly associated the two together. This developed against the backdrop of the civil war and culminated in the immediate post-war years.

Navarre was awarded the Laureled Cross of Saint Ferdinand by Franco himself, in official recognition of its services to the Spanish nationalist cause: 'If Ferdinand the Catholic received Navarre in Burgos, the Caudillo . . . travelled to the ancient kingdom to give visible form, in simple and profound solemnity, to the commitment of Carlism to the nation.'<sup>107</sup> In the speeches delivered at the presentation ceremony, on 9 November 1937, all references coincided in Carlism's identification with Navarre. The elements already mentioned came together in a profuse, baroque symbolism, as recorded in one of the few cinematographic records of wartime Navarre that has been conserved: *Homage to the Brigades of Navarre* (1937).<sup>108</sup> The title itself, explicitly mentioning the troops, contributes to the 'confusion', since the collective award was conferred on Navarre.<sup>109</sup> In the documentary, the central arguments of a process of identity formation – which was aimed at identifying Carlism with Navarre – were brought together in a propaganda operation which was largely spontaneous. But this process also reflected an express desire to reduce the forces of Carlism to an isolated ghetto, with no scope of action beyond its confines and with no possibility of causing problems for the structure of Franco's 'New State'. All this satisfied the Navarrese leaders, as it guaranteed their personalist (*caciquil*) system of dominance. The Carlist momentum in Navarre, without being unanimous, was strong enough to be used in detriment to Carlism itself, which from April 1937 was effectively denied its chance of sharing power. To compensate for this, the links between Navarre and Carlism were enhanced and the province was conceded certain prerogatives which would remain in force during the entire period of Franco's regime, including the esteem of the dictator himself who, on various occasions, intervened in favour of Navarre. Of the Navarrese people, it would be said that 'their God, King and Country constitute their entire *raison d'être* and, thanks to this, they are an admirable people . . . These are the real underlying reasons that overlap between Carlism and Navarre.'<sup>110</sup> The civil war provided new elements – the most important – in this process of association that would last for decades.<sup>111</sup>

## 10 'Presenting arms to the Blessed Sacrament': civil war and Semana Santa in the city of Málaga, 1936–1939

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*Michael Richards*

The people believe what they see as the first step to believing what they do not see; and if they see the authorities paying Catholic homage to God, if they see the armed forces presenting arms to the Blessed Sacrament, if they see the splendour of the Spanish Catholic cult, encouraged by public and ostentatious intervention by the civil and military authority, they will believe that the Truth is indeed that to which religious homage is paid. Not without reason does the supreme wisdom of the Church sustain all the splendour of the rites and external cult, against cold and self-absorbed Protestant subjectivism; not without reason does it also sustain its cult of images.<sup>1</sup>

During Holy Week (Semana Santa), Spanish Catholic lay associations (confraternities) known as *cofradías de penitencia* channel penitential devotion through advocations of Christ and the Virgin. Intensely realistic images, evoking episodes of the Passion, are carried bodily on huge swaying platforms through the city streets.<sup>2</sup> Within popular Catholic practice, these *pasos*, dramatising the last events of Christ's earthly life, have profound resonance. Constituting the central drama of Christianity as a 'religion of lament', reenactment of the Passion, with the suffering body of Christ and the purity of the grieving Virgin explicitly at its centre, becomes the primary focus of the popular 'para-liturgy' of the street.<sup>3</sup> Although political debate and contestation overlapped prominently with the Semana Santa processions once the Second Republic (1931–9) was proclaimed, the symbolism of Holy Week has not been central to research on contemporary Spanish history and the civil war.<sup>4</sup> Analysts of 1930s Spain have generally been less concerned with the meaning of the signs and symbols of religious display than with the more formally political organisation of Catholics.<sup>5</sup> A few historians have nonetheless suggested that liturgical representations can be related to the war. Alfonso Álvarez Bolado, for example, has emphasised the Spanish Church's understanding of the conflict in terms of a symbolic 'religious

universe' organised temporally through institutionalised devotions according to the cycles of Epiphany (preceded by Advent) and Easter (preceded by Lent).<sup>6</sup>

The quotation that opens this chapter comes from one of the most widely disseminated justifications of the emerging Francoist 'New State'. In this treatise on the political moment in 1937, composed amid the resurgence of Catholic display in the rebel zone, the monarchist-Falangist ideologue José Pemartín, head of secondary education in wartime Nationalist Spain, stated his faith in a reconstruction of what was admirably seen as the clerico-authoritarian state of the sixteenth century. The focus of this 'natural pact' between old and new was the concept of '*fascismo integral*', a combination of religious and political 'totalism' or 'integrism'. Pemartín's thesis suggests that the baroque idiom of Spanish Catholicism, as exemplified in the Semana Santa processions, was interpreted, from above, as key to the political message of the Nationalist war effort and as justification for the violence of that war. This point has been consistently made by historians who have justifiably focused on the *political* construction of the conflict by the Nationalist side as a religious 'crusade'. At the same time, exploration of the *cultural* significance of this crusade has been lacking. Given the circumstances of the war and revolution, a drawing together of church and regime politically was probably inevitable, but this 'pact' was not without problems. Conflicting interpretations of what constituted religious as against political acts and gestures were at the root of concerns expressed by some leaders of the church about the superficiality of the 'resurgence of the divine' demonstrated in the wartime massification of public devotions.<sup>7</sup>

The religious and political significance of such ritual certainly preceded the war. Following the victory of the left-wing Popular Front coalition in the Spanish national elections of February 1936, a republican government representative had been dispatched to the Andalusian city of Málaga. His objective was to insist that the public street processions around penitential images of the Sacramented Christ and the Madre Dolorosa should go ahead as they had until the proclamation of the Second Republic in April 1931. The aim of this mission was to create a sense of normality at a moment of great social and political tumult which the government was attempting to control. The lay association of confraternities in Málaga (known as the Agrupación de Cofradías), which formally organised the processions, asserted its authority over the festivities and declined to 'play the game of the *frentepopulistas*', refusing to cooperate on the pretext of lacking sufficient sacred images as a result of the iconoclastic violence of May 1931.<sup>8</sup> The government's

plea, the *cofradías*' effective control and boycott of the Passion-tide devotions, and the constant threat of popular violence against them, all suggest that the political significance of the Semana Santa rituals in 1930s Spain was considerable. Their contested social and cultural significance – indicated by the government's implicit recognition that the processions were an expression of popular religiosity – was to be confirmed by the experience of the civil war that was triggered only five months after the February elections.

Conflicts over symbolic boundaries in the city of Málaga, as elsewhere in Spain, had long been represented through the relationship between the festivals of Carnival and Holy Week, separated by forty days of abstinence during Lent. The church and Catholic lay organisations had for centuries countered the sins of Carnival with collective devotional acts to reinforce the separation of sacred and profane.<sup>9</sup> A key primary text demonstrating such representations applied to the civil war is the pastoral letter of the cardinal primate of Spain, Isidro Gomá y Tomás, entitled 'La cuaresma de España' ('Spain's Lent'), issued in January 1937 on the eve of Málaga's 'liberation' from republican control.<sup>10</sup> An order for the suppression of Carnival was made by the authorities throughout Nationalist territory shortly before the fall of the city.<sup>11</sup> In a call to 'purify' the 'carnal pleasures' of the Republic and the revolution, the bishop of Málaga, Balbino Santos y Olivera, announced a programme of 'acts of reparation' during the three days of the Carnival season, alongside other public and private acts of contrition. In praying that Carnival might disappear for always from the civil calendar, the bishop proclaimed that there would be no more of the 'folly' and 'madness' of this 'abominable' and 'pagan' festival.<sup>12</sup> Theology offered a doctrinal basis for symbols that supported the conservative Catholic critique of 'atheistic' 'carnavalesque' liberalism and that meshed with the Nationalist narrative of the war itself as 'crusade', imagining the years of the Republic as another Calvary.

There has been relatively little consideration in the historiography of the ways these symbols were understood. The relationship of ritual activity to politics – and, more broadly, the role of spirituality in achieving a level of assent in the early post-war years in Spain – remains a vital element of the most intractable and crucial aspect of current historical debate about the origins and nature of Francoism, namely the relative roles of coercion and consent. Through public devotional practices, wartime and post-war communities in Nationalist and Francoist Spain went beyond politics, doctrine and the officially controlled processes of redeeming the sacrifices of the conflict. Through para-liturgical devotional activity people assimilated the pain and suffering and contributed

more broadly to cultural reproduction. Some form of 'liberty' (from collective – or even *national* – sin) had been granted only through enormous sacrifice and 'the sacrificed' could not be betrayed.<sup>13</sup>

The significance of memory to a sense of local identity, as expressed in the Passion-tide devotions, was widely recognised in the 1930s. Anti-clerical activists in Málaga in the early 1930s placed memory at the heart of their critique when they argued that the public commemoration of Holy Week not only lacked sanctity but functioned as a distraction from material social realities and had therefore become a 'festival of forgetting' rather than of remembrance.<sup>14</sup> The sense of collective remembering was reinforced during the civil war. Holy Week rituals commemorated those who had died for the Nationalist cause in the conflict. Those who died for the Republic could not be publicly mourned in 'liberated' Spain. In the 'collectively intoned prayer' of the Good Friday procession in Málaga following the city's 'liberation' in 1937, everyone, it was claimed, 'thought of what had been resurrected and also of those who were unable to witness the rebirth, because they had (already) watered its pathway with their blood'. The people were not officially, of course, supposed to be thinking of the republican dead.<sup>15</sup> Ritualised memories, however, could not be easily controlled. Public devotions had contestable meanings, even those whose origins can clearly be located in the war itself.

One such was the confraternity of the Santísimo Cristo de los Mutilados, founded in February 1939 by the Málaga association of wounded and disabled Nationalist veterans. The religious fervour aroused by the presence in society of war wounded provoked many similar initiatives in 'liberated' Spain, which were formally regulated by church authorities in November 1937.<sup>16</sup> The sacrifice of those 'fallen for God' was focused in Málaga on the mutilated image of the Crucified Christ housed in the Church of the Tabernacle (Sagrario) which the revolutionaries had been unable to destroy in 1936, though they had hacked off Christ's right leg and left foot. 'Celestial intervention' had prevented it falling to the ground where it would surely have perished. The dramatically realistic image would be processed each year, in its mutilated state, reminding people of the sacrifice and also the 'shame' of the revolution, until the transition to democracy in the 1970s, when it began to provoke concerted protests. Though there remains no evidence about the specific nature and circumstances of the revolutionary degradation of this crucifixion, as with similar images interpreted after the revolution as symbols of a 'broken Spain', the focus on the assaulted image suggests that, in the 1940s at least, its sacrality was vindicated by Christ's 'wounding' and survival. The manner in which such figures were saluted by the crowd suggests that the 'encounter' between image and onlooker imparted a


charismatic, semi-divine element to political authority won through the enormous trauma of civil war, especially since local or national military commanders – the notably mutilated General Millán Astray in the case of Málaga in 1939 – would parade immediately in front of the sacred figure, flanked by a guard of honour. (Queipo de Llano would do something similar in Seville.) Witnesses in 1939 claimed how the humanising effect of Christ's lacerated body was intensified by the mutilated state of this particular image. It became a palpable testament of 'senseless profanation' that conjured up analogies to the 'ridiculed and broken Christ' who, on the Cross, reached 'the most exalted state of omnipotence and love'.<sup>17</sup> In later years, we may suppose, the meaning of the image had more to do with a broader politics of memory than with mourning, bitterness and division – the conflict's directly felt effects. The point, however, is that a local viewpoint, from below, suggests that the official religio-militarist notion of the Nationalist 'crusade' imposed merely as an instrument of politics requires discussion.

### **Religion, urban space and war in Málaga**

A pervasive sense of suffering haunts images of Málaga during the civil war. The military revolt in July 1936 had been successfully resisted but the province was rapidly cut off from the rest of republican Spain by the deep incursions of the Army of Africa. The city was not situated on the frontline and, as in other urban centres distanced from the fighting and with a recent history of strained social relations and political conflict (the most obvious comparison being Barcelona), Málaga became a focus of social revolution. This places in context the high proportion of civil war deaths which occurred at a distance from military confrontation. There was no sustained military battle or *guerrilla* struggle in the city, but some 1,100 people were killed, as 'enemies of the revolution', during the republican period, from 18 July 1936 to 7 February 1937. The violence of the counter-revolution went further than the revolutionary purge and was more systematic. During the formative period of Francoist 'liberation', from February 1937 up to the end of 1940, at least 2,500 men and women associated in some way with the Republic were executed.<sup>18</sup> The relationship between these two violent processes may be explained by material conflicts over social class and urban space. They may also be explained through the prism of religion understood broadly as shared beliefs, rituals and experience associated with the supernatural and the afterlife and affecting, in turn, morality and collective identity.

In putting down the July 1936 military rebellion, many of the inhabitants of the working-class *barrios* (neighbourhoods) of the city, to the west

of the river Guadalmedina, took possession of the bourgeois urban centre to the east, the hub of local wealth and city authority. This was a repetition of the pattern of public politics and protest that had become ritualised since the mid-nineteenth century, demonstrated – invariably by women – during the textile workers’ strike of 1890, the consumer protests of January 1918, the general strike of 1930, the proclamation of the Republic in April 1931, and the bread riots at the height of the republican years in February 1934. In July 1936 this ‘occupation’ culminated in the gutting of the houses of the rich and powerful. Gerald Brenan, the liberal English writer, who had lived for years in the countryside overlooking the city, witnessed the emerging revolution and watched the bourgeois quarter go up in smoke, ‘its streets seething with armed mobs, corpses curled up like wax dolls by the roadside, red-flagged lorries filled with excited militiamen’.<sup>19</sup>



Map 10.1. Plan of the city of Málaga, c.1930.

The elegant Palacio Larios, headquarters of the right-wing Catholic political organisation, Acción Popular, seen from below as leading the obstruction of the Republic's reforms since 1931, was one target of the incendiary destruction. Following the precedent of the notorious anti-clerical violence of May 1931, which can be seen as symbolic defence of the assumption to power by 'the people' in April, churches, convents and other religious buildings were identified as representing power and also targeted. During the civil war, six of the churches of Málaga were destroyed and a further 282 throughout the province were partially destroyed, profaned or sacked.<sup>20</sup> Virtually all of the liturgical objects of the diocese, and most of the sculpted images of the *Semana Santa* processions that had not perished in 1931, were lost to the revolution's iconoclasm. The diocese of Málaga had 240 priests at the beginning of 1936. Of these, 115 would be killed by supporters of political groups allied to the republican cause during the revolution following the military rebellion against the government.<sup>21</sup>

In the aftermath of the revolt of July 1936, public religious devotions were widely seen as manifestations of sentiments which were at the core of the Nationalist 'narrative of order' and as threats to the revolution and the cohesion of local republican authority. The mental images associated with the purge of political enemies and symbols of the status quo would be imprinted in Catholic memory and articulated in the post-revolution resurgence of religious displays. When crowds of on-lookers gathered to watch priests and captured military officers paraded through the central streets of the city, on the way to prison, images of Calvary and of the annual *Semana Santa* devotions were called forth.<sup>22</sup> One victim of the revolution was Benito Ortega Muñoz, mayor during the radical-CEDA governance in 1935, a symbol of the relationship between confraternal activity and political conflict.<sup>23</sup> Ortega Muñoz was publicly recalled during the war for presiding over a municipal commission established to oversee a restoration of the public processions. He was thus a danger because he appeared to be legitimating the public devotions as a representation of Catholic ideas which were aimed at restoring social normality – the antithesis of revolutionary gestures.

### ***Semana Santa, political conflict and collective identity***

In the Spanish region of Andalusia, the religious practices and beliefs surrounding Holy Week were (and remain) complex and multi-dimensional. They have been seen as a defining feature of regional culture responding to ideas of masculinity, femininity and sensuality, and collective anxieties about sin, death and redemption.<sup>24</sup> The



challenge of an interpretation of the rituals of Holy Week which sees them as timeless and immutable is to identify links to the sum of prevailing social relationships surrounding them. In the city of Málaga the importance of Semana Santa was broadly recognised and several social groups sought to appropriate and represent it according to their own interpretations. At Easter 1939 the bishop of Málaga insisted that 'everything has its time and place, and each symbol has its meaning, whether congenital or conventional'.<sup>25</sup> The formal conventions of the processions were essential to the confraternities and the middle classes. The responses of 'the masses' were more difficult to gauge, but these reactions tended to be seen (from above) as instinctive or 'in-bred'. While the church insisted that a clear boundary between spiritual and material be maintained, the religious vitalism of the bodily images of Semana Santa was essential to the popular attraction and texture of the ritual and could not easily be diluted. Cathartic, community-building and culturally reproductive elements therefore existed alongside more divisive and contested features in the processions. The ambiguities of popular participation, often displayed in 'off-stage' expressions, were thus an essential part of the *pasos*. A singular illustration of this was the popular tradition of singing *saetas* (ejaculatory prayers), often with quasi-political content and intention, which were directed towards the sacred images by kneeling singers on the periphery of the processions.<sup>26</sup>

By the end of the nineteenth century, many *cofradías* in Andalusia were under the patronage of the local commercial bourgeoisie, forming a network as a 'white' devotional counterpart to the 'red', free-thinking (republican) masonic lodges<sup>27</sup> and visually demonstrating a link between bourgeois ethics and age-old Catholic traditions. They operated within a 'vertical' structure shaped by the doctrinal parameters set by the ecclesiastical authority and their statutes required diocesan approval. At the same time, the images were invoked *popularly* – with often radically different meanings – at times symbolising underlying social relations. From below, the simple Catholic 'faithful', and those who enjoyed the public devotions, while perhaps actively supporting anticlerical political groups, tended to perceive the officials (*cofrades*) of the confraternities resentfully as 'tutors' who attempted to shape morality according to class perceptions and define a single 'authentic' devotional practice.

By 1930, the city's population stood at some 190,000 inhabitants, an expansion since 1880 of more than 50 per cent. Much of the inward migration occurred in the 1920s and 1930s as a result of persistent agricultural crises.<sup>28</sup> The 1930s economy was fragile and dominated by absentee elite dynasties, such as the Larios family, who were commonly perceived as oblivious to poverty and who 'modernised' by

clearing away old communities based around traditional practices of production to 'the other side' (of the river). Social elites were closely allied with the church through both monarchist-Catholic political groups and patronage of the confraternities. Years of pre-war conflict culminated during the revolutionary aftermath of the coup of July 1936 when the Larios factories were the first to be collectivised at the insistence of the workforce.<sup>29</sup>

In spite of all their efforts, the radical middle-class republicans of the late nineteenth century suffered a gradual sociological estrangement from the popular classes.<sup>30</sup> Republican proselytism emanated from the professions and the civic ideals of the French revolution. Secularisation, often proposed through intemperate anticlerical language, was believed to be the key to an alternative version of 'modernity'. The discourse of representatives of the liberal intelligentsia elevated the individual above 'classist' 'bourgeois' morality that favoured conformity, hardship and 'backwardness', symbolised, as they saw it, in the religious processions.<sup>31</sup> This modernity and the 'maleness' of Spanish republicanism was reinforced by its outright rejection of public devotional display. An undifferentiated understanding of the 'baroque spectacle' sponsored by the Spanish Church led to depictions of the Semana Santa festivities as a 'tragic deformation'. This rejection failed to appreciate the complex motives behind popular participation. Liberal reformers saw religious faith as rational and legitimate only if it constituted an individualist belief system – an issue of conscience – the kind of faith viewed by José Pemartín and other ideologues of the 'crusade' as 'Protestant subjectivism'. At the same time, the growing marginalised groups in the *barrios* on the outskirts of the city became active politically in socialist, communist and anarcho-syndicalist organisations. Many continued to participate in some manner in the Semana Santa processions.<sup>32</sup> Many were paid to help carry the huge platforms while others celebrated the spectacle for a variety of reasons. The poor 'peasant' servants in the house where Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell stayed in the city in the late 1920s requested special leave to attend the Easter processions.<sup>33</sup>

The 'masses' from the *barrios* shared the disdain for clerics articulated by middle-class radicals, but their religious attitudes were complex. The 'people' had always been active in developing the language of the penitential ritual of the street and the popular significance of Semana Santa was quite different from the understanding of the lawyers, doctors and merchants who guarded the conscience of liberal republicanism. The latter often interpreted the popular elements of the *estaciones de penitencia* as emotional religiosity and even as 'pagan' or 'primitive' expressions of object worship. In this interpretation of popular devotion in the *barrios*

merely as 'schematic faith', radical liberals echoed the condescension of the city's Catholic elites.<sup>34</sup>

Spatial boundaries in the city were reinforced by these varying rhythms of life, class consciousness, religious customs and attitudes towards gender and identity.<sup>35</sup> The city was primarily divided territorially by the Guadalmedina river, which for much of the year was dry but was prone to sudden and threatening inundation.<sup>36</sup> The very act of crossing the river, even in day-to-day activities, let alone in protests and processions, symbolised an expression of freedom and collective assertion, particularly for women.<sup>37</sup> At each protest or strike similar features were part of dissent: verbal and physical attacks against ecclesiastical symbols of authority, the occupation of nodal points of the city, appeals to the collective identity of particular communities, and the activism of women.<sup>38</sup> Long before July 1936, the extent of the city's 'redness' was articulated in attitudes towards the *barrios* on 'the other side' of the river. Trinidad and El Perchel, to the west of the river, had become hugely overcrowded and unhealthy during late nineteenth-century industrialisation. A discourse of otherness developed, translated into political relations and framed by racial analogy. The experience of revolution in 1936 confirmed to the middle classes the sense of a '*morisco* sediment' deposited 'congenitally' within the popular masses as a result of the Islamic 'invasions' of the past, provoking a constant state of mental 'agitation'.<sup>39</sup>

The effectiveness of women's protest in drawing attention to material exploitation partly explains why social elites developed a gendered discourse of threatening otherness, reinforced by Moorish racial analogies, which overlay the spatial threat.<sup>40</sup> The Second Republic had offered women greater freedom, allowing transgression of 'natural law' which viewed them as weaker, less rational and more emotional than men. The struggle for greater freedom had crystallised in the parliamentary debate on the right to divorce and the granting of the vote to women in 1931. Women militants recalled during the height of the siege of the city in 1936 how their rights, before the Republic, had been denied because politicised women had focused on daily realities and 'revealed the spectacle of the starving'.<sup>41</sup>

Among the most popular advocations of the Mother of God was the Virgen de los Dolores who was greatly revered in working-class Perchel. Her significance straddled class divisions (without necessarily narrowing them). The local social hierarchy was reinforced by elite patronage of confraternities like that of the Cristo de la Expiración which organised penitential devotion to this great popular Virgin of Sorrows.<sup>42</sup> The Virgin's unblemished stoicism reflected the 'positive' potential encompassed in

the establishment's idealised image of the *barrio*, constructed, of course, from *outside* the neighbourhood. For Perchel women themselves, the Maundy Thursday penitence of the Virgen de los Dolores represented something rather different. Perchel women, fervent in their devotion and their best dresses, traditionally accompanied their 'Sovereign' behind a ceremonial squadron of hussars and a battalion of cavalry, suggesting a sense of integration. The dark, 'typically *perchelera*' Virgin held those present in a state of rapture, the drama of the *paso* heightened by the expressive figure of the Magdalen at the feet of the dying Saviour, symbolising the possibility of absolution. The itinerary was significant, however, beginning in Perchel and crossing the Tetuán bridge, continuing along the Alameda, the grandest avenue of the bourgeois city, the calle Larios and the Plaza de la Constitución, in a form of sanctioned 'occupation'. The women of Perchel would thereby cross to 'the other side' before returning 'triumphant' with the 'living emblem' of their own identity before them.<sup>43</sup> The meanings were complex and shifting and they criss-crossed the categories of class, religion, locality and gender. Although the Virgin was popularly venerated, the confraternity attracted violence. Its central sacred figure of Christ was destroyed in May 1931 as was its replacement in 1936, though the Virgin was unharmed.<sup>44</sup>

In spite of the cathartic potential, the convulsive political context of the 1930s accentuated divergent interpretations of the ritual. The bourgeois imagination resorted easily to a duality of 'Virgin and whore' in times of social challenge to explain 'female religiosity'. Thus women of Perchel were viewed not as religious but as merely suggestible and, even by some, as little more than a frenzied mob, enthralled by 'profane idolatry'. Their 'emotional frenzy' owed much, it was argued, to the proximity of Africa which also explained the prevalence of female spiritualist sects in working-class districts. Later, in the wake of the civil war, the role of alleged rites of violence performed by women from the 'dangerous' side of the river were prominent in Francoist accounts of the incendiarism of July 1936.<sup>45</sup> The 'lability' of the threat – its ever-changing nature, its proneness to disequilibrium – had clearly feminine origins and connotations:

The Santo Domingo bridge is the point for the invasion . . . The '*barrios*', like the Guadalmedina itself, almost always dry but quickly flooding, brimming over and overwhelming, would one day burst across the bridges and devastate the city.<sup>46</sup>

To the extent that images (and their symbolism) were in some ways shared, across the class divide, suggests a channelling, cathartic element to the Semana Santa rituals. But uneven economic modernisation, from the late nineteenth century, infused Catholic tradition with a strongly

bourgeois ethical sense. The important differences of symbolic interpretation – the hierarchical ordering of ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ piety,<sup>47</sup> for example, and the duality of ascetic discipline (imposed) and ascetic poverty (popularly regarded) – meant that by the 1930s Holy Week became a primary symbolic focus of division and conflict.

