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Review Article

Experience, Identity, and Memory: The Legacy of World War I*

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Though George F. Kennan named it the seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century, World War I has since 1945 remained hidden to some degree in the shadows of the more recent debacle of the Second World War; at most it was seen by historians and the broader public alike as an early warning sign of the later war.[1] But beginning in the late 1980s, about the seventy-fifth anniversary of mobilization, work began to appear that broke out of the molds set by the scholarship of the preceding decades, particularly concerning Germany, France, and Britain. Some of the more recent scholars, establishing the scope of the "new military

* Reviewed here are Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, *14–18, Retrouver la guerre,* Bibliothèque des Histoires (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), pp. 272, €16.77; Annette Becker, *War and Faith: The Religious Imagination in France, 1914–1930,* trans. Helen McPhail, The Legacy of the Great War (Oxford: Berg, 1998), pp. xiii + 191, $65.00; Susan R. Grayzel, *Women's Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France during the First World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), pp. xix + 334, $19.95; John Horne, ed., *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War,* Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. xv + 292, $60.00; Alex King, *Memorials of the Great War in Britain: The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance,* The Legacy of the Great War (Oxford: Berg, 1998), pp. xii + 274, $19.50; Helen McPhail, *The Long Silence: Civilian Life under the German Occupation of Northern France, 1914–1918* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), pp. x + 235, $65.00; Giovanna Procacci, *Dalla rassegnazione alle rivolta: Mentalità e comportamenti popolari nella grande guerra,* Storia e documenti, vol. 30 (Roma: Bulzoni, 1999), pp. xxiii + 391, €25.82; Richard Stites and Aviel Roshwald, *European Culture in the Great War: The Arts, Entertainment, and Propaganda, 1914–1918,* Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. xii + 430, $65 (cloth), $26.00 (paper); Jeffrey Verhey, *The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in Germany,* Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, vol. 10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000), pp. xiv + 268, $60.00; Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (1995; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. xiv + 268, $18.00; and Benjamin Ziemann, *Front und Heimat: Ländliche Kriegserfahrungen im südlichen Bayern 1914–1923,* Veröffentlichungen des Instituts zur Erforschung der Europäischen Arbeiterbewegung, vol. 8 (Essen: Klartext, 1997), pp. 510, €43.00.

[1] G. F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order* (Princeton, N.J., 1979). Aviel Roshwald and Richard Stites claim this is their reason for reverting to the appellation "The Great War": they do so specifically to avoid the otherwise implicit reference to the successor conflict. See also Jay Winter, "Catastrophe and Culture: Recent Trends in the Historiography of the First World War," *Journal of Modern History* 64, no. 3 (1992): 525–32.

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history," sought to examine World War I in its own right and in all its manifestations. Others have attempted in turn to understand in new ways the enormous impact of the war on subsequent decades, even beyond the twentieth century. The latest spate of such books, spanning the continent and including an unprecedentedly broad range of populations, contributes to challenging long-held assumptions, adds striking nuance to existing interpretations, and provides important methodological models. The proliferation of work can be seen in part as both cause and effect of the Historial de la Grande Guerre in Péronne, France, which, since its opening in 1990, has sponsored countless scholarly enterprises, including two major journals and, directly or otherwise, four works reviewed here.[2] The renewed importance of the topic may be read as well through the establishment of two Anglophone book series: "The Legacy of the Great War," put out by Berg Books, and, despite the more general title, "Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare," published by Cambridge University Press; both series are edited by an eminent scholar of the war, Jay Winter. Indeed, half the books reviewed here appear within these lists, the former of which includes a number of important titles in translation. But ongoing interest in World War I is by no means confined to these enterprises.

The work under review here, from both distinguished senior scholars and very fine junior counterparts, makes significant contributions on some six major interrelated themes. The first concerns the extreme variety of experience under the ravages of war. Following that, the second topic examines identity in war: how one saw oneself and others and how this informed one's relation to the war. This could not help but influence what constitutes the third theme, that of public sentiment toward the war over time. The fourth looks in turn at the impact of the war, both short term and long term, beginning as the war still raged. The fifth is the question of what kinds of ruptures and continuities the war represented, and, more specifically, whether and how the war ushered in modernity. The final theme is that of memory and memorializing the war. Many of these titles contribute to our understanding of several of these themes, collectively leaving us with a far more textured understanding of the war and its consequences, including evidence for the war's status as "Ur-catastrophe." This is perhaps the most compelling conclusion: that in many previously unacknowledged ways this war set the pace for the most murderous century in human history, and that it continues to matter. Many of the works represent important efforts at comparative and transnational investigation, including some of the heretofore neglected areas. Several also make important methodological strides, including advances in cultural and anthropological history.

Until the last dozen years, history of the war still meant primarily, aside from

[2] Horne, ed., Becker, *War and Faith;* King, and Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker all bear connection to the Historial; see also the journals *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* and *14–18, Aujourd'hui, Today, Heute.* (The volume by Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker will appear imminently in English as *1914–1918: Understanding the Great War* [New York, 2003].) According to Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau, World War I now rates higher in French opinion polls of major events of the twentieth century than it did at any time since polling began (pp. 10–11). This review regards new work on the war in Europe only, but it should be noted that excellent work on the war in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the Americas, and elsewhere has also burgeoned in recent years.

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the "origins" debates, the history of its major strategies and strategists broadly speaking.[3] Even the pathbreaking social histories that emerged beginning in the 1960s, which devoted significant attention to the home front, focused almost exclusively on institutional leaders and organized protest activity, such as strikes, marches and demonstrations.[4] Beyond this a couple of major works took on issues of culture, memory, and modernity, but these were the exception to the rule.[5] One indicator of the new round of work, then, has been a concerted move to look at home front life broadly, including that outside the factory gates.[6] This work has overlapped with an emphasis on the category of experience in examining the war, tapping underused sources to tell "untold stories."[7] Some of this research has included greater attention to the "largest group of adult noncombatants" (Grayzel, p. 2), namely, "ordinary" women.[8] The work here under review, including that of

[3] Compare, among others, Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York, 1967); A. J. P. Taylor, *A History of the First World War* (New York, 1966); Paul Kennedy, ed., *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914* (London, 1979); K. D. Erdmann and Egmont Zechlin, eds., *Politik und Geschichte: Europa 1914—Krieg oder Frieden* (Kiel, 1985); Martin Kitchen, *The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916–1918* (London, 1976); Kathleen Burk, *War and the State: The Transformation of the British Government, 1914–1919* (London, 1982); Charles Maier, "Wargames: 1914–1919," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars,* ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge, 1989); Gregor Schöllgen, ed., *Escape into War? The Foreign Policy of Imperial Germany* (Oxford, 1990). See for recent interesting and provocative studies on these themes Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (London, 1998); and Holger H. Herwig, *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918* (New York, 1997).

[4] Some of the best known concern Germany, including Gerald Feldman, *Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918* (1996; reprint, Providence, R.I., 1992); Karl-Ludwig Ay, *Die Enstehung einer Revolution: Die Volksstimmung in Bayern während des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Berlin, 1968); and Jürgen Kocka, *Facing Total War: German Society, 1914–1918,* trans. Barbara Weinberger (Leamington Spa, 1984 [orig. German 1973]).

[5] See Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York, 1975); Eric Leed, *No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I* (Cambridge, 1979); Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979); Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (Boston, 1989).

