The Politics of Memorial Representation

The Controversy Over the German Resistance Museum in 1994

J. David Case
C-Span Archives, Purdue University

Introduction

The study of historical memory in its various forms is a burgeoning area of inquiry among historians. The debate over public, official, government-supported memory and private individual memories reveals a complex dynamic among myth, memory, and history, which as Michel Foucault and others have argued, is simply the dominant form of memory in a society at a given time.[1] Some of the most revealing instances of the intersection between public and private memory are commemorations and memorial sites where personal memories are created and sustained within the context of the official representation of the event and those involved. The constant need to locate memories within a larger social frame of reference ensures that supporters of different memories of the same event will directly and forcefully link images from the present with their memories of the past, no matter how incongruous these images may appear.[2] Thus the images of the past are relinked to present concerns in a continual process that reveals much about the present through the representations and interpretations of the events and persons in question.

Postwar Germany presents a unique set of circumstances that complicates any construction of public memory. If 1945 was *Stunde Null*, the zero hour, i.e., a fundamental divide between the old and new Germanys, then the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) for that matter, needed to recast

their societies in new, yet still German, images. The burden of the Nazi past made this process all the more complex, especially in the more open society of West Germany. Of course, the anti-Hitler resistance was one of the few positive images from twentieth-century German history, which greatly enhanced its value as a counterbalance, however inadequate, to the immensely shameful aspects of the Nazi period. The unification of Germany has in no way resolved this search for identity because now a new collective identity has to be fashioned. So the German resistance to Hitler has been at the center of many attempts, both conscious and unconscious, to create an identity for each Germany and, in 1994, the newly reunited Germany. Nowhere was this more evident than in the heated controversy that erupted in 1994 over the exhibit at the German Resistance Museum in Berlin.

But the 1994 debate over the resistance did not result solely from this attempt to reunify a divided historical legacy in a newly reunited, though still very divided, Germany. It was in many ways the culmination of a debate that had been evolving for fifty years with flashpoints at the major anniversary years of 20 July 1944.[3] For example, in 1974, there was a large student outcry against the invitation of Hans Filbinger to speak at the main commemoration ceremony because in May 1945, after the war had ended, he had sentenced a man to six months in prison for removing the swastika from his uniform.[4] But the debate over the resistance was not confined to anniversary years. For example in 1951, the federal government issued a statement in defense of the resistance against allegations of treason by individuals and in the media. In 1977 Herbert Wehner, a Communist who had resisted while in exile in Moscow, was invited and then uninvited to speak at a commemoration ceremony due to pressure from Claus von Stauffenberg's son, who felt Wehner was an inappropriate speaker given his previous allegiance to Soviet communism [5] The physical presence of the museum added energy to the debate because it was a medium for educating the public, especially young people, about the resistance and its legacy. Thus it was more important than some commemoration speech or historical monograph because it had this tremendous potential to reach a significant portion of German society. All these factors make the resistance museum controversy both an excellent and highly charged case study of the battle over public historical memory in a free society.

J. David Case

20 July 1944: the Foundation of Resistance Memory

On 20 July 1944, Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg, a colonel who was regularly posted to the German Army headquarters in Berlin, placed a bomb in Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia during an afternoon military situation briefing. As Stauffenberg left the area, the bomb exploded, and he assumed that all the occupants, especially Hitler, were dead. Stauffenberg flew back to Berlin and set plans in motion to take over the government from the Nazi regime. But the coup attempt was over before it started, because a huge oak table had saved Hitler's life. Hitler soon took control of the situation by announcing on the radio that he was still alive. He ordered the various organs of the police to round up the conspirators in Berlin and execute several of them immediately. The Nazi dragnet continued into the following weeks and months as the regime imprisoned or executed hundreds of others.