### **The revolution: ‘Málaga’s Calvary’**

Partly because of the absence of many men, women took on unaccustomed public roles during the seven-month period of Republican control when life was largely determined by the struggle to feed the population. Once the phase of the most violent revolutionary gestures had passed, mass political meetings became a central feature of collective activity. These took the place of religious processional display. The war effort could not afford regular military parades of ‘the People’s Army’, but when the Assault Guards, the Republican National Guard, the Pablo Iglesias Socialist militia and the Militia of the Republican Left paraded, a great multitude of people congregated in the central zone of the city to watch and cheer.<sup>48</sup>



Figure 10.1. Members of the left-wing militia in the central park of Málaga, 1936.

In the context of siege and hunger the struggle was also affirmed in everyday practices, although limited psychological and material resources of solidarity allowed for little more than humanitarian care for refugees and a symbolic process of renaming. The women's home workers' union became the union of 'Social Emancipation' and the street vendors' association became La Sociedad 'Pasionaria'.<sup>49</sup> Several anti-fascist affirmations took the form of secular commemorations, like that held by the Agrupación Socialista in October 1936 to remember the Asturian revolution of 1934. A minute's silence was observed in dedication to those who were fighting, or had sacrificed themselves, and to their mothers, widows and children.<sup>50</sup> In early November, at the height of the defence of Madrid, some 2,000 people celebrated the anniversary of the Russian revolution at the Teatro Cervantes with speeches from the Young Communist League (Pioneros Malagueños), the girls' youth movement, the JSU, the PSOE, and the Republican Left. The defence of the republican capital was compared with the revolutionary struggle for Petrograd. Optimism was built around such slogans as 'the *Patria* of the proletariat' and the year 1917 became a symbolic point of political convergence around which the cause could be affirmed in the city centre.<sup>51</sup> One female militant declared that not a single man or woman could remain inactive.<sup>52</sup> The mass meeting of the JSU in early October attracted attention for the number of young militiawomen present.<sup>53</sup> Other women performed a public role giving talks on education provision and health care as well as on more narrowly political issues. At the PCE rally for women, only weeks before the fall of the city, the emphasis was on sacrifices for the combatants. A woman participant declared how 'Christ had been the first socialist in the world', but that the church had aggravated the 'bourgeois humiliation of women'.<sup>54</sup>

Shelter had to be found for an inward stream of 30,000 refugees. Aid committees were established by the political groups. Unión Republicana and the republican teachers' federation established children's refuges. The Republican Left organised homeless shelters, run by people in the *barrios*. Churches, including the vast space of the cathedral, became vital spaces of refuge. A contingent of homeless found shelter in the convents of the city, including a group of 'fallen women' who had previously lived with the nuns in return for their labour.<sup>55</sup> Many of the homeless had struggled on foot over the mountains from Granada, Córdoba and Seville relating stories of the slaughter of supporters of the Republic.<sup>56</sup>

The humanitarian activity of women, within what was seen as the feminine sphere of the rearguard, was not recognised by the occupying forces, because such 'feminine activity' was negated by women's crossing of traditional boundaries through their left-wing activism. Nationalist

propagandists constructed an image of republican civil war women, who wore overalls to take on public roles, as 'whores dressed like men'. They were negatively contrasted with the (middle-class) women of the Sección Femenina who wore white pinafores over blouses of virginal blue to serve food to hungry orphans in the eating stations of *Auxilio Social* after the 'liberation' and who did not involve themselves in politics.<sup>57</sup> The revolution would henceforth be seen in association with a disruption of traditional gender roles and of the spatial order. The violence of the revolution, aimed first against those seen as instigating or supporting the rebellion, was interpreted as resulting from the 'unbridling' of individual and collective passions. Franco propagandists recognised the popular mythical notion of the centre of the city as a focal point. They interpreted this threat through a discourse of unpredictable desires and appetites. One described how in July 1936 the 'mob gorged its fury' on the calle Larios, the 'physical synthesis of the bourgeois world of Málaga' with its cafés, casinos, hotels, mansions of the rich, and commerce in luxuries and sensuality which the people themselves were taught to reject:

From all the *barrios*, crossing the bridges, leaving their miserable slums behind them . . . they mass in the calle de Larios . . . And the frenzied women commence an orgiastic dance, with a furious stamping, as if they were crushing the entire bourgeois world beneath their feet.<sup>58</sup>

In the first two or three months following the military rebellion of July 1936 many people were rounded up and imprisoned because of class, political or religious affiliations. Some forty individuals were taken captive after the abortive coup, rising to 300 by the second half of August and 500 by September. The process represented 'punishment' for the elites' role in weakening the Second Republic and in supporting the military rebellion. Imprisoning 'enemies' also demonstrated the power of the revolution and, as a guard against fifth-column sabotage, was seen as a direct contribution to the war effort. Those imprisoned became extremely vulnerable to violence given the divisions within local political authority and the precarious military defence of the city, particularly as Málaga began to be bombed from the air. Although many revolutionary 'uncontrollables' were arrested by republican police in the first days after the military rebellion, following the pattern throughout the republican zone, killings reached their height in August and reduced only gradually by late September 1936.<sup>59</sup> Most of the executions therefore took place without a formal legal process.<sup>60</sup> The prison was assaulted on five occasions (from 22 August to 24 September) after devastating Nationalist air-raids, and 'enemies of the Republic' were taken away for execution.<sup>61</sup>



Of the 1,100 or so individuals killed during the revolution, some 40 per cent were from the professions (doctors, lawyers, engineers), and a further 40 per cent were clerics or military men.<sup>62</sup> Although priest-killing began very quickly after the rebellion, it may be significant that in the first '*saca*' from the prison on 22 August, no clerics were selected for execution.<sup>63</sup> Local leaders of the Radical Socialist Party enunciated an essentially class-determined rationale, viewing the 'spiritual sons' of Catholicism, those *educated* by priests, like the privileged members of the Marian congregations, and the affluent who organised public devotions to the Sacred Heart and the penitential confraternities, as the 'real' enemies.<sup>64</sup> The normal activities of many clerics in Andalusia had little relevance to the daily material suffering around them, as exiled priests from Catalonia and the Basque Country confirmed when they were drafted into communities in the south, trailing behind Franco's forces of occupation.<sup>65</sup> Priests were also, however, part of a symbolic order (not simply an *economic* order) that the revolution sought to destroy.<sup>66</sup> Although local republican newspapers attempted to act as a restraining influence, in the first days following the rebellion occasional press declarations were inflammatory. 'Purifying flames' were necessary, it was argued, to cleanse the city of demonic enemies, monstrous, unnatural creatures, with the blood of innocents on their hands, who planned to take power back from the revolution.<sup>67</sup> Such images were gradually less prevalent and were in tension with a more positive message of republican citizenship, though this vision still had no obvious place for religion.<sup>68</sup>

The last mass killing of the revolution in the city took place on 24 September 1936 when a bombing raid provoked a crowd to congregate at the prison to demand redress. On this occasion 107 people were taken, including some priests and eight women. Among them were María Lamothe Castañeda who had been a prominent activist in the Catholic political party Acción Popular in 1931, and whose family was known for promoting the religious confraternities of the city. Soledad Lamothe, who was secretary of the women's branch of the lay organisation Acción Católica, was also killed, as was the president of the organisation's women's section, Carmen López Heredia.<sup>69</sup> Their deaths were interpreted by Francoists as punishment by 'the mob' for having given charity to the poor.<sup>70</sup> The remaining records show that 270 people, approximately 25 per cent of total deaths during republican control, were disposed of after being taken from prison. Thus, there were clearly many other extra-judicial executions in the city during the summer of 1936.<sup>71</sup>

The aim of this section has not been to account for the revolutionary violence in Málaga except to show that it was related to religion



understood both as institutionalised and material power and as a set of beliefs expressed through ritual. The purpose of describing (however fleetingly) some of the features of the revolutionary violence has been to provide a context for the discussion of the religious rituals of the 'liberation' which follows. Memories of the revolution shaped Catholic perceptions as expressed through the Holy Week devotions. Following the 'liberation' of Málaga, while the war continued, Semana Santa was understood as a time to draw together and bear witness. An example of public testimony was that of Enrique Navarro who became president of the Agrupación de Cofradías because the incumbent, Antonio Baena, had been executed by 'the mob' in August 1936. Navarro declared to the newspapers that he owed his own life to the Virgin of Sorrows, whose confraternity he headed. During his captivity he had never once removed the medallion of the Virgin that he wore throughout the revolution. Despite his persecution and imprisonment, he had survived; this was something to be explained in religious terms: 'she had wanted it thus and because of her I live'.<sup>72</sup>

### **'The liberation': Málaga's redemption**

Although Italian troops had been the first to reach Málaga on 7 February 1937, the myth of a providential *national* victory as part of the 'crusade' was disseminated in the press and through ritualised ceremony. The newspapers celebrated how the duque de Sevilla, member of the Bourbon dynasty and head of the Marbella Column, had gloriously ridden into the city on a white horse. Recalling familiar images of St James, known in Spain as the Christian 'slayer of Moors', the duque traversed and conquered 'communist Perchel' before crossing the Tetuán bridge to recapture the old heart of the city. At that moment of 'resurrection' the cloud that had covered the sky all morning 'gave way to magnificent sunshine'.<sup>73</sup> The next day, devotional activity resumed in the church of Santo Domingo when soldiers of the Spanish Legion, 2,000 of whom had participated in the advance on the city, held a funeral with full solemnities for a young Nationalist soldier killed during the occupation.<sup>74</sup> The legion thereby reclaimed the temple from where the crucifixion of the 'Cristo de la Buena Muerte' ('Christ of the Good Death') was ritually escorted by its officers through the city each Semana Santa.<sup>75</sup>

The 'liberation' was preceded by a mass flight from the city. Thousands, many with feet bound in rags, took to the east road for Almería: miles of people, 'like an army of ants', according to an eye-witness.<sup>76</sup> The silence, broken only by the deadly bombing and strafing of Nationalist planes, intensified the sense of grieving, which, 'like a subterranean

sorrow, devoured us from inside'.<sup>77</sup> The constant stream of humanity, 'rustling and sighing like the wind in trees', passed by the house of Peter Chalmers Mitchell who was reminded of one of Goya's most dreadful pictures: 'the dispossessed of the earth driven by dull, almost animal instincts of flight'.<sup>78</sup> Many would flee as far as Barcelona, finishing up in brutalising French concentration camps after escaping the Francoist advance on Catalonia in the winter of 1938–9. The perception of the conquerors was that those who fled 'must have had uneasy consciences' and were 'probably implicated in murder'.<sup>79</sup>

The harshness of the material conditions and the fear suggested by the flight from the city were intensified by political coercion. Falangism justified the violence of occupation through a secular model of 'purification' confirming a new 'community of victory'. The 'symbols of hate' associated with the Republic – class (or 'horizontal') solidarity, the confusion of hierarchies and spatial boundaries, 'descent into the mire' – were to be replaced by 'verticality', 'ascension' and 'unity'.<sup>80</sup>

The martyred city, whose face had been deformed, would, through liberation, recuperate its own 'special physiognomy'.<sup>81</sup>

The atmosphere of order and tranquility recorded in the newspapers owed much to fear and a need to demonstrate loyalty to the occupying powers. Within days of the occupation mass executions began, often with no real judicial process. The violence was concentrated on the social groups supportive of the Republic: the working class, the younger generation, 'the people'. More than eighty victims were documented as falling to the firing squads on 16 February, the first anniversary of the Popular Front electoral victory of 1936. Some forty on average were killed each day throughout March and into April, and still some thirty or forty per week in June. The executions would continue in regular batches until 1940.<sup>82</sup> The mass exodus and the killings formed a purifying counterpoint to the ritualised religious cleansing of the city, which is the main theme for discussion in the rest of this chapter.

A key feature of the rituals of the occupation was the mixing of sacred and secular symbols. On 11 February an open-air mass was held for the armed forces and militia before the duque de Sevilla, surrounded by his general staff and escort, at an altar adorned with flowers by women of the Sección Femenina. The ceremony was a combination of display of political power, reassertion of traditional gender roles, and instrument of salvation on behalf of 'the sacrificed'.<sup>83</sup> A triumphal march, led by Falangists and followed by boys and girls of the party youth movement, proceeded along what had become, with the fall of the city, the Alameda del Generalísimo Franco, and the duque de Sevilla rode through the crowds to receive the salutes which 'the people of Málaga owed to him'.

Sacred activity was at least as significant as the political organisation of the occupation. The sacrilegious acts of the 'red hordes' during the revolution, obliged the bishop of the city, Balbino Santos y Olivera, to reconsecrate the city's churches. A solemn act, in and around the cathedral, in March 1937, marked the reconciliation of the Mother Church with her family. Before a large congregation in the Bishop's Square, with his palace at one side and the cathedral on another, the external boundaries of the great temple were purified, beginning with the symbolic threshold of the main door, followed by the interior of the temple. Incense reached into every dark corner, reestablishing the separation of sacred and profane space. Outside, centurions of the Falange and of the Sección Femenina formed in rank and inside the cathedral more uniformed Falangists kept guard over the altars as they were blessed. The wafted incense of penitence, rising up like a prayerful offering, 'comforted people', as did the ritual of consecrating purifying oils for liturgical blessing, distributed to priests for use throughout the diocese.

Wartime sacrifice, officially recognised only when made 'for God and the *Patria*', gave a redemptive sense to the 'liberation' as expressed through collective public manifestations. The suffering of 'the Godly' formed the basis of a moralistic reordering. At the same time, this redemption aimed not only to purify the proletarian revolution but was invested by the church with a generalised, self-referential sense of making amends for the pre-war sins of the city. A sense of triumph was thus deferred while the war continued and the focus of Semana Santa was on expiation and sacred intercession on behalf of Franco.<sup>84</sup> Wartime devotions were kept simple and solemn, also because so many sacred images had been lost in the revolution. The Agrupación de Cofradías decided that a single solemn procession in 1937 would focus on the Holy Virgin of Sorrows of the mendicant Order of Servites, a much more simple and modest image than the impressively mantled Virgin processed by the confraternity of the Cristo de la Expiración. The Virgen de los Servitas represented both the desolation of the Mother of God and the providential nature of the city's 'liberation' since her image had been 'miraculously' saved during the war. The Virgin symbolised austere devotion. The image was not associated with the popular *barrios* and thus could safely represent elite reclamation of the city as well as sorrow and mourning. The loss of sacred images and the consequent 'stripping down' of the Holy Week ritual to its most essential level contributed to a sense of a purified resurgence and an intensification of devotion. This intensification also relied on the exclusion of everything associated with the Republic, thereby reducing cathartic and propagandistic potential. The intensification of the immediate post-liberation period would

gradually give way to a grandiose and more politicised display with the Nationalist triumph at Easter in 1939.

The most enthusiastic of those in the crowds that began from 4 a.m. to direct themselves 'towards Calvary' on Good Friday in 1937 were brothers and sisters of the confraternities. The day commenced with a Via Crucis accompanied by soldiers and bandsmen from a corps of *requeté* (Carlist) militiamen. The military squads which had been taking part in executions of republican enemies now held their rifles at reversed arms, as in a funeral procession, their military spirit tempered by devotion. Communion was taken at 8.30 a.m., and before the penitential march proper the Holy Virgin was displayed for people to file past in the cathedral beside the altar and at the feet of the image of the Cristo de la Buena Muerte, 'incarnation of serene and redemptive death'. The oration was a commentary on the seven last words of Christ on the Cross as they related to the moments currently lived by 'the beloved *Patria*'.

The procession of the Virgin, beginning at nine in the evening, as the *Marcha Real* was intoned with great solemnity and respect, would not end until the early hours of the morning. Carried in turns by brothers of the various *cofradías*, her guard of honour was composed of uniformed Falangists, *requetés*, and Assault Guards, accompanied by all of the civil, military, and ecclesiastical authorities, by boys and girls of the militia youth movements and by women of the Sección Femenina. Throughout the length of the procession, priests circulated amongst penitents and observers praying the rosary – one of the particular devotions of the Servites – to which those assembled responded with great concentration and fervour. Some 50,000 *malagueños* presented themselves in the streets in silence broken only by the sound of prayer. The sense of reconsecrating the city space was reflected by commentators: to see the procession traverse the streets of Málaga, 'in which Soviet barbarism had left its terrible imprint', was to see something 'miraculous'.

The unity of the 1937 Good Friday procession, with *cofrades* of all brotherhoods together, dressed in black, solemnly accompanied by soldiers and militiamen, concentrated mourning and the collective remembering of those still fighting. Their sacrifices were redeemed by the providential turn of Spain away from democracy and back 'towards her traditions'. Devotion was thus 'purified'. It relied on 'donations of faith and repentance' rather than gifts of jewels. So clearly ascetic was the nature of the ritual that some people hoped it would lead to a future when only those who 'feel and practise religion' would take part in the public processions.<sup>85</sup>

The procession of the Virgin of the Servites a year later implored God to 'place his hand upon the unconquerable head of the *caudillo*'. By now,

although explicit instructions were issued for maintaining the strict discipline and dignity of the proceedings, attention had begun to turn to the renewal of minds 'corrupted' by the loose morals of democracy, war and revolution.<sup>86</sup> Such renewal could be achieved through coercive means and organised instruction resting upon popular traditions like devotion to the Blessed Virgin. Thus it was that the most popular *pasos* were resumed, albeit in a limited way, in the working-class parishes. The restorative sense of redemption is evident in declarations about the acclamation offered in Perchel to the Virgin of Sorrows and the Virgin of Great Power as 'symbols of rightful restitution'. The sacred images were transported in the early morning from the church of the Holy Martyrs to the parish church of the Carmelites where a sacred mission was to be initiated in the parish during the three weeks leading up to Passion-tide. A sense of reincorporating corrupted areas of the city can be seen in the process of conveying the Virgin of Sorrows to the Iglesia del Carmen. The route traversed the central avenues of Málaga, with great purpose, accompanied by the authorities, before returning to the working-class side of the river across the Tetuán bridge where the clergy of the *barrio*, bearing the parochial cross, waited to take charge of her. People filled the streets which, as in pre-war times, were garlanded in national colours. The ecclesiastical 'home' of the confraternity, the ruined church of San Pedro, destroyed in the anticlerical violence of 1931, became, in effect, a purified shrine, a 'living testament to harmonious service'. While the Virgin rested, sacred and secular were mixed as the national hymn was played with particular enthusiasm and 'thousands of arms were raised in salute as a tribute of respect and love for the Mother of God'. The streets of 'the purest (*castizo*) *barrio*' were reported to be teeming with people, including many more men (perhaps *wanting* to be seen) than formerly in such processions, surrounding the 'dark and *perchelera* Virgin'. Allegories of renewal abounded as the 'night of sorrow', tragedy, and 'satanic horror' passed, giving way to 'the clear morning of spring' and 'the triumph of truth'.<sup>87</sup>

The authorities declared that 'faith and its external manifestations' were firmly 'fixed' in the Spanish soul 'year after year, deeply felt in our veins through the blood given us by our fathers and mothers': the 'race itself would have to be destroyed' in order to finish with religion. This was witnessed, the claims continued, by the 'crazed enthusiasm' and 'frenzy of devotion' in Perchel, once believed to be the cradle of Marxism, but also a perennial source of 'purity'. The *barrio* had ceased to be 'red' with the Virgin's 'homecoming'. Rejuvenated by Holy Week, people 'with clean hearts' would return to their labours without faltering, to dream of the more grandiose Semana Santa that would come with




Figure 10.2. Penitential procession, Málaga, 1938.

final victory over 'those without faith'. The Virgin channelled a great variety of emotions, as she always had. A chronicle from one 'Gregorio Urbanistondo', claiming to be a son of Perchel, related how the sorrowful face of the Virgin was a reflection of 'tears of grief, of happiness, of anger, (and) remorse'. This multivalent sense of the Virgin was far from new. Its use, however, as an instrument of political repression and nationalism was an opportunistic attempt to play on guilt: 'we have wished to read in her lovely eyes something which speaks of the shameful past of many of her children'. The people, on receiving their Virgin with such love, would henceforth follow the doctrine of Christ. The Virgin was, in effect, calling for public acts of contrition by *percheros* and promises before God to 'sin no more'; the popular response, however, is difficult to interpret.<sup>88</sup>

Instructional exertions and the conversion of sinners were made by the church's pastoral agencies as part of the process of 'liberation'. Indulgences were conceded to those attending three days of prayerful vigil in the cathedral to beseech the Sacramented Lord to grant his peace and his blessings to the *Patria*, during the time when Carnival would normally grip the city. Following the vigil, the girls' youth section of Acción Católica held a solemn 'Via Crucis to Calvary, of prayer and penitence for Spain', beginning from the church of San Lázaro on Ash Wednesday.<sup>89</sup> A diocesan mission was planned for the days of Semana Santa to precede a mass of reparation for the profanation of the war which would take place on Good Friday.<sup>90</sup> Each dawn the rosary was recited and each evening a sermon pointed to daily duties and to 'the mercy of God and his justice', and to rewards and punishments. Parochial missions to 'redeem children' were held in 1938 with the object of rectifying the neglect of 'Christian education' by the republican regime. Priests, mission fathers, and teachers adapted spiritual exercises in explaining sin, redemption and salvation to the children who attended mass as part of the school programme and, as a culmination, processed through the streets of their neighbourhoods. The sight of this innocent flock in the same streets that had been the scene of 'so many subhuman acts and passions', gave a sense of 'optimism and hope for the future spiritual grandeur of [the Spanish] race'. In the worker *barrio* of Trinidad, for example, 'where blasphemy, hatred and barbarism had their favoured environment', hundreds of children left the churches and processed, each carrying a little flag with the national colours, following images of the child Jesus and the Immaculate Conception. As they processed, the multitude of onlookers raised their arms in salute and the children sang:




Figure 10.3. The entry of Christ into Jerusalem (and into Málaga), Palm Sunday, 1939.