[6] There is an enormous literature concerning wartime workers within factory gates, including most recently among women laborers: see, as a sampling, Françoise Thébaud, *La Femme au Temps de la Guerre de '14* (Paris, 1987); Deborah Thom, *Nice Girls and Rude Girls: Women Workers in World War I* (New York, 1998); Barbara Curli, *Italiane al lavoro: 1914–1920* (Venezia, 1998); Ute Daniel, *The War from Within: German Working-Class Women in the First World War* (1989; reprint, New York, 1997); Laura Lee Downs, *Manufacturing Inequality: Gender Division in the French and British Metalworking Industries, 1914–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995); Gail Braybon, *Women Workers in the First World War: The British Experience* (London, 1981); Barbara A. Engel, "Not by Bread Alone: Subsistence Riots in Russia during World War I," *Journal of Modern History* 69, no. 4 (1997): 696–721. See also Jean-Louis Robert, *Les ouvriers, la patrie et la révolution: Paris, 1914–1919* (Besançon, 1995).

[7] See Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle, eds., *Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced* (London, 1996); Gerhard Hirschfeld and Gerd Krumeich, eds., *Keiner fühlt sich hier als Mensch: Erlebnis und Wirkung des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Essen, 1993); Gerhard Hirschfeld et al., eds., *Kriegserfahrungen. Studien zur Sozial- und Mentalitätsgeschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Essen, 1997); Richard Wall and Jay Winter, eds., *The Upheaval of War: Family, Work, and Welfare in Europe, 1914–1918* (Cambridge, 1988).

[8] This now includes a broad range of scholarship, from James McMillan's early *Housewife or Harlot: The Place of Women in French Society, 1870–1940* (New York, 1981), to Margaret Hi-

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Susan R. Grayzel, Helen McPhail, Giovanna Procacci, and Annette Becker, has advanced these efforts, telling a greater variety and more nuanced versions of such untold stories, and, in the case of the last three, integrating discussion of women's lives into a framework beyond "women's history." For, however strongly women identified with their gender and were identified as such, this category in no way framed and limited the totality of their wartime experience. There is no reason to imagine that their gender subjected European women generally to experiences that were more different than similar to those of their civilian male counterparts. As Helen McPhail demonstrates, women's experience of occupation was in important ways little distinguishable from that of men. To be sure, as has long been observed, the gendered division between those who could and could not potentially become soldiers had a significant impact on thinking concerning citizenship and one's place in the nation.[9] At the same time, the conditions of total war and the blurring of soldier/civilian status challenged even this division. And yet, paradoxically, the category "woman" in many ways took on both unprecedented importance and greater narrowness in the war. As Grayzel makes clear for France and England, men and women both, in literary expression and broad discourse, identified women specifically as mothers, biologically immutable; this characteristic was manifested in forms ranging from sources of physical and cultural renewal, to natural defenders of peace, to a site of national liability through their vulnerability to rape and infection with the "bacteria of sin" by enemy soldiers (Grayzel, p. 82).[10] Grayzel

gonnet et al., eds., *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars* (New Haven, Conn., 1987), to Nicole A. Dombrowski, ed., *Women and War in the Twentieth Century: Enlisted With or Without Consent* (New York, 1999).

[9] See Susan Pedersen, *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France, 1914–45* (Cambridge, 1993); Michael Geyer, "Ein Vorbote des Wohlfahrtsstaates: Die Kriegsopferversorgung in Frankreich, Deutschland, und Grossbritannien nach dem ersten Welt-krieg," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 9 (1983): 230–77; and essays in Thomas Kühne, ed., *Männergeschichte, Geschlechtergeschichte. Männlichkeit im Wandel der Moderne* (Frankfurt/Main, 1996). Compare this as a long-standing trope in Karen Hagemann, *Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre: Nation, Militär und Geschlecht in Preußen zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege* (Paderborn, 2001).

[10] See also Ruth Harris, "The Child of the Barbarian," *Past and Present* 141 (October 1993): 170–206; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, *L'enfant de l'ennemi, 1914–1918* (Paris, 1995); Becker, *War and Faith.* On women's other "inimical" properties and forms, see McMillan; Philippa Levine, "'Walking the Streets in a Way No Decent Woman Should': Women Police in World War I," *Journal of Modern History* 66 (1994): 34–78; Susan Kingsley Kent, *Making Peace: The Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain* (Princeton, N.J., 1993); Mary Louise Roberts, *Civilization without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Birthe Kundrus, *Kriegerfrauen, Familienpolitik und Geschlechterverhältnisse im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Hamburg, 1995). On recent work contesting historians' long-standing assumption concerning women's "natural pacifism," see Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing* (New York, 1999), esp. pp. 294–333; Jean Quataert, *Staging Philanthropy: Patriotic Women and the National Imagination in Dynastic Germany, 1813–1916* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2001); Helen Bradford, "Regendering Afrikanerdom: The 1899–1902 Anglo-Boer War," in *Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century,* ed. Ida Blom et al. (Oxford, 2000); and compare Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, eds., *Gendering War Talk* (Princeton, N.J., 1993), and Billie Melman, ed., *Borderlines: Genders and Identities in War and Peace, 1870–1930* (New York, 1998). Certainly British officials from the Boer War through World War I's "White Feather" campaign counted on women's willing bellicosity.

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argues that the wartime prominence of such images as a way to define and contain half the population meant that, although Britain awarded the franchise to women in the wake of the war and France did not, this distinction was not terribly significant in terms of women's place in postwar society in the two countries.[11]

Such attention to the range of experience provides other insights. Writing on wartime Hungary in Richard Stites and Aviel Roshwald's important collection on wartime culture, Joseph Held notes that for perhaps the majority of Hungarians outside Budapest the war passed with relatively little impact, particularly for the rural population that defended itself well enough against the ravages of the blockade of goods to Central Europe.[12] Andrew Wachtel likewise observes how little Croatian culture, broadly speaking, was affected by the war in contrast with other parts of the Empire. These conclusions should not be seen to reproduce stereotypes of periphery versus center: many of the chapters in this volume describe "peripheral" regions at the very center of the war's ravages. It demonstrates rather the limits of assumptions appropriate within any single, totalizing category: nation, gender, class, or confession. Even at the center of many historians' focus there is still much to be learned in this way. Moving beyond recent important, but very broad, discussions of memorialization and its implications, Alex King's study of England examines the everyday activity, squabbles, and eventual determinations governing the construction of war memorials, beginning as early as 1915. Naturally this activity was driven by "the war," but the war was received and remembered in radically different ways, even by the same people: as tragic, heroic, the source of intense national pride and of insuperable familial grief. The actors involved with the planning and erection of memorials brought with them far more than differing views of the war: they carried all the social, political, and other allegiances and interests to which they were drawn before the war and for which the discussion of memorials provided a major foil, further dividing as much as uniting British society. Those planning "official" memorials argued fiercely over the meaning they were to convey and over whose professional and artistic interests ought to be served; in turn these proceedings often conflicted with the erection of spontaneous street shrines and other popular manifestations of commemoration.

Key to this war was not only the kaleidoscope of experiences on the home front but also, and even more, the blurriness between home and battlefront. Studies by Giovanna Procacci and Benjamin Ziemann tell stories that cross boundaries heretofore fixed in the literature between these fronts, offering evidence for their great interdependence. A major scholar of the war in Italy, Procacci reviews the experience primarily of workers, men and women both; the former also served as

[11] See Susan Pedersen, "Gender, Welfare, and Citizenship in Britain during the Great War," *American Historical Review* 96, no. 2 (1991): 983–1006.