But this was not a singular event. Members of the armed forces had been discussing such an action for years, and a few others had made attempts on Hitler's life. In addition, the military was not the only source of opposition to the regime. Socialists, Communists, and even politically unaffiliated individuals had opposed the regime in their own ways since its outset in 1933. In one sense, this assassination and coup attempt was the ultimate act of resistance, but in another, it was the end, even the failed end, of a long series of activities against the regime. Still, 20 July and the German resistance to Hitler are synonymous to many Germans, which was one main source of contention in 1994.

Resistance Discourse since 1945

A brief history of resistance discourse in the Federal Republic is necessary to understand fully the issues at stake in the museum controversy in 1994. There has always been debate over the legacy of the German resistance, but the issues under debate have remained relatively constant. In the immediate postwar period, the debate was essentially three-sided. Many scholars and some conservative political leaders, as well as some resisters themselves,

attempted to prove the existence of anti-Nazi resistance against the allied victors' notion that all Germans had supported Hitler wholeheartedly throughout the Third Reich. Others, including many veterans, argued that these resisters betrayed Germany in her greatest hour of need. Among the loudest proponents of this view was Otto Ernst Remer, the man who led the detachment that ended the coup attempt in Berlin. In the early 1950s, he was the leader of the *Sozialistische Reichspartei*, a neo-Nazi party that the federal government banned in 1952. In 1951, he was tried in Hanover for defamating the resistance after labeling its members traitors in several campaign speeches. After a very public trial, he was sentenced to three years in prison.[6] Yet others, especially Social Democratic (SPD) leaders, strove to include working-class opposition in the resistance. At the base of all this discourse was the philosophical question of whether resistance, especially by military leaders under oath to Hitler, was justified and whether it was a type of *Hochverrat*, treason against the government, or the much more serious crime, *Landesverrat*, treason against the nation.

Although many veterans and other members of the World War II generation of Germans had lingering doubts about whether this resistance was very different from treason,[7] gradually the debate over the resistance became divided along three major issues. The essential question became: who was a resister? And the related question was: what constituted resistance in the unique sociopolitical conditions of the Third Reich? Another important matter was the reason why these persons, whomever they were defined to be, resisted an oppressive yet popular regime when most Germans simply obeyed and complained quietly and privately. Lastly, after defining the identity and motivations of the resisters, the question remained: how were resisters' examples relevant to today, and therefore how should present Germans honor and remember them?

By the late 1960s the debate had coalesced into two very different views of the resistance and how it reflected upon West German society. On one hand, there was the traditional, "intentionalist," point of view that emphasized the coup attempt of 20 July and the heroes who had carried it out against all odds. From this vantage point, resisters constituted an elite to be honored and emulated, if possible. Proponents of the other "functionalist" perspective held that while

resisters were heroes, they were not an elite, but a reflection of the pluralism and diversity of the Federal Republic. To deny this was a disservice both to resisters' memory and to the public at large. Not only was resistance membership broad; the very concept of resistance was not strictly divided along categorized activities, such as assassination or sabotage. Instead it was a dynamic, fluid model in which several different attitudes toward the Nazi regime could coexist within a person or group simultaneously. This was especially evident as the close relationship between the conservative resistance and the regime became clearer.[8] Certainly each school of thought had its period of dominance, the traditional school until the early 1970s and the functionalist one in the 1970s and early 1980s. But by the mid-1980s, there was essentially a strategic balance between the two sides, although the Kohl government certainly promoted the traditional view. Both this balance and the governmental bias contributed greatly to the ferocity of the debate in 1994.[9]

Conditions in 1994: a Highly Charged Atmosphere

The year 1994 was momentous in the German, no longer West German, memory of the resistance. This is not surprising because it was the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination attempt and thus probably the last major anniversary that many adult citizens of the Third Reich would still be alive to experience. That year was also a hotly contested election year as the Left, including the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successor to the East German Communist party, tried to regain momentum from the conservative tide of the 1980s. It was also the first major resistance anniversary after German reunification and the demise of the Soviet Union. Lastly, it was the first major anniversary after the opening of a new memorial museum of the German resistance in the Bendler-Block, where Stauffenberg and several co-conspirators were executed. All these factors contributed to the most intense and public debate over the legacy of the German resistance in the history of the Federal Republic.