Viva Mary,  
Death to sin,  
Christ Jesus will be  
Glorified for ever.<sup>91</sup>

The seven-day mission was concluded with a sermon delivered by the bishop in the cathedral: as with the reclamation of the great temple itself, the streets of the city had now been sanctified.<sup>92</sup>

By February 1939 it was clear that Francoist victory was imminent. The provincial committee in charge of finances felt able to fund sufficiently the forthcoming Easter processions and the Agrupación de Cofradías was able to celebrate a veritable resurgence of processions mounted by fourteen confraternities.<sup>93</sup> The renewed grandeur would reinforce the difficulty of the relationship between the regime's nationalist politics, the complex nature of popular devotion, and the official church's ambiguous interpretation of such devotion as based on 'myths'.<sup>94</sup> Issuing instructions on public participation in devotions in 1939 and restating the church's authority, the bishop of Málaga declared that religious devotion required solemnity if it was not to be reduced to an expression of patriotism: spiritual and even bodily pleasure could be gained as long as it was 'virtuous'. Parishioners had enquired of him whether, as a demonstration of respect and religiosity, the same salutes and reverence addressed to the symbols of civil or military authority ought also to be accorded to sacred images. The fascist salute for military and civilians had been made obligatory a year or so earlier during all marches in Nationalist Spain. The bishop's response emphasised that bodily gestures introduced by the new regime to indicate patriotism and adhesion to the Nationalist cause, like the fascist-style salute, were laudable. The church, indeed, had been the first to make such a salute. This was out of place, however, when applied to religious ends. A diocesan 'crusade' to resanctify religious festivals was to be launched.<sup>95</sup> The streets of the city, he explained, should form 'a temple' during the processions of Passion-tide. Just as in a church, before the altar, even when the national hymn was sung, he argued, 'it would be ridiculous to stand with the arm raised and the hand extended or stand to attention in a military style as before the ensign of the *Patria* or an officer of the army'. Religious processions should not become excuses for military parades. The *estaciones de penitencia* had to be demonstrations of faith, piety, veneration and commemoration of the saints. The systematic customs instilled by the church in infancy were to be followed:

gentlemen shall remove their hats, the head must be bowed profoundly, knees should be humbly bent, one must prostrate oneself as a sign of veneration and reverence, the hands should be held together in a prayerful attitude, make the

sign of the cross, maintain quiet . . . And above all of this, pray mentally or vocally, not with a vain and sterile sentimentalism, but with the robust faith and the filial confidence that the gospel teaches us.<sup>96</sup>

The church could not therefore alter its ceremonial customs and etiquette to placate a secular authority. The bishop argued that the regime should have understood this since it did, after all, profess itself to be a Catholic state. The bishop's concerns, however, were not simply motivated by the 'militarisation' and politicism of the processions and of the church itself. There was an important three-way tension between the politico-military requirements of the nascent Francoist regime, the institution of the Catholic Church and its doctrine, and the ambiguities and complexities of popular religiosity. 'Crusade' meant something different to each. Behind the bishop's strictures about virtue and restraint lay doubts about the political nature of 'Franco's crusade', on the one hand, and fears of popular traditions and the emotions of 'the crowd', on the other. The latter either rejected the notion of 'crusade' completely or accepted it for its own uses in aiding the process of mourning, assimilating the sacrifices and rebuilding some sense of community, as well as frequently conforming to the fascistic gestures imposed politically. In spite of the hierarchy's 1939 calls for restrained recognition of the mystery of redemption, sacred, secular and popular symbols were present that year in as complicated a mix of symbolic language as ever. Behind the Perchel Virgin of Sorrows, for example, there walked an isolated barefoot woman, her face covered by a hood, and her feet in chains and several women loudly delivered dramatic *saetas* to the Virgin as she passed while other onlookers saluted.<sup>97</sup> A new penitential confraternity, dedicated to the suffering of wartime prisoners, was established in the working-class *barrio* of Trinidad in 1939, focused on the image of Christ as captive. Ex-prisoners of the revolution who had suffered 'for religion and for Spain' would process in front of the holy image. This was as intended. The significance of the ritual would become shared, however, as the custom grew for families of the prisoners of the Francoist state during the early post-war years to follow in procession behind the shackled figure of Christ. The ritual seems to have been an opportunity for a publicly sanctioned inclusion in the post-war community based on 'alignment with suffering'.<sup>98</sup>

### Some conclusions

The Semana Santa processions can be viewed through the cultural anthropologist Victor Turner's sense of *communitas*.<sup>99</sup> Holy Week was more popular than any other public devotional activity, and thus is

useful in revealing a range of meanings. The rituals were *para*-liturgical, taking place alongside official church doctrine and practice. But they can also be considered as intense expressions of a sense of popular communion, taking place 'outside' society and beyond law-bound 'social structure'. According to Turner, *communitas* and structure exist simultaneously in dialectic relationship, allowing society to function. The processions thus constituted, potentially, a cathartic space for expressing a variety of collective needs and feelings. The gestures, words and objects were cyclical expressions of local associative mechanisms.

The problem was that the extent of social and political conflict in Málaga, building momentum at least since 1900, meant that Semana Santa increasingly failed to channel very effectively a sense of community. Semana Santa was more likely than other public devotional activity to provoke suspicion both from clerical and secular authorities; hence, attempts from above to impose a kind of normative or ideological *communitas* rather than allowing its spontaneous generation. The symbolic use of urban space and the public, collective activity of women, for example, were difficult to control. Moreover, the 'off-stage' Holy Week commentaries, from all quarters, were expressive not only of community identity but also of differences enmeshed within economic inequality, religion and clericalism, and attitudes to gender and morality. During the civil war, and in its difficult aftermath, the processions also displayed significant *contingent* aspects in response to the collective crisis that overlay their seasonal, cyclical significance. Within the war context, there was an imperative to pursue the basic requirements of cultural reproduction and survival as well as the victors' version of 'the nation'. The reenactment of Christ's Passion during the period 1937–9 had a particular resonance, mirroring the feelings of many of those present, giving a plausible physical and temporal shape to the otherwise unfathomable tragedy of the war. At the same time, there were also inevitable ideological connotations.

Combining the concept and terminology of *communitas* with the Gramscian notion of hegemony achieved through an element of consent within civil society, we can identify a circumscribed community-building process in the city of Málaga during the 'liberation'. The limits to cultural reproduction in post-civil-war Spain were extremely important, however. Those responsible for directing the repression participated very publicly in the religious rituals. Religious purification encompassed both the reconsecration of the urban space and the purging of minds and bodies in the process of building a 'purified' community. In order for persecution to become a stimulant to building a sacred community in the aftermath of the Spanish civil war, the profanation and violence of

the revolution had to be placed at the forefront of the process of redemption.<sup>100</sup> The remains of the 1,100 or so victims of the revolution in the city of Málaga were transferred across the river from the proletarian cemetery of San Rafael to the 'chapel of victory' in the cathedral in December 1941. In the consecration service their bodies were claimed as 'penitential material' and the shared values of their sacrifice – a rejection of 'sensuality', 'feminisation' and 'the dark city' – were restated.<sup>101</sup> These were the originating myths of the imagined community, to be found in Catholic memory and repeated in religious rituals. Elements of the myth pre-dated the conflict, but the sacrifices of the war would cause them to be restated juridically and through demonising language and violence during the early post-war years. This process perpetuated the structural division between victors and vanquished, overriding the periodic cathartic displays such as *Semana Santa*.<sup>102</sup>

## Notes

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### HISTORY, MEMORY AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: RECENT PERSPECTIVES

- 1 This bi-polar framework has begun to be critically addressed in recent years. See, e.g., Paul Preston, *Las tres Españas del 36* (Barcelona, 1998).
- 2 For a recent tendentious account of the republican war effort as a 'communist' struggle, see the editorial commentary in Ronald Radosh et al. (eds.), *Spain Betrayed: the Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War* (New Haven, 2001). For an effective demolition of this version of the history of the Second Republic, see Helen Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War, 1936–1939* (Cambridge, 2002).
- 3 E.g. Susanna Tavera, *Solidaridad Obrera: el fer-se i desfer-se d'un diari anarco-sindicalista (1915–1939)* (Barcelona, 1992).
- 4 E.g. Gonzalo Santonja, *La novela revolucionaria de quiosco, 1905–1939* (Madrid, 1993).
- 5 Raymond Williams, *Keywords* (London, 1976), pp. 76–82; Terry Eagleton, *The Idea of Culture* (Oxford, 2000).
- 6 One volume, first appearing in 1984 and focused on social and political history, represented a benchmark in showing how the civil war was, in fact, many wars. Paul Preston (ed.), *Revolution and War in Spain, 1931–1939* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn, London, 1993).
- 7 Juan Díez Nicolás, 'La mortalidad en la guerra civil española', *Boletín de demografía histórica*, 3. 1 (March 1985).
- 8 José Luis Abellán (ed.), *El exilio español de 1939*, 6 vols. (Madrid, 1976); Michael Richards, 'Memory and historical consciousness in post-war Spain', *Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut, Essen, Jahrbuch* (2002/3), 174–92.
- 9 See Montserrat Roig, *Noche y niebla: los catalanes en los campos nazis* (Barcelona, 1978).
- 10 Ismael Saz and A. Gómez (eds.), *El franquismo en Valencia: formas de vida y actitudes sociales en la posguerra* (Valencia, 1999), p. 17.
- 11 Paul Preston, 'War of words: the Spanish civil war and the historians', in Preston (ed.), *Revolution and War*, pp. 1–13.
- 12 E.g. Emilio Silva and Santiago Macías, *Las fosas de Franco: los republicanos que el dictador dejó en las cunetas* (Madrid, 2003); Ricard Vinyes et al., *Els nens perduts del franquisme* (Barcelona, 2001).
- 13 Gerald Brenan, *The Face of Spain* (Harmondsworth, 1965 [1950]), p. 146.

- 14 Esther Martínez Tórtola, *La enseñanza de la historia en el primer bachillerato franquista (1938–1953)* (Madrid, 1996).
- 15 For a recent comparative approach, see Gregory M. Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe* (Oxford, 1991).
- 16 Santos Juliá, 'La historia social y la historiografía española', *Ayer*, 10 (1993), 29–46.
- 17 See, e.g., Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpúrua, 'Centre and periphery 1900–1936: national integration and regional nationalisms reconsidered', in Frances Lannon and Paul Preston (eds.), *Elites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 35–6.
- 18 Julio Aróstegui, 'El observador en la tribu. (Los tratadistas extranjeros y la historia española)', *Historia Contemporánea*, 20 (2000), 3–29.
- 19 Enrique Gómez Arboleya, 'Sociología en España', *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 98 (1958), 47–83.
- 20 See José Álvarez Junco, *Mater dolorosa: la idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 2001), esp. pp. 455–63, and, more generally, pp. 305–496.
- 21 See Américo Castro, *España en su historia: cristianos, moros y judíos* (Buenos Aires, 1948). Juan Benet, 'De nuevo "España en su historia"', *El País*, 25 March 1985, p. 11.
- 22 Michael Richards, 'From war culture to civil society: Francoism, social change and memories of the Spanish civil war', *History and Memory*, 14. 1/2 (Fall 2002), 93–120.
- 23 On 'internal colonisation', see Michael Richards, *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936–1945* (Cambridge, 1998).
- 24 Manuel Fraga Iribarne, 'El 18 de julio y la juventud', in *La guerra de liberación nacional* (Zaragoza, 1961), pp. 669–92.
- 25 See, e.g., *Semanas Sociales de España: los problemas de la migración española* (Madrid, 1959).
- 26 Antonio Elorza, *La utopía anarquista bajo la Segunda República* (Madrid, 1973); Francesc Bonamusa, *El Bloc Obrer i Camperol: els primers anys, 1930–1932* (Barcelona, 1974); Xavier Cuadrat, *Socialismo y anarquismo en Cataluña (1899–1911): los orígenes de la CNT* (Madrid, 1976); Antonio Bar, *La CNT en los años rojos* (Madrid, 1981); *Catalunya sota el règim franquista: informe sobre la persecució de la llengua i la cultura de Catalunya pel règim del General Franco* (Paris, 1973); Beltza, *El nacionalismo vasco, 1876–1936* (San Sebastián, 1976); Javier Corcuera Atienza, *Orígenes, ideología y organización del nacionalismo vasco (1876–1904)* (Madrid, 1979).
- 27 Chris Ealham, 'The Spanish revolution: 60 years on', *Tesserae: Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies*, 2 (1996), 209–34.
- 28 See, e.g., Fernando Claudín, 'Dos concepciones de la vía española al socialismo', *Horizonte español*, 2 (1966), 59–100.
- 29 Julián Casanova, 'Guerra civil, ¿lucha de clases?: el difícil ejercicio de reconstruir el pasado', *Historia Social*, 20 (1994), 135–50.
- 30 For an attempt to incorporate into the historiography on the Spanish post-war period the concept of 'consenso', more popular in Italian historical-political parlance and ambiguously translatable as either 'assent' or

- 'consensus', see Ramon Garrabou et al., *Franquisme: sobre resistència i consens a Catalunya (1938–1959)* (Barcelona, 1990).
- 31 Paloma Aguilar Fernández, *Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil española* (Madrid, 1996) [English transl. *Memory and Amnesia: the Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy*, (New York and Oxford, 2002)].
  - 32 Alberto Reig Tapia, *Memoria de la Guerra Civil: los mitos de la tribu* (Madrid, 1999).
  - 33 Santos Juliá, 'Fieles y mártires: raíces religiosas de algunas prácticas sindicales en la España de los años treinta', *Revista de Occidente* (April 1983), 61–75.
  - 34 For a recent historiographical guide, see Javier Paniagua, 'Una gran pregunta y varias respuestas. El anarquismo español: desde la política a la historiografía', *Historia Social*, 12 (1992), 31–57.
  - 35 Dionisio Pereira, *A CNT na Galicia, 1922–1936* (Santiago de Compostela, 1994); Julián Casanova et al., *El pasado oculto: fascismo y violencia en Aragón, 1936–1939* (Madrid, 1992).
  - 36 See, for instance, Josep Maria Solé i Sabaté and Joan Villarroja i Font, *La repressió franquista a Catalunya, 1938–1953* (Barcelona, 1985).
  - 37 See the critique of José Álvarez Junco and Manuel Pérez Ledesma, 'Historia del movimiento obrero. ¿Una segunda ruptura?', *Revista de Occidente*, 12 (1982), 19–41.
  - 38 Thompson's celebrated *magnum opus*, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963), first appeared in Spain in 1977 [*La formación histórica de la clase obrera: Inglaterra, 1780–1832* (Barcelona, 1977)], retranslated and reprinted in 1989 as *La formación de la clase obrera en Inglaterra*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1989). A special issue of the journal *Historia Social* (vol. 16) was dedicated to discussions of Thompson's work in 1994.
  - 39 See, e.g., *Nuevas perspectivas sobre la mujer* (Madrid, 1982); *Ordenamiento jurídico y realidad social de las mujeres* (Madrid, 1986). Among later groups have been the Seminario de Estudios Interdisciplinarios de la Mujer of the Universidad de Málaga, founded in 1988, and the Instituto de Investigaciones Feministas, Universidad Complutense, Madrid (1985). The Spanish Ministry of Culture has supported publication of significant research. See, e.g., *Las mujeres y la guerra civil española* (Madrid, 1991). For a summary, Mary Nash, 'Dos décadas de historia de las mujeres en España', *Historia Social*, 9 (1991), 137–61.
  - 40 E.g., Mercedes Vilanova (ed.), *Poder en la sociedad* (Barcelona, 1986).
  - 41 Anna Monjo and Carme Vega, *Els treballadors i la guerra civil: història d'una indústria catalana col·lectivitzada* (Barcelona, 1986).
  - 42 Ronald Fraser, *Blood of Spain: the Experience of Civil War, 1936–1939* (London, 1979).
  - 43 Conxita Mir, *Vivir es sobrevivir: justicia, orden y marginación en la Cataluña rural de la postguerra (1939–1951)* (Lleida, 2000); Richards, *A Time of Silence*; Ricard Vinyes, Montse Armengou and Ricard Belis, *Els nens perduts del franquisme* (Barcelona, 2002); Dolors Marin Silvestre, *Clandestinos: el Maquis contra el Franquismo, 1934–1975* (Barcelona, 2002).
  - 44 Carme Molinero and Pere Ysàs, '*Patria, Justicia y Pan*', *la repressió franquista a Catalunya, 1939–1951* (Barcelona, 1985); Carles Santacana i Torres,

- Victoriosos i Derrotats: el Franquisme a l'Hospitalet, 1939–1951* (Barcelona, 1994).
- 45 Eduardo González Calleja and Fernando del Rey Reguillo, *La defensa armada contra la revolución: una historia de la 'guardias cívicas' en la España del siglo XX* (Madrid, 1995). See also Eduardo González Calleja, *La razón de la fuerza: orden público, subversión y violencia política en la España de la Restauración (1875–1917)* (Madrid, 1998) and *El máuser y el sufragio: orden público, subversión y violencia política en la crisis de la Restauración (1917–1931)* (Madrid, 1999).
  - 46 On revisionism, see, e.g., Manuel Suárez Cortina (ed.), *La Restauración: entre el liberalismo y la democracia* (Madrid, 1997).
  - 47 José Álvarez Junco, *El Emperador del Paralelo: Lerroux y la demagogia populista* (Madrid, 1990); Pere López Sánchez, *Un verano con mil julios y otras estaciones. Barcelona: de la Reforma Interior a la Revolución de Julio de 1909* (Madrid, 1993); Manuel Pérez Ledesma, *Estabilidad y conflicto social: España, de los iberos al 14-D* (Madrid, 1990).
  - 48 See, for instance, José Luis García Delgado (ed.), *Las ciudades en la modernización de España: los decenios interseculares* (Madrid, 1992); López Sánchez, *Un verano con mil julios y otras estaciones*; Pamela Radcliff, *From Mobilization to Civil War: the Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–1937* (Cambridge, 1996); José Luis Oyón, 'Obreros en la ciudad: líneas de un proyecto de investigación en historia urbana', *Historia Contemporánea*, 18 (1999), 317–45; González Martínez, 'Guerra civil en Murcia'; Chris Ealham, *Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937* (London, 2004).
  - 49 See Álvarez Junco, *El Emperador del Paralelo*.
  - 50 An example of this approach is found in Carmen González Martínez, *Guerra Civil en Murcia: un análisis sobre el poder y los comportamientos colectivos* (Murcia, 1999).
  - 51 E.g. a recent volume of articles, Rafael Cruz and Manuel Pérez Ledesma (eds.), *Cultura y movilización en la España contemporánea* (Madrid, 1997).
  - 52 A recent addition to the historiography of the experience of the war in the republican zone relies on a reductive framework of 'individualism'. See Michael Seidman, *Republic of Egos: a Social History of the Spanish Civil War* (Madison, 2002).
  - 53 Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1994 [1978]), p. xi, acknowledging the influence of the anthropologist's understanding found in A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, *Culture: a Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (New York, 1952).
  - 54 Paul Willis, 'Shop floor culture, masculinity and the wage form', in John Clarke, Chas Critcher and Richard Johnson (eds.), *Working-Class Culture: Studies in History and Theory* (London, 1979), pp. 185–6.
  - 55 Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (London, 1973), p. 158.
  - 56 See Robert Darnton, 'The history of mentalities', in Richard Harvey Brown and Stanford M. Lyman (eds.), *Structure, Consciousness and History* (Cambridge, 1978), p. 109.
  - 57 José Luis Oyón has lamented the absence of social perspectives on the city, something he regards as 'an indicator of the infancy of urban historical



- research in Spain'. ('Spain', in Richard Roger (ed.), *European Urban History* (Leicester, 1993), p. 38.)
- 58 Examples include Albert Balcells, *Crisis económica y agitación social en Cataluña (1930–1936)* (Barcelona, 1971); J. R. Corbin, *The Anarchist Passion: Class Conflict in Southern Spain, 1810–1965* (Aldershot, 1993); and M. Sánchez, *La Segunda República i la Guerra Civil a Cerdanyola (1931–1939)* (Barcelona, 1993).
  - 59 Oyón, 'Obreros en la ciudad', pp. 317–45; P López Sánchez, *Un verano con mil julios y otras estaciones*; García Delgado (ed.), *Las ciudades en la modernización de España*; Jesús I. Bueno Madurga, *Zaragoza, 1917–1936: de la movilización popular y obrera a la reacción conservadora* (Zaragoza, 2000); Carlos Gil Andrés, *Echarse a la calle: amotinados, huelguistas y revolucionarios (La Rioja, 1890–1936)* (Zaragoza, 2000).
  - 60 Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question: a Marxist Approach* (London, 1977), pp. 129–30; Doreen Massey, *Spatial Divisions of Labour* (London, 1984), *passim*; Ira Katznelson, *Marxism and the City* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 7–8.
  - 61 As John Urry has observed: 'When added together there may be a "national class structure" which is not in fact pertinent to anybody's specifically local class experience.' ('Localities, regions and social class', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 5 (1981), 464.)
  - 62 Such acts were formally encouraged by the church. See Vicente Cárcel Ortí (ed.), *Actas de las Conferencias de Metropolitanos Españoles (1921–1965)* (Madrid, 1994), p. 391.
  - 63 For a contemporary and suggestive critique of Marxist orthodoxy on the countryside, see Ernst Bloch, 'Nonsynchronism and the obligation to its dialectics', originally published in 1932, as part of *Erbschaft dieser Zeit*, reprinted in *New German Critique*, 11 (Spring 1977), and the accompanying introduction, Anson Rabinbach, 'Unclaimed heritage: Ernst Bloch's *Heritage of Our Times* and the theory of fascism'.

## THE SYMBOLISM OF VIOLENCE DURING THE SECOND REPUBLIC IN SPAIN, 1931–1936

- 1 See Raymond Battegay, *La agresión, ¿es un medio de comunicación?* (Barcelona, 1981).
- 2 José Luis Piñuel, *El terrorismo en la transición española (1972–1982)* (Madrid, 1986), p. 96.
- 3 Yves-Alain Michaud, *Violencia y política* (Paris, 1980), pp. 161–2.
- 4 Adam Schaff, *Ensayos sobre filosofía del lenguaje* (Barcelona, 1973), p. 138.
- 5 John Harding, 'Estereotipos', in David Sills (ed.), *Enciclopedia Internacional de las Ciencias Sociales* (Madrid, 1979), vol. 4, pp. 491–3.
- 6 Peter Heintz, *Los prejuicios sociales* (Madrid, 1968), p. 86; Wolfgang Metzger, *Los prejuicios* (Barcelona, 1971), pp. 30–1; Gordon Allport, *La naturaleza del prejuicio* (Buenos Aires, 1968), p. 29.
- 7 Prologue by Eugenio de Bustos to Juan Félix García Santos, *Léxico y política de la Segunda República* (Salamanca, 1980), p. 12.
- 8 Carl Schmitt, *Estudios políticos* (Madrid, 1975), pp. 98–166.

