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Sicilian Bandits and the Italian state: Narratives about Crime and (in)Security in the Post-War Italian Press, 1948 – 1950

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ABSTRACT

The article examines how Italian newspapers and illustrated magazines reported the life and crimes of the notorious Sicilian bandit, Salvatore Giuliano. Articles and special features on Giuliano reflected more widely upon Italy's ability to embrace democracy after the fascist dictatorship, as well as the historic North-South divide. Sensationalist narratives often presented the outlaw as a mythical figure. On occasion, however, they revealed the persistence of late-nineteenth-century racial concepts of Southern 'difference'. Press coverage of police action against Giuliano, while often critical of the Italian government, also mirrored ideological conflict which had intensified with the onset of the Cold War.

KEYWORDS

Italian press; banditry; Sicily; racism; Italian nationhood

Introduction

In its issue of 16 July 1950, the whole of the front page of the *Domenica del Corriere*, the weekly illustrated supplement to the Italian broadsheet, the *Corriere della Sera*, was taken up by a colour drawing of the Sicilian bandit, Salvatore Giuliano, in the instant in which Capitano Perenze of the *Carabinieri* (military police) shot him in the courtyard of a building in the town of Castelvetro, outside Palermo. The underlying caption indicated that the killing of Giuliano, whose criminal acts had terrorised the populace of Montelepre for seven years, marked the end of a 'ruinous myth'.¹ Significantly, too, the image on the front page of the Sunday supplement reflected the official but inaccurate account of Giuliano meeting his death in an armed battle with the police, when in fact his own lieutenant, Gaspare Pisciotta, had shot him while he was sleeping.²

Since the nineteenth century, sensationalist reports of violent crime have fascinated newspaper readers. Not infrequently, such reports, by framing a criminal phenomenon as threatening the very foundations of society, have provoked public outrage and alarm.³ Articles and features about Giuliano in the post-war Italian press, while partly expressing indignation about a murderous criminal against whom the state appeared powerless, often capitalised on the 'appeal' of a charismatic figure whose actions could be rooted in the timeless despair of the South of Italy. Depictions of Giuliano ranged from a 'Lombrosian' criminal type to a mythical 'Robin Hood'

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figure. In the pages which follow, representations of Giuliano and Sicilian banditry in several Italian newspapers and illustrated magazines are analysed in the context of the recent demise of the fascist regime and efforts to rebuild society after the Second World War. While Giuliano's criminal career began in September 1943, the article concerns his final years (1948–1950), reflecting intensified press interest. If levels of violent crime in Italy were higher in the preceding years,⁴ focus on the latter period allows an analysis of press responses to a phenomenon which could no longer be ascribed merely to a generic state of post-war criminality. Representations of banditry in the post-war Italian press fed broader narratives concerning the nature of the South; the ability of the newly founded Republic to confront public order emergencies; and the role and rights of the recently 'liberated' press. Related to the wider question of the role of the media in transitional regimes,⁵ these representations in turn shed light on how successfully or not the post-war Italian press addressed issues surrounding the legacy of fascism and the historic divide between the North and the South.

Since unification, Italian legal experts had been alarmed about the high levels of violent crime in their country, but the figures suggested a more violent south. As Paul Garfinkel notes, a count of murders between 1864 and 1870, for example, showed that the murder rate in the South was between four and five times that of the North.⁶ Fascist propaganda claimed that thanks to Mussolini the state had finally addressed the lawlessness historically associated with the South, and the attention which the press gave to the government's campaign to eradicate the Sicilian Mafia reflected this. The Turin broadsheet, *La Stampa*, for example, published several articles reporting the 'successes' of the Prefect Cesare Mori.⁷ We may situate Giuliano's criminal career in the wider context of aggressive bandit activity, armed separatism, and the re-awakening of the Mafia in Sicily during the 1940s.⁸ This reflected a surge in crime throughout Italy brought by the demise of fascism and the severe economic difficulties associated with the end of the Second World War. According to statistics cited by Romano Canosa, the overall number of reported crimes increased from 484,332 in 1941 to 1,260,870 in 1946 before starting to decline. Of particular interest to this study, the figures for robbery (*rapina*), extortion and kidnapping rose from 975 in 1941 to a peak of 18,382 in 1946, before decreasing to 6,997 in 1948, and 3,593 in 1950.⁹ Citing judicial statistics, Canosa notes that murders rose from 924 in 1940 to a peak of 11,330 in 1945 before decreasing to 2927 in 1948. The high figures of the mid-1940s partly reflect acts of violence committed in the civil war between partisans and fascists during the German occupation (1943–45).¹⁰ Moreover, during the post-war period, social unrest and rivalries between political parties often took on violent proportions.¹¹ Alongside their attention to Sicilian banditry, articles in the press reflected public fears about a rise in juvenile delinquency, given that young men, sometimes under the age of twenty, were often the perpetrators of armed robberies in the large cities of the centre and north.¹² They also excessively focused on cases of individual – mainly female – criminals.¹³

Born in 1922, the son of a poor farmer of Montelepre in the mountains west of Palermo, Giuliano became involved in black market activities amidst serious food shortages in the late summer of 1943, shortly after the Allied invasion of Sicily. He became an outlaw in September that year after killing a *carabiniere* at a check point to avoid being handed over to the American authorities for illegally transporting grain.¹⁴

According to Billy Jaynes Chandler, Giuliano subsequently justified his action, 'the core of his contention being the threat to him of severe punishment for an act that others committed with impunity'.¹⁵ Giuliano survived for nearly seven years by creating his own band which financed its existence through robbery, kidnappings and extortion.¹⁶ He also needed to eliminate informers and defend himself against police incursions into the mountains where he was hiding; but often he directly attacked the police, partly because he held them responsible for holding the local populace, including his family, to ransom in their efforts to get him.¹⁷ He also formed political alliances. Illustrating his support of Sicilian independence, he participated, alongside other bands, in an unsuccessful separatist armed revolt in December 1945.¹⁸ Denoting Giuliano's staunchly anti-communist sentiments,¹⁹ after prominent separatists subsequently moved away from the movement to join conservative political forces, his band, with the support of the Mafia, engaged in violent attacks against the local Communist and Socialist parties and peasants organisations, the bloodiest of which was the gunning down on 1 May 1947 of peasants celebrating workers' day at Portella della Ginestra, causing eleven deaths.²⁰ Giuliano's involvement in politics was clearly motivated by desire to be pardoned or granted an amnesty, and this also explains his public support of the Christian Democrats and right-wing parties at the general election of 1948, though any promise of freedom in return for his services remained unfulfilled.²¹ Thereafter, Giuliano resumed his war against the police forces.²²

As this article will illustrate, several depictions of Giuliano in the press partly presented the appealing image of an individual who despite being an outlaw was civilised, intelligent and motivated by a sense of justice. In this context, Eric Hobsbawm's well-known analysis distinguishes the 'social bandit' from the criminal outlaw, stressing the universally idealised figure of Robin Hood or 'noble robber', the image of which:

defines both his social role and his relationship with the common peasants. His role is that of the champion, the righter of wrongs, the bringer of justice and social equity. His relation with the peasants is that of total solidarity and identity.²³