[12] Compare circumstances, e.g., in Vienna in Steven Beller, "The Tragic Carnival: Austrian Culture in the First World War," in Stites and Roshwald, eds., *European Culture in the Great War;* Robert A. Kann et al., eds., *Habsburg Empire in World War I: Essays on the Intellectual, Military, Political, and Economic Aspects of the Habsburg War Effort* (New York, 1977); Mark Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (New York, 2000); and esp. Maureen Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

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soldiers. It is understood that Italian workers perceived the war as imposed on them, feeling very little of the war enthusiasm, real or proclaimed, associated with the other victor nations. The residual lack of legitimacy accorded the Giolitti government, along with the pro-war Salandra regime's early inattention to popular opinion, created a widespread mood best described as "resignation." But by the fall of 1917, following the rout at Caporetto and the attendant increased domestic repression, close contact between soldiers and workers as well as farmers—who were often the same people moving to and from the battlefront—spurred that population toward increasing discontent, leading it to reject not only the war but also the government itself. By 1919 this manifested itself, particularly among workers, as full-fledged revolt. In this way, Procacci claims, though governed in principle by a liberal regime and emerging on the winning side of the war, Italy would best be compared to Russia in terms of the way the population experienced a total betrayal by the ruling government.

In a major work emerging from a dissertation, Benjamin Ziemann goes still further in transcending imagined experiential barriers between battle and home front, offering a damning portrayal of frontline life among soldiers of rural Bavaria. Not only letters (despite censorship) but also leaves, orally relayed messages, and other means kept soldiers in surprisingly close touch with home and family; their own self-perception, as cause and effect of this contact, was far more closely connected with the home front than with fellow soldiers.[13] Postwar trauma among German soldiers may not lie centrally in their inability to leave behind a transcendent soldier identity that those at home could not understand. Ziemann claims these soldiers' extreme disaffection after the war drew far more heavily on the continued "forced economy" that had already plagued their families throughout the war years. This was coupled with the ongoing sentiment, implicating even the new regime, that the war and its devastation had been imposed on them by the greed and designs of Prussia and Berlin. This offers a very different view than has been provided in

[13] On idealized images of the women at home, including that of the "godmother," see Becker, *War and Faith;* Grayzel; A. Molinari, *La buona signora e i poveri soldati: Lettere a una madrina di guerra (1915–1918)* (Torino, 1998); and Maria Bucur, "Between the Mother of the Wounded and the Virgin of Jiu: Romanian Women and the Gender of Heroism during the Great War," *Journal of Women's History* 12, no. 2 (2000): 30–56. On reading frontline experience compare, among other fine works, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, *Men at War: National Sentiment and Trench Journalism in France during the First World War,* trans. Helen McPhail (Providence, R.I., 1992); John G. Fuller, *Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies, 1914–1918* (Oxford, 1990); John Ellis, *Eye-Deep in Hell* (London, 1976); Anne Lipp, "Friedenssehnsucht und Durchhaltenbereitschaft: Wahrnehmungen und Erfahrungen Deutscher Soldaten im Ersten Weltkrieg," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 36 (1996): 279–92; and the important recent studies: Samuel Hynes, *The Soldier's Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War* (London, 1998), and Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge, 2000). See also useful documentary sources: Jean Guéno and Yves Laplume, eds., *Paroles de Piolus: Lettres et carnet du front (1914–1918)* (Paris, 1998); Thierry Bonzon and Jean-Louis Robert, *Nous crions grâce: 154 lettres de pacifistes, juin-novembre 1916* (Paris, 1989); Bernd Ulrich and B. Ziemann, eds., *Frontalltag im Ersten Weltkrieg: Wahn und Wirklichkeit. Quellen und Dokumente* (Frankfurt/Main, 1994); as well as Bernd Ulrich, "Feldpostbriefe des Ersten Weltkrieges—Möglichkeit und Grenzen einer alltagsgeschichtlichen Quellen," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 53 (1994): 73–84.

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the past of the sources of support for the paramilitary and other radical right-wing forces that sprouted so prodigiously in Bavaria, including support for the Nazi party, and accentuates the importance of the home front in this development.[14] It also emphasizes a different element of the German "continuity" argument: it was not long-standing desires for global conquest, inflamed by the war's failures, but rather domestic enmities, urban/rural and Prussian/Bavarian divides that remained the framing elements of these soldiers' wartime and postwar experience.

Such discussions cast light on the notion of "total war" and its relevance to World War I. Debates over the 1914–18 conflict as a total war have emphasized different national examples and a variety of characteristics. But, Roger Chickering claims, all belligerents in this war engaged in total war, precisely by virtue of the transcendence of borders between soldiers and civilians both as actors in the war effort and as objects of violence.[15] Certainly this newest work confirms such a conclusion. "Total war" also speaks to the experience, particularly in the second half of the war, of authorities' intensification of efforts, or "remobilization," as John Horne characterizes it. Contributors to his superb collection *State, Society and Mobilization* take up the question: How well did individual belligerent states move the entirety of their populations as well as other resources to attend primarily to the cause of war? Horne finds the differences in response to be constitutive not only of how well individual countries did in the war but also of how well the various ruling regimes fared in consequence of the war. Certainly Procacci and Ziemann offer examples of ultimate failure in one way or another. As contributors to Horne's volume find, the French and English governments seem to have done the best job of mobilizing public opinion (though with different levels of coercion) at a time when the need to intensify the concentration of all resources toward war met serious challenges in "self-mobilization." In turn, these states found them-

[14] Richard Bessel, *Germany after the First World War* (Oxford, 1994), and Gerald Feldman, *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1923* (New York, 1993), also emphasize the prominent loathing of the official economy. See also Deborah Cohen, *The War Come Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914–1939* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001). Naturally this varies precisely by experience: urban dwellers—civilians and soldiers alike—were far more supportive of the principle, if not the wartime reality. See Belinda Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000). The horrors of the battlefront, from shelling to poison gas attacks, as at Caporetto, saw in turn extreme reactions from civilians; see Nicola Labanca, *Caporetto: Storia di una disfatta* (Firenze, 1997).

[15] Roger Chickering, "Total War: Use and Abuse of a Concept," in *Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914,* ed. Manfred Boemeke et al. (Cambridge, 1999), and *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 65–94. See I. F. Beckett, "Total War," in *War, Peace and Social Change in Twentieth-Century Europe,* ed. Clive Emsley et al. (Milton Keynes, 1989), pp. 26–44; Stig Förster and Jörg Nägler, *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871* (Cambridge, 1997); Volker Berghahn and Martin Kitchen, eds., *Germany in the Age of Total War* (London, 1981). Compare for World War II, Michael Howard, "Total War in the Twentieth Century: Participation and Consensus in the Second World War," in *War and Society,* ed. B. Bond and I. Roy (London, 1975), pp. 216–26, and Wilhelm Deist, "The Road to Ideological War: Germany, 1918–1945," in *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War,* ed. Williamson Murray et al. (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 352–92.

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selves better able to fend off late-war and postwar challenges, compared to Germany and Italy as well as to Austria-Hungary and Russia. But, as Leonard Smith notes for the French case, confirming Procacci's counterexample, states' success had as much to do with the prewar legitimacy of particular states and of the prevailing ideology as it did with anything individual regimes accomplished in wartime itself. Thus, although French soldiers mutinied in spring 1917 in the name of "democratic citizenship," they "self-mobilized" once again, informed by the same cause, rallying for the final stretch of fighting.[16]

These findings offer a tissue of new insights. But battlefront, home front, and even any combination thereof do not comprise the full range of wartime experiences. In 1993, Procacci published a study of the nether world of Italians in German prisoner-of-war camps. The circumstances of these soldiers provided yet another source of major popular disaffection for the Italian government, which allowed these prisoners to starve rather than send food for them to Germany. The work also described a significant locus of wartime cruelty and violence to which relatively little attention had been paid for the First World War, in contrast with other twentieth-century wars.[17] Annette Becker has also written on liminal populations of the war, including military prisoners, while Alan Kramer and John Horne have for their part offered startling proof of German atrocities in occupied Belgium and France, exposing yet another set of lives forgotten, despite all the contemporary propaganda about them.[18] Such experiences are emerging more generally as a source of revealing new studies on the war, including in particular new sites of enormous and complex violence. Helen McPhail's examination of those under occupation in wartime northern France, though short on analysis and spare with sources, provides a richly textured as well as widely accessible study of this experience. This population suffered generally a sense of extreme isolation, cut off from—and apparently ignored by—fellow nationals at a time when "nation" took on a very particular meaning. They endured the stress of "outlaw" existence vis-à-vis France, yet at the same time they were forced to participate in enemy culture,

[16] See also Leonard V. Smith, *Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War I* (Princeton, N.J., 1994); Guy Pedroncini, *Les mutineries de 1917* (Paris, 1967).