- 9 In spring 1928 a book by several political and military specialists (P. Togliatti, M. Tukhatchevsky, Ho-Chi-Minh, etc.) appeared under the pseudonym of A. Neuberg, *La insurrección armada*, the first Spanish edition appearing in Madrid in 1932. The first edition in Spanish of the work of Curzio Malaparte, *Técnica del golpe de Estado. Bonaparte, Lenin, Trotsky, Mussolini, Hitler, Kapp, Pilsudski, Primo de Rivera*, appeared in Madrid in 1931.
- 10 The classic work by Maurras is *Si le coup de force était possible*. . ., published in Paris, in 1910, which did not reach Spanish monarchist circles until twenty years later. Among the many minor works and essays justifying the rebellious stance of Catholic public law that appeared during the Republic, the following deserve a mention: *Aspectos del golpe de Estado. Ponencias en el Círculo de Estudios de la Juventud Monárquica de Bilbao* (Bilbao, 1933); Aniceto de Castro Albarrán, *El derecho a la rebeldía* (Madrid, 1933) and Marcial Solana, 'La resistencia a la tiranía, según la doctrina de los tratadistas del Siglo de Oro Español', *Acción Española*, 1 August 1933, pp. 352–71; 16 August 1933, pp. 442–61; 1 September 1933, pp. 580–90 and 16 September 1933, pp. 1–8, and '¿Quiénes pueden ser tiranos en los modernos regímenes democráticos y constitucionales?', *Acción Española*, 16 February 1934, pp. 1105–7.
- 11 See Antonio Fontecha Pedraza, 'Anarcosindicalismo y violencia: la "gimnasia revolucionaria" para el pueblo', *Historia Contemporánea*, 11 (1994), 153–79, and Julián Casanova, *De la calle al frente: el anarcosindicalismo en España (1931–1939)* (Barcelona, 1997).
- 12 See Eduardo González Calleja, 'La violencia y la política', in Julio Aróstegui, Jordi Canal and Eduardo González Calleja, *El carlismo y las guerras carlistas: hechos, hombres e ideas* (Madrid, 2003), pp. 199–215.
- 13 Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975* (Oxford, 1989), p. 20.
- 14 Raúl Morodo Leoncio, *Acción Española: orígenes ideológicos del franquismo* (Madrid, 1980); Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, *Acción Española: teología política y nacionalismo autoritario en España (1913–1936)* (Madrid, 1998).
- 15 Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección Tribunal Supremo: Causas Criminales y Sección Fondos Contemporáneos: Audiencia Territorial de Madrid, Serie Criminal (1900–42).
- 16 Gordon Allport and Leo Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York, 1948).
- 17 *Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes*, 4 January 1934, p. 294.
- 18 Adelardo Fernández Arias (*El Duende de la Colegiata*), *Gil Robles, la esperanza de España* (Madrid, 1936), p. 44; José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *Obras: edición cronológica* (Madrid, 1971), p. 714.
- 19 Primo de Rivera, *Obras*, p. 926.
- 20 *JAP*, 8 June 1935, cited in José María Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz* (Barcelona, 1968), p. 325.
- 21 Manuel Azaña, *Obras completas* (Mexico, 1966), vol. 2, pp. 416 and 50, respectively.
- 22 *Leviatán*, May 1934, cited in Cruz y Raya, May 1934, p. 108.
- 23 Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, 'Los problemas de la revolución nacional-sindicalista', *JONS*, August 1934, pp. 148–9.

- 24 This expression was first used in an editorial in *El Socialista*, 3 January 1934 ('¡Atención al disco rojo!'); it was taken from the warnings given to car drivers to pay attention to traffic lights in big towns and cities in Spain.
- 25 Primo de Rivera, *Obras*, pp. 557–70.
- 26 *El Adelanto*, 16 February 1936.
- 27 Manuel Rubio Cabeza, *Diccionario de la Guerra Civil Española* (Barcelona, 1987), vol. 1, pp. 225–34.
- 28 Joaquín del Moral and Pérez Aloe, *Oligarquía y 'enchufismo'* (Madrid, 1933), pp. 1–2. The term gave rise to other imaginative neologisms, such as the libellous work by José María Albiñana Sanz, *La República Jurdana: novela románica de estructuración enchuficola* (Madrid, 1934).
- 29 Santos Juliá, *Madrid, 1931–1934: de la fiesta popular a la lucha de clases* (Madrid, 1984). See also García Santos, *Léxico*, pp. 133–200.
- 30 Juan Linz, *La quiebra de las democracias* (Madrid, 1981), p. 401.
- 31 *El Socialista*, 13 August 1932, 13 October and 9 November 1933 respectively.
- 32 Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, *Diccionario político español, histórico y biográfico (desde Carlos IV hasta 1936)* (Buenos Aires, 1945), p. 442.
- 33 Emilio Lussu, *Teoría de los procesos insurreccionales contemporáneos* (Buenos Aires, 1972), p. 107.
- 34 Primo de Rivera, *Obras*, p. 929.
- 35 See, for example, the account of the murders of the Falangist José Cuellar and of the socialist Juanita Rico on 10 June 1934, in *El Sol*, 12 June 1934; *El Siglo Futuro*, 13 June 1934; *Heraldo de Madrid*, 11 June 1934; *La Nación*, 11 June 1934.
- 36 Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, 1956), p. 118; Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflicts and Social Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, 1973), p. 50.
- 37 *Heraldo de Madrid*, 10 January 1936.
- 38 García Santos, *Léxico*, pp. 657–8.
- 39 *No Importa: boletín de los días de persecución*, 20 May 1936.
- 40 See Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, 'Política de lo sublime y teología de la violencia en la derecha española', in Santos Juliá (ed.), *Violencia política en la España de siglo XX* (Madrid, 2000), pp. 129–30.
- 41 Eduardo González Calleja, 'La "ribellione degli studenti". Forme di attivismo violento della gioventù controrivoluzionaria in Spagna (1884–1940)', *Storia e Problemi Contemporanei*, 7 (2001), 147–71.
- 42 Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon* (Glencoe, 1960), p. 21.
- 43 Julio Aróstegui, 'Violencia, sociedad y política: la definición de la violencia', *Ayer*, 13 (1994), 40.
- 44 Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: a Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 83, 112.
- 45 See Julio Aróstegui, 'Sociedad y milicias en la Guerra Civil Española, 1936–1939: una reflexión metodológica', *Estudios de historia de España: homenaje a Tuñón de Lara* (Madrid, 1981), vol. 2, pp. 307–25; Julio Aróstegui, 'La militarización de la política durante la II República', *Historia Contemporánea*, 11 (1994), 11–179.

- 46 Michel Wieviorka, 'Un outil pour l'analyse de la violence politique: la notion d'inversion', *Etudes Polémologiques*, 37 (1986), 191–213.
- 47 José Antonio Pérez Bowie, *El léxico de la muerte durante la guerra civil española (ensayo de descripción)* (Salamanca, 1983), pp. 131–3.
- 48 Azaña, *Obras completas*, vol. 2, pp. 29, 880.

# NATIONS IN ARMS AGAINST THE INVADER: ON NATIONALIST DISCOURSES DURING THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

- 1 See Dieter Langewiesche, *Nationalismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: zwischen Partizipation und Aggression* (Bonn, 1994); Thomas J. Scheff, *Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism, and War* (Boulder, Co, 1994).
- 2 Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-face Killing in Twentieth-century Warfare* (London, 1999), pp. 141–70; Robert W. Rieber and Robert J. Kelly, 'Substance and shadow: images of the enemy', in Rieber (ed.), *The Psychology of War and Peace: the Image of the Enemy* (New York, 1991), pp. 3–39.
- 3 A good example is the role of the Franco-German confrontation in the shaping of images and motives within both nationalisms before 1914. See Jakob Vogel, *Nationen im Gleichschritt: der Kult der 'Nation in Waffen' in Deutschland und Frankreich 1871–1914* (Göttingen, 1997), as well as Michael Jeismann, *Das Vaterland der Feinde: Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 1792–1918* (Frankfurt am Main, 1991).
- 4 Paloma Aguilar, *Memoria y olvido de la Guerra Civil española* (Madrid, 1996). English edition: *Memory and Amnesia: the Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy* (Oxford, 2002).
- 5 See for the argument José Ignacio Lacasta Zabalza, *España uniforme* (Pamplona, 1998).
- 6 See Matthew Lvinger and Paula Franklin Lytle, 'Myth and mobilisation: the triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric', *Nations and Nationalism*, 7:2 (2001), 175–94; John Elster, *Alchemistries of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions* (Cambridge, 1999).
- 7 See José Álvarez-Junco, *Mater dolorosa: la idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 2001).
- 8 For the sake of comprehension, 'Nation' is often used in this chapter to render the more complex 'Patria', which can also be translated, somewhat problematically, as 'Fatherland'.
- 9 Santos Juliá, 'Discursos de la guerra civil española', in Manuel Requena Gallego (ed.), *La Guerra Civil española y las Brigadas Internacionales* (Cuenca, 1998), pp. 29–46.
- 10 Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, 'Prefigurazione e storia: la guerra civile spagnola del 1936–39 come riassunto del passato', in Gabriele Ranzato (ed.), *Guerre fratricide: le guerre civili in età contemporanea* (Turin, 1994), pp. 193–220.
- 11 Antonio Elorza, 'La "nation éclatée": Front Populaire et question nationale en Espagne', in Serge Wolikow and Anne Bleton-Ruget (eds.), *Antifascisme*

- et Nation: les gauches européennes au temps du Front Populaire* (Dijon, 1998), pp. 113–28.
- 12 José Babiano Mora, 'España, 1936–1939: la segunda guerra de la independencia', *Historia* 16, 190 (1992), 25–34; Dolores Ibárruri, *Memorias de Dolores Ibárruri Pasionaria: la lucha y la vida* (Barcelona, 1985), pp. 360–1; Vicente Uribe, *El problema de las nacionalidades en España a la luz de la guerra popular por la independencia de la República española* (Barcelona, n.d.).
  - 13 María Zambrano, *Los intelectuales ante el drama de España* (Santiago de Chile, 1937), pp. 45–7.
  - 14 Juan José Escrich, *El Partido Comunista y la unidad de la juventud española en defensa de la Patria* (Valencia, n.d. [1937]), pp. 10–19. Many rank-and-file communists were recognised to have a Spanish nationalist sentiment before 1936: see, for example, Manuel Tagüña Lacorte, *Testimonio de dos guerras* (Mexico, 1973), pp. 43–4.
  - 15 Jesús Hernández, *El orgullo de sentirnos españoles* (n.p., n.d. [1938]), pp. 12–13.
  - 16 *¡Milicianos al frente!... Comedia en un acto original de Ignacio Zugadi, con un Prólogo y un Epílogo de José Castilla* (New York, n.d. [1936]), pp. 11–12.
  - 17 This parallelism was also stressed outside Spain. See, for example, Charles Duff, *Spain against the Invaders: Napoleon 1808 – Hitler and Mussolini 1936* (London, 1938).
  - 18 See, for example, Teodoro Delgado, 'A España' (1937) and Miguel Hernández, 'Andaluzas' (1937), in Antonio Ramos-Gascón (ed.), *El Romancero del Ejército Popular* (Madrid, 1978), pp. 175 and 205.
  - 19 'Mater Nostra' (1937), in Serge Salaün (ed.), *Romancero de la guerra de España*, vol. 1: *Romancero libertario* (n.p. [Paris], 1971), pp. 61–2.
  - 20 See several examples in Ramos-Gascón, *El Romancero*, pp. 210–12, as well as in Serge Salaün (ed.), *Romancero de la guerra de España*, vol. 3: *Romancero de la tierra* (Barcelona, 1982), pp. 29–31.
  - 21 See Carulla and Carulla, *La guerra civil*, vol. 1, pp. 164–5.
  - 22 A. Fernández, 'La venganza de España' (1937), in Ramos-Gascón, *El Romancero*, pp. 213–14.
  - 23 See Víctor Manuel Santidrián Arias, *Historia do PCE en Galicia (1920–1968)* (A Coruña, 2002), pp. 395–400.
  - 24 *Poble de Catalunya* (1938), in Carulla and Carulla, *La guerra civil*, vol. 1, p. 278.
  - 25 See Carlos Serrano, 'Guerre et question nationale en Espagne', in Wolikow and Bleton-Ruget (eds.), *Antifascisme*, pp. 193–202.
  - 26 See the poster issued in 1937 by *Izquierda Republicana: Por la Independencia y la Libertad de España. ¡Todos a una!*, in Carulla and Carulla, *La guerra civil*, vol. 1, p. 171.
  - 27 Speech at the city council of Valencia, 21 January 1937, reproduced in Manuel Azaña, *Los españoles en guerra* (Barcelona, 1977), pp. 15–43.
  - 28 Speech at the University of Valencia, 18 July 1937, reproduced in Azaña, *Los españoles*, pp. 47–77.

- 29 Speech at the city council of Madrid, 13 November 1937, in Azaña, *Los españoles*, pp. 79–95.
- 30 See Carulla and Carulla, *La guerra civil*, p. 157.
- 31 See A. G. Nieto, *España, el Movimiento Libertario y los traidores* (Mexico, n.d.), pp. 5–6.
- 32 Federica Montseny, *La Commune de París y la revolución española* (n.p, n.d. [1937]), pp. 29–32.
- 33 Juan García Oliver, *El fascismo internacional y la guerra anti-fascista española* (n.p. [Barcelona], n.d. [1937]), pp. 6–11. See also Diego Abad de Santillán, *Por qué perdimos la guerra: una contribución a la historia de la tragedia española* (Madrid, 1975 [1940]), p. 34.
- 34 Abad de Santillán, *Por qué*, pp. 158–9, 212–14; Jacinto Toranzo, *No éramos tan malos* (Madrid, 1975), pp. 284–338, and Juan García Oliver, *El eco de los pasos* (París/Barcelona, 1978), p. 435.
- 35 Abad de Santillán, *Por qué*, pp. 36–9.
- 36 José Peirats, *La CNT en la revolución española* (Paris, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 199–205.
- 37 Juan López, *Concepto del federalismo en la guerra y en la revolución* (n.p. [Barcelona], n.d. [1937]).
- 38 *Fines de guerra de la República Española* (Barcelona, 1938).
- 39 See, for instance, Alfonso M. Carrasco, ‘Se tragó España’, in *Zafarrancho de España (poemas de la guerra)* (Barcelona, 1937), pp. 39–40; Edmundo Barbero, *El infierno azul (seis meses en el feudo de Queipo)* (Madrid, n.d. [1937]), pp. 22–3.
- 40 J. Herrera, *¡España en armas!* (Buenos Aires, 1936), pp. 6–7.
- 41 See for instance the cartoon by Goñi (1937), in Fernando Díaz-Plaja, *La caricatura española en la Guerra Civil*, special issue of *Tiempo de Historia*, 7:73 (1980), 37.
- 42 See Carulla and Carulla, *La guerra civil*, vol. 1, p. 162.
- 43 Eloy Martín Corrales, *La imagen del magrebí en España: una perspectiva histórica, siglos XVI–XX* (Barcelona, 2002), pp. 151–79.
- 44 ‘Romance de Villafraja’ (1938), in Ramos-Gascón, *El Romancero*, pp. 192–4.
- 45 See Francisco Caudet (ed.), *Romancero de la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, 1978), pp. 146–50.
- 46 See, for instance, Antonio López Pardavila, ‘¡¡¡Ya sois de España!!!’ (1938), in Ramos-Gascón, *El Romancero*, pp. 130–1.
- 47 See Carulla and Carulla, *La guerra civil*, vol. 1, pp. 256–7.
- 48 As a monarchist leader observed. See Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, *Testimonios y recuerdos* (Barcelona, 1978), p. 263.
- 49 Venancio Diego Carro, *La verdad sobre la guerra española* (Zamora, 1937), pp. 35–40; Cirilo Martín-Retortillo, *Razones jurídicas de esta Guerra* (Huesca, 1937).
- 50 On the ideological origins of ‘Francoist nationalism’, see Raúl Morodo, *Orígenes ideológicos del franquismo: Acción Española* (Madrid, 1985) and

- Alfonso Botti, *Cielo y dinero: el nacionalcatolicismo en España (1881–1975)* (Madrid, 1992), pp. 73–100.
- 51 Carlos Ruiz del Castillo, *Manual de Derecho Político* (Madrid, 1939), pp. 29–31.
  - 52 See Víctor Pradera, *El Estado Nuevo* (Madrid, 1935), and the introduction signed by Franco to the posthumous edition of Pradera's collected works or *Obra completa* (Madrid, 1945), vol. 1, pp. v–xii.
  - 53 Albino G. Menéndez Reigada, *Catecismo patriótico español* (Salamanca, 1937), pp. 46–50.
  - 54 José Pemartín, *Qué es 'lo nuevo': consideraciones acerca del momento español presente* (Madrid, 1940 [1937]). See also Joaquín Azpiazu, *El estado católico (líneas de un ideal)* (Madrid/Burgos, 1939).
  - 55 Aniceto de Castro Albarrán, *Guerra santa, el sentido católico del movimiento nacional español* (Burgos, 1938), pp. 130–46.
  - 56 See Isidro Gomá y Tomás, 'Catolicismo y Patria' (5 February 1939), in his *Pastorales de la guerra de España* (Madrid, 1955), pp. 191–255.
  - 57 Castro Albarrán, *Guerra santa*, pp. 162–5 and 169–92. See also Juan Tusquets, *Masonería y separatismo* (Burgos, 1937).
  - 58 See Eugenio Vegas Latapié, *La frustración de la victoria: memorias políticas 1938–1942* (Madrid, 1995), pp. 123–66, and Joan M. Thomàs, *La Falange de Franco* (Barcelona, 2001), pp. 86–7 and 153–63.
  - 59 See, for instance, Francisco Javier Conde, 'La idea actual española de nación' (1939), in his *Escritos y fragmentos políticos* (Madrid, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 323–64.
  - 60 Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida, *El antisemitismo en España: la imagen del judío (1812–2002)* (Madrid, 2002), pp. 351–80. For a contemporary example, see Albino G. Menéndez-Reigada, *Los enemigos de España* (La Laguna, 1939).
  - 61 *Fiesta de la Bandera 15 Agosto 1937, II Año Triunfal. Alocución patriótica del Excmo. Sr. D. José María Pemán* (Cádiz, 1937), pp. 9–11.
  - 62 See Eduardo González Calleja and Fredes Limón Nevado, *La Hispanidad como instrumento de combate: raza e imperio en la prensa franquista durante la guerra civil española* (Madrid, 1988), Antonio Tovar, *El imperio de España* (Valladolid, n.d. [1936]), and Ismael Saz, *España contra España: los nacionalismos franquistas* (Madrid 2003).
  - 63 Francisco de Cossío, *Meditaciones españolas* (Valladolid, 1938), pp. 210–11.
  - 64 Castro Albarrán, *Guerra santa*, p. 156.
  - 65 Juan Brasa, *España y la Legión (Cómo viven, luchan y triunfan los caballeros legionarios)* (Valladolid/Ourense, n.d. [1938]), pp. 18–19. See also Isidro Gomá y Tomás, *La cuaresma de España, carta pastoral sobre el sentido cristiano-español de la guerra* (Pamplona, 1937), pp. 21–2, 27–8 and 36–7.
  - 66 Castro Albarrán, *Guerra santa*, pp. 48–9.
  - 67 Ernesto Giménez Caballero, *Triunfo del 2 de Mayo* (n.p. [Madrid], 1939). Similar arguments in Francisco Palenzuela Sáinz, *Versos por España* (Madrid, 1940), pp. 26–7.

- 68 For instance, n.a., *Por la Fe y por la Patria. Jornadas del movimiento nacional en España: Julio-Agosto de 1936* (n.p. [Zaragoza], n.d. [1936]), pp. 2–8.
- 69 *Intervención del marxismo internacional en la guerra de España: testimonio de combatientes rojos* (Bilbao, 1939).
- 70 José Martín Villapecellín, *Estampas de un nuevo estilo: ha pasado el soviet* (n.p. [Barcelona], n.d. [1939]), pp. 13–14.
- 71 See Díaz-Plaja, *La caricatura*, pp. 55–7, and Luis Montán, *Bilbao Rojo y Bilbao nacional* (Valladolid, n.d. [1937]), pp. 11–12.
- 72 Joaquín Pérez Madrigal, *El miliciano Remigio ‘pa’ la guerra es un prodigio* (Ávila, 1937), pp. 223–6.
- 73 María Rosa de Madariaga, *Los moros que trajo Franco. . . la intervención de tropas coloniales en la Guerra Civil española* (Barcelona, 2002), pp. 345–64; Enrique Arqués, *17 de Julio: la Epopeya de África. Crónica de un testigo* (2nd edn, Madrid, 1948), pp. 10–11; Seamas MacKee, *I Was a Franco Soldier* (London, 1938), pp. 18–20.
- 74 See, for instance, Luis Montán, *La conquista de Retamares por la columna de Castejón* (Valladolid, n.d. [1937]), pp. 25–7, or Pedro de Escalante y Huidobro, ‘Romance de Jamido’ (1937), in his *En campaña (poesías)*, (Santander, 1940), pp. 53–7.
- 75 Sebastian Balfour, ‘War, nationalism and the masses in Spain, 1898–1936’, in Edward Acton and Ismael Saz (eds.), *La transición a la política de masas*, (Valencia, 2001), pp. 75–91; Brasa, ‘España y la Legión’, pp. 99–100.
- 76 José María Pemán, *Poema de la bestia y el ángel* (3rd edn, Madrid, 1939).
- 77 Hilari Ragner, *La pólvora y el incienso: la Iglesia y la Guerra Civil española (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 2001), pp. 65–81.
- 78 Quoted by Ronald Fraser, *Blood of Spain: the Experience of Civil War, 1936–39* (3rd edn, London, 1988) p. 173.
- 79 Martin Blinkhorn, *Carlismo y contrarrevolución en España 1931–1939* (Barcelona, 1975), pp. 366–7. [English edition: *Carlism and Revolution in Spain, 1931–1939* (Cambridge, 1974).]
- 80 Francisco Javier Martín Abril, *Castilla y la guerra* (n.p. [Valladolid], 1937).
- 81 Giménez Caballero, *Triunfo*, pp. 28–9. Also see the chapter by Francisco Javier Caspistegui in this volume.
- 82 *Por la Fe y por la Patria*, pp. 56–7; Vicente Gracia, *Aragón, baluarte de España* (Zaragoza, 1938).
- 83 See n. a. [Lisardo Rodríguez Barreiro], *Resposta escontra unha inxuria. Romance de cego, por un percebe copreiro de Cortegada* (Vigo, 1936).
- 84 Rafael Abella, *La vida cotidiana durante la Guerra Civil*, vol. 1: *La España nacional* (Barcelona, 1973), pp. 188–92; Josep Massot i Muntaner, *El primer franquisme a Mallorca: guerra civil, repressió, exili i represa cultural* (Barcelona, 1996), pp. 429–33.
- 85 Jenny Brumme, ‘Llenguatge polític de la Falange i llengües minoritàries d’Espanya’, *Spagna Contemporanea*, 2 (1992), 59–77; also, Menéndez-Reigada, *Catecismo*, pp. 11–12.