Hobsbawm nevertheless stresses that: 'In real life most Robin Hoods were far from noble.'²⁴ While, for example, they were expected to limit violence to 'just' killings (as defined by the peasant society they belonged to), this was unlikely to happen in practice.²⁵ In this regard, Giuliano's involvement in the killings at Portella della Ginestra hardly fits the image of the 'social bandit'. However, questioning the affinity which Hobsbawm draws between 'social bandits' and class revolution, Chandler argues that local peasant support for Giuliano 'persisted after his links to the privileged classes and state authority became known'.²⁶ He also stresses the deeper context of Sicilian society's distrust of the authorities, resulting in a culture of *omertà*, as well as its attachment of violence to the Sicilian cult of manliness, stressing: 'The primary question was not always whether a man's actions were good or bad but rather whether in a duel with others he was able to impose his will.'²⁷

Many of the press sources which the article analyses addressed Sicilian culture and crime from a Northern Italian or mainland perspective,²⁸ though reports were often provided by local correspondents. The article also examines party newspapers, illustrating how the tense climate of the Cold War affected portrayals of banditry and the

government's response to it.²⁹ Both daily newspapers and illustrated weekly magazines produced sensationalist crime news. On occasion reports on Giuliano occupied the front pages of newspapers.³⁰ The latter genre, which experienced a boom in the 1950s, reflecting a more easily digestible format in a country where illiteracy rates were high and where newspaper circulation was low in comparison to other industrialised countries,³¹ made use of (often quite graphic) photographs to report crime. Indeed, the ability of journalists to post photos of Giuliano in hiding enhanced the appeal of magazine coverage of the Sicilian outlaw. Despite the popularity of photo-romances and features on Hollywood stars,³² several illustrated magazines catered for more cultured readerships and included more sophisticated topics. Paolo Murialdi compares three Milan-based magazines, cited in the article: the “modern fairy-tale” vein’ of *Oggi* appealing to readers of all social classes; the ‘more direct and less sentimental’, ‘secular and progressive’ *Tempo*, modelled on the US magazine, *Life*; and *L'Europeo* which targeted the ‘best-informed and most advanced sectors of the middle-class public’ with features on politics, lifestyles, and high society.³³

Though the partial survival of fascist censorship laws enabled the state to prevent the publication of particularly ‘disturbing’ news stories,³⁴ the manner of post-war crime reporting largely reflected the newly acquired freedom of the press. As the sections which follow illustrate, the attention which the press gave to Giuliano and his outrages, and to criminal phenomena in Sicily and the South more generally, on the one hand reflect the investigative character of the post-war press, which, however, in its desire to produce sensational news often employed ‘othering’ and mythologisation. On the other hand, such attention entailed wider but rarely consensual reflection on issues surrounding the democratisation of Italian society after fascism and the historic afflictions of the South. This in turn allows us to determine how far during the transition from Mussolini’s dictatorship to the Republic the press acted as a vehicle for recasting Italian nationhood and citizenship, promoting a new civic and democratic consciousness.

Reporting the South and Giuliano

In the post-war period, the Italian press brought back to the fore the afflictions of the South which fascist propaganda and censorship had attempted to conceal. Press narratives about Giuliano ranged from depictions of a typical southern delinquent to sensationalist accounts which treated him as a Hollywood star. The starting point for my analysis concerns not Giuliano, but a brutal episode committed by another Sicilian band reported in the magazine *Crimen* in June 1948. Founded in 1945, based in Rome, and carrying the sub-title ‘Criminology and Forensic Policing Weekly Magazine’, *Crimen* had an illustrated magazine format. It published numerous graphic photos of crime scenes, including murdered bodies. *Crimen* presented itself as a serious magazine which aimed to inform the public about nature of crime and the work of the police and judiciary to bring criminals to justice. Police officials and criminologists often contributed articles. Its editor in chief, Ezio D’Errico, the author of several works of crime fiction during fascist period,³⁵ undoubtedly influenced the narrative style of the magazine. The article in question regards the trial in June 1948 at Termini Imerese, Sicily, of a group of men who in December 1945 perpetrated the kidnapping of a 46-year-old landowner, an act that ended in his murder. Beyond reporting the outcome of the trial (three life sentences

and a sentence to 30 years) and recalling in detail the whole affair, the article, though focusing on the 'backwardness' of the inhabitants of the Sicilian interior, is an example of the common representation of Sicilian culture as 'other', as being detached from that of the Italian nation as a whole. Carrying the title 'Silent Men and Women in Black', it places stress on rigidly separate gender roles, the inevitability of violence in the male Sicilian psyche, as well as the presence of the mysterious arm of the Mafia in all affairs. The article opens by focusing on six women, relatives of the defendants, sitting in courtroom. Following the reading of the sentence:

the six women in black got up almost contemporaneously, drying a few tears; then they took off their clogs, pulled their shawls more tightly around them, and in silence, like shadows, they crossed the courtroom and the entrance. The crowd, as if struck, had moved out of their way. For the whole length of the trial, six or seven days, they had remained glued to their seats maintaining a strange fixedness.³⁶

Using a literary reporting style to dramatise the account, the local correspondent Marcello Sofia portrays Sicilian society and culture as mysterious and backward. The article goes on to note that when the judges retired to reach their verdict, the women knelt down in the courtroom for almost two hours to pray. 'They started to mumble out prayers. One of them, the eldest, held a rosary in her hand and, pale and feverish, was pulling its thread. Quietly, the others echoed every 'amen'.³⁷ The article also focuses on the resignation of these women towards the violent lives of their men. In commenting on the outcome of the trial, Sofia notes that the severity of the prison sentences did not matter excessively to the women: 'men follow their destiny. (. . .) If a man kills or is killed, whatever the reasons might have been (. . .) it is considered as an inevitable fact. It had to happen because it was inscribed in the large book of life (. . .).³⁸

The article amplifies the deviance of both the perpetrators of the crime and the environment in which they act, for example, in the use of negative symbols and bias, based on Southern stereotypes, in the title and the opening words of the article to describe the appearance and dress of the women, and in the employment of melodramatic vocabulary in the description of their behaviour in court ('like shadows', 'strange fixedness', 'pale and feverish').³⁹ The article also exemplifies how news reports of that period could identify the physical 'signs' of deviance on criminals, drawing on Lombrosian criminal anthropology: of one of the defendants, Sofia notes that: 'The bony features, the sun-burnt colouring of his face, the thick and bristly hair over his low forehead characterized the criminal type'.⁴⁰