[17] Giovanna Procacci, *Soldati e prigionieri italiani nella Grande Guerra* (1993; reprint, Torino, 2000); see also the "veritable death march" in Mesopotamia of British and Indian prisoners of war, described by Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History* (New York, 1994), pp. 247–48.

[18] See Annette Becker, *Oubliés de la Grande Guerre: Humanitaire et culture de guerre, 1914–1918: Populations occupées, déportés civils, prisonniers de guerre* (Paris, 1998); John Horne and Alan Kramer, "German 'Atrocities' and Franco-German Opinion, 1914: The Evidence of German Soldiers' Diaries," *Journal of Modern History* 66 (1994): 1–33, and *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven, Conn., 2001). Compare also generally new work on the range of children's experience in wartime and the discussion around it, including Andrea Fava, "War, 'National Education' and the Italian Primary School, 1915–1918," in Horne, ed.; Audoin-Rouzeau, *L'enfant de l'ennemi, La guerre des enfants, 1914–1918: Essai d'histoire culturelle* (Paris, 1993); Deborah Dwork, *War Is Good for Babies and Other Young Children: A History of the Infant and Child Welfare Movement in England, 1898–1918* (London, 1987); and Andrew Donson, "War Pedagogy and Youth Culture: Nationalism and Authority in Germany in the First World War" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2000).

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from celebrating the Kaiser's birthday to setting their clocks to German time. Those under occupation surrendered their mattresses and their food supplies. Indeed, they retained dangerously little of the latter, an extreme manifestation of what constituted a key feature of "total war" across Europe. As Herbert Hoover noted, "In every respect th[is] land is like a vast concentration camp."[19] They submitted to billeting abusive soldiers (and unwelcome French and Belgium refugees) and to forced labor. They endured rape by enemy soldiers and forced prostitution—and, as Grayzel discusses, they endured in turn protracted public debates by their fellow nationals on bearing "the child of the barbarian" (p. 54), magnifying their pain and extending it indefinitely. Indeed, this was a common effect of government and other responses, which exploited such populations for propaganda and then, as Becker has observed, subverted the memory of these peoples to fit a uniform "official memory."

In turn, Becker and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau assert in their joint study that descriptions of extremes of experience wrought by the war, including unprecedented terror and horror, have until now been silenced both in scholarly circles and more broadly—with grave consequences throughout the twentieth century. Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau bemoan the "prudery" that, aside from such writers as John Keegan, chroniclers of the war have demonstrated in describing its awful violence. Beyond this they lament the lack of connection of this violence to politics and to the broader meaning of the war. In this context the authors discuss, though only briefly, the genocide of the Armenians, the most extreme example of violence in a war that achieved heretofore unprecedented levels thereof.[20] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker admonish public figures, scholars, and others for their sanitization of the war—stemming even from the best motivations—that has led over time to memorialization of soldiers as victims of killing, failing to recognize them also as killers (p. 8). Yet, these authors suggest, here and elsewhere, that this violence in all its manifestations, and, above all, the repressed memory of this experience—itself a form of violence—must be recognized in deadly events throughout the twentieth century. Moreover, this violence came not only in physical forms. There is relatively little detail concerning the horrors of everyday life in the battle-ravaged territories of Central and Eastern Europe of which the Richard Stites and Aviel Roshwald volume provides welcome exposure. But a sense of culture under battle in the most literal sense emerges from poignant discussions of Poland, Serbia, and Belgium in wartime. An outstanding feature of the many "forgotten" countries in this study is the experience of "cultural colonialism" (p. 5). If some Hungarians or Croatians experienced the war only as relatively distant from their everyday lives, for others the most familiar surroundings changed face. The cafés of Warsaw saw brutal cultural clashes among Russians, Germans, and Poles; Rus-

[19] Cited in McPhail, p. 55.

[20] Thankfully, this subject is now garnering greater scholarly and public attention outside Armenian-language work. See Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide* (Detroit, 1998), *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics* (New York, 1992); Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens, histoire d'un génocide* (Paris, 1996); Vhakn Dadrian, *Histoire du génocide arménien* (Paris, 1996).

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sian and Polish cities, streets, and families won new names; Russian Jews were banned from reading or writing in Yiddish or Hebrew; and local culture in Belgrade and Brussels was all but crushed.

This work makes clear that experience was perceived not only through the specificities of place, activity, and event but also through the still-useful category of identity—or, better, identities. Most significant, this new body of work challenges the nature and import—and even the existence—of national identity in the war years. It goes without saying that many subjects of the Habsburg empire felt little allegiance to the regime in Vienna and what it symbolized. But Ziemann's Bavarian soldiers also demonstrated not only a striking absence of national sentiment but also an outright antipathy to it; they identified the war as marking the end of what national identity they had previously subscribed to (p. 265).[21] Indeed, contrary to the hope of those states that prosecuted war at least in part as a means to instill a patriotic fervor that transcended divisions and discontents—a hope among many of the belligerents—the war clearly challenged this allegiance to the extreme.[22] If some working-class Russians initially supported a war against Germany as being, effectively, against the bourgeoisie of Europe (Stites in Stites and Roshwald, p. 26), class enmities became in many instances imbricated with affect toward the state and nation, dissolving patriotic feeling, as Harold B. Segel observes in the same volume for the case of Poland. Where populations transcended class, regional, or rural/urban divides, it was often in common antipathy toward the state, as in the cases of Italy and Germany. Thus identities worked in a complicated and conflicted fashion in the war, as always, but in this period with powerful implications. Religious identity informed fervent war enthusiasm in France, if unevenly, as soldiers imagined Jeanne d'Arc and even the Madonna at their sides. But it could just as often act as a divisive force, as Ziemann, Alex King, and Aviel Roshwald show for Germany, England, and Poland, respectively. The role of "mother," supported by official propaganda as well as other discourse, helped many women in France and Britain find a role through which to demonstrate their patriotism while maintaining their distinction from male nationals. But, as Grayzel demonstrates, this role also acted to encourage some women's involvement in antiwar, if not antigovernment, activity, as in the movement led by French activist Hélène Brion.

If efforts to create transcendent national identities had only limited success, soldiers and civilians in turn frequently failed to assimilate the enmities that pro-

[21] To be sure, some historians have long since demonstrated the limits of regional and/or rural devotion to the state and "its war." In the German case, see Ay (n. 4 above); and Robert Moeller, "Dimensions of Social Conflict in the Great War: A View from the Countryside," *Central European History* 14, no. 2 (1981): 142–68. On crises of national identity, see Aviel Roshwald's excellent *Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914–1923* (New York, 2001).

[22] Bulgaria was an exception—but only until the end of hostilities. See Evelina Kelbetcheva, "Between Apology and Denial: Bulgarian Culture during World War I," Roshwald and Stites, eds.; Liulevicius (n. 13 above); Franz Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee, eds., *Authority, Identity, and the Social History of the Great War* (Providence, R.I., 1995); and Danilo Veneruso, *La Grande Guerra e l'unità nazionale* (Torino, 1996).