- 86 Carlos Serrano, *El nacimiento de Carmen: símbolos, mitos, nación* (Madrid, 1999), pp. 101–3.
- 87 Borja de Riquer, *L'últim Cambó (1936–1947): la dreta catalanista davant la guerra civil i el franquisme* (Vic, 1996).
- 88 Hubertus of Loewenstein, *A Catholic in Republican Spain* (London, 1937), p. 23.
- 89 See accounts of former ERC and Lliga's members in Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, pp. 443–9, as well as in Albert Manent, *De 1936 a 1975: estudis sobre la guerra civil i el franquisme* (Barcelona, 1999), pp. 155–8.
- 90 Justo G. Beramendi and Xosé-Manoel Núñez, *O nacionalismo galego* (Vigo, 1995), p. 174.
- 91 Santiago de Pablo, Ludger Mees and José Antonio Rodríguez Ranz, *El péndulo patriótico: historia del Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, vol. 2: 1936–1979 (Barcelona, 2001), pp. 9–15; Fernando de Meer, *El Partido Nacionalista Vasco ante la Guerra de España (1936–1937)* (Pamplona, 1992).
- 92 Lluís Nicolau d'Olwer, *Després del 19 de juliol: articles i discursos* (Barcelona, 1938), pp. 24–5.
- 93 See, for instance, Anna Murià, *El 6 d'octubre i el 19 de juliol* (Barcelona, 1937).
- 94 See Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, *The Shadow of a Doubt: Fascist and Communist Alternatives in Catalan Nationalism, 1919–1939* (Barcelona, 2002).
- 95 Abad de Santillán, *Por qué*, pp. 129–30, 143–5 and 181–2.
- 96 Quoted in Albert Balcells, *Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present* (London, 1996), p. 119.
- 97 See Antoni Rovira i Virgili, 'La República Federal' (2.9.1936), 'La sobirania de Catalunya' (14.8.1936), and 'Què és Espanya?' (26.7.1938), in his *'La guerra que han provocat'. Selecció d'articles sobre la guerra civil espanyola*, ed. Josep M. Roig Rosich (Barcelona, 1998), pp. 105–7, 117–18, and 305–9.
- 98 Jaume Miravittles, *El que jo he vist a Madrid* (Barcelona, n.d. [1937]), pp. 34–8.
- 99 Alfonso. R. Castelao, *Obras*, vol. 4 (Vigo, 2000), pp. 339–43 and 347–8.
- 100 See José Luis de la Granja, *República y Guerra Civil en Euskadi* (Oñati, 1990).
- 101 Manuel Azaña, *Memorias políticas y de guerra*, vol. 4 (Madrid, 1981), pp. 103–4, 257–62, 275–80, 432–49 and 587; see also Azaña, 'Cataluña en la guerra' (1939), in his *Causas de la guerra de España* (Barcelona, 1986), pp. 105–17.
- 102 Quoted by Azaña, *Memorias*, p. 285.
- 103 See Carles Pi i Sunyer, *La República y la Guerra: memorias de un político catalán* (Mexico, 1975), pp. 469–72.
- 104 Quoted by Julián Zugazagoitia, *Guerra y vicisitudes de los españoles* (Barcelona, 1977 [1940]), p. 454.
- 105 Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, *La Catalunya populista: imatge, cultura i política en l'etapa republicana (1931–1939)* (Barcelona, 1982), pp. 295 and 339–41; Nicolau d'Olwer, *Després del 19 de juliol*, pp. 13–27.
- 106 Pi i Sunyer, *La República*, pp. 528–9.
- 107 Nicolau d'Olwer to R. Peypoch, Paris, 15 June 1939, letter quoted by Daniel Díaz Esculies, *El catalanisme polític a l'exili (1939–1959)* (Barcelona, 1991), p. 18.

- 108 See Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, pp. 395–412.
- 109 For instance, the ‘Macià-Company’s Column’ and later the ‘Pyrenean Militias’. See Alfons Segalàs Solé, *Carnet d’un milicià soldat, 1936–1939* (Barcelona, 1986), and Manent, *De 1936 a 1975*, pp. 119–47.
- 110 See Pi i Sunyer, *La República*, pp. 513–15 and 533–40.
- 111 See Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (eds.), *Myths and Nationhood* (London, 1997).
- 112 Alvarez Junco, ‘El nacionalismo español’, p. 65.
- 113 For instance, the daily bulletin published by the Fifth Regiment, *Milicia Popular*, made very little use of patriotic rhetoric. Instead, the main focus is one of appeals to working-class solidarity and to the defence of Madrid as a bulwark of mankind’s liberties.
- 114 See, for instance, *El Triunfo de la Ciudad de Dios y la Resurrección de España: Carta Pastoral del Excmo. y Reverendísimo Señor Obispo de Salamanca* (Bilbao, 1939).
- 115 For the thesis of weak nation-building, see Borja de Riquer, *Escolta, Espanya: la cuestión catalana en la España liberal* (Madrid, 2001). The contrary thesis in Ferrán Archilés and Manuel Martí, ‘Un país tan extraño como cualquier otro: la construcción de la identidad nacional española contemporánea’, in Mari Cruz Romeo and Ismael Saz (eds.), *El siglo XX: historiografía e historia* (Valencia, 2002), pp. 245–78.
- 116 Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, 1995).
- 117 Azaña, *Memorias*, p. 222; Louis Fischer, *La guerre en Espagne* (Paris, 1937), pp. 91–2.

### ‘THE KEYS OF THE KINGDOM’: RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, JULY–AUGUST 1936

I am grateful to the British Academy for a small grant to fund the research on which this chapter is based. Some of the arguments were rehearsed in a paper to the Anglo-American Conference of Historians 2003. Colleagues at the University of Sheffield, Tom Buchanan, Martin Conway and Paul Heywood also commented helpfully on work in progress.

- 1 Antonio Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa en España, 1936–9* (Madrid, 1961), pp. 758–68. Recent work on Madrid has put the number of murdered priests from the diocese at 435, as against an original estimate of 334. In other dioceses, however, the revisions are marginal, Vicente Cárcel Ortí, *La persecución religiosa en España durante la Segunda República, 1931–9* (Madrid, 1990), pp. 241–2.
- 2 Almost 50 per cent of the total number of clerical victims, Jesús Iribarren, *Documentos colectivos del episcopado español, 1870–1974* (Madrid, 1974), pp. 42–3.
- 3 *Land and Freedom* (1996).
- 4 Julio de la Cueva Merino, ‘“Si los frailes y monjes supieran. . .”: la violencia anticlerical’, in Santos Juliá (ed.), *Violencia política en la España del siglo XX* (Madrid, 2000), p. 225.
- 5 For instance, Vicente Cárcel Ortí, *Mártires españoles del siglo XX* (Madrid, 1995), pp. 74–5; *La persecución religiosa*, pp. 15–41.

- 6 Quoted in Manuel Pérez Ledesma, 'Studies on anticlericalism in contemporary Spain', *International Review of Social History*, 46 (2001), 240.
- 7 See further, Manuel Delgado, 'Anticlericalismo, espacio y poder: la destrucción de los rituales católicos, 1931–9', in Rafael Cruz (ed.), *El anticlericalismo*, special issue of *Ayer*, 27 (1997), 149–80, esp. 153–4.
- 8 *Solidaridad Obrera*, 27 July; 18 August 1936.
- 9 '¡Abajo la Iglesia!', *ibid.*, 15 August 1936.
- 10 De la Cueva, "'Si los curas y frailes supieran. . .'", p. 210.
- 11 On the nineteenth century, see Alain Corbin, *The Village of Cannibals* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 61–101.
- 12 'Reflexiones sobre la violencia', *Condeferación*, 5 February 1937.
- 13 On Mexican anticlericalism, see Gregorio L. de la Fuente Monge, 'Clericalismo y anticlericalismo en México, 1810–1938', in Cruz (ed.), *El anticlericalismo*, pp. 39–65; Manuel Delgado Ruíz, *Luces iconoclastas: anticlericalismo, espacio y ritual en la España contemporánea* (Barcelona, 2001), pp. 74–6.
- 14 The classic interpretation of anarchists as 'children of the categorical imperative' is Gerald Brenan's (*The Spanish Labyrinth*, Cambridge, 1943, pp. 170–202).
- 15 Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, pp. 763–4. See further Julio de la Cueva, 'El anticlericalismo en la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil', in Emilio La Parra López and Manuel Suárez Cortina (eds.), *El anticlericalismo español contemporáneo* (Madrid, 1998), pp. 265–8.
- 16 Ronald Fraser, *Blood of Spain: the Experience of Civil War 1936–9* (London, 1975), pp. 48–80.
- 17 For example, the Barcelona CNT paper *Solidaridad Obrera*, 1 August 1936, argued that 'In order to avenge the murders committed by the Church, you would have to make priests, for there aren't enough to equal the numbers of the Inquisition's victims. And you'll see: not a dozen priests have died. And even these few [died] because they fired on the people from the churches.'
- 18 Helen Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War, 1936–9* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 84; Manuel Ortiz Heras, *Violencia política en la Segunda República y el primer franquismo: Albacete, 1936–50* (Madrid, 1996), pp. 105–6. But see the note of caution in Delgado Ruíz, *Luces iconoclastas*, pp. 117–18.
- 19 Archivo Histórico Nacional (henceforth AHN), Causa General (henceforth CG), legajo 1059, caja 2.
- 20 'Informe de la Parroquia de Nuestra Señora de la Expectación', AHN, CG, legajo 1009. Other cases of removing the name of the divine from place names are discussed in de la Cueva, 'El anticlericalismo en la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil', pp. 278–9.
- 21 Both Graham (*Spanish Republic at War*, pp. 85–6) and Julián Casanova ('Rebelión y revolución', in Santos Juliá et al., *Víctimas de la Guerra Civil*, Madrid, 1999, pp. 153–7) see anticlerical violence simply as the result of the church's long-lasting association with the ruling order and the political right.
- 22 All examples cited in de la Cueva, 'Religious persecution, anticlerical tradition and revolution: on atrocities against the clergy during the Spanish civil

- war', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33.3 (1998), 361, 367. Pueblos where the only victim was the priest were also found in southern Spain, e.g. Fondón, Almería, AHN, CG, legajo 1038, caja 1.
- 23 Cárcel Ortí, *Mártires españoles*, pp. 43–82, and *La persecución religiosa*. For an historiographical context, see Hilari Ragner, *La pólvora y el incienso: la iglesia y la Guerra Civil española, 1936–9* (Barcelona, 2001), intro. esp. pp. 32–3, and Pérez Ledesma, 'Studies on anticlericalism', pp. 227–55 esp. 228–9.
- 24 Here I am referring specifically to those ecclesiastical historians who are also ordained priests: Antonio Montero (now bishop of Badajoz), the late Jesús Iribarren and Vicente Cárcel Ortí. It is worth noting that Delgado Ruíz, *Luces iconoclastas*, also rejects a distinction between secularism and anticlericalism, seeing both as modernising phenomena with roots in the Reformation.
- 25 Cárcel Ortí, *Mártires españoles*, pp. 7–13, quotations at pp. 7, 8, 11.
- 26 Vicente Cárcel Ortí and Ramón Fita Revert, *Mártires valencianos del siglo XX* (Valencia, 1998).
- 27 Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, pp. 147–54, 174–9, has those who witnessed or disapproved of violence but none who attempted to justify it or who admitted to involvement. Related to this is the retrospective view of the civil war – particularly pronounced during the transition to democracy – as a period of 'collective madness', Paloma Aguilar, *Memoria y olvido de la Guerra Civil española* (Madrid, 1996), esp. pp. 284–6.
- 28 The English language summary produced by the regime refers to 'the demonstration (sic) of criminal activities on the part of the subversive elements who in 1936 openly attacked the very existence and the essential principles of their Country, which was providentially saved at the last moment by General Franco's coup', *The Red Domination in Spain: the General Cause (Causa General)* (Madrid, 1953), p. 7.
- 29 See Isidro Sánchez, Manuel Ortiz and David Ruiz (eds.), *España Franquista: Causa General y actitudes sociales ante la Dictadura* (Cuidad Real, 1993), particularly the chapters by Glicerio Sánchez Recio and Manuel Ortiz Heras. Lists of victims drawn up for each pueblo always identify perpetrators, recording their fate or current whereabouts.
- 30 Carmen González Martínez, 'La Causa General de Murcia: técnicas de estudio', in Sánchez et al., *España Franquista*, pp. 69–71 at 70. There are also striking similarities with Falangist novels, such as Tomás Borrrás, *Oscuro heroísmo* (Seville, 1939) and *Checas de Madrid* (Madrid, 1940); Concha Espina, *Retaguardia* (Córdoba, 1937).
- 31 'La tragedia de la Merced en Jaén', AHN, CG, legajo 1009, caja 2.
- 32 Timothy Mitchell, *Violence and Piety in Spanish Folklore* (Philadelphia, 1988); René Girard, *The Scapegoat* (Baltimore, 1986).
- 33 Pérez Ledesma, 'Studies on anticlericalism', pp. 228–9.
- 34 David Riches, 'The phenomenon of violence', in his edited collection, *The Anthropology of Violence* (Oxford, 1986).
- 35 Testimony of Eugenio López in Ronald Fraser, *The Pueblo: a Mountain Village on the Costa del Sol* (London, 1973), p. 46; Mijas, Estado no. 3,

- AHN, CG, legajo 1059, caja 2. In 1938, the diocese valued the damage at 500,000 pesetas, 'Relación algunos de los daños causados a la Iglesia de Málaga durante el periodo republicano', AHN, CG, legajo 1060, caja 2.
- 36 Mijas, Estados nos. 1 and 3, AHN, CG, legajo 1959, caja 2. The violence in Mijas is recollected in Fraser, *The Pueblo*, pp. 47–70, though this incident is not mentioned. One respondent claimed, 'And the killings. . . they occurred at night when our backs were turned. People from other villages. . . came for them; there were very few here who joined in their dirty work', *ibid.*, p. 57.
- 37 Lucía Prieto Borrego, *La guerra civil en Marbella: revolución y repression en un pueblo de la costa* (Málaga, 1998), p. 72. For further examples, see Carmen González Martínez, *Guerra Civil en Murcia: un análisis sobre el poder y Los comportamientos colectivos* (Murcia, 1999), pp. 180–1, and for Arriate, Alpan-diére and Junquera, all in Málaga province, AHN, CG legajo 1059, caja 1.
- 38 AHN, CG, legajo 1059, caja 1; similar incidents occurred in Parauta, Cartajima, Totalan, Marbella and Mijas. In Lorca (Murcia) the bonfires were built in the atria of the seventeen churches and chapels which were sacked on 14 August. The parish archives were also burnt, one in the sacristy, 'Cuerpo General de Policía, Lorca', AHN, CG, legajo 1066, caja 1.
- 39 Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell, recounted in Brennan, *Spanish Labyrinth*, p. 189.
- 40 The anti-clerical weekly *La Traca* referred to both purifying and disinfecting after the 1931 church-burnings. José Alvarez Junco, 'El anticlericalismo en el movimiento obrero', in Germán Ojeda (ed.), *Octubre 1934* (Madrid, 1995), p. 299.
- 41 Mitchell, *Violence and Piety*, pp. 102–6; Delgado Ruíz, 'Anticlericalismo, espacio y poder', p. 187.
- 42 Prieto Borrego, *La guerra civil en Marbella*, p. 83.
- 43 AHN, CG, legajo 1038, caja 1, ramo 50; letter from parish priest, 2 December 1944, legajo 1164, caja 1.
- 44 'Relación de algunos de los datos causados a la Iglesia de Málaga', AHN, CG, legajo 1060, caja 2; Cárcel Ortí, *Mártires del siglo XX*, pp. 416–25; Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, p. 606.
- 45 Estado no. 3, AHN, CG, legajo 1066, caja 1.
- 46 'Declaración de Ana M<sup>a</sup> Gil Cutanda', AHN, CG, legajo 1066, caja 1; Cárcel Ortí and Fita Revert, *Mártires valencianos*, pp. 276, 323; AHN, CG, legajo 1038, caja 1, ramo no. 7; Cárcel Ortí, *La persecución religiosa*, pp. 255–6.
- 47 De la Cueva, 'El anticlericalismo en la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil', pp. 261–3.
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 263.
- 49 Cárcel Ortí and Fita Revert, *Mártires valencianos*, pp. 265–6; quoted in de la Cueva, *ibid.*, 263.
- 50 Sebastian Balfour, *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford, 2002), p. 87, lists mutilations (including genitals in mouths, missing eyes, ears and tongues) encountered by troops on the battlefield. Such gestures were also found in much older military traditions.

- 51 Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, pp. 610–11; *Mundo Gráfico*, 20 Dec. 1936, reproduced in *Red Domination of Spain*, annex 5, no. 47.
- 52 Zemon Davis, *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, 1975), pp. 152–88; Denis Crozet, *Les Guerriers de Dieu* (Paris, 1990) vol. 1, pp. 236–317.
- 53 Casanova, ‘Rebelión y revolución’, p. 157.
- 54 George A. Collier, *Socialists of Rural Andalucía: Unacknowledged Revolutionaries of the Second Republic* (Stanford, 1987), p. 150.
- 55 Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology* (3rd edn., London, 1996), p. xvi.
- 56 In the Huelva case, this was by staging a mock bullfight with the Virgin’s veil as a cape before burning the images on a bonfire. Collier, *Socialists of Rural Andalucía*, pp. 149–50.
- 57 In arid regions, where the relief of drought was often vital, village processional routes commonly ended at a river.
- 58 ‘Declaración de Manuel Rodríguez González’, AHN, CG, legajo 1164, caja 1.
- 59 This is vividly illustrated in Christian, *Local Religion*, with photographs taken in the 1970s by Cristina García Roderó. See also Timothy Mitchell, *Passional Culture: Emotion, Religion and Society in Southern Spain* (Philadelphia, 1990), esp. pp. 128–80, and chapter 10, by Mike Richards, in this volume.
- 60 On the ambivalence of Carnival, see Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World* (Bloomington, 1984), pp. 1–59, and David D. Gilmore, *Carnival and Culture: Sex, Symbol and Status in Spain* (New Haven, 1998), pp. 4–8, 9–25.
- 61 Casanova, ‘Rebelión y revolución’, pp. 154–5.
- 62 AHN, CG, 1068; there is an almost identical comment in the Almería *informe*, AHN, CG, 1164. Consecrated hosts were often hidden or consumed by those anxious to protect them, but neither tabernacles nor ciboria seem to have been systematically singled out.
- 63 Richard Maddox, ‘Revolutionary anticlericalism and hegemonic processes in an Andalusian town, August 1936’, *American Ethnologist*, 22 (1995), 125–43, esp. 132.
- 64 Letter from *alcalde*, 29 January 1943, AHN, CG, legajo 1066, caja 1. Reports from parish priests invariably comment on the destruction of shrines and much-venerated images. See further Delgado Ruíz, ‘Anticlericalismo, espacio y poder’, pp. 167–9.
- 65 William A. Christian Jr, *Local Religion in Sixteenth-Century Spain* (Princeton, 1981), pp. 181–208, and *Moving Crucifixes in Modern Spain* (Princeton, 1992), pp. 6–28.
- 66 AHN, CG, legajo 1066, caja 1; Delgado Ruíz, *Luces iconoclastas*, p. 113; Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, p. 652; *Red Domination of Spain*, pp. 198–90.
- 67 Cárcel Ortí and Fita Revert, *Mártires valencianos*, pp. 275–6.

- 68 See the discussion of Sant Crist de Piera in Delgado Ruíz, *Luces iconoclastas*, pp. 114–26.
- 69 A reference to the spontaneous religious weeping of Baroque Catholicism which survived in the emotional rituals of Holy Week. William A. Christian Jr, 'Provoked religious weeping in early modern Spain', in John Davis (ed.), *Religious Organisation and Religious Experience* (London and New York, 1982), pp. 97–114.
- 70 Bruce Lincoln, 'Revolutionary exhumations in Spain, July 1936', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 27 (1985), 241–60.
- 71 *ABC* (Madrid) 1 August 1936, quoted in Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, p. 64 fn 36.
- 72 Similar stories had led to demonstrations in Barcelona in 1910. Temma Kaplan, *Red City, Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso's Barcelona* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1992), pp. 103, 107–9.
- 73 Lincoln, 'Revolutionary exhumations', p. 247–8; Girard, *The Scapegoat*, pp. 16–17; for the evil eye, Mitchell, *Violence and Piety*, pp. 99–102.
- 74 Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, pp. 64, 431–2.
- 75 Bruce Lincoln, 'Revolutionary exhumations', pp. 257–8.
- 76 Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, pp. 7–8, 11–12, 26–9 and 303–67.
- 77 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 78 'Declaración de José Megías Torres', AHN, CG, legajo 1164, caja 1; Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, p. 152.
- 79 'Revolutionary exhumations', p. 258.
- 80 This is, though, far less likely to be directly addressed in ecclesiastical sources. For the bishops, see Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, p. 414.
- 81 De la Cueva, 'El anticlericalismo en la Segunda República', p. 281.
- 82 Cárcel Ortí and Fita Revert, *Mártires valencianos*, p. 243.
- 83 Marjorie Garber, *Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety* (London, 1993), pp. 210–33.
- 84 See further, de la Cueva, 'El anticlericalismo en la Segunda República', pp. 222–4.
- 85 'Informe de los Hermanos de las Escuelas Cristianas'; 'Declaración de la Reverenda Madre Fermina Beperet de Jesús', AHN, CG, legajo 1164, caja 1.
- 86 See also Alvarez Junco, 'El anticlericalismo', pp. 296–8.
- 87 AHN, CG, legajo 1164, caja 1.
- 88 Cárcel Ortí and Fita Revert, *Mártires valencianos*, pp. 132–3; for the multiple rape of a female landowner in Adra (Almería), see AHN, CG, legajo 1038, ramo 21.
- 89 José Andrés-Gallego and Antón M. Pazos (eds.), *Archivo Gomá: documentos de la Guerra Civil. Julio-Diciembre 1936*, documento 1–85, 183. The collective pastoral letter which Gomá drafted the following July nevertheless contained several references to the 'dishonouring' of nuns.
- 90 Alvarez Junco, 'El anticlericalismo', p. 297.

- 91 *Ibid.*, p. 296.
- 92 Cárcel Ortí and Fita Revert, *Mártires valencianos*, p. 265; Gilmore, *Carnival and Culture*, develops a Bakhtinian analysis of this theme.
- 93 During the French wars of religion all these organs were seen as vessels of concupiscence, and so were removed in a symbolic purging of the corpse. A similar phenomenon may be observed during the civil war, but excluding the guts, now a symbol of gluttony rather than of lust.
- 94 Alvarez Junco, 'El anticlericalismo', pp. 295–6; David D. Gilmore, 'The anticlericalism of the Andalusian rural proletarians', in Alvarez Santaló et al., *La religiosidad popular: antropología e historia* (Barcelona, 1989), pp. 481–92. Timothy Mitchell, *Betrayal of the Innocent: Desire, Power and the Catholic Church in Spain* (Philadelphia, 1998) is an often ahistorical investigation of similar themes.
- 95 Cárcel Ortí and Fita Revert, *Mártires valencianos*, p. 303.
- 96 *Ibid.*, pp. 287, 351, 357; 322–3; see also Cárcel Ortí, *Mártires españoles*, pp. 405, 412–13.
- 97 Gilmore, 'Anticlericalism', p. 492. See also Mitchell, *Betrayal of the Innocents*, p. 78.
- 98 Cárcel Ortí and Fita Revert, *Mártires valencianos*, p. 337; 'Relación algunas de los daños causados a la Iglesia de Málaga', AHN, CG, 1060, caja 2; Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, pp. 614–17.
- 99 Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, pp. 614–16; the Roman martyr St Agnes was sentenced to a brothel where Heaven protected her from assault.
- 100 Alvarez Junco, 'El anticlericalismo', pp. 289–90.
- 101 As reported of the temporary prison established in Jaén cathedral, 'Informe acerca de la que fue prision habilitada de la catedral', AHN, CG, legajo 1009.
- 102 See Delgado Ruíz, *Luces iconoclastas*, pp. 127–45.
- 103 Bakhtin, *Rabelais and his World*, pp. 368–436.
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- 105 Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, pp. 598–605.
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- 107 Collected in pieza 11 of the Causa General.