Despite the democratic ideals which animated the early period of the Republic, we can largely trace post-war representations of Sicilian lawlessness back to 'Orientalist' discourse in late nineteenth-century Italy. In this regard, Pasquale Villari, whose writings, together with those of Leopoldo Franchetti and Sidney Sonnino, 'articulated for the first time the regional specificity of the social, political, and economic conditions of the South',⁴¹ in one of a series of *Southern Letters* (*Lettere meridionali*), published in 1875, described at length the plight of the peasantry in the face of brigandage. As Nelson Moe argues, his manner of writing 'produces the distinct impression that the South is profoundly different from the rest of the nation', employing 'scandalous analogies, references (like slavery, Ireland, the Middle Ages) that are blatantly out of place (and time) with respect to contemporary Italy'.⁴² Moreover, as Sofia's article demonstrates,

one can identify in the post-war narratives some of the racial classifications which criminal anthropologists applied to Southern Italy at the end of the nineteenth century, in the context in which 'race was used (...) to explain persistent differences within the nation, especially divergences between the North and the South'.⁴³ This brings into question how far (if at all) post-war Italy dispensed with racial thinking about the South, which we should also consider in the broader context of the country's failure to visit its colonial past and the associated atrocities.⁴⁴

As illustrated below, some journalists also used Lombrosian racial narratives to describe Giuliano in their reports, though such depictions usually separated them from the rest of the Sicilian population. Despite some alarmist reports, there is little evidence of the creation of 'moral panic' around Giuliano.⁴⁵ Moreover, many northern Italian news readers arguably felt unaffected by forms of criminality which they believed rooted in the historic 'backwardness' of the South, though some reports speculated that Sicilian banditry had invaded the mainland. A front-page article in the evening edition of the Turin-based *Nuova Stampa*, dated 30 July 1948, suggested that Giuliano might be in action in the Pisa area, given the recent involvement of Sicilians (one of whom originated from Montelepre) in armed robberies and assaults there.⁴⁶ However, several newspaper reports also adopted a more light-hearted approach, playing on fascination surrounding Giuliano's elusiveness, for example. An article in the same paper appearing in October 1948 speculated over whether Giuliano would be able to dodge the police to watch his favourite football team, Palermo, play Milan at an away match.⁴⁷

Several features went further, employing 'positive' connotations which focused on Giuliano's good looks and charisma, his alleged intelligence, kind manners and sense of justice, though embedded within a broader discourse of 'otherness'. This gave Giuliano a public profile, from which he appeared to profit. An article by the US journalist Michael Stern who managed to interview Giuliano in the early part of 1947, originally published in *True Magazine*,⁴⁸ was republished in the Italian illustrated news magazine, *Tempo*, in April 1948.⁴⁹ By placing on its front cover one of the photos which Stern had taken of Giuliano, with the caption 'Giuliano poses in front of the camera', *Tempo* was able to give the bandit the treatment normally reserved for Hollywood stars in post-war illustrated magazines.⁵⁰ On the summary page of the edition of *Tempo* was a description of how Giuliano appeared to the journalist at the beginning of their encounter:

Giuliano presented himself to the American journalist, Michael Stern, in a green fustian jacket, rib-stitch corduroy trousers, an American army shirt, his pockets filled with grenades, and a 14-shot pistol on his hip. The first impression which Giuliano gives rise to is of a man endowed with exceptional strength. Then one notes the handsome and expressive features, his unconstrained expression, two vivacious eyes and carefully combed black hair. A vigorous peasant, well-cultivated, with an intelligent and shrewd air about him and civilized appearance.⁵¹

These words are a far cry from the more conventional, 'Lombrosian', descriptions of bandits. In the article, Stern reinforces the success of his journalistic scoop by expressing his earlier scepticism about the possibility of meeting Giuliano, given that no Italian journalist had managed this.⁵² The US journalist also underlines his feat by describing how Giuliano's lieutenant drove him undisturbed past a *Carabinieri* roadblock to reach the outlaw. Giuliano took advantage of the meeting to hand Stern a letter to pass on to

President Truman, in which he proclaimed his staunch anti-Communism and that Sicily, once separated from Italy, would request annexation to America.⁵³ In the caption to a photo of Giuliano appearing alongside the article, *Tempo* makes much of the fact that the 'bandit' willingly consented to have his photo taken, thereby revealing an up-to-date portrait of Giuliano. He posed several times 'with a certain satisfaction'. The caption states that in the photograph Giuliano is looking 'towards the roadblocks which have never managed to stop him', before announcing that in the next issue he will appear 'positioned behind a tree trunk with a pistol in one hand and a grenade in the other'.⁵⁴ In the second instalment, Stern analyses the complexities of Giuliano's character, referring to several episodes, including his allegedly civilised encounter with the Duchess of Prato Ameno when he raids her villa, noting that Giuliano was proud of his reputation for honesty.⁵⁵ He concludes the article by describing how at the end of the interview they shook hands and he watched the bandit he considered strong and courageous, and whom he compared to the gangster John Dillinger and the philanthropist John Rockefeller, head back to 'his' mountain.⁵⁶

While not denying Giuliano's brutality, Stern's article presents a personality who juxtaposes criminal and civil characteristics, but also his desire to use the press in order to appeal to the public during a period in which many citizens, criminals included, desired to emulate the 'good' and 'bad' roles of Hollywood stars they read about in magazines.⁵⁷ At the end of 1949, by which time Giuliano's band had passed its heyday, the illustrated weekly, *Oggi*, published a series of features based on an encounter between the outlaw and the journalist, Jacopo Rizza, accompanied by a photographer and a cameraman. Rizza clearly aims to underline the human side of Giuliano – his intelligence and composure, if not a certain vanity, and his sensitiveness – but also the alleged injustices he suffered which determined his fate as an outlaw and his sense of justice. In the second instalment, of 29 December 1949, Giuliano reveals to Rizza his more intimate side, allowing him to read and copy part of his personal diaries. There follows a transcription of an entry from when he first went into hiding to elude the police. At the bottom of the entry, was a short poem which Giuliano had composed to express the hopelessness of his situation.⁵⁸

Details of the *Oggi* interview were also replicated in mainstream newspapers. An article published in *La Nuova Stampa* in December 1949, entitled 'An Interview with Giuliano', suggests the outlaw's capacity for dialectic. It notes that 'the bandit was not parsimonious with words or opinions', as he explains to the interviewer, mostly in Sicilian dialect but 'expressing himself occasionally in Italian, too', his point of view about the battle the police are fighting to eliminate him and his men.⁵⁹