Among these factors, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent unification of Germany were sufficient to cause the strenuous debate that occurred in 1994. The political, economic, and social chasms of

the Cold War had contributed to the development of two very different Germanys. These differences reached deeply into both societies' self-identities, which in many ways were based on a disavowal of the Nazi past. In essence, each nation had perceived and publicly proclaimed that the other was the continuation of a totalitarian, whether fascist or communist, state while each was itself a rebirth of German democratic traditions.[10] Of course this division greatly affected the memory of the resistance in the two Germanys. The anti-fascist basis of East Germany and the anti-totalitarian basis of West Germany created prime conditions for making heroes of Communist resisters in East Germany and conservative resisters in West Germany with the corresponding exclusion of any other resistance.[11]

Despite these long-standing differences, many historians argued that this was precisely the time to unify memory of the resistance in order to bring it closer to historical reality. Of course this would not be easy, but resistance traditions, especially their historiographical elements, had been converging since the 1960s to include a recognition of resistance from the "other Germany," East or West.[12] In order to accomplish the unification of memory as well, both East and West German historians had to critically re-examine their previously acknowledged, and mythologized, resistance and also acknowledge the contributions of other resistance. In addition, historians had to analyze all resisters in their historical context without the bias of a teleological view, whether from 1945, 1989, or any point in between. Lastly, scholars had to use the example of the dictatorship in East Germany to raise new questions about the nature of the Nazi dictatorship, and therefore resistance to it. If such a reunification of memory were to be possible, then hitherto doubly neglected resisters, such as Jewish resisters, could also be included in a broader resistance memory.[13]

Instead just the opposite happened because many conservatives wanted to restore the taboos on Communist resistance so evident during the early Cold War period. In 1954, one of the strongest unifying forces of the young Federal Republic was an anti-totalitarian consensus that repudiated both Nazism and Communism. According to Peter Steinbach, there were four main reasons for the marginalization of Communist resistance, including the acceptance of the futility of resistance in exile and the equation of all German Communists

with Stalinism and East Germany.[14] In 1994, many conservatives once again advocated such a foundation for the reunited Germany in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union. So not only did the brutality and repression associated with Communist regimes strip Communist resisters of any legitimacy as they had in 1954, but in 1994, the perceived systematic failure of communism also showed that Communist resisters had supported a political and economic system that history had judged as an ultimate failure. So in the early postwar period, West Germans marginalized Communist resisters during some of the hottest points of the Cold War, and in 1994 some West Germans wanted to marginalize them because the Cold War had ended, in both cases due to a perceived identity between all Communists and the East German regime.

Resistance Discourse in 1994: the Range of the Controversy

The great debate over the resistance legacy in 1994 manifested itself in a variety of ways. There were several controversies surrounding the traditional, official government commemoration ceremony at the Bendler-Block, where the coup attempt came to its inglorious end. Many people, including some resisters' family members, resented what they perceived as Chancellor Kohl's attempt to monopolize the ceremony in two ways. First, they resented the growing military nature of the ceremony, which, although it occurred at the site most closely associated with the military resistance, had evolved over the past fifty years into a remembrance for all resisters. Thus they felt that Kohl was imposing his traditional monolithic view of the resistance on a properly diverse ceremony. Second, Chancellor Kohl was the main speaker at the ceremony, even though he had been the main speaker ten years earlier in 1984. In addition, a Social Democratic leader was not invited to speak, thus breaking the precedent set in 1984, when the Social Democratic mayor of Hamburg, who was a son of a resister, spoke along with Chancellor Kohl.[15]