## CATALAN POPULISM IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

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- 18 Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, ‘Moderni sogni gironcini: Italiani, portoghesi e catalani nella rivoluzione repubblicana spagnola (1923–1938)’, *Quaderns del Cercle Rosselli*, Special issue: *Carlo Rosselli e la Catalogna antifascista*, ed. A. Landuyt, 2 (1996), 67–86. For a detailed treatment of the internal CNT schism, see Eulàlia Vega, *El trentisme a Catalunya (1930–1933)* (Barcelona, 1980).
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- 64 'Max Reiger', *Espionnage en Espagne* (Paris, 1938).
- 65 The official CNT–FAI statement (*Los sucesos de Barcelona: relación documental de las trágicas jornadas de la primera semana de mayo 1937* ([Barcelona?], 1937) can be contrasted with foreign Trotskyist pamphlets such as Katia Landau, *Le Stalinisme bourreau de la Révolution espagnole*, Marcel Ollivier,

- Les journées sanglantes de Barcelone – mai 1937 (Le Guépéou en Espagne)*, or *L'assassinat d'Andrés Nin*, in M. Ollivier and K. Landau, *Les fossoyeurs de la Révolution sociale* (Paris, 1975). The main difference is that the anarcho-syndicalists stressed nationalist machinations with the PSUC as the ultimately damning evidence, while the Trotskyists naturally preferred to underline the ramifications of the Soviet secret services in Spain and the heavy hand of Moscow in the 'betrayal of the revolution'.
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  - 68 Ucelay-Da Cal, *La Catalunya populista*, pp. 335–48.
  - 69 Francois Godicheau, 'Répression et ordre public en Catalogne pendant la Guerre Civile (1936–1939)', unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ecole des Hauts Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris), 2001, 3 vols.
  - 70 For a testimony of such worship, see Dr Ignasi de Gispert, *Memòries d'un neuròleg* (Barcelona, 1976), p. 73; in general, see Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, 'La fascinació d'Azaña: l'home de paper', *L'Avenç*, 152 (1991), 54–9.
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  - 74 See Xosé-Manoel Núñez's chapter (3) in this volume.
  - 75 Palmiro Togliatti, *Escritos sobre la Guerra de España* (Barcelona, 1980).
  - 76 For the idea that the Soviets found 'minority nationalisms' especially useful, see Taline Ter Minassian, *Colporteurs du Komintern: l'Union Soviétique et les minorités au Moyen-Orient* (Paris, 1997). For the PSUC in the immediate Spanish post-war, after 1939, see Miquel Caminal, *Joan Comorera: comunisme i nacionalisme (1939–1958)* (Barcelona, 1985), vol. 3; José Luis Martín Ramos, *Rojos contra Franco: historia del PSUC 1939–1947* (Barcelona, 2002).

THE MYTH OF THE MADDENED CROWD: CLASS, CULTURE AND SPACE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY URBANIST PROJECT IN BARCELONA, 1936–1937

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- 2 Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), p. 4.
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- 4 Henri Lefebvre, *Le droit à la ville* (Paris, 1968). See also Chris Ealham, 'La lluita pel carrer, els venedors ambulants durant la II República', *L'Avenç*, 230 (1998), 21–6.
- 5 Fentress and Wickham, *Social Memory*.
- 6 Manuel Roldán, *Las colectivizaciones en Cataluña: dos años y medio de destrucción de vidas y riqueza* (Barcelona, 1940), p. 77; José del Castillo and Santiago Alvarez, *Barcelona, objetivo cubierto* (Barcelona, 1958), p. 198; Manuel Benavides, *Guerra y revolución en Cataluña* (Mexico, 1978), p. 220; Claudi Ametlla, *Catalunya, paradís perdut (la guerra civil i la revolució anarco-comunista)* (Barcelona, 1984), p. 84.
- 7 Antonio Pérez de Olaguer, *El terror rojo en Cataluña* (Burgos, 1937), pp. 13, 14; José María Gibert Félix, *Perfiles de esclavitud: tríptico de la dominación rojo-atea* (Barcelona, 1942), p. 33; Jaume Miravittles, *Gent que he conegut* (Barcelona, 1980), p. 84; Josep Maria López-Picó, *Dietari, 1929–1959* (Barcelona, 1999), pp. 103, 148; Josep Serra Pàmies, *Fou una guerra contra tots (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 1980), p. 22. The largest diocese in Spain, 279 of Barcelona's 1,251 (22%) priests were killed, mainly in the very first weeks of the revolution (José M. Sánchez, *The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy*, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1987, p. 10).
- 8 Stanley Payne, *The Spanish Revolution* (London, 1970), p. 222; Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, *La Catalunya populista: imatge, cultura i política republicana (1931–1939)* (Barcelona, 1982), p. 290; Josep Maria Solé i Sabaté and Joan Villarroja i Font, *La repressió a la reraguarda de Catalunya (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 1989), 2 vols.; Victor Castells, *Nacionalisme català i Guerra Civil a Catalunya (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 2002).
- 9 See Demeterio Beriain Azqueta, *Prat de Llobregat, ayer: un pueblo sin estado* (n. p., n. d.), p. 86; Abel Paz, *Viaje al pasado (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 1995), p. 47; Alfonso Carrasco, *Barcelona con el puño en alto! Estampas de la revolución* (Barcelona, 1936), *passim*; Tomás Caballé y Clos, *Barcelona roja: dietario de la revolución (julio 1936 – enero 1939)* (Barcelona, 1939), p. 31.
- 10 Carrasco, *Barcelona*, p. 44.
- 11 *Fragua Social*, 19 July 1937.
- 12 Pérez, *Terror*, p. 44.
- 13 Ametlla, *Catalunya*, p. 85.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 92.

- 15 Joan Llach, *Los días rojinegros: memorias de un niño obrero, 1936* (Barcelona, 1975), p. 103.
- 16 Carrasco, *Barcelona*, p. 8.
- 17 Beriain, *Prat*, p. 86; see also Carrasco, *Barcelona*, p. 13, and R. Sanz, *El sindicalismo y la política: los 'Solidarios' y 'Nosotros'* (Toulouse, 1966), p. 306.
- 18 Guy Debord, Attila Kotányi and Raoul Vaneigem, *Aux poubelles de l'histoire* (Paris, 1963).
- 19 Chris Ealham, 'The Spanish revolution: 60 years on', *Tesserae: Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies*, 2 (1996), 209–34.
- 20 *Solidaridad Obrera*, 24 July 1936.
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- 23 Abel Paz, *19 de juliol del '36' a Barcelona* (Barcelona, 1988), p. 87.
- 24 'Al pueblo de Barcelona', joint CNT–UGT manifesto, September 1936.
- 25 They were described as 'governing committees' (*comités gobierno*) (César Lorenzo, *Los anarquistas y el poder, 1868–1969*, Paris, 1972), a point appreciated by elite commentators, who recognised their 'unlimited power' on the streets (Antonio Guardiola, *Barcelona en poder del Soviet (el infierno rojo): relato de un testigo*, Barcelona, 1939, pp. 30, 47). Meanwhile, according to Franz Borkenau, Barcelona 'overwhelmed me by the suddenness with which it revealed the real character of a workers' dictatorship' (*Cockpit*, p. 175).
- 26 Adolfo Bueso, *Recuerdos de un cenetista: de la Segunda República al final de la guerra civil* (Barcelona, 1978), vol. 2, p. 191.
- 27 Paz, *Viaje*, pp. 71–2.
- 28 Solé and Villarroya, *Repressió*, vol. 1, p. 12.
- 29 Llach, *Rojinegros*, pp. 126, 150–1; Anna Monjo and Carme Vega, *Els treballadors i la guerra civil: història d'una indústria catalana col·lectivitzada* (Barcelona, 1986), pp. 68–9; Dolors Marín, *Clandestinos: el Maquis contra el franquismo, 1934–1975* (Barcelona, 2002), p. 202.
- 30 Solé and Villarroya, *Repressió*, vol. 1, pp. 172, 450; Julio de la Cueva, 'Religious persecution, anticlerical tradition and revolution: on atrocities against the clergy during the Spanish civil war', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33 (1998), 358.
- 31 Joan Casanovas i Codina, 'El testimoniatge d'un membre de les patrulles de control de Sants', in *La guerra i la revolució a Catalunya. II Col·loqui Internacional sobre la Guerra Civil Espanyola (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 1986), pp. 51–9.



- 32 Following complaints about a shopkeeper who was profiteering from food shortages, members of the militia and locals joined forces to destroy the shop of the offending trader (*El Noticiero Universal*, 27 July 1936).
- 33 Charles Tilly, 'Afterword: political movements in space and time', in Jonathan Boyarin (ed.), *Remapping Memory: the Politics of TimeSpace* (Minneapolis, 1994), pp. 241–56, p. 244.
- 34 Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 129–30.
- 35 Chris Ealham, 'Class and the city: spatial memories of pleasure and danger in Barcelona, 1914–23', *Oral History*, 29 (2001), 33–47.
- 36 *Solidaridad Obrera*, 6 September 1936.
- 37 Caballé, *Barcelona*, pp. 50–62; Beriain, *Prat*, pp. 52–3.
- 38 Joan Peiró, *Perill a la reraguarda* (Mataró, 1936), pp. 39–40.
- 39 According to Abel Paz, some 8,000–10,000 activists in Barcelona followed neither the orders of the Central Committee of Anti-fascist Militias nor those of the 'higher committees' of the CNT–FAI (*Viaje*, p. 64).
- 40 Thus, in l'Hospitalet there was a Comité Revolucionaria, in Badalona a Comité Local Antifascista and in Vilanova i la Geltrú a Comité de Salud Pública.
- 41 Paz, *Viaje*, p. 28.
- 42 Abel Paz, *Durruti, el proletariado en armas* (Barcelona, 1978), p. 360.
- 43 According to Paz, *Viaje*, p. 64, the barricades 'lacked a precise objective'. Only when the power of the revolution had faded, did radical anarchists acknowledge that the district revolutionary committees might have served as the focal point for local politics; see *Ruta*, 14 May 1937.
- 44 *La Vanguardia*, 22 July 1936.
- 45 Josep Eduard Adsuar, 'El Comitè Central de Milícies Antifeixistes', *L'Avenç*, 14 (1979), pp. 50–6
- 46 *Butlletí Oficial de la Generalitat*, 17 October 1936.
- 47 Carrasco, *Barcelona*, p. 15; Paz, *Viaje*, p. 28.
- 48 In the city centre the POUM occupied the Hotel Falcón, the Lyon d'Or café and the Virreina Palace on the Rambles; the anarchist youth established its HQ in the palace of an aristocrat who had fled to France (Bueso, *Recuerdos*, vol. 2, p. 190; Paz, *Viaje*, p. 76).
- 49 Paz, *Viaje*, p. 56.
- 50 Solé and Villarroja, *Repressió*, vol. 1, p. 290.
- 51 Pere López Sánchez, *Un verano con mil julios y otras estaciones. Barcelona: de la Reforma Interior a la Revolución de Julio de 1909* (Madrid, 1993).
- 52 Llarch, *Rojinegros*, p. 122; Antonio Turón interviewed in *Vivir la utopia*, Televisión Española documentary, 1996.
- 53 Mary Low and Juan Brea, *Red Spanish Notebook* (San Francisco, 1979 [1937]), p. 20; George Orwell, *Homage to Catalonia* (London, 1938), pp. 3–4; Walter Gregory, *The Shallow Grave: a Memoir of the Spanish Civil War* (London, 1986), pp. 26–7.
- 54 Hanns Kaminski, *Los de Barcelona* (Barcelona, 1976 [1937]), p. 46.

- 55 Borkenau, *Cockpit*, p. 70; Orwell, *Homage*, p. 4; 'Schmit', *5 meses con los rojos en Barcelona* (Palma de Mallorca, 1937), p. 31; Pérez, *Terror*, p. 30; Juan Gomis, *Testigo de poca edad (1936–1943)* (Barcelona, 1968), p. 229; Guardiola, *Barcelona*, pp. 36, 49; Gibert, *Esclavitud*, p. 25; Megan Laird, 'A diary of revolution', *The Atlantic Monthly*, November 1936, p. 528; Lacruz, *Alzamiento*, p. 129; Caballé, *Barcelona*, p. 44; Ametlla, *Catalunya*, pp. 86–8; Grifol, *Veinte años*, p. 28.
- 56 Ametlla, *Catalunya*, p. 83.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p. 88.
- 58 Guardiola, *Barcelona*, p. 57.
- 59 Lacruz, *Alzamiento*, p. 129; Kaminski, *Barcelona*, p. 35; Ametlla, *Catalunya*, p. 86.
- 60 Kaminski, *Barcelona*, p. 37; Lacruz, *Alzamiento*, p. 129; Cedric Salter, *Try-Out in Spain* (New York, 1943), p. 29; Llarch, *Rojinegros*, pp. 127–8, 152.
- 61 Borkenau, *Cockpit*, pp. 69–70; John McNair, *Spanish Diary* (Manchester, n. d.), p. 6., Low and Brea, *Notebook*, p. 21.
- 62 *Esfuerzo* appeared from the middle of March 1937 until its suppression after the 'May Days'.
- 63 Paz, *Viaje*, p. 48.
- 64 Antoni Castells Durán, *Les collectivitzacions a Barcelona, 1936–1939* (Barcelona, 1993).
- 65 Perhaps as much as 50 per cent of the bourgeoisie fled Barcelona (Agustín Souchy and Paul Folgare, *Colectivizaciones: la obra constructiva de la revolución española*, Barcelona, 1977, p. 75).
- 66 Michael Seidman, *Workers against Work: Labor in Paris and Barcelona during the Popular Fronts* (Berkeley, 1991), *passim*.
- 67 José Palou Garí, *Treinta y dos meses de esclavitud en la que fue zona roja de España* (Barcelona, 1939), p. 30.
- 68 Langdon-Davies, *Barricades*, pp. 119, 142. The right was scandalised by the transformation of the Ritz; see 'Schmit', *Barcelona*, p. 26.
- 69 Paz, *19 de juliol*, p. 114.
- 70 Low and Brea, *Notebook*, p. 19; Borkenau, *Cockpit*, p. 115; Carles Santacana i Torres, *Victoriosos i derrotats: el franquisme a l'Hospitalet, 1939–1951* (Barcelona, 1994), p. 52.
- 71 Gaston Leval, *Collectives in the Spanish Revolution* (London, 1975), pp. 269–70; Francesc Roca, *Política, economía y espacio: la política territorial en Cataluña (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 1983), p. 63. Before the revolution, infant mortality rates in proletarian Raval were twice as high as in bourgeois parts of the city.
- 72 Fidel Miró, *Una vida intensa y revolucionaria: juventud, amor, sueños y esperanzas* (Mexico, 1989), p. 287.
- 73 *El Noticiero Universal*, 27 July 1936.
- 74 Llarch, *Rojinegros*, pp. 121–2.
- 75 Paz, *Viaje* pp. 56, 115; Caballé, *Barcelona*, pp. 85–6.
- 76 Langdon-Davies, *Barricades*, plate 2.

- 77 Paz, *Viaje*, p. 58; Caballé, *Barcelona*, p. 71.
- 78 Laird, 'Diary', p. 524; Carles Pi Sunyer, *La República y la guerra: memorias de un político catalán* (Mexico, 1975), p. 390; Salter, *Try-Out*, pp. 9–11; Guardiola, *Barcelona*, p. 39; Francisco Lacruz, *Alzamiento*, pp. 117–18; H. Edward Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain* (London, 1937), p. 33; Caballé, *Barcelona*, p. 11; Pérez, *Terror*, p. 9; 'Schmit', *Barcelona*, pp. 5–6.
- 79 Seidman, *Workers*, p. 1; Benavides, *Guerra*, pp. 131–2, 159.
- 80 See Nicolau Rubió i Tudurí, *Pla de distribució en zones del territori català* (Barcelona, 1932) and Francesc Roca, *El Pla Macià* (Barcelona, 1977).
- 81 In the late 1990s the debate surrounding the role of car in the city was still very much alive: see 'La pregunta: una ciutat sense cotxes?', *Barcelona, metropolis mediterrània*, 45 (1999), 8–12.
- 82 Carme Miralles and José Luis Oyón, 'De la casa a la fábrica: movilidad obrera y transporte en la Barcelona de entreguerras, 1914–1939', in José Luis Oyón (ed.), *Vida urbana en la Barcelona de entreguerras* (Barcelona, 1998), pp. 159–201.
- 83 Salter, *Try-Out*, pp. 9–11.
- 84 The Arenas bullring in the working-class *barrio* of Sants was the resting place for wrecked cars in the days after the revolution (Carrasco, *Barcelona* pp. 21–2).
- 85 Laird, 'Diary', pp. 524–6; Lacruz, *Alzamiento*, p. 129; Ametlla, *Catalunya*, p. 86.
- 86 Llarch, *Rojinegros*, p. 120.
- 87 Pi, *Republica*, p. 390; Guardiola, *Barcelona*, pp. 36, 39; Caballé, *Barcelona*, p. 11.
- 88 Chris Ealham, *Policing the City: Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937* (London, 2005), chapter 2.
- 89 Langdon-Davies, *Barricades*, p. 141.
- 90 *Solidaridad Obrera*, 13 August 1936; Caballé, *Barcelona*, p. 44. Additional information provided by Manel Aisa Pàmpols.
- 91 The house of Joan Pich i Pon, president of the Barcelona landlords' association, was attacked, as was property belonging to right-wing politicians and German and Italian companies (*Solidaridad Obrera*, 26 July 1936; Caballé, *Barcelona*, pp. 32–4). On the survival of so-called 'traditional' forms of protest, see Manuel Pérez Ledesma, *Estabilidad y conflicto social: España, de los iberos al 14-D*. (Madrid, 1990) pp. 165–202.
- 92 Carrasco, *Barcelona*, p. 13.
- 93 Lacruz, *Alzamiento*, pp. 117–18; Pérez, *Terror*, pp. 64, 72; Caballé, *Barcelona*, p. 37.
- 94 Laird, 'Diary', p. 522; Borkenau, *Cockpit*, p. 74; Pi, *República*, p. 393; Lacruz, *Alzamiento*, p. 121; Palou, *Esclavitud*, pp. 143–4.
- 95 Peadar O'Donnell, *Salud! An Irishman in Spain* (London, 1937), p. 100.
- 96 Paz, *Viaje*, p. 42; Carrasco, *Barcelona*, p. 29.
- 97 Pérez, *Terror*, p. 63.

- 98 Guardiola, *Barcelona*, p. 42.
- 99 *The Times*, 23–24 July 1936; O'Donnell, *Salud!*, pp. 97–9, 151; Edgar Allison Peers, *Catalonia Infelix* (London, 1937), pp. 258–9; Borkenau, *Cockpit*, p. 74.
- 100 Pearse declined the invitation 'on the grounds that he was an Englishman'! (Stansbury Pearse, 'Spain: the Truth', *The Tablet*, 15 August 1936, pp. 203–4).
- 101 Joan Camós i Cabecerón, 'Testimoniatsges de Francesc Pedra i Marià Corominas: l'activitat política a l'Hospitalet de Llobregat (1923–46)', *L'Avenç*, 60 (1983), 14.
- 102 Carrasco, *Barcelona*, p. 15.
- 103 Peadar O'Donnell, 'An Irishman in Spain', *The Nineteenth Century*, December 1936, p. 704.
- 104 Isidro Griful, *A los veinte anos de aquello, julio-diciembre de 1936* (Barcelona, 1956), p. 33.
- 105 Albert Balcells, 'El destí dels edificis eclesiàstics de Barcelona durant la guerra civil espanyola', in Albert Balcells (ed.), *Violència social i poder polític: sis estudis històrics sobre la Catalunya contemporània* (Barcelona, 2001), pp. 202–9.
- 106 Langdon-Davis, *Barricades*, pp. 177–8.
- 107 Balcells, 'Edificis', p. 191
- 108 O'Donnell, 'Irishman', pp. 701, 704–5. For a discussion of this carnivalesque, revolutionary inversion, see Mary Vincent's chapter (4) in this volume.
- 109 Between 23 and 25 July some 40,000 people filed past the Iglesia de la Enseñanza, on Aragó Street, to inspect the disinterred and partly mummified bodies of clerics (Pérez, *Terror*, pp. 18–21).
- 110 Orwell, *Homage*, p. 3.
- 111 Beriain, *Prat*, p. 55; Solé and Villarroja, *Repressió*, vol. 1, pp. 102, 289; Balcells, 'Edificis', p. 191.
- 112 Balcells, 'Edificis', pp. 202, 207, 209.
- 113 Carrasco, *Barcelona*, pp. 13, 27; *Solidaridad Obrera*, 30 July, 15, 20 August 1936; *La Batalla*, 19 August 1936; *La Vanguardia*, 2 August 1936.
- 114 Manuel Delgado, *La ira sagrada: anticlericalismo, iconoclastia y antirritualismo en la España contemporánea* (Barcelona, 1992), pp. 71–9.
- 115 José Alvarez Junco, *El Emperador del Paralelo. Lerroux y la demagogia populista* (Madrid, 1990), pp. 397–414.
- 116 Demetrio Castro Alfin, 'Cultura, política y cultura política en la violencia anticlerical', in Rafael Cruz and Manuel Pérez Ledesma (eds.), *Cultura y movilización en la España contemporánea* (Madrid, 1997), p. 70.
- 117 Jordi Estivill and Gustau Barbat, 'L'anticlericalisme en la revolta popular del 1909', *L'Avenç*, 2 (1977), 35.
- 118 Gabriele Ranzato, 'Dies Irae: la persecuzione religiosa nella zona repubblicana durante la Guerra civile spagnola (1936–1939)', *Movimento operaio e socialista*, 2–3 (1988–9), 195.
- 119 Jordi Estivill and Gustau Barbat, 'Anticlericalisme populaire en Catalogne au début du siècle', *Social Compass*, 28 (1980), 219, 225.