The publication of Giuliano's interviews, alongside stress on the 'complexities' of his personality, were the cause of controversy within the press itself. In May 1948, Marcello Sofia published an article in *Crimen*, in which he proclaimed that in the light of the Giuliano affair, and contrary to his earlier conviction, he no longer believed that the soul of a Sicilian delinquent was the same as that of all other delinquents.⁶⁰ The following month, the chief editor of *Crimen* published a letter he had received from Giuliano, in which the outlaw explained the enigma surrounding him to which Sofia's article had referred. D'Errico transcribed the text of the letter in full and included a photo of one of the original handwritten pages. He responded at length in what was clearly a de-mythologising of Giuliano and any suggestion that he might represent the

feelings of the Sicilian population.⁶¹ D'Errico stated that the tenor of the letter confirmed that Giuliano's personality corresponded to scientific models of any other bandit which Lombroso and other adherents to the 'positivist school' of criminal anthropology had elaborated.⁶² Citing parts of the letter, D'Errico underlined the self-centred character of all bandits, their 'persuasion that the whole world is interested in them', their inverted sense of justice, and their 'insane conviction that they are invulnerable and unassailable'. 'These', D'Errico argued, 'are the classic characteristics of all bandits who first go into hiding after a crime motivated "by vendetta", but then find it convenient to steal and rob'. The chief editor of *Crimen* appears to separate Sicilian criminals from most Sicilians by ascribing their delinquent characteristics to foreign racial influences, noting that the flowery style of Giuliano's language 'in which it would not be difficult to find traces of Arab descent, is common to nearly all the island's bandits'. Before advising Giuliano to surrender, D'Errico dismissed the outlaw's description of himself as a separatist fighter, stressing the superficiality of those journalists who were easily taken in by his declarations. The great majority of Sicilians, 'about whose Italianness it would be offensive to raise doubts', he argued, approved the fact that the movement had had its day.⁶³

In a similar vein, an article in the Catania-based, Liberal Party-leaning newspaper, *La Sicilia*, 'others' banditry as a foreign phenomenon. An article of 13 August 1949 commenting on the quick succession of kidnappings claimed that it seemed that the war had brought from over the Atlantic Ocean the 'unwelcome gift' of the Far West, 'the El Dorado of brigandage'.⁶⁴ If such 'othering' may reflect the reluctance of the Sicilian press to stress banditry as having local roots, Michele Serra, writing in the same newspaper the following September, noted that Giuliano continued his attacks undisturbed because the local populace continued to help him, 'offering hospitality when he needs it, but above all keeping all they have seen and heard from the police'. Referring to the historic culture of *omertà*, Serra stressed that in Sicily, where over centuries the populace 'have become used to considering soldiers and police officers as the army of the enemy', it was considered shameful to report anything to the police. In Palermo to pronounce the word 'fuzz' ('sbirro') was still worse than saying 'brigand'.⁶⁵

The 'popularity' of Giuliano was also explained as the product of a more general sense of injustice concerning the Italian state's historic treatment of the South. In his front-page comment in *La Nuova Stampa* on 8 May 1949, the Calabrian journalist and novelist, Corrado Alvaro, asks a predominantly northern Italian readership why a bandit, responsible for dozens of crimes, has been able to play the part of an appealing character, in the face of which his bloody acts take a back row. It is almost, Alvaro argues, as if there is a feeling of pity 'towards the son of a generous land who has given way to wrong-doing', his 'primordial sense of justice' transformed into delinquency, one of too many cases of 'desperation' which Italy had produced in its history, individuals who were 'almost condemned to wrong-doing', but equally humane.⁶⁶ Giuliano would not be the last in a line of 'sad characters' whose 'insane and inhumane protest' arguably reflected the 'humane and patient drama' of the people of the South. His 'rebellion' was one of many that every so often broke out.⁶⁷

Fighting banditry

Analysis of press representations of the severe difficulties which the police encountered in their efforts to suppress Giuliano's band reveals a frequent discrediting of the Italian state that, moreover, questions the soundness of its emergence from the fascist dictatorship and its ability to fully embrace democratic principles both in the policing of banditry and in how it manages the press. A survey of news reports and articles hardly reflects a country which is united in fighting banditry, beyond common acknowledgement of the need to repress it. In the first place, there was evident scepticism that police and *Carabinieri* action alone would be sufficient to repress Sicilian banditry and there was also concern about the policing methods employed. This partly focused on the alleged adoption of policing styles more appropriate for a dictatorship. In his article in *Crimen* about the killing of a police officer and two *Carabinieri* officers in an assault by bandits in Partinico in September 1948, Marcello Sofia argued that the current strategy, based on military-style combing out of bandit territory with large scale arrests of citizens suspected of supporting the bandits, would lead to a similar outcome to that of the earlier action of the Prefect, Cesare Mori, who repressed Sicilian criminality for a short period, but without extirpating it.⁶⁸ In May 1949, writing in *La Nuova Stampa* Corrado Alvaro criticised the persecution of entire families, whom he described as 'voluntary but more often involuntary accomplices of the bandits', when the police were eternally incapable of protecting 'citizens' homes, families, freedom, integrity and dignity'. Resorting to large-scale repression only when an eternally bad situation became explosive, was a serious error.⁶⁹

The Communist Party press reserved the most severe criticism of how the state was responding to the crisis, which they attributed to the political protection which Giuliano enjoyed. In the aftermath of the brutal assault at Bellolampo, an article in the communist daily *Il Paese* of August 1949 concerning the 'indiscriminate' arrests by the police and *Carabinieri* of around two hundred peasants on the orders of the Interior Minister, Mario Scelba, described such action as 'the usual pointless reprisal' which had taken place over the previous four years in response to Giuliano's attacks.⁷⁰ Such a statement reflected the Communist Party's belief that post-war police repression unfairly targeted workers and peasants. The following day an article entitled 'Powerlessness against Banditry Alarms Public Opinion' claimed that Scelba was never hesitant to repress striking workers, when by contrast Giuliano was treated delicately. The police should focus their actions on the Mafia, landowners and certain political environments, rather than on agricultural labourers.⁷¹

Police action against Giuliano fed public opinion which was already divided in relation to how to deal with law-and-order threats. In the context of Giuliano's violent assaults against the police forces in the summer of 1949, the centre and right-wing press often expressed itself in favour of hard-line policing. Following the institution in August 1949 of the *Corpo delle Forze per la Repressione del Banditismo* in Sicilia (CFRB),⁷² as a result of which control of policing in the area under Giuliano's control passed to the *Carabinieri*, the front page article of the press organ of the Christian Democrat Party, *Il Popolo*, was optimistic about the imminent destruction of what it stressed as the remnants of banditry which 'arising from the disorderly post-war period has totally disappeared from the whole of Sicily, with the exception of just a third of the

province of Palermo, namely the area of Montelepre'.⁷³ *La Sicilia* applauded the news that the battle against Giuliano was now in the hands of a military organ. An article published on 25 August 1949 stressed the *Carabinieri's* historic record of heroism and sacrifice and praised their 'traditional toughness and intransigence when carrying out their duty'. Consequently, they would undertake 'true and proper guerrilla action' against Giuliano.⁷⁴ Yet, reports in the newspaper suggest a misinformed concept about the different roles of the two police forces, by distinguishing the activities of the Interior Ministry police (which the above article described as a civilian corps), reputed to persecute the local population needlessly, and the *Carabinieri*, who, it was argued, would only attack the bandits. They ignored the fact that the CFRB combined units of both police organisations,⁷⁵ just as both forces had previously been involved in controversial policing in Giuliano's territory, and that the Interior Ministry police had been militarised in 1943, as evident in the military-style Celere flying squads employed to deal with public order violations.⁷⁶ An article appearing the following day in *La Sicilia* proclaimed that Scelba's initiative had encouraged widespread optimism among the public who welcomed the principle that banditry should be fought with the same methods which it employed against the law. Citing the daily newspaper, *Il Giornale d'Italia*, which proclaimed that in place of the 'Mori system' there was now a return to the 'classical military' method for dealing with banditry, the article was optimistic that once the populace were left alone, the soldiers ('militari') would aim directly at their target, no longer molesting anyone, 'by methodically eliminating the scourge of delinquency which after every war takes root and prospers in the open wounds of violence and poverty'.⁷⁷