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paganda across Europe worked unceasingly to produce. Italians reflected cynically on the improvements that might come with Austrian (re-)occupation. Bavarian soldiers not only felt little enmity toward their French and British counterparts on the Western Front but also, Ziemann tells us, engaged in far more fraternization with the enemy than has been previously recognized. As one Bavarian infantryman noted in midwar, "we have excellent discussions" in no-man's-land with French soldiers. "They bring our cigarettes back over there, and we bring their wine over to our side" (p. 104).[23] Indeed, he suggests, a key factor preventing collective, large-scale desertion was precisely the lack of identification with fellow German soldiers. (Soldiers overall tended to choose individual strategies of escape under such loss of morale, often wounding themselves, as David Englander, writing in the Horne volume, shows for the case of Britain.) Many of the works reviewed here indicate a far less intense hatred of national enemies than had been thought to exist previously—or at least an uneven sentiment. The occupied French hated their German occupiers perhaps more acutely and concretely than their free civilian counterparts, yet they sometimes made their peace with individual Germans billeted in their homes, and they grimly noted certain advantages of occupation, as in access to free dental care in Lille. Where enmities were the fiercest, soldiers and civilians seem to have drawn not so much on the rhetoric of government propaganda as on other sources. As Becker shows in the welcome translation of her 1994 study of religion and the war in France, at least some French soldiers adopted the language of a religious crusade against the German devil.[24] She extends investigation of the crusade image and of a virtual "religion of war" in her joint study with Audoin-Rouzeau. Like their German and English counterparts, French soldiers adopted the rhetoric of "civilization" versus "*Kultur,*" invoking in this case imperialist and racist representations of German "barbarians" "outside humanity" or German "beasts" who will go to hell. The authors see this rhetoric as prefiguring France's willing mistreatment of Algerians and others in later colonial wars. To square these divergent findings we must, once again, recognize the diversity of experience, even within the same person or group of people from one moment to the next. Jean Renoir made this paradox clear in his 1937 film *La grande illusion;* this new work offers fresh evidence of these contradictions. Such paradoxes concerning patriotism and "the enemy" were naturally a given in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Ireland and Belgium, as chapters in *European Culture in the Great War* and *State, Society and Mobilization* make clear. Finally, even in those cases where official propaganda against the enemy was most effective, it ultimately redounded little to the propagandizing nation's benefit.

If the foreign enemy was hit or miss as a theme of propaganda, the specter of the "inner enemy" rose to haunt many European countries—a manifestation of

[23] Of course work on fraternization is not in itself new. See Roger Boutefeu, *Les camarades: Soldats français et allemands au combat, 1914–1918* (Paris, 1966); and Eksteins (n. 5 above).

[24] Some of this rhetoric originated with government propaganda, but French people deployed it in their own ways. See also Cecil and Liddle, eds. (n. 7 above); and George Mosse's work on the role of a "fierce Christianity" at play, as in *The Jews and the German War Experience, 1914–1918* (New York, 1977).

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governments' failures to transcend prewar divides and, once more, an effect in contradiction with most governments' wartime aims. Historians have noted how prewar class and ethnic divides coupled with maldistributed wartime privations generated hate across Europe for perceived "war speculators," both industrial and agricultural. Real hunger in pockets throughout the continent fomented some of the worst animosities, in the form of rural/urban divides, regional retrenchments, and, unsurprisingly, suspicion among classes.[25] This was a phenomenon particularly of the home front, though the starvation rations endured above all by Russian artillerymen and Italian prisoners of war made this experience a powerful force among soldiers as well. Gender difference also stood in for national difference and related enmities. Susan Grayzel observes that, beyond their "pain of being excluded," women as a group also suffered official as well as popular condemnation. Britain's DORA act identified women as a site of national vulnerability because of their thoughtless "flirting" with potential enemies, among other things. Writer and speaker Rose Allatini found herself, as a woman and a pacifist, "despised and rejected." Women broadly felt themselves "under fire" from their own conationals.[26] Beyond this, ethnic minorities bore some of the worst antipathy. Russians were far more likely to direct their hatred against their ethnic German compatriots than against the German military enemy. Drawing on prewar proclivities, rural Bavarians developed a range of wartime internal enemies, from Prussians to urban dwellers to Jews, a phenomenon in turn heavily marking postwar society. The well-known ratcheting antisemitism Jewish Europeans experienced generally as the war raged on takes on new clarity in some of this work. Jewish writers and artists experiencing the war in Poland and Russia described Eastern Europe all too prophetically as a "physical and spiritual graveyard for Jews"—even foreseeing Jews deported in cattle cars (Roshwald, in Stites and Roshwald, pp. 100–101). Writing in *State, Society and Mobilization,* Christhard Hoffmann reviews the longstanding paradox that the war seemed an opportunity for Jewish Europeans to demonstrate their commitment to their respective national communities but that, certainly in Germany, the reality was far more to exacerbate suspicion and prejudice against them, especially after 1916, as somehow "representatives of the enemy." He notes, indeed, officials' role in fomenting this sentiment, in a misguided bid for enhanced commitment to the nation and the war (p. 89).[27] In turn, as Alan

[25] See Lars Lih, *Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914–1921* (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Mary McAuley, "Bread without the Bourgeoisie," in *Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War,* ed. Diane Koenker et al. (Bloomington, Ind., 1989); Thierry Bonzon and Belinda Davis, "Feeding the Cities," in *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, and Berlin, 1914–1919,* ed. Jay M. Winter and Jean-Louis Robert (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 305–41; Bernard Waites, *A Class Society at War, England, 1914–1918* (New York, 1987); Panikos Payani, ed., *Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during the Two World Wars* (Providence, R.I., 1993).

[26] See this image also in Margaret R. Higonnet, ed., *Lines of Fire: Women Writers of World War I* (New York, 1999).

[27] Compare Werner Mosse, ed., *Deutsches Judentum in Krieg und Revolution, 1916–1923* (Tübingen, 1971); Egmont Zechlin, *Die Deutsche Politik und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen, 1969); Philippe E. Landau, *Les juifs de France et la Grande Guerre: Un patriotisme répub-*

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Kramer demonstrates in the same volume, the German state was woefully unsuccessful in promoting loyalty to Germany among Alsatians, succeeding only in engendering other Germans' animosity against Alsatians—thereby once more dividing German soldiers against one another.[28]

Experience and identity together offer important keys to understanding public sentiment toward the war. State propaganda and the pressure of mass nationalist fervor were not the only factors promoting acceptance of, willingness to engage in, and even enthusiasm for war, initially and for the longer term. Alex King demonstrates how the war helped promote the fortunes of a variety of interest groups, as they used it to establish their own patriotism and other social virtues in order to shore up support for unrelated goals. We know that some women, social classes, and minority groups looked upon the war as an opportunity to demonstrate their own patriotism in the pursuit of citizenship rights, among other things. Naturally a variety of interests stood to profit financially from the war, not least munitions industrialists and food wholesalers. Beyond this, Joanna Bourke has chillingly asserted that enthusiasm arose, in this war and throughout the twentieth century, in part out of the pleasure of killing.[29] In his piece in *State, Society and Mobilization,* Wolfgang Mommsen joins others in emphasizing war enthusiasm particularly among intellectuals and cultural figures around Europe, who celebrated war's virtues, from burning off the excesses of bourgeois culture to establishing the superiority of particular national cultures. As both Mommsen and Peter Jelavich note, even Otto Dix, the German artist best known for his hideous portrayals of trench warfare, remained convinced throughout the war that it was for these reasons a necessary evil, if not as "beautiful" as it had earlier seemed.[30] Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau as well as Grayzel and others make still more pronounced than in earlier work the widespread imperialist and social Darwinist agendas that motivated Europeans to take up arms—or screwdrivers, or pens—in the interest of war. Some French found it easier to hate the German enemy, and thereby support the war, if the German were imagined as an African gorilla, bound on raping

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licain (Paris, 1999); and Jonathan Frankel, ed., *Jews and the Eastern European Crisis* (Oxford, 1988).