- 120 One working-class activist explained: 'What was the Church, only a chain-store dealing in funerals, baptisms, marriages, hospitals, education, money-lending, banks, cafés' (cited in O'Donnell, *Salud!*, p. 94).
- 121 Caballé, *Barcelona*, pp. 45, 47.
- 122 Kaminski, *Barcelona*, p. 42.
- 123 Caballé, *Barcelona*, pp. 41, 43, 48, 54, 62.
- 124 Low and Brea, *Notebook*, pp. 23, 25, 228.
- 125 Miró, *Vida*, p. 195; Kaminski, *Barcelona*, p. 61; Borkenau, *Cockpit*, p. 73; Low and Brea, *Notebook*, p. 61.
- 126 One recruiting poster carried an image of a woman in tight-fitting dungarees uttering the slogan 'Les milicies us necessiten!' ('The militias need you!'), representing, in the words of one British observer, 'the hiring of Aphrodite to help the work of Ares, which I had always felt to be hitting below the belt' (Langdon-Davies, *Barricades*, p. 156).
- 127 Low and Brea, *Notebook*, pp. 47, 181, 186–7.
- 128 Carrasco, *Barcelona*, p. 81.
- 129 *Ruta*, 28 November 1936; Low and Brea, *Notebook*, pp. 196–7.
- 130 Salter, *Try-Out*, pp. 134; see also Miró, *Vida*, p. 187.
- 131 Letter from Benjamin Péret to André Breton, Barcelona, 5 September 1936 in Péret, *Death*, p. 184.
- 132 Borkenau, *Cockpit*, p. 169.
- 133 Low and Brea, *Notebook*, pp. 212–29.
- 134 Borkenau, *Cockpit*, p. 175.
- 135 For instance, the republican authorities repressed worker-activists who circulated 'illegal' flyers and who wrote 'illegal' graffiti on walls. They also prohibited flyposting in public places (Caballé, *Barcelona*, p. 135.)
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- 138 Orwell, *Homage*, pp. 146–9.
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## THE CULTURE OF EMPOWERMENT IN GIJÓN, 1936–1937

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- 3 Pamela Radcliff, *From Mobilization to Civil War: the Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–1937* (Cambridge, 1996).
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- 8 See Pamela Radcliff, 'La representación de la nación: el conflicto en torno a la identidad nacional y las prácticas simbólicas en la Segunda República', in Rafael Cruz and Manuel Pérez Ledesma (eds.), *Cultura y movilización en la España contemporánea* (Madrid, 1997).
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- 10 Ronald Fraser, 'The popular experience of war and revolution', in Paul Preston (ed.), *Revolution and War in Spain, 1931–1939* (London, 2001).
- 11 CNT, 15 January 1937.
- 12 *El Comercio*, 12 September 1936.
- 13 CNT, 28 February 1937.
- 14 Radcliff, *From Mobilization*, pp. 201–13.
- 15 *El Noroeste*, 15 April 1936.
- 16 *El Comercio*, 7 November 1936.
- 17 *El Comercio*, 1 November 1936.
- 18 Pamela Radcliff, 'The emerging challenge of mass politics', in José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (eds.), *Spanish History since 1808* (London, 2000), especially pp. 143–6.
- 19 Angel Garralda, *La persecución religiosa del clero en Asturias (1934 y 1936–37)* (Avilés, 1983), vol. 1, *passim*, is the source for this information. Vicente Carcel Orti, *La persecución religiosa en España durante la II República* (Madrid, 1990), says that 11.9 per cent of the clergy in Asturias were assassinated (pp. 245–6), while Garralda puts the figure at 14 per cent (p. 81).
- 20 *El Comercio*, 31 December 1936.
- 21 *El Comercio*, 29 September 1936.
- 22 *El Comercio*, 28 November 1936.
- 23 CNT, 21 April, 2 May 1937.
- 24 CNT, 18 May 1937.
- 25 CNT, 14 March 1937.
- 26 CNT, spring 1937, date illegible.
- 27 CNT, 8 January 1937.
- 28 *El Comercio*, 23 September, 2 October, 4 November 1936.
- 29 E.g. CNT, 8 January 1937.
- 30 *Avance*, 11 June 1937.
- 31 CNT, 30 January 1937.
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- 33 Mary Nash, *Defying Male Civilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War* (Denver, 1995).
- 34 CNT, 26 April 1937.
- 35 *Boletín del Norte*, 9 September 1937.
- 36 See the surviving minutes of the sewing branch of the Clothing Union and of the Mujeres Antifascistas, Archivo de la Guerra Civil, Salamanca, legajo K-263.
- 37 CNT, 29 March 1937.
- 38 Radcliff, *From Mobilization*, p. 74.
- 39 *El Comercio*, 20 July, 2 September 1936.
- 40 *El Comercio*, 2 October 1936.

- 41 *El Comercio*, 13 December 1936.
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- 46 C. Benito del Pozo, 'Municipalismo y República: la importancia política de los ayuntamientos', in *Cuadernos Republicanos*, April 1991, pp. 17–19.
- 47 CNT, 6 February 1937.
- 48 See Moisés Llordén Miñambres, *La producción de suelo urbano en Gijón, 1860–1975* (Oviedo, 1978).
- 49 Quoted in Álvarez, *Mallada*, p. 288.
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- 51 CNT, 3 January 1937.
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- 53 CNT, 11 February 1937.
- 54 I argue this from a broader national perspective in 'La representación', in Cruz and Pérez Ledesma (eds.), *Cultura y movilización*.

## OLD SYMBOLS, NEW MEANINGS: MOBILISING THE REBELLION IN THE SUMMER OF 1936

- 1 The rhetoric of the early days is analysed here in the following newspapers: *El Adelanto* of Segovia, *El Norte de Castilla* of Valladolid, *El Diario de Burgos* and *El Noticiero* of Zaragoza, *El Diario de Navarra* of Pamplona and the *ABC* of Seville. For the contrasting case of Pamplona, see chapter 9, in this volume, by Francisco Javier Caspistegui.
- 2 The complaints of the Acción Popular leaders are reported in *El Adelanto*, 14 August 1936. All subsequent press references are from 1936. The accusations, in Julia Cifuentes Chueca and Pilar Maluenda Pons, *El Asalto a la República: los orígenes del franquismo en Zaragoza (1936–1939)* (Zaragoza, 1995), p. 252. For the monarchists, see Eugenio Vegas Latapié, *Los caminos del desengaño: memorias políticas (II), 1936–1938* (Madrid, 1987), p. 49. A symptom of the lack of comradeship was the creation of new, rather disrespectful words for the anthem *Cara al Sol* (ibid., pp. 59–60). For Cardinal Gomá, see Hilari Raguer, *La pólvora y el incienso: la Iglesia y la Guerra Civil española (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 2001), p. 113. The demands of a leading role are analysed in *El Adelanto*, 9 September.
- 3 Something similar occurred in the republican camp in the summer of 1936, but the republican press gave less coverage to the parades than did the rebel press.
- 4 *Diario de Navarra*, 25 July, in allusion to the order given by the Comandancia Militar to remove the republican purple colour from tobaccoists and lottery establishments.

- 5 Jose María Iribarren, *Mola: datos para una biografía y para la historia del alzamiento nacional* (Zaragoza, 1938), p. 174.
- 6 This text maintains the perspective of the mobilisation as a cultural tool to select and activate existing rhetoric, beliefs, ideas and symbols, taken from Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (Cambridge, 1994). The concept of cultural tool is from Ann Swidler, 'Culture in action: symbols and strategies', *American Sociological Review*, 51 (1986), 273–86.
- 7 For the mobilisation of the Carlists in Pamplona, see Javier Ugarte Tellería, *La nueva Covadonga insurgente: orígenes sociales y culturales de la sublevación de 1936 en Navarra y el País Vasco*, (Madrid, 1998). For the destruction and substitution of symbols, see *Diario de Navarra*, 21 July 1936. For Mola's reply, see Iribarren, *Mola*, p. 115.
- 8 For the removal of flags and bunting, see *Diario de Burgos*, 20 July, and Vegas Latapié's *Los caminos del desengaño*, pp. 25 and 32. In his monumental *Historia de la cruzada Española* (Madrid, 1984 [1941]), vol. 3, Joaquín Arrarás mentions the flag being raised but forgets its subsequent removal (p. 377).
- 9 *El Noticiero*, 25 July; *El Adelanto* of Salamanca, 28 July; *ABC* of Seville, 1 August. Ugarte Tellería, *La nueva Covadonga*, pp. 201–10.
- 10 In republican territory the funerals immediately acquired political importance too, but at the beginning of the war and at the end of September the press here spread instructions not to hold mass funerals (see *Ahora*, 21 July, publishing a recommendation from the Ministry of the Interior which indicated: 'henceforth, the funerals will be devoid of formal ceremony, as the present circumstances advise').
- 11 The first funeral with the two-colour flag is reported in *El Norte de Castilla*, 22 and 23 July; *Diario de Burgos*, July 23. Redondo's funeral, in *El Norte de Castilla*, 26 July. The rest, in *El Norte de Castilla*, 28 July, *Diario de Burgos*, 23 July. News of the first funerals in Pamplona and Logroño is reported in *Diario de Navarra*, 25 July; in Zaragoza in *El Noticiero*, 24 July; in Seville, in *ABC*, 3 August.
- 12 The act of reparation in Zaragoza is reported in *El Noticiero*, 4 August. Those in Valladolid, León and Palencia, in *El Norte de Castilla* on 8, 11, and 26 August, respectively.
- 13 The event in Burgos did not get much coverage in the press, barely twenty lines (*El Diario de Burgos*, 17 August). Raising of the two-colour flag in Córdoba, Cádiz, Huelva and other towns in Andalusia is reported in *ABC*, 16 and 18 August; in Soria, *El Adelanto*, 6 August; in Valladolid, *El Norte de Castilla*, 14 August; in Zaragoza, *El Noticiero*, 30 August. Raising of other flags, in León and Aranda de Duero, *El Norte de Castilla*, 19 and 22 August. With a field mass in Pontevedra and in Astorga, *El Norte de Castilla*, 1 and 3 September.
- 14 The mobilisation in Seville is reported in *ABC*, 16 August 1936, and in the work of Leopoldo Nunes, *A guerra em Espanha!* (Lisbon, 1936), pp. 294–7.
- 15 *El Adelanto* of Salamanca, 9 September 1936. In the cities where there had been mobilisations during August one could see their streets decked with



- red-and-yellow balcony bunting representing the flag. In some cases, as in Valladolid, there was such a demand for cloth that they had to make do with paper instead, or as in Zaragoza, superimposing the two colours on white cloth (*El Norte de Castilla*, 3 September; *El Noticiero*, 1 September).
- 16 During the negotiations between General Mola and the Carlists in preparation for the military rebellion and the civilian support, the Carlists laid the question of the flag on the table, proposing that the two-colour flag be used as the rebels' banner. Mola did not accept this and, despite the Carlists' insistence, the demand disappeared in the overall negotiations (see Martin Blinkhorn, *Carlismo y contrarrevolución en España, 1931–1939*, Barcelona, 1979 [1975], pp. 340–4).
  - 17 *La Marcha Real* is mentioned in Iribarren, *Mola*, p. 240. For the rest of the anthems, see the rebel press during the summer of 1936. The blue overalls were also a garment that symbolised the rebel militias' social status, though more extensively in the republican zone (see Vegas Latapié *Los caminos del desengaño*, p. 37). It can also be seen in the press photographs of those months. The fascist salute was institutionalised by Franco's decree in 1937.
  - 18 From the speech of Aniceto de Castro Albarrán, during the act of reparation to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, reported in *El Adelanto*, 21 August 1936.
  - 19 See, e.g., *ABC*, 17 February 1936. For the crusade in the traditionalists' (Carlists') thought, see Ugarte Tellería, *La nueva Covadonga*, pp. 159–60.
  - 20 Editorial in *Diario de Navarra*, 19 July; there are several references in the same newspaper to the crusade and the crusaders on 21 July.
  - 21 Franco's words are reported in *ABC*, 22 and 26 July; *El Noticiero*, 24 July; Valente on Radio Castilla of Burgos in *ABC*, 27 July; Iscar in *El Adelanto*, 31 July; Pujol in *El Adelanto*, 4 August; in Valladolid, *El Norte de Castilla*, 4 August. José Andrés-Gallego establishes the different meanings of the term crusade prior to and during the war (*Los españoles entre la religión y la política*, Madrid, 1996, pp. 30–1). See also T. Pérez Delgado and A. Fuentes Labrador, 'De rebeldes a cruzados: pioneros del discurso legitimador del Movimiento Nacional. Salamanca, julio-octubre de 1936', *Studia Histórica. Historia Contemporánea*, 4: 4 (1986), pp. 253–5.
  - 22 *El Adelanto*, 2 September.
  - 23 For the tradition of the act of reparation, see Andres Sarriá Muñoz's *Religiosidad y política: celebraciones públicas en la Málaga del siglo XVIII* (Málaga, 1996), pp. 113–14 and 134–6. For the joint political participation, see Giuliana di Febo's *La Santa de la Raza: un culto barroco en la España franquista* (Barcelona, 1988), p. 35. A text which describes and interprets the meaning of these rituals very well is that of Alfonso Álvarez Bolado, *Para ganar la guerra, para ganar la paz* (Madrid, 1995), pp. 44–5. The largest mass mobilisation based on an act of reparation to Nuestra Señora del Pilar took place in Zaragoza (*El Noticiero*, 4 August). The first act of reparation to the Sacred Heart of Jesus took place in Burgos, where people from 'all social classes' mixed with the militia (*Diario de Burgos*, 18 August; *El Norte de Castilla*, 21 August).
  - 24 Redondo's funeral is reported in *El Norte de Castilla*, 26 July; that of the civil guard, in *El Adelanto*, 31 July; God and *Patria*, e.g., in *El Norte de Castilla*, 4 August, and *El Adelanto*, 19 August. The term 'martyr' is in all the articles

- about funerals in the newspapers. See also José Antonio Pérez Bowie, *El léxico de la muerte durante la guerra civil española* (Salamanca, 1983). Mola's speech is reported in *El Noticiero*, 2 August. All the articles about the funerals highlight the presence of the raised cross at the funerals.
- 25 The Pamplona agreement is reported in *Diario de Navarra*, 25 August. Lamamié in Alba de Tormes (Salamanca), in *El Adelanto*, 21 August. The Falangists in Béjar (Salamanca), in *El Adelanto*, 9 August; in La Coruña, in *El Norte de Castilla*, 13 August; in Cádiz, in *ABC*, 1 September. The rest, in *ABC*, 16 and 18 September.
  - 26 Álvarez Bolado, *Para ganar la guerra*, p. 45.
  - 27 The blessing of flags is reported, e.g., in *El Adelanto*, 9 September; the blessing of those present at political meetings, in *El Adelanto*, 12 September; the blessing of the armoured truck, in *El Noticiero*, 18 September.
  - 28 The mass in La Coruña is reported in *El Norte de Castilla*, 24 August. The processions in Seville, in *ABC*, 16 August, and in Pamplona, in *Diario de Navarra*, 21 and 25 August. The three-day Novenas and the *Te Deum*, e.g., in *El Norte de Castilla*, 20 August, and in *Diario de Burgos*, 28 September, respectively.
  - 29 The bells are reported in *El Norte de Castilla*, 5 August. The chaplains, in *Diario de Navarra*, 23 July. The altar boys and the monstrance, in *El Norte de Castilla*, 9 September. The rest, in *Diario de Burgos*, 21 July; *El Adelanto*, 6 August; *El Noticiero*, 25 July.
  - 30 In *El Noticiero*, 9 August. Castro Albarrán's speech on Inter-Radio of Salamanca, in *El Adelanto*, 16 August. Mola's speech on Radio Castilla of Burgos, in *El Norte de Castilla*, 18 August.

### 'SPAIN'S VENDÉE': CARLIST IDENTITY IN NAVARRRE AS A MOBILISING MODEL

I wish to express my gratitude for the suggestions made by Ignacio Olabarri, Jesús Longares and Jordi Canal, and especially for those by the editors, Chris Ealham and Michael Richards. I also wish to thank Adriana Rípodas for consulting the correspondence of Antonio Izal (henceforth AAI, Villava), Pablo Larraz for his useful references; Carlos Sáenz de Tejada Benvenuti and Luis Prieto for their invaluable help in enabling me to reproduce the painting by Carlos Sáenz de Tejada (Figure 9.3); and Ana Hueso, of the Municipal Archives of Pamplona.

- 1 Arthur Koestler, *Spanish Testament* (London, 1937), p. 111.
- 2 Although they are not synonyms, I shall use the terms Carlism and traditionalism alternately in this chapter, given that in the epoch under analysis they were used interchangeably and any clarification on my part would make a reading of the texts discussed more complex.
- 3 Miguel Ángel Cabrera, 'Historia y teoría de la sociedad: del giro culturalista al giro lingüístico', in Carlos Forcadell and Ignacio Peiró (eds.), *Lecturas de la historia: nueve reflexiones sobre historia de la historiografía* (Zaragoza, 2001), pp. 262, 265. See also his *Historia, lenguaje y teoría de la sociedad* (Madrid, 2001).
- 4 *Diario de Navarra* (henceforth DN) and *El Pensamiento Navarro* (henceforth EPN), 22 July 1936.

- 5 Francisco Javier Caspistegui, 'Navarra y el carlismo durante el régimen de Franco: la utopía de la identidad unitaria', *Investigaciones Históricas*, 17 (1997), 285–314.
- 6 Javier Ugarte Tellería, *La nueva Covadonga insurgente: orígenes sociales y culturales de la sublevación de 1936 en Navarra y el País Vasco* (Madrid, 1998), p. 143.
- 7 Federico García Sanchiz, *Del robledal al olivar. Navarra y el carlismo* (San Sebastián, 1939).
- 8 El Tebib Arrumi (Víctor Ruiz Albéniz), *Navarra se incorpora* (Madrid, 1940 [1939]), pp. 7–8, 52.
- 9 *El Balear*, October 1937, cited in Francisco López Sanz, *Navarra en el alzamiento nacional (testimonios ajenos)* (Madrid, 1946), pp. 51, 52; Ugarte Tellería, *La nueva Covadonga*, p. 258.
- 10 *EPN*, 23 July 1936.
- 11 Campaign for the collection of books for the wounded (21 September 1936. Archivo administrativo de Navarra, Diputación Foral de Navarra, Junta Central Carlista de Guerra, henceforth AAN, DFN, JCCGN, box 20298, exp. 3).
- 12 Jorge Claramunt, *El temiente Arizcun: novela de amor y de guerra* (Burgos, 1937), p. 56.
- 13 Juan Pujol, prologue to *Fal Conde y el requeté juzgados por el extranjero: crónicas de guerra* (Seville, 1979 [1937]), p. 9. Antonio Pérez de Olaguer, *Lágrimas y sonrisas* (Burgos, 1938), p. 17.
- 14 Cited in López Sanz, *Navarra*, p. 26.
- 15 Francisco Gutiérrez Lasanta, *Navarra en el Plan Divino o Actuación de Navarra en la Cruzada Española de 1936–39* (Logroño, 1953), pp. 69–70.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- 17 *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15. This same argument was used by the provincial council, which hoped for recognition for a land which 'is blessed and favoured by Providence, which has always given everything that it is and everything that it has – including the blood of its sons – in the fight against the enemies of God and the Fatherland' (Memoria General de Diputación, 1938. AAN, DFN, Secretaría, box 42707).
- 18 Cardinal Isidro Gomá y Tomás, 'El caso de España' (November 1936), in Gomá, *Pastorales de la guerra de España* (Madrid, 1955), p. 51.
- 19 Pérez Olaguer, *Lágrimas*, pp. 59–60. See, also, the article by Eladio Esparza, 'Viva España', *DN*, 24 July 1936; *DN*, 30 July 1936 or *Jerarquía*, 2 (1937), pp. 145–8.
- 20 *EPN*, 23 July 1936.
- 21 Hilari Ragner, *La pólvora y el incienso: la Iglesia y la Guerra Civil española (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 2001), p. 205; Ugarte Tellería, *La nueva Covadonga*, pp. 183–91.
- 22 *EPN*, 24 July 1936.
- 23 Antonio Izal, Somosierra, 28 July 1936. AAI, Villava.

- 24 Marcelino Olaechea, bishop of Pamplona, *Boletín Oficial Eclésiástico de Pamplona*, 15 September 1936, pp. 352–3.
- 25 Ugarte Tellería, *La nueva Covadonga*, p. 160.
- 26 Ramón Salas Larrazábal, *Cómo ganó Navarra la Cruz Laureada de San Fernando* (Madrid, 1980), p. 45. The ‘Navas de Tolosa’ was the battle (1212) in which the king of the Navarrese territories defeated the Muslims and obtained what, since then, has been the coat of arms of the region.
- 27 AAN, DFN, JCCGN, Box 20298, exp. 2; *DN* and *EPN*, 26 July 1936, p. 1; Melchor Ferrer, *Don Alfonso Carlos de Borbón y Austria-Este* (Seville, 1979), pp. 344–5.
- 28 Comunión Tradicionalista Carlista [Manuel Fal Conde], *Devocionario y ordenanza del requeté* (Seville, 1979 [1936]), no pagination.
- 29 Conde de Saint-Aulaire, *La renaissance de l’Espagne* (Paris, 1938), p. 305.
- 30 Claramunt, *El teniente*, p. 26.
- 31 Pío Baroja, *Ayer y hoy: memorias* (Madrid, 1997 [1939]), p. 26.
- 32 *EPN*, 21 July 1936.
- 33 *DN*, 20, 22 July 1936; *EPN*, 21 July 1936.
- 34 *DN*, 22 July 1936.
- 35 Javier Ugarte, ‘Un episodio de “estilización” de la política antirrepublicana: la fiesta de San Francisco Javier de 1931 en Pamplona’, in Luis Castells (ed.), *El rumor de lo cotidiano: estudios sobre el País Vasco contemporáneo* (Bilbao, 1999), pp. 159–82.
- 36 Jesús Ibero, ‘Los requetés navarros en 1936: acercamiento a la historia oral’, in *La guerra y la paz cincuenta años después* (Madrid, 1990), p. 184.
- 37 *EPN*, 25 July 1936. Joaquín Pérez Madrigal, a former Radical Socialist Party member of parliament, spoke – in positive terms – of the Carlist circle of Pamplona, referring to it as ‘the deepest recess of the cave’ (*Memorias de un converso*, Madrid, 1943–1952, Madrid, 1952, vol. 6, pp. 128–30).
- 38 *Pelayos*, 21 February 1937, vignette 96.
- 39 Letter dated 15 August 1936, cited in Ferrer, *Don Alfonso*, p. 348.
- 40 These embroidered images of Jesus’s heart were worn on shirts over the heart and were accompanied with the words: ‘Halt, bullet’. See José María Gironella, *Un millón de muertos* (Barcelona, 1961), p. 165.
- 41 Ernest Hemingway includes this in his *For Whom the Bell Tolls* (Harmondsworth, 1964 [1941]), p. 257:  

‘Thou,’ she said. ‘Didst thee see what he wore on his chest?’  
‘Yes. Why not?’  
‘It was the Sacred Heart.’  
‘Yes. All the people of Navarre wear it.’
- 42 Rafael García Serrano, *La fiel infantería* (Madrid, 1964), pp. 407–8.
- 43 Manuel Bellosillo, *Tercio de Requetés Valvanera: semblanzas y canciones* (Madrid, 1992), p. 146.
- 44 Letter from Antonio Izal, Horcajo, 23 December 1936 (AAI, Villava).

- 45 Letter from Jesús Lambea, Olaeta, 14 April 1937, cited in López Sanz, *Navarra*, p. 103.
- 46 *Flechas y Pelayos: por el Imperio hacia Dios*, 5 March 1939. I have consulted the facsimile edition (Madrid, 2000).
- 47 Francisco Javier Caspistegui and Gemma Piérola, 'Entre la ideología y lo cotidiano: la familia en el carlismo y el tradicionalismo (1940–1975)', *Vasconia*, 28 (1999), 45–56.
- 48 *Flechas y Pelayos*, 21 May 1939. *Pelayos*, 21 February 1937, vignette 93; López Sanz, *Navarra*, pp. 57–8.
- 49 *Flechas y Pelayos*, 28 May 1939.
- 50 Caspistegui, 'Navarra'; Mary Vincent, 'The martyrs and the saints: masculinity and the construction of the Francoist crusade', *History Workshop Journal*, 47 (1999), 69–98.
- 51 *Flechas y Pelayos*, 10 September 1939.
- 52 Gutiérrez Lasanta, *Navarra*, pp. 83, 84.
- 53 *DN*, 24 July 1936.
- 54 Antonio Pérez de Olaguer, *Los de siempre: hechos y anécdotas del requeté* (Burgos, 1937), pp. 62–3.
- 55 Claramunt, *El teniente*, p. 26; Manuel Iribarren, *Símbolo* (Seville, 1939), p. 91 and his *Pugna de almas* (Madrid, 1943), p. 109.
- 56 Harold Cardozo, *The March of a Nation. My Year of Spain's Civil War* (London, 1937), p. 20.
- 57 Bellosillo, *Tercio*, p. 146.
- 58 *Le Courier Royal*, cited in *Fal Conde*, p. 32.
- 59 *Le Petit Parisien*, cited in *Fal Conde*, p. 61.
- 60 Somosierra, 22 February 1937. AAI, Villava.
- 61 Complaints from Pitillas and Beire, registered on 13 and 24 August 1936, to the Carlist council of war of Navarre. AAN, DFN, box 20298, exp. 2.
- 62 Interview conducted by the author with 'E.A.', Pamplona, 1991.
- 63 Somosierra, 31 August 1936. AAI, Villava.
- 64 William Foss and Cecil Gerahty, *The Spanish Arena* (London, 1940(?)), p. 287.
- 65 Gomá y Tomás, *Pastorales*, p. 51.
- 66 Alfonso Junco, *El difícil paraíso* (Mexico, 1940), p. 174; Foss and Gerahty, *Spanish Arena*, p. 240.
- 67 Antonio Pérez de Olaguer, *Estampas carlistas* (Madrid, 1950), p. 341; *Heraldo de Aragón*, 13 September 1937, cited in López Sanz, *Navarra*, pp. 67–70; Pérez de Olaguer, *Lágrimas*, pp. 57–62.
- 68 Francisco Javier Caspistegui, "Esa ciudad maldita, cuna del centralismo, la burocracia y el liberalismo": la ciudad como enemigo en el tradicionalismo español', in *Arquitectura, ciudad e ideología antiurbana* (Pamplona, 2002), pp. 71–86.
- 69 Manuel Iribarren, *La ciudad* (Madrid, 1939), p. 7.
- 70 Iribarren, *La ciudad*, pp. 309–10.