Yet, newspapers of varying political persuasions also cast doubt on the willingness of the government to admit the gravity of the situation in Sicily, which they claimed the government wanted the press to play down. Writing in *Il Paese* in August 1949, Michele Ranieri noted with irony that in the nerve centre of banditry, between Alcamo and Partinico, the latest activity had been 'normal': this time the outlaws had only stopped seven cars in three hours, forcing the passengers to lie face to the ground and taking off with a total of half a million Lire and their identity cards.⁷⁸ Ranieri went on to describe a trip which he and other journalists made between Erice and Palermo, considered the most dangerous road in Sicily. He noted that they only encountered one patrol of four *carabinieri* on foot armed with muskets, which, he argued, 'explains more than any other argument the state of public security in Sicily'. Ranieri stated that the Italian public were not made aware of other daily episodes of Sicilian delinquency, for example, the fact that at Calatafimi the bandits had set fire to a farm and 'destroyed 1,600 grapevines, an olive press and other agricultural tools', concluding that Scelba considered the situation normal.⁷⁹

Alluding to the fascist period, the following month Michele Serra in *La Sicilia* criticised the provincial prefects and the press for concealing the extent of banditry. Serra states that, given the gravity of the situation, it was strange that the local authorities should ask journalists to 'minimize' the banditry, and that some of the island's newspapers should oblige. He insinuated that the authorities continued to be influenced by the culture of the previous fascist Ministry of Popular Culture in their determination to limit news about banditry, with reports consequently appearing: 'small, with dull titles, often reduced to the text of a press agency release, half-hidden in the inside pages between a run-over cyclist and an advertisement for purgatives'.⁸⁰

Even more critical was an article appearing in the right-wing periodical, *Il Borghese*, on 1 July 1950, penned by its chief editor, Leo Longanesi, who took issue with the extensive publicity in the pages of the press and from the Interior Ministry about the activities of the CFRB and the time it was taking to eliminate Giuliano. This disorientated the public, who believed that 'to capture the bandit (...) too much money was being spent and too many soldiers were being mobilised'. Soldiers who had fought in the First World War, and in Greece, Russia and Africa during the recent conflict, the Blackshirts of the Italian Social Republic, and the partisans, Longanesi argued, 'looked at each other in disbelief: "How is it possible", they said, "that to capture a bandit an army has to be mobilized?"'⁸¹ Longanesi criticised the government's war bulletin-style announcements regarding police action. Alluding to the propagandised campaigns of the dictatorship, Longanesi noted that the Italian public finally realised that a return was taking place to the 'epic climate of the battle against flies, the war against noise, and the battle for grapes'.⁸² Yet, in spite of such announcements, many months went by. A journalist managed to photograph the bandit. *Oggi* went on trial but was acquitted. Then the announcements stopped. This, he claimed, was an affront to the dignity and prestige of the Italian state.⁸³

We can relate press representations of banditry, and of the state's responses to it, to the wider scenario of the cultural production of insecurity during the early Cold War years, according to theoretical elaborations in the fields of international relations and security studies. As Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall argue: 'Beyond the state narrowly defined, discourses of insecurity are also produced and circulate through what Gramsci called the extended state – schools, churches, the media, and other institutions of civil society that regulate populations'.⁸⁴ In Cold War Italy, the Christian Democrat government created insecurity around the threat of the Soviet Union and the large Communist following in Italy. This is evident, for example, in state pronouncements about the insurrectionary intentions of the Italian Communists, which would justify hard-line repression.⁸⁵ The Christian Democrat press backed this, frequently underlining Communist excesses and unlawfulness.⁸⁶ However, much of the press – and not only on the Left – inadvertently or purposefully delegitimized the very state entrusted with defence of the nation from communism, questioning its security capacity through criticism, if not ridicule, of the inability of the forces of law and order to eliminate Giuliano. Any insecurity which the press created around Giuliano was arguably often more focused on the failings of the state than the outrages of the bandit.

With specific reference to the left-wing press, depictions of the failure of the state to capture Giuliano, and of police persecution in communities suspected of protecting the outlaw, were part and parcel of a larger left-wing narrative that saw the Italian state and its institutions as an 'enemy' that had little consideration for the livelihood and security of citizens, and which, moreover, was unable to protect them from crime. In October 1949, for example, the Communist Party daily, *L'Unità*, reported the case of three hundred citizens whom the police evicted from a building, where they had taken refuge since losing their homes during the war, to allow it to be transformed into a *Carabinieri* barracks.⁸⁷ The previous summer, it made much of the police's alleged inability to prevent crime, in the light of a number of recent house break-ins in the Garbatella district of Rome.⁸⁸ The political Left, therefore, created 'insecurity' around the

Christian Democrat and 'bourgeois' ruling class, in the broader context of the development of rival Catholic and Communist political sub-cultures after the Second World War. As Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall argue:

Insecurities, it turns out, are constructed by many different communities (...) as they seek to assert, maintain, or reproduce their identities. It is in the clash between those different identities that the politics of difference and otherness, and hence the cultural production of insecurity, is to be found.⁸⁹

Conclusion

Two days after the publication of Longanesi's scathing article in *Il Borghese*, and just one day before the Giuliano's death, Michele Serra wrote a piece for the Rome daily, *Il Messaggero*, which stressed the successes of Colonel Ugo Luca, head of the CFRB, in weakening the outlaw's position. He achieved this by acquiring the trust of the peasantry and by entering into contact with Giuliano's men to negotiate their surrender, one by one, without spilling blood. Serra noted that:

What is most strange is that he, a man of the far North, succeeded, where so many southerners had failed. A year ago *carabinieri* were not even able to get the peasants to show them the way to the railway station. The peasants pretended not to understand Italian and shrugged their shoulders in silence. Today they are talking, and the bandits are talking, too.⁹⁰