[28] Compare also from the other side, Camille Maire, *1914–1918: Des Alsaciens-Lorrains ôtages en France* (Strasbourg, 1998).

[29] Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing,* and *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain, and the Great War* (Chicago, 1996). Compare here also Ferguson (n. 3 above), pp. 339–66.

[30] Peter Jelavich, "German Culture in the Great War," in Roshwald and Stites, eds., pp. 32–57. See the recent literature on high culture in and after war, including Wolfgang Natter, *Literature at War, 1914–1940: Representing the "Time of Greatness" in Germany* (New Haven, Conn., 1999); Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Elisabeth Müller-Lückner, *Kultur und Krieg. Die Rolle der Intellektuellen, Künstler und Schriftsteller im Ersten Weltkrieg* (München, 1996); Philippe Dagen, *Le silence des peintres. Les artistes face à la Grande Guerre* (Paris, 1996); Richard Cork, *A Bitter Truth: Avant Garde and the Great War* (New Haven, Conn., 1994); Bernd Hüppauf, ed., *Ansichten vom Krieg: Vergleichende Studien zum Ersten Weltkrieg in Literatur und Gesellschaft* (Königstein, 1984); and, more broadly conceived, Hubertus F. Jahn, *Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994); and Jean-Jacques Becker et al., eds., *Guerre et cultures, 1914–1918* (Paris, 1994).

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French women and cutting off their breasts (Grayzel, p. 58). One prominent French scientist asked whether German *Kultur* had not "regress[ed] to African fetishism," thereby emphasizing the appropriateness of attempting to quash it (Becker, p. 102). Such ideas, focusing centrally on the war as well as on empire and on war more broadly, have also been examined with increasing fruitfulness by comparative and global historians, Africanists, Asianists, scholars of the Middle East, and others.[31] These ideologies became tangled and confused, as in the linkage between racism and religion that Annette Becker observes. And thus they led ultimately to ambivalent sentiments toward the war, as Mommsen and Jeffrey Verhey demonstrate.

Most of the studies here under review highlight this ambivalence toward the war. The "myth of 1914" long held that the European public—or at least that within Germany, France, and Britain—rallied virtually universally to war, though conclusions regarding the second half of the war were less clear-cut. By 1980, however, eminent war scholar Jean-Jacques Becker demonstrated public uncertainty early on in the French case; this was reinforced by later work examining the meaning of the French army mutinies of 1917.[32] The most recent research challenges even an initial enthusiasm of any undiluted nature, though this should not be confused with the near-universal expectation that war would indeed take place. Studies of the last several years have narrowed the window of truly widespread war enthusiasm in the German case to the "August experience," lasting perhaps until the catastrophic September 1914 Battle of the Marne. But, as Jeffrey Verhey demonstrates in a national study, confirming the conclusions of a number of local projects, even in this very narrow range of time a "collage of powerful emotions and sensations" (p. 73) ruled in Germany—including healthy doses of panic, depression, suspense, and a "carnivalesque" response. To be sure, scholarship in the 1980s compellingly demonstrated, in the German case and beyond, that on the eve of hostilities the pressure for war was not simply coming from the top down but also flowed upward, from relatively small but shrill minorities. But, Verhey observes, particularly in some working-class neighborhoods, fairly straightforward antipathy to war was also clearly visible in the wake of mobilization, despite the commitment to the war effort declared by the Social Democratic Party. Niall Ferguson has also suggested that in August 1914, for England as well as Germany,

[31] See, among others, Michael Adas, "Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology," *Journal of World History* (in press), and "Comparative History and the Colonial Encounter: The Great War and the Crisis of the British Empire," *Itinerario* 14, no. 2 (1990): 57; Marc Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique: Contributions et réactions à l'effort de Guerre en A.O.F. (1914–1919)* (Paris, 1982); and, anticipating the war, Antoinette Burton, *At the Heart of the Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in Late-Victorian Britain* (Berkeley, Calif., 1988). See also Andrew D. Evans, "Anthropology at War: World War I and the Science of Race in Germany" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 2002).

[32] Jean-Jacques Becker, *Les Français dans la grande guerre* (Paris, 1980), translated as *The Great War and the French People* (New York, 1986). Compare, on the eve of war, Jean-Jacques Becker, *1914, Comment les Français sont entrés dans la Guerre: Contribution à l'étude de l'opinion publique printemps–été 1914* (Paris, 1977). See also J. M. Winter, *The Great War and the British People* (Cambridge, 1985). See, among useful local studies, B. Bracco et al., eds., *Milano in Guerra, 1914–1918: Opinione pubblica e immagini della nazioni nel primo conflitto mondiale* (Milano, 1997).

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"evidence qualifies, if it does not wholly refute, the thesis of mass bellicosity," citing equal measures of "anxiety, panic, and even millenarian religiosity."[33] Ferguson indeed finds the "enthusiasm" to lie predominantly with British political leaders, and above all with Lord Grey. Harold Segel observes that the "myth of Pilsudski," grafted onto the "myth of Napoleon," was an effective spur to war enthusiasm in Poland—but certainly not in the way that the Romanov dynasty had hoped. Moreover, as contributors to *State, Society and Mobilization* collectively make clear, war enthusiasm as well as postwar sentiment related not only to nationalist sentiment, fear of outside attack, and the other factors adumbrated above but also to prewar state legitimacy; this also inspired a highly mixed bag of responses.[34] For this reason as well, some governments' hopes of leaving an uncomfortable past through a moment of national crisis proved impossible from the start.

The intensity and variety of wartime experiences in turn influenced the impact of the war, which recent work suggests may be more powerful than commonly recognized in the post–World War II decades. One of the longest-standing and fundamentally indisputable interpretations of the war's short-term legacies is of radical domestic discontent leading in numerous cases to the dissolution of existing governments. There is little question that the war experience directly incited revolution and consequent civil war in Russia and elsewhere. Literature on Italy has long traced the connection between the war and the rise of fascism, both directly and indirectly, the latter trend being most obviously a combination of animosity toward an increasingly repressive government, the country's ambivalent victory, and, for many, the frightening prospect of revolution during the *biennio rosso.*[35] Procacci's volume, along with essays in Horne's volume by Procacci and Paul Corner and by Andrea Fava, advance this discussion by framing it also in terms of the Italian state's legitimacy, combining prewar with wartime influences. Procacci carefully traces the "mental transformations" broadly speaking that led to "revolutionary fervor" for some and "apolitical conformity" for others. Essays by Mark Cornwall in Horne's volume and by Joseph Held in the Stites and Roshwald collection likewise confirm and extend extant interpretations concerning the war, postwar political decisions within the new nation and without, and the rise of fascism in Hungary, while Annette Becker traces the same impulses, even in a premier victor country, in the burgeoning of the Action Française.

[33] Ferguson (n. 3 above), p. 177. Compare for Germany, among others, Berliner Geschichtswerkstaat, e.V., ed., *August 1914: Ein Volk zieht in den Krieg* (Berlin, 1989); Thomas Rohkrämer, "August 1914—Kriegsmentalität und ihre Voraussetzungen," in *Der Erste Weltkrieg: Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse,* ed. Wolfgang Michalka (München, 1994); and, on the eve of war, Jost Dülffer and Karl Holl, eds., *Bereit zum Krieg: Kriegsmentalität im wilhelminischen Deutschland, 1890–1914: Beiträge zur historischen Friedensforschung* (Göttingen, 1986).