- 71 Rafael García Serrano, *Plaza del Castillo* (Madrid, 2001 [1951]), p. 95; Conde de Saint-Aulaire, *La renaissance*, p. 305. The reference is to liberal philosopher and supporter of the Republic, José Ortega y Gasset.
- 72 García Sanchiz, *Del robledal al olivar*, p. 150.
- 73 Bonifacio Gil, *Cancionero histórico carlista* (Madrid, 1990), p. 155.
- 74 *Jerarquía: la revista negra de la Falange*, 2 (1937), p. 17.
- 75 Cardozo, *March*, pp. 75, 313.
- 76 *L'Action Française Mensuelle*, cited in *Fal Conde*, p. 58; Lucien Maulvault, *El requete* (Sic) (Paris, 1937), p. 19.
- 77 Claramunt, *El teniente*, p. 7.
- 78 Gutiérrez Lasanta, *Navarra*, p. 77.
- 79 Pérez de Olaguer, *Los de siempre*, p. 59.
- 80 Santiago de Pablo, 'La identidad navarra a través del cine durante la guerra civil', in *Mito y realidad en la historia de Navarra* (Pamplona, 1998), vol. 2, pp. 118–19.
- 81 Maulvault, *El requete*, p. 58. See also *Flechas y Pelayos*, 25 December 1938; López Sanz, *Navarra*, pp. 45–9.
- 82 Foss and Gerahty, *Spanish Arena*, p. 287. See references to the 'March of Oriamendi' and to the Pamplona brass band of the *requeté*, set up soon after the start of the war (17 September 1936. AAN, DFN, box 20298, exp. 3).
- 83 Claramunt, *El teniente*, p. 32.
- 84 1 August 1936. AAI, Villava.
- 85 Cardozo, *March*, p. 58.
- 86 López Sanz, *Navarra*, pp. 299–300; Amando Lázaro Ros, *Viboral* (Madrid, 1961), p. 98.
- 87 Segundo Serrano Poncela, *La viña de Nabot* (Madrid, 1979), p. 150.
- 88 Dolores Ibárruri, *El único camino* (Madrid, 1992), p. 348.
- 89 Koestler, *Spanish Testament*, p. 112.
- 90 Arthur Koestler, *Autobiografía, II. La escritura invisible* (Madrid, 2000 [1954]), p. 358.
- 91 Agustín Arbeloa Egüés, a seminarian during the war and later a priest, in *Luz y niebla de encrucijada* (Pamplona, 1991), p. 33; José Luis Castillo Puche, *El vengador* (Barcelona, 1981 [1956]), p. 149; Gironella, *Un millón*, p. 274.
- 92 Juan de Iturralde [Juan José Usabiaga Irazustabarrena], *El catolicismo y la cruzada de Franco: quiénes y con qué fines prepararon la guerra* (n.p., 1955), pp. 121, 129, 451.
- 93 Iñaki de Aberriogoyen, *Sept mois et sept jours dans l'Espagne de Franco* (Paris, 1938), p. 91; Koestler, *Spanish Testament*, p. 111.
- 94 Cited in José Mario Armero, *España fue noticia: corresponsales extranjeros en la guerra civil española* (Madrid, 1976), p. 168.
- 95 Julián Zugazagoitia, *Guerra y vicisitudes de los españoles* (Barcelona, 1977), p. 111.
- 96 Koestler, *Spanish Testament*, p. 72.

- 97 Palmiro Togliatti, *Escritos sobre la guerra de España* (Barcelona, 1980), pp. 50–1.
- 98 Popular festivals with obscure religious origins. Juan Goytisolo, *Señas de identidad* (Barcelona, 1994 [1966]), p. 283.
- 99 José Luis de Vilallonga, *Fiesta* (Barcelona, 1983 [1971]), pp. 67–8.
- 100 Castillo Puche, *El vengador*, p. 11; Manuel Chaves Nogales, *A sangre y fuego* (Madrid, 2001 [1937]), pp. 238–9; Zugazagoitia, *Guerra*, pp. 252–3.
- 101 Koestler, *Spanish Testament*, pp. 46, 85; Arthur G. London, *Espagne* (Paris, 1966 [1963]), p. 27.
- 102 Ibárruri, *El único camino*, p. 348; Zugazagoitia, *Guerra*, p. 59.
- 103 Gironella, *Un millón*, pp. 30–1. A reply to this was Francisco López Sanz's *¿Un millón de muertos? Pero con ¡Heroes y mártires!*, (Pamplona, 1963); Koestler, *Spanish Testament*, pp. 91–2, 107.
- 104 Toribio Echevarría, *Recordando la guerra: diario de viaje de un refugiado español* (Donostia, 1992), p. 51.
- 105 José Antonio Aguirre to Azaña, 19 July 1937, in Azaña, *Diarios*, p. 1048.
- 106 de Aberri-goyen, *Sept mois*, pp. 30, 63, 120–1; Marino Ayerra, *No me avergoncé del Evangelio: desde mi parroquia* (Buenos Aires, 1959). Elena Taberna's short film, *Alsasua, 1936* was inspired by this as was the documentary *Recuerdos del 36* (both from 1994).
- 107 García Sanchiz, *Del robledal al olivar*, p. 149.
- 108 de Pablo, 'La identidad navarra. . .', pp. 113–15.
- 109 Salas Larrazábal, *Cómo ganó Navarra*, p. 4.
- 110 Eduardo Conde, *La cruzada de Occidente. Escritos políticos. Envío a Navarra* (Barcelona, 1957), p. 77.
- 111 An example of this was the common use of the phrase from Shakespeare's *Love's Labours Lost*, considered by many Carlists to be prophetic: 'Navarre shall be the wonder of the world' (act 1, scene 1, 12). Other references in Joaquín Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española* (Madrid, 1940), vol. 3, p. 548; López Sanz, *Navarra*, p. 14; Francisco Javier de Lizarza Inda, *Navarra, julio de 1936* (Madrid, 1980), p. 3.

**'PRESENTING ARMS TO THE BLESSED SACRAMENT':  
CIVIL WAR AND SEMANA SANTA IN THE CITY OF  
MÁLAGA, 1936–1939**

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- 1 José Pemartín, *Qué es 'Lo Nuevo': consideraciones sobre el momento español presente* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn, Santander, 1938), p. 77 (1st edn, Seville, 1937).
- 2 See, e.g., Isidoro Moreno, *Confradías y hermandades andaluzas: estructura, simbolismo e identidad* (Seville, 1985).
- 3 For this 'lamenting' conception, see Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power* (Harmondsworth, 1992 [1960]), pp. 68–70.
- 4 Notwithstanding the substantial anthropological bibliography on aspects of popular religious rituals (mainly rural) in Andalusia. See, e.g., many of the

- contributions in Carlos Álvarez Santaló et al. (eds.), *La religiosidad popular*, vol. III (Barcelona, 1989); Salvador Rodríguez Becerra, *Las fiestas de Andalucía: una aproximación desde la antropología cultural* (Seville, 1985); Pedro Castón Boyer et al., *La religión en Andalucía: Aproximación a la religiosidad popular* (Seville, 1985).
- 5 An important exception explores particular episodes in the Basque Country in 1931: William A. Christian, *Visionaries: the Spanish Republic and the Reign of Christ* (Berkeley, 1996).
  - 6 Álvarez Bollado, *Para ganar la guerra, para ganar la paz: iglesia y guerra civil, 1936–1939* (Madrid, 1995), pp. 22–3, 110–11, 118–38.
  - 7 For the reservations of Spanish cardinal primate Gomá see his prohibited pastoral letter of 8 August 1939, *Lecciones de la guerra y deberes de la paz*, reproduced in Anastasio Granados, *El cardenal Gomá, primado de España* (Madrid, 1969), esp. pp. 411–12. See also Ramon Muntanyola, *Vidal i Barraquer: el Cardenal de la paz* (Barcelona, 1971), pp. 417–23.
  - 8 *Boinas Rojas*, 2 April 1938, p. 5. For the May 1931 events, see Juan Escolar García, *Memorables sucesos desarrollados en Málaga: un reportaje histórico* (Málaga, 1931).
  - 9 The ‘authenticity’ of Carnival was also contested according to allegiances of social class in the 1930s. See María Jesús García, *Málaga era una fiesta* (Málaga, 1991).
  - 10 ‘La cuaresma de España’, in Gomá, *Pastorales de la guerra de España* (Madrid, 1955), pp. 95–145. Reproduced in Málaga press, e.g. *Boinas Rojas*, 25 March 1937, p. 2.
  - 11 *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, 5 February 1937.
  - 12 *Boinas Rojas*, 23 February 1938, p. 3.
  - 13 E.g., Francisco García Alonso S.J., *Oración fúnebre predicada en la Santa Iglesia Catedral de Málaga* (Cádiz, 1942).
  - 14 *Christus*, 1930 (no page numbers); *Rebeldías*, 23 January 1933, p. 6; 29 April 1933, p. 10.
  - 15 *Sur*, 28 March 1937, p. 9. Those wounded ‘in offering their lives for Spain’ had places reserved for them in seats in the Plaza de José Antonio, formerly the Plaza de la Constitución.
  - 16 See Vicente Cárcel Ortí (ed.), *Actas de las conferencias de metropolitanos españoles (1921–1965)* (Madrid, 1994), p. 395.
  - 17 *Sur*, 2 April 1939, p. 7.
  - 18 1,884 of these were killed during the first eleven months of Francoist occupation. Antonio Nadal Sánchez, *Guerra civil en Málaga* (Málaga, 1984), pp. 190, 195. The official death rate in the city in 1937 (7,042) was nearly twice that of the yearly average in the period 1930–5 (3,605). The 1936 figure was 4,258. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, *Reseña estadística de la Provincia de Málaga* (Madrid, 1956), p. 107.
  - 19 Gerald Brenan, *The Face of Spain* (London, 1965 [1950]), p. 72. British diplomats made unofficial attempts to secure the release of the leading military rebels. See National Archive (TNA) Foreign Office, 1936, FO371/20560/W18513/427/41; FO371/20469/W386/W682/2/41. Other targeted groups were successfully evacuated by the British. Some one



- hundred nuns, for example, in August 1936. TNA/FO371/20560/W15777/427/41.
- 20 Antonio Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa en España, 1936–1939* (Madrid, 1960). See also Vicente Cárcel Ortí, *La persecución religiosa en España durante la segunda república, 1931–1939* (Madrid, 1990).
  - 21 *Boinas Rojas*, 2 October 1937, p. 3; Francisco García Alonso S.J., *Flores de heroísmo* (Seville, 1939), p. 104; Ángel Gollonet Megías and José Morales López, *Sangre y fuego: Málaga* (Granada, 1937), p. 34.
  - 22 García, *Flores*, p. 25.
  - 23 *Boinas Rojas*, 14 April, 1938, p. 19. Ortega was a candidate of the broad Alianza Republicana in the municipal elections of June 1931.
  - 24 Useful discussions are to be found in Timothy Mitchell, *Passional Culture: Emotion, Religion, and Society in Southern Spain* (Philadelphia, 1990), see esp. pp. 50, 62, 164; and Stanley Brandes, *Metaphors of Masculinity: Sex and Status in Andalusian Folklore* (Philadelphia, 1980), pp. 177–204.
  - 25 Circular del Obispado, *Boletín Oficial del Obispado de Málaga*, April 1939, printed in press, e.g., *Sur*, 2 April 1939, p. 7. Victor Turner, in *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (London, 1969), p. 128, privileges human faculties such as rationality, volition, and memory above ‘inherited drives released from cultural restraints’.
  - 26 E.g., *Rebelión*, 10 May 1931, p. 9.
  - 27 For the many masonic lodges in Málaga, see Archivo de la Guerra Civil Española, Salamanca, PS, Masonería y Comunismo, carpetas 451, 763–5. Also Elías de Mateo Avilés, *Masonería, protestantismo, librepensamiento y otras heterodoxias en la Málaga del siglo XIX* (Málaga, 1986); Leonor Martín de los Ríos, ‘La masonería en Málaga durante la República’, in *Estudios sobre la II República en Málaga*, (Málaga, 1986), pp. 121–42.
  - 28 Damián López Cano, *La población malagueña en el siglo XX* (Málaga, 1985), pp. 51, 76, 102.
  - 29 *Julio*, 22 January 1937, pp. 2, 3.
  - 30 Manuel Morales Muñoz, *El republicanismo malagueño en el siglo XIX* (Málaga, 1999), p. 50.
  - 31 See, e.g., *Vida Nueva*, 15 September 1936, p. 1; 2 October 1936, p. 1.
  - 32 There were, for example, some 30,000 CNT affiliates in Málaga in 1931 and 45,000 by 1933. Although the socialist UGT was largely a rural force in the province during the Republic, the JSU would later become organised and popular, and the PCE had already mobilised 5,000 members by the end of 1931, largely among the unemployed.
  - 33 Chalmers Mitchell, *My House in Málaga* (London, 1938), p. 20.
  - 34 E.g., *Christus*, 1930 (no page numbers); García-Herrero, *Recuerdos*, pp. 109, 114. Also Caro Baroja, ‘Reseña y antecedentes’, p. 33.
  - 35 See María del Carmen Ocaña Ocaña, *Atlas social de la ciudad de Málaga* (Málaga, 1984), p. 7.
  - 36 On the human losses in the flood of 1907, for example, see *Boletín Eclesiástico del Obispado de Málaga* (1907), 304–7, cited in Fernando Arcas Cubero, *Málaga contemporánea: textos y documentos* (Málaga, 1993), pp. 181–2.

- 37 See María José González Castillejo, 'Realidad social de la mujer: vida cotidiana y esfera pública en Málaga (1931–1936)', *La mujer en Andalucía* (Granada, 1990), p. 421.
- 38 Antonio Nadal, '1890. La huelga de las tejedoras de la industria Malagueña', *Gibralfaro*, 27 (1975), 52; María Dolores Ramos, 'Realidad social y conciencia de la realidad en la mujer: obreras malagueñas frente a la crisis de subsistencias (1918)', in María Carmen García-Nieto (ed.), *Ordenamiento jurídico y realidad social de las mujeres* (Madrid, 1986), pp. 302–8; *El Debate*, 17 February 1934, p. 4.
- 39 Joaquín Arrarás Iribarren, *Historia de la cruzada española* (6 vols.), vol. 5 (Madrid, 1941), pp. 52, 69. Also Gollonet and Morales, *Sangre y fuego*, p. 11. Moriscos: Muslims – in fact, often of European descent – converted to Christianity, forcibly, and repressed as heretics following expulsion of Islam at end of the fifteenth century.
- 40 Michael Richards, 'Morality and biology in the Spanish civil war: psychiatrists, revolution and women prisoners in Málaga', *Contemporary European History*, 10. 3 (2001), 410.
- 41 Anita Carrillo in *El Popular*, 12 January 1937, p. 4.
- 42 The principal patron was María Cecilia Cubas y Erice, Marquesa de Aldama.
- 43 'La Virgen de la Expiración regresa a su templo', *La Saeta*, 1931.
- 44 *Sur*, 4 April 1939, p. 7; Andrés Llordén and Sebastián Souvirón, *Historia documental de las Hermandades de la Pasión de la ciudad de Málaga*, (Málaga, 1969), pp. 295–7.
- 45 García-Herrero, *Recuerdos*, pp. 116, 172, 194. See also Gómez Bajuelo, *Málaga bajo el dominio rojo* (Cádiz, 1937), p. 105; Mercedes Formica, *Visto y vivido 1931–1937* (Barcelona, 1982), pp. 201–19; Tomás López, *Treinta semanas en poder de los rojos*, (Seville, 1938), p. 96. For pre-war examples of these constructions, see, e.g., Albuera, *Vida cotidiana*, p. 123; García-Herrera, *Recuerdos*, p. 154.
- 46 Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada*, vol. 5, pp. 50, 52. See also Richards, 'Morality and Biology', esp. pp. 397–8.
- 47 *Boinas Rojas*, 26 February 1939, p. 7; 8 March 1939, p. 3; 15 March 1939, p. 6; *Málaga y el Corazón de Jesús* (Málaga, 1940), pp. 6, 14.
- 48 *Vida Nueva*, 3 October 1936, p. 1.
- 49 *El Popular*, 22 November 1936, p. 7; *Julio*, 22 January 1937, p. 4. Mutual aid committees were set up in the name of 'el 16 de febrero' (the date of the victory of the Popular Front electoral coalition in 1936), and in representation of groups of refugees from outside the city.
- 50 *Vida Nueva*, 6 October 1936, p. 1.
- 51 *El Popular*, 8 November 1936, p. 3.
- 52 See *El Popular*, 8 and 22 November 1936.
- 53 *Eco Popular*, 5 October 1936, p. 3.
- 54 *El Popular*, 12 January 1937, p. 4.

- 55 *Vida Nueva*, 14 November 1936. Subscriptions were begun for neighbourhood blood banks. *El Popular*, 1 August 1936, p. 4; *Eco Popular*, 5 October 1936, p. 3.
- 56 *El Popular*, 2 August, 1936, p. 4; *Vida Nueva*, 12 September 1936; 16 September 1936; 4 October 1936, p. 1; *Eco Popular*, 6 October 1936, p. 2; *Julio*, 25 January 1937, p. 2; 27 January 1937, p. 2.
- 57 *Boinas Rojas*, 27 March 1938, p. 5.
- 58 Arrarás, *Historia*, pp. 57, 66.
- 59 On the activities of the newly created Tribunal Popular, see *El Popular*, 1 October 1936, p. 2, continued in following days.
- 60 E.g., *El Popular*, 24–31 July 1936.
- 61 On the bombing of civilians, see, e.g., *El Popular*, 3 October 1936, p. 3; communication of acting British Consul, 15 September 1936, TNA/FO927/14.
- 62 See Nadal, *Guerra civil*, pp. 172–3.
- 63 García, *Flores*, p. 94.
- 64 See, e.g., *Vida Nueva*, 15 September 1936, p. 1; 2 October 1936, p. 1.
- 65 Rafael Abella, *La vida cotidiana durante la guerra civil: la España Nacional* (Barcelona, 1973), pp. 178–9.
- 66 For the debate about the motivation of violence against priests, see chapter 4 above.
- 67 *El Popular*, 31 July 1936, p. 12.
- 68 The rhetoric occasionally returned during the siege: the ‘producing class’ was, for ‘economic and biological reasons’, the only one ‘with a right to live’. *El Popular*, 27 October 1936, p. 7.
- 69 Lisardo Guede y Hernández, *Martirologio malagínense* (Málaga, 1988), pp. 188–9. A commemorative stone cross is still kept at the diocesan seminary.
- 70 Luis Bolín, *Spain: the Vital Years* (London, 1968), p. 245.
- 71 By 19 August 1936 Gerald Brenan estimated that the Comité de Salud Pública was killing forty people a night. See Jonathan Gathorne-Hardy, *The Interior Castle* (London, 1994), p. 308.
- 72 *Boinas Rojas*, 25 March 1937, p. 12; 2 April 1938, p. 5.
- 73 Gómez Bajuelo, *Málaga bajo*, p. 51; *Sur-¡Arriba!*, 12 February, 1937, p. 1; Gollonet and Morales, *Sangre y Fuego*, pp. 317–18.
- 74 Guede y Hernández, *Martirologio*, p. 149.
- 75 For the pre-war ritual, see *La Unión Mercantil*, 12 April 1930, p. 1; 1 April 1931; 7 April 1931, pp. 10–11.
- 76 T. C. Worsley, *Behind the Battle* (London, 1939), p. 188.
- 77 Adolfo Vázquez, ‘Málaga, ciudad sacrificada’, *Hora de España*, III, March 1937, p. 46.
- 78 Mitchell, *My House*, pp. 266–7.
- 79 Bolín, *Vital Years*, p. 252.
- 80 *Sur-¡Arriba!*, 13 March 1937, p. 2.
- 81 *Sur-¡Arriba!*, 11 February 1937, p. 4.

- 82 Nadal, *Guerra civil*, pp. 192, 217–32.
- 83 *Sur-¡Arriba!*, 12 February 1937, p. 1.
- 84 Editorial, *Boinas Rojas*, 28 March 1937, p. 1.
- 85 *Boinas Rojas*, 28 March 1937, p. 6; 25 March 1937, p. 12.
- 86 The majority of wartime Republican prisoners held in Málaga following ‘the liberation’ came from working-class *barrios*. Richards, ‘Morality and biology’.
- 87 *Boinas Rojas*, 22 March 1938, p. 3.
- 88 *Boinas Rojas*, 22 March 1938, p. 3; 27 March 1938, pp. 3, 5.
- 89 *Boinas Rojas*, 26 February 1938, p. 8; 1 March 1938, p. 9.
- 90 *Sur-¡Arriba!*, 18 March 1937, pp. 1, 6; *Boinas Rojas*, 18 March 1937, pp. 6, 20 March 1937, p. 6.
- 91 *Boinas Rojas*, 25 March 1938, p. 3; 27 March 1938, p. 9.
- 92 *Boinas Rojas*, 29 March 1938, p. 4.
- 93 *Boinas Rojas*, 26 February 1939, p. 3.
- 94 Particularly critical of the politicism of the church in the early post-war years was the exiled bishop of Tarragona, Francesc Vidal i Barraquer. See especially his communications to Pope Pius XII of 25 November 1939 and 18 December 1940, in Muntanyola, *Vidal i Barraquer*, p. 422.
- 95 Balbino Santos y Olivera, *Carta pastoral sobre la santificación de las fiestas* (Málaga, 1939).
- 96 Circular del Obispado, April 1939, *Sur*, 2 April 1939, p. 7.
- 97 *Boinas Rojas*, 6 April 1939, p. 24.
- 98 *Sur*, 12 March 1940, p. 2; Dolores Carrera et al., *La Semana Santa malagueña a través de su historia* (Málaga, 1987), p. 248. Canetti, *Crowds*, p. 170.
- 99 Turner, *The Ritual Process*.
- 100 For this argument put in social-psychological terms, see, e.g., Antonio Vallejo-Nágera, *Psicosis de guerra: estudio clínico y estadístico*, (Madrid, 1942); Juan José Lopez Ibor, ‘Neurosis de guerra’, *Actas Españolas de Neurología y Psiquiatría*, 3, 1–2 (January–April 1942), 124, 126, 132.
- 101 García Alonso, *Oración*, pp. 9, 13, 32, 36.
- 102 On the ‘national community’, see Manuel Pérez Ledesma, ‘Una dictadura “Por la Gracia de Dios”’, *Historia Social*, 20 (1994), 187–8.

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