Serra continued that Luca was able to organise material help for the families of bandits, noting that 'extreme poverty is behind banditry'. This helped to create an environment of 'rudimentary chivalry' thanks to which there had been no massacres that year. Serra appears to praise the effectiveness of Luca's decision to disregard official police norms and practices, referring to this as his 'greatest merit'. Had he been appointed earlier, the massacres at Bellolampo and Portella della Ginestra would not have happened.⁹¹ Serra seemingly legitimises the employment of unconventional policing methods to fight banditry. Such methods, it later turned out, involved engagement with the Mafia to eliminate Giuliano. As Di Lello notes, the Mafia had previously benefitted from Giuliano in their opposition to the peasant movement but had become anxious about the temerity of his attacks (including against their own members), which also attracted a major military presence. This enabled Luca to turn to them for support in eradicating banditry.⁹² Capitano Antonio Perenze of the CFRB provided an official but false version of the bandit's death.⁹³

Much of the mythologisation and sensationalism which the press had created around Giuliano now shifted to representations of the suffering of his mother, Maria Lombardo, as she confronted her son's death. As exemplified by an article published in *Tempo*, such representations underlined that 'a mother's pain is always sacred.'⁹⁴ In a similar vein, an article in the Christian Democrat daily, *Il Popolo*, implying the need for closure surrounding the case, stressed that: 'Any controversy, even as tremendous and tragic and simultaneously legitimate and justified as that regarding the Giuliano case, is evidently destined to run out and shatter itself in the face of the commotion surrounding a mother's pain.'⁹⁵ The special feature in *Tempo*, in its melodramatic representation of Lombardo's reactions to her son's death, played on Southern Italian

stereotypes of the uncontrolled expression of passion and pain. The front cover featured a photograph of Lombardo having collapsed, after seeing the body of her son in the mortuary, under the title 'Giuliano's Mother Could Not Withstand the Pain'.⁹⁶ The article also describes journalists rushing to the scene of the killing in time to see Lombardo throw herself to the ground: 'she kissed and almost ate the earth which had been wet by her son's blood.'⁹⁷

While the daily papers accepted the version which the *Carabinieri* and Interior Minister provided of Giuliano's death, weekly magazines, by contrast, were less prepared to exercise caution, as evident in the ability of *L'Europeo* to demonstrate that this version was false.⁹⁸ Under the sub-title: 'The Only Thing That Is Certain Is That He Is dead', the magazine's correspondent in Palermo, Tommaso Besozzi, with the help of statements of inhabitants of Castelvetro, provided a detailed account of why the official version of events presented several contradictions. The article also argued that the appearance of Giuliano's body in the courtyard (where he had allegedly been killed) and the lethal injuries inflicted upon it did not correspond to the official account, before suggesting that the police had induced one of Giuliano's men to betray him.⁹⁹

As the article has argued, press representations of Giuliano also served for reflection or criticism relating to issues of key importance in the early post-war reconstruction phase in Italy. The emergence of the Italian state from fascism was accompanied by questions about its ability and willingness to correspond fully to the democratic spirit of the newly-founded Italian Republic, illustrated by the Christian Democrat government's employment of the remnants of the authoritarian framework of the fascist state to limit the freedom of the press, and its use of a superficially purged police force to fight communism.¹⁰⁰ In regard to post-war lawlessness in the South, the press was critical both of the inability of the state to deal with crime and of hard-line policing methods which allegedly harked back to inhumane fascist strategies for dealing with the Mafia. Pronouncements of this kind in the left-wing press were part of a process of de-legitimisation of the Christian Democrat ruling establishment, which entailed pitting the masses against the state. Representations of Giuliano, and of southern lawlessness more generally, often continued to draw on 'orientalist' or Lombrosian stereotyping, which foreshadowed the survival of racial notions of the South well beyond the 1940s.¹⁰¹ Those sensationalist depictions which desired to 'reveal' the human side of banditry often continued to play on the idea of Southern 'exoticism'. Moreover, exhortations of military-style repression or praise of unofficial methods for dealing with banditry might have sustained backward-looking cultural attitudes which risked inhibiting democratic renewal and the development of progressive civic consciousness.

While some press narratives rhetorically pitted a fundamentally healthy Sicily against Giuliano and his kind, others, without justifying his actions, interpreted him and his 'popularity' as representative of a rebellion against the historic misfortunes and mistreatment of the South. Overall, press coverage of Giuliano suggests limited consensus across the media about how to liberate the South. This reflected partly the marked ideological division produced by the onset of the Cold War, but also the intensified debate among politicians, sociologists, anthropologists and economists, highlighted by Annalisa Di Nola, over how to

reform the South.¹⁰² In this context, the role of the press as a vehicle for circulating ideas and concepts about the South, democratic renewal, nationhood and citizenship to a wider public in the context of the transition from fascism to the Republic was a crucial one.

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Notes

1. *La Domenica del Corriere* 52, no. 29 (1950), p. 1.
2. Giuseppe Di Lello, 'La vicenda di Salvatore Giuliano', in Luciano Violante (ed.), *Storia d'Italia. Annali 12. La criminalità* (Turin: Einaudi, 1997), pp. 567–89; p. 588.
3. See Ian Marsh and Gaynor Melville, *Crime, Justice and the Media* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 1–18.
4. Romano Canosa, *Storia della criminalità in Italia dal 1946 a oggi* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1995), pp. 8–9.
5. See Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan (eds), *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
6. Paul Garfinkel, *Criminal Law in Liberal and Fascist Italy* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), Chapter 1. For murder figures, see p. 35.
7. See, for example, 'L'epurazione in Sicilia', *La Stampa*, 16 August 1926, p. 1; 'Un problema risolto', *La Stampa*, 8 September 1929, p. 1. For the fascist campaign against the Mafia, see Christopher Duggan, *Fascism and the Mafia* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1989).
8. Canosa, *Storia della criminalità*, pp. 9, 25–6.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 54. The figures cited are of reported crimes being investigated by the judicial authorities.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
11. For an analysis, see Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, *Polizia e protesta. L'ordine pubblico dalla Liberazione ai 'no global'* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), pp. 83–84.
12. See, for example, reports about an armed bank raid in Turin in May 1948: 'Con mitra e pistole 4 banditi irrompono nell'agenzia della Commerciale', *La Nuova Stampa*, 30 May 1948, p. 2; Gildo Carigli, 'All'assalto di una banca quattro banditi', *Crimen. Settimanale di Criminologia e Polizia Scientifica* 4, no. 23 (1948), pp. 7–9.
13. Canosa, *Storia della criminalità*, pp. 9–10. See, for example, Vittorio Bonicelli, 'Delitto alla sfilata', *Tempo* 10, no. 39 (1948), pp. 4–5.
14. Billy Jaynes Chandler, *King of the Mountain. The Life and Death of Giuliano the Bandit* (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1988), pp. 5–9.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
16. For a detailed account, *ibid.*, pp. 9–22.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 14–17, 142–3, 159–62.
18. For a detailed account of Giuliano's support of separatism, *ibid.*, pp. 48–63. Chandler also illustrates how Giuliano campaigned on behalf of the Separatists at the June 1946 elections (pp. 64–69).
19. Chandler, *King of the Mountain*, pp. 85–86.
20. Canosa, *Storia della criminalità*, pp. 31–32. See also Chandler, *King of the Mountain*, Chapter 5.
21. Chandler, *King of the Mountain*, pp. 64–5, 87, 130–4.
22. Canosa, *Storia della criminalità*, pp. 32–33.

23. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 34–35. Hobsbawm identifies some traits in Giuliano which correspond to his definition of the ‘noble robber’. See pp. 35–6, 42.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 38–39.
26. Chandler, *King of the Mountain*, pp. 215–18.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 19–22 (quotation from p. 20).
28. This also reflects the mainly regional or pluri-regional character of Italian newspapers. See Robert Lumley, ‘Peculiarities of the Italian Newspaper’, in David Forgacs and Robert Lumley (eds), *Italian Cultural Studies. An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 199–215; 200.
29. See Lumley, ‘Peculiarities of the Italian Newspaper’, pp. 201, 206–8 for a discussion of the Italian party press.
30. Of the daily newspapers cited in the article, Murialdi provides circulation estimates for 1950 for the following: *La (Nuova) Stampa*: 220,000; *Il Messaggero*: 100,000–140,000; *L’Unità*: 250,000 (four weekday editions). See Paolo Murialdi, ‘Dalla Liberazione al centrosinistra’, in Valerio Castronovo and Nicola Tranfaglia (eds), *La stampa italiana dalla Resistenza agli anni sessanta* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1980), pp. 169–308; p. 243.
31. For an analysis of the consumption of Italian newspapers and magazines, see Lumley, ‘Peculiarities of the Italian Newspaper’, pp. 202–206; David Forgacs and Stephen Gundle, *Mass Culture and Italian Society from Fascism to the Cold War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 35–42 and Chapter 3.
32. See Forgacs and Gundle, *Mass Culture and Italian Society*, pp. 39–42. Lumley, ‘Peculiarities of the Italian Newspaper’, pp. 205–206.
33. See Murialdi, ‘Dalla Liberazione al centrosinistra’, pp. 216–17. Of the magazines cited in the article, Murialdi provides circulation estimates for 1950 for the following: *La Domenica del Corriere*: 600,000; *Tempo*: 150,000; *Oggi*: 500,000; *L’Europeo*: 150,000 (pp. 243–44).
34. Murialdi, ‘Dalla Liberazione al centrosinistra’, pp. 221–231, 252–54. While Article 21 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic reduced state censorship powers, the judiciary could still confiscate press editions and the police could intervene directly in situations of urgency (pp. 225–28).
35. See Jane Dunnett, ‘The Emergence of a New Literary Genre in Interwar Italy’, in Giuliana Pieri (ed.), *Italian Crime Fiction* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2011), pp. 6–26; pp. 15–16.
36. Marcello Sofia, ‘Uomini silenziosi e donne in nero’, *Crimen* 4, no. 24 (1948), pp. 12–14; 12.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
39. My analysis here is inspired by Cohen’s work on ‘deviance inventories’: Stanley Cohen, ‘Mods and Rockers: The Inventory as Manufactured News’, in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds), *The Manufacture of News. Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media* (London: Constable, 1973), pp. 226–41.
40. Sofia, ‘Uomini silenziosi e donne in nero’, p. 13. Mary Gibson states that in the first edition of *Criminal Man* (1876), Lombroso listed the physical characteristics of criminals as: ‘small and deformed skulls, greater height and weight, light beards, crooked noses, sloped foreheads, dark skin, eyes, and hair, large ears, protruding jaws, less muscular strength, and little sensitivity to pain’. See *Born to Crime. Cesare Lombroso and the Origins of Biological Criminology* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. 22. Regarding the South of Italy, Gibson notes (p. 105), for example, that Lombroso identified two categories of Calabrians: ‘Semites with long heads (*dolicocefalo*), eyebrows that almost met over arched noses, and either black or dark brown eyes; and Greco-Romans with short heads (*brachicefalo*), high broad foreheads over aquiline noses, and lively, conspicuous eyes.’ Referring to the South in general, he argued that ‘the areas populated by Greeks were the least criminal, at least in crimes of blood’ (pp. 105–6).

41. Nelson Moe, 'The Emergence of the Southern Question in Villari, Franchetti and Sonnino', in Jane Schneider (ed), *Italy's 'Southern Question'. Orientalism in One Country*, ed. Jane Schneider (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1998), pp. 51–76; 51.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 57–58.
43. Mary Gibson, 'Biology or Environment? Race and Southern "Deviancy" in the Writings of Italian Criminologists, 1880–1920', in *Italy's 'Southern Question'* (see note 41), pp. 99–115; 100.
44. See Angelo Del Boca, 'The Myths, Suppressions, Denials, and Defaults of Italian Colonialism', in Patrizia Palumbo (ed), *A Place in the Sun. Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 17–36; 17–20.
45. Cohen and Young stress that the mass media are 'the main agents and carriers of moral panics', playing on the 'normative concerns of the public' to 'create social problems suddenly and dramatically'. Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, introduction to Part 3 'Effects and Consequences', in *The Manufacture of News* (see note 39), pp. 337–49; pp. 343–44.
46. 'Banditi di Giuliano anche nel Pisano?', *Nuova Stampa Sera*, 30 July 1948, p. 1. *La Stampa* changed its title to *La Nuova Stampa* between July 1945 and December 1958.
47. 'Il bandito Giuliano a Milano col Palermo?', *Nuova Stampa Sera*, 8–9 October 1948, p. 1.
48. See Di Lello, 'La vicenda di Salvatore Giuliano', 577.
49. Michael Stern, 'Giuliano raggiunto, fotografato e intervistato 1', *Tempo* 10, no. 16 (1948), pp. 6–8, 30.
50. Front cover photo of Giuliano, with caption 'Giuliano in posa davanti all'obbiettivo', *Tempo* 10, no. 16 (1948), p.1.
51. Summary page of *Tempo* 10, no. 16 (1948), p. 2.
52. Stern, 'Giuliano raggiunto, fotografato e intervistato 1', p. 6.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 7. Di Lello argues that, rather than having been penned by Giuliano himself, the letter was written by whoever employed him for anti-Communist purposes ('La vicenda di Salvatore Giuliano', p. 577).
54. Stern, 'Giuliano raggiunto, fotografato e intervistato 1', p. 8.
55. Michael Stern, 'Giuliano raggiunto, fotografato e intervistato 2. Il Brigante e la Duchessa', *Tempo* 10, no. 17 (1948), pp. 15–17; 16.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
57. In July 1948, *Crimen* published the case of the leader of a gang of robbers based in Modena (Emilia) who claimed that Douglas Fairbanks inspired his criminal acts: 'Sognava i trionfi di Hollywood il capo dei rapinatori', *Crimen* 4, no. 27 (1948), p. 5.
58. Jacopo Rizza, 'Un giorno con Giuliano. Per la prima volta il bandito ha fatto leggere il suo diario', *Oggi* 5, no. 53 (1949), pp. 22–23. The preceding pages (pp. 20–21) include a selection of photos entitled 'Salvatore Giuliano, bandito senza banda'.
59. 'A colloquio con Giuliano', *La Nuova Stampa*, 17 December 1949, p. 3.
60. Marcello Sofia, 'Conflitto a Montelepre', *Crimen* 4, no. 20 (1948), pp. 8–10.
61. Ezio D'Errico, 'Il bandito Giuliano ci ha scritto', *Crimen* 4, no. 23 (1948), pp. 3–4.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 4. Regarding D'Errico's reference to Arab descent in Sicilian bandits, Gibson (*Born to Crime*, p. 106), states that in the fifth edition of *Criminal Man*, Lombroso stressed the influence of earlier Berber and Semitic tribes in the development of brigandage around Palermo.
64. Mario Stella, 'Offensiva senza sosta di Giuliano', *La Sicilia*, 13 August 1949, p. 4.
65. Michele Serra, 'Ma Giuliano è ancora in Sicilia', *La Sicilia*, 2 September 1949, p. 1. Though representations of crime in cinema newsreel are not the focus of the article, it is relevant that its coverage of Giuliano also implied that hard-line military-style responses (discussed below) were justified by the state of *omertà* in bandit territory. A report of July 1947 noted that 'even the deserted streets and the mules are accomplices of Giuliano', and as the camera momentarily focuses on the face of a young man in Giuliano's hometown of