[34] Through a new conference yet to take place at the time of this writing, John Horne will explore the theme of demobilization in what promises to provide the basis for another important volume. Compare also Bessel (n. 14 above).

[35] See, among recent contributions, Nicola Tranfaglia, *La prima Guerra e il fascismo* (Torino, 1995); and G. Sabbatucci and Vittorio Vidotto, eds., *Guerra e fascismo* (Bari, 1997). Compare Ernst Nolte's early *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism* (New York, 1965); also, for France, Antoine Prost, *In the Wake of War: Les Anciens Combattants and French Society* (1977; reprint, Providence, R.I., 1992).

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This newest work builds in part on George Mosse's argument linking the war experience broadly to the rise of totalitarianism.[36] Yet some of the newest work stops short of endorsing the link itself, which Mosse identified for decades as the brutalizing frontline experience. Benjamin Ziemann rejects the "brutalization" argument, finding soldiers' connections to civilian life to be a fundamental source of their postwar political proclivities. Those scholars who train our eyes away from the front, offering images of enormous violence elsewhere as well as evidence of the repression of such experiences, compel us to conceive of wartime violence and its aftermath in a far broader fashion. In Ziemann's estimation, insofar as the memory of the frontline soldier did correspond to enthusiasm for paramilitary forces and the prospects of renewed battle, this "memory" corresponded far more to postwar myth than to any actually lived experience during the war. This wide range of experiences helped contribute to a postwar politics of violence and deepened internal societal chasms—as well as to a variety of other political, cultural, and social outcomes, as scholars have observed, from new citizenship laws to new nation-states.[37] Thus, moreover, while the research here under review may seem dominated by the socioeconomic emphasis of recent decades, the conclusions it offers provide important new findings in and new methodological models of political and cultural history as well.

But, as Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau as well as Jay Winter argue, attention to the effects of the war cannot be limited to the long-standing arguments for how World War I engendered political upheaval and, directly or indirectly, World War II. The war and its constant reinterpretation over successive decades, layered by hindsight and new events, has had still other major, long-term effects, according to these authors. In the Canto reissue of his 1995 *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning,* Jay Winter confirms the linkage between the two wars but elaborates on the role of the first event. This was a particularly nefarious war precisely because, in contrast to World War II, the First World War could be used to "justify" if not "glorify" new rounds of war.[38] Expanding on Fritz Fischer's thesis concerning German war guilt, Winter finds the war a crucial step in a "special path," ironically defined: a Europe-wide "path of collective slaughter" (p. 227) that was, if not first set in motion by this war, then certainly and decisively advanced by it. Yet never, Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker claim, did any event generate mourning in Europe as did World War I, including in victor nations—nor has any other event caused such "infinite mourning," which, in their view, still does not seem to end (p. 17).

[36] See, among others, George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford, 1990).

[37] Along with Procacci, I make the case in *Home Fires Burning* (n. 14 above) for the simultaneous emergence of a broad spectrum of potential political futures based on wartime experience. See also variously Robert Weldon Whalen, *Bitter Wounds: German Victims of the Great War, 1914–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984); and Margaret H. Darrow, "French Volunteer Nursing and the Myth of War Experience in World War I," *American Historical Review* 101, no. 1 (1996): 80–106.

[38] See, in this context, Michael Walzer's concept of just and unjust wars, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York, 1977). Of course, World War II was most commonly conceived of as a just war.

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These authors suggest that the effects of the war continued beyond 1945, that the brutal nature of France's colonial wars, particularly with Algeria and at Dien Bien Phu, must be seen at least as much through the experience of 1914–18 as through that of 1939–45. Extending Winter's thesis, they claim that, if the earlier war was renowned for its atrocities, including those against French citizens, war acted as a kind of "school of atrocities" (p. 31) from which the French seem to have learned all too well, as demonstrated in World War II and beyond. Picking up from the Napoleonic wars, World War I acted as a quantum step in the development of "total battle"; simultaneously it provided lessons for a "banalization of war" (p. 47) that permitted French excesses later in the century against soldiers and civilians. But when successive generations have "read" the war, it has been through the text of memory—or rather "memories," including those that have been "silenced" and "forgotten," as per McPhail's characterization. These memories naturally bear the weight of successive events as well, extending up to the present, at which point, as Jay Winter claims, the war is finally over. But, as Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker assert obversely, the war's present-day "sanitization," in which it is styled as a war of victims rather than of victors, permits its deadly influence to live on. "The paradox will permit the heritage of a culture of brutalisation of the years 1914–1918"—on the battle front and beyond—"to burgeon in coming years, at the expense of new victims in the prolongation of the conflict" (p. 105). Theirs is a sobering contribution to the argument for understanding history's role in present-day politics.

Clearly the ongoing influence of the war has to be understood through mourning, memory, and memorialization, as Walter Benjamin intimated in the years following the war.[39] Michaël Pollack has written that "the weight of the dead on the living" must be measured;[40] in turn, strategies to "exorcise the dead," as Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker put it, must be recognized and understood. A substantial and distinguished literature has emerged particularly in the last decades concerning memory and memorialization, both specifically regarding the war and more generally.[41] The current round of writings extends this important work, with its careful attention to who does the memory work, how different memories and mournings conflict with

[39] See Jay Winter's discussion of Benjamin in *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning,* pp. 223–27.

[40] Michaël Pollack, "Mémoire, oubli, silence," in *Une identité blessée: Études de sociologie et d'histoire,* ed. Michaël Pollack (Paris, 1993).

[41] Compare from the early work of Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory,* trans. Francis J. Ditter, Jr., and Vida Yazdi Ditter (New York, 1980), to Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers;* Reinhard Koselleck and Michael Jeismann, eds., *Der politische Totenkult: Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne* (München, Fink, 1994); Pierre Nora, "Grande Guerre et lieux de mémoire," *14–18, Aujourd'hui, Today, Heute* 3 (2000): 241–46; Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds., *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 1999); Samuel Hynes, *A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture* (New York, 1991); Catherine Moriarty, "Narrative and the Absent Body: Mechanisms of Meaning in First World War Memorials" (Ph.D. diss., University of Sussex, 1994); Daniel Sherman, *The Construction of Memory in Interwar France* (Chicago, 1999); and Adrian Gregory, *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day, 1919–1946* (Providence, R.I., 1994). Compare Peter Fritzsche, "The Case of Modern Memory," *Journal of Modern History* 73, no. 1 (March 2000): 87–117. Indeed, it is against this powerful new emphasis that Roshwald and Stites have focused on the war itself rather than on its aftermath and on the memory of war.

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one another, what gets lost in the process, and what that loss itself contributes to the process. These historians try to plot the effects of mass death on such a scale; these deaths were officially commemorated in a unified fashion, yet they spurred such varying immediate responses as guilt, indebtedness, denial, cynicism, and insanity. Annette Becker observes, "The dead stole their day of glory from the survivors. But the survivors knew well that it must be so" (p. 163). Concerning the sense of "indebtedness to the fallen that can never fully be discharged," Winter confirms that "Europeans imagined the postwar world as composed of survivors perched on a mountain of corpses. How to relate to the fact of mass death, how to transcend its brutal separations and cruelties, were universal dilemmas" (pp. 94, 17). Benjamin Ziemann points to the vital importance of mourning and memorialization in the short term for the story he tells: not one of soldiers' guilt for surviving but rather a cynical envy for the dead, who were honored, while they, "living memorials," shared little of the honor, though they had been wounded—on the battle and home fronts—in innumerable ways. Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau find the results of which Pollack speaks manifested in a schizophrenic process of amnesia and "hypernesia" throughout the postwar decades, as individuals and groups, societies and governments continue to struggle with the "appropriate" interpretation(s) of an unprecedented degree and range of violence that has in itself been still so little acknowledged and interpreted in the myths of the era.