- Montelepre, the commentator questions whether he is a peasant or an outlaw. See Archivio LUCE (archivioluce.com): La Settimana Incom 00069, 31 July 1947, 'Polizia e carabinieri all'erta nella lotta contro il banditismo'.
66. Corrado Alvaro, 'Giuliano', *La Nuova Stampa*, 8 May 1949, p. 1.
 67. Ibid. The problems and injustices of the South inspired Alvaro's collection of stories, first published in 1930, *Gente in Aspromonte* (Milano: Garzanti, 1989), alongside his personal observations in *Un treno nel Sud* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2016), first published in 1958.
 68. Marcello Sofia, 'La strage di Partinico', *Crimen* 4, no. 36 (1948), pp. 3–4; 4.
 69. Corrado Alvaro, 'Giuliano', *La Nuova Stampa*, 8 May 1949, p. 1.
 70. Michele Ranieri, 'Mille carabinieri e agenti di Polizia battono invano da ieri la zona di Bellolampo', *Il Paese*, 21 August 1949, p. 1.
 71. 'L'impotenza contro il banditismo impressiona la pubblica opinione', *Il Paese*, 22 August 1949, pp. 1, 6.
 72. See Di Lello, 'La vicenda di Salvatore Giuliano', p. 587.
 73. 'Un apposito CFRB sostituirà l'Ispettorato Generale di PS', *Il Popolo*, 25 August 1949, p. 1.
 74. 'L'azione decisiva contro Giuliano affidata esclusivamente ai Carabinieri', *La Sicilia*, 25 August 1949, p. 1.
 75. Specifically, the Comando consisted of 1,500 Carabinieri and 500 police officers. See Di Lello, 'La vicenda di Salvatore Giuliano', p. 587.
 76. For the militarisation of the Interior Ministry police, see Della Porta and Reiter, *Polizia e protesta*, Chapters 1 and 2.
 77. 'Volontari per Montelepre cento carabinieri milanesi', *La Sicilia*, 26 August 1949, p. 1.
 78. Michele Ranieri, 'Temerarietà del Bandito di Montelepre', *Il Paese*, 9 August 1949, p. 1.
 79. Ibid.
 80. Michele Serra, "'Turiddu" accettò il grado di colonello', *La Sicilia*, 8 September 1949, p. 1.
 81. Leo Longanesi, 'La battaglia contro le mosche', *Il Borghese*, 1.8 (1950), pp. 228–9; 228.
 82. Ibid., pp. 228–9.
 83. Ibid., pp. 229.
 84. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall, 'Introduction: Constructing Insecurity', in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (eds), *Cultures of Insecurity. States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 1–33; 19.
 85. For an analysis, see Mirco Dondi, *La lunga liberazione. Giustizia e violenza nel dopoguerra italiano* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1999), pp. 193–196.
 86. In this regard, *Il Popolo* interpreted violent confrontation between the police and peasants or workers during strikes as being motivated by communist excesses. See, for example: 'L'Assalto alle fabbriche fu preordinato dagli estremisti. Ristabilita la calma a Modena', *Il Popolo*, 10 January 1950, p. 1.
 87. 'Altri trecento sfrattati per far posto a una caserma', *L'Unità*, 20 October 1949, p. 2.
 88. 'Cittadini. Premunetivi per Ferragosto!', *L'Unità*, 9 August 1949, p. 2.
 89. Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, 'Introduction', p. 19.
 90. Michele Serra, 'Una inchiesta sul banditismo siciliano. Giuliano con le spalle al muro spera nella guerra e nella atomica', *Il Messaggero*, 3 July 1950, p. 5.
 91. Ibid.
 92. Di Lello, 'La vicenda di Salvatore Giuliano', p. 587.
 93. Ibid., 588. The official version of Giuliano's death was also reported in cinema newsreels. See Archivio Luce (archivioluce.com), La Settimana Incom 00466, 12 July 1950, 'Uccisione di Salvatore Giuliano'.
 94. Umberto De Franciscis, 'Giuliano o della morte misteriosa', *Tempo* 12, no. 28 (1950), pp. 34–36; p. 36.
 95. Alfredo Ferruzza, 'La Sicilia liberata da un incubo', *Il Popolo*, 7 July 1950, p. 1.
 96. 'Non resse al dolore la madre di Giuliano', front cover of *Tempo* 12, no. 28 (1950).
 97. De Franciscis, 'Giuliano o della morte misteriosa', p. 36.

98. Murialdi, 'Dalla Liberazione al centrosinistra', p. 249.
99. Tommaso Besozzi, 'Un segreto sulla fine di Giuliano', *L'Europeo* 4, no. 29 (1950), pp. 1–2.
100. For the Italian police after fascism, see Jonathan Dunnage, *Mussolini's Policemen. Behaviour, Ideology and Institutional Culture in Representation and Practice* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), Chapters 6 and 7.
101. Gibson notes ('Biology or Environment?' p. 114) that in post-war Italy, 'while the names of criminal anthropologists are not remembered, sadly their notion of southern racial inferiority persists.'
102. Di Nola notes, for example, how the Marxist anthropologist Ernesto De Martino criticised the agrarian economist, Manlio Rossi-Doria, who 'gave up his original theorization of the need for a substantial land reform in favour of a more conservative approach' and who 'conceived of peasant civilization as immobile and resistant to change', while De Martino himself faced criticism from the Communist Party for his interest in peasant folklore. Annalisa Di Nola, 'How Critical Was De Martino's "Critical Ethnocentrism" in Southern Italy?' in *Italy's 'Southern Question'* (see note 41), pp. 157–75; pp. 164–5.

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