Ziemann, among others, observes that the new project of official memorialization, replacing traditional private and/or church-based forms, failed in innumerable ways to meet the needs of the broad populations that sought ways to grieve in very different fashions and over widely divergent memories of loss. Jay Winter describes how various countries' officials attempted to solve the problem of locating hundreds of thousands of decimated soldier bodies and returning them to their families for burial by claiming the appropriateness of leaving together those that "death united," creating new, "fictive kinships" (p. 59); many families found this concept deeply distressing and dissatisfying. He records one English woman's thoughts concerning officials' efforts to commemorate: "I appreciate my husband's name being erected on the 'Hall of Memory' immensely but what about those left behind?" (p. 50). In principle this should not have been the case. In England generally, Alex King tell us, memorials were required to be "collective gift[s] from the community" (p. 35). Although this process of public mourning set the precedent for such practices in subsequent wars, at the same time it bore some similarity to the memory work that followed the Boer war at the turn of the century. As Winter also claims, the forms of mourning drew on long-standing and apparently meaningful traditions. In addition, monuments, from obelisks to hospitals to park benches, were intended as often to honor the war and all its soldiers, and even the families thereof, as only to commemorate the war dead; they were also to offer the opportunity for viewers and users to infuse the monuments with their own meanings. Finally, the street shrines King describes provided a significant opportunity for personal and community-specific expressions of grief. But in practice the process was extremely uneven. Many individuals rejected it entirely, while others found efforts to apply traditional moral teachings to the war and its consequences to provide little consolation and to incite only cynicism.

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Moreover, from the beginning and in the years following the war, King observes that politicians and activists all round "used commemoration to enlist the dead in their political battles" (p. 206). The purported "neutrality" of such commemorative objects rendered them fertile ground for politicking, which was problematic insofar as these objects so quickly lost their original purposes, for which many still felt a need. Various "communities in mourning," as Winter puts it (p. 29), were subverted in the process. Jeffrey Verhey too demonstrates that memorialization provided fruitful ground for social conflict as well as an opportunity for state and local governments to martial the war dead in order to impose authority. Friedrich Ebert, first president of the Weimar Republic, was deeply uncomfortable with "the spirit of '14," but he offered the spin that "the spirit of the dead remain [*sic*] alive in our people, so that it can be born once again: the free Germany" (p. 209). The extreme political right, in contrast, enthusiastically embraced such mythologies, distorting memory to create the legend of the Battle of Langemarck and finding German soldiers' true spirit in the storm troopers that sought to bring down the republic. It was through such efforts to ensure that soldiers "had not died in vain" (p. 213) that notions of the *Volksgemeinschaft* and the *Dolchstoßlegende* were widely disseminated. If in Italy, in turn, "the trauma of 'total war'—indeed the failure of 'total war'—dictated the perception of the peace," the fascist movement represented an effort to create the national unity that had not existed in war (Procacci and Corner, in Horne, ed., pp. 239, 237). Building on the findings of Daniel Sherman and Catherine Moriarty, Susan Grayzel claims that, for the French as for the British, commemoration was a "communal activity," creating in this sense as well new "fictive kinships." Yet, precisely by highlighting the specifically "unknowable" suffering of mothers, women were separated from men as mourners—and as citizens. These works all identify, directly or not, the hazards of contemporaries' inability to satisfactorily mourn either the unfathomable massiveness of death or the unendingly various forms of human damage. They also highlight the political and social dangers of the mythologization of memory and experience.

Drawing on themes of memory and mythos, Jay Winter asserts in contrast with some leading cultural critics that World War I did not represent an unmitigated rupture and, as such, the clear beginnings of "modernity."[42] Indeed, it was the continuities, the possibility of mourning the war in traditional ways, though so at odds with the actual wartime experience, that permitted Europeans to imagine a second world war. Annette Becker's work on religion and war anticipates these conclusions; she notes in her own findings, as in other examples of the most recent work, the "continuities as well as—and perhaps even more than—the ruptures" (p. 2). Procacci too observes the importance of wartime and postwar millenarianism, drawing on long-standing religious traditions, precisely in rendering possible a "new order."[43] For the case of popular culture and public discourse in France and England, Grayzel also argues for the significance of continuities, refuting those who identify a sharp break both in cultural representations of women and gender

[42] See, above all, Fussell (n. 5 above); Hynes, *A War Imagined;* and Eksteins (n. 5 above).

[43] See also Emilio Gentile, "Un'apocalisse nella modernità: La Grande Guerra e il mieto della

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and in the postwar foundation of the welfare state and patterns of labor. Others of the works here under review seem to confirm at least the lack of a universal definitive break and beginning of modernity. Aviel Roshwald and Richard Stites take the question of cultural ruptures as the starting point for their anthology: "Did the war catalyze and accelerate tendencies that were bound to rise to prominence in any case or did it decisively change the course of historical evolution? Was its cultural impact as clearly discernible as its material consequences?" (p. 1). As these scholars point out, the answers depend on how culture and modernity are defined, and where one looks for the evidence. The essays in this volume reflect the range of rejoinders to these questions; the only constant is one of ambiguity, of multivalent and paradoxical responses even within a single country, social class, or set of sources. Here, yet again, these authors' answer is, "It's all more complicated than it seemed."

This is a useful and compelling conclusion. Writ large, it is of course the conclusion of historical scholarship more broadly at this moment of rejection of monocausal explanations, totalizing social science models, and "grand theory" generally. While some scholars have professed frustration with what we can know from so many tiny pieces of the mosaic, it seems from the example of these studies that we may really know substantially more about the whole than we can learn from a picture that aggregates and flattens out difference. Yet this is not to say there are not rough spots in this work in progress. One of the strengths of this work is also at this moment its weakness: the emphasis on comparative and trans(/sub)national history, which permits us to employ rich case studies, operating at the level of everyday experience, to contribute to the big picture. *European Culture in the Great War* is brilliant and essential for its effort to make cultural comparisons across Europe, including among countries and ethnicities almost universally ignored in histories of the war available to an Anglophone audience. It is also impressive for its effort to discuss culture in the broad sense, rather than "high" versus "low." Yet the result in many of the essays is a catalog of cultural forms: with important exceptions, the emphases of novelists, dramaturges, painters, journalists, and denizens of coffee houses in one country or area are trotted out, the next commencing as the previous one ends. Obversely, it is not always clear in *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning* what difference a nation, or any other geographical or cultural unit, makes. For its part, *Women's Identities at War* consistently juxtaposes thematic sections on France and Britain, but the relationship between the two is almost never spelled out except in a general thesis. While Grayzel may be praised for not getting bogged down in "equal representation," the unevenness of comparative sections is disconcerting and in its own way artificial. (Why talk about British women pacifists at all if there is only a page and a half to be written about them, compared to twenty-one pages on their French counterparts? More important, can this decision be explained?) The occasional likening to religious awakening in the United States makes a well-chosen counterpoint to Becker's argument

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rigenerazione della politica," *Storia contemporanea* 5 (1995): 734–69; and compare Martin Geyer, *Verkehrte Welt: Revolution, Inflation und Moderne: München, 1914–1924* (Göttingen, 1998).

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concerning France, as does Procacci's revealing comparison of Italy's postwar fortunes to those of Russia and Germany. But the claim Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau make for their joint study—that it is transnational in scope—is not compelling. Important as the study is, the authors would have had to use a substantially broader range of sources to convince the reader that the book is not fundamentally about France. This may be only to say that these historians as a group are among pioneers of new, important territory, topically and methodologically, and that they lay clear paths for future work.

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