These issues may seem rather insignificant, but their importance to many Germans demonstrates the passions that the resistance could generate among sectors of the public. On 18 July, members of

the Anti-Nationalist League, a leftist student group from Hamburg, posed as visitors and occupied part of the resistance museum for six hours. In a less violent way, the Central Union of Democratic Resisters, an organization dedicated to a broad view of the resistance, held an alternative ceremony on 20 July. The main speaker was a Social Democratic leader, and the ceremony occurred at Plötzensee, where the Nazi regime had tortured and executed opponents from all backgrounds between 1933 and 1945.[16]

There was also debate over the attempt by some to marginalize members of the conservative resistance because of their support for or complicity with many Nazi policies. Beginning in the late 1960s, several functionalist historians began to examine more closely the domestic and foreign policy goals of many of the more conservative resisters involved in the coup of 20 July. After their examination, these scholars characterized these resisters' ideas as anti-democratic, anti-capitalistic, and overtly nationalistic, in other words, very similar to Nazism.[17] By the mid-1980s there was a sharp divide within academic circles over resisters' ideas, as well as some of their actions and inactions. The proceedings of a 1984 historical conference on the resistance show the deep divisions among scholars over the morality of conservative resisters.[18]

In 1994, this debate featured a related issue: resisters' views regarding Jews and the "Jewish Question." However, this was not the first time their views on this matter had been debated. Resistance critics, such as Christoph Dipper, leveled two main charges at most conservative resisters: the prewar persecution of Jews was not a motive for resistance because many conservative resisters supported it, and the news of mass murder changed resisters' plans and goals very little. Conservative resistance supporters, such as Peter Hoffmann, argued that such a characterization was unfair and untrue. Just because many of these resisters believed Jewish persecution to be a diplomatic catastrophe because it rallied allied support for unconditional surrender did not imply, they asserted, that the resisters did not also consider it a moral catastrophe. In addition, they claimed that there was much direct evidence from the Nazi regime's records on the resistance that the fate of the Jews was a major motivation for many conservative resisters.[19]

A Brief History of the German Resistance Museum

Still, the most vociferous debate about marginalization concerned the exhibit at the German Resistance Museum. Part of the former Army headquarters in Berlin had served as a museum since the 1960s, but its focus was on the coup conspiracy and the military resistance.[20] The choice of this location is quite understandable since this was the site where both movements met their unfortunate ends; and also the museum was built when the traditional point of view was still dominant. But in 1983, Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin's mayor and soon to be federal president committed to making Germans encounter their past in very direct ways, initiated the enlargement of the exhibit to include all facets of German resistance to Nazism (the Berlin Senate had decided to do so in 1979).[21] To direct this effort, he selected Peter Steinbach, a scholar who was part of a growing group of historians calling for a broader and less moralistic view of the resistance in such a pluralistic society as West Germany.

The actual representation of diversity within the resistance was a difficult task for two main reasons. First, the more pluralistic view of the resistance was still under fierce debate as the 1984 historical conference proved. Thus Steinbach and his colleagues had to prioritize the exhibits in the midst of an ongoing debate that certainly did not end with the completion of the museum in 1989. In addition, the continuing discovery of a wider variety of resistance activities and localities made the selection of some central place for a museum very difficult. The best solution seemed to be to use the one central location of resistance in the minds of all Germans – the Bendler-Block, where the 20 July coup had ended.[22] This decision would be an endless source of dispute for both opponents and proponents of the inclusion of Communists in resistance exhibits.

Overall the museum shows the diversity of anti-Nazi resistance while maintaining some focus on the military resistance. It outlines the Nazi seizure of power to provide historical context, then provides a chronology of the prewar resistance in all its various forms. At the center of the exhibit, literally and figuratively, is the military resistance, especially the coup execution and the conservative resisters' ideas for a new government. This may seem odd considering Steinbach's public emphasis on activities as the sole qualification

for being a resister. But the plans had long been an integral part of resistance historiography and could not be easily discarded, even by the chief creator of the exhibit. Then the exhibit proceeds on to other types of resistance, including the groups mentioned in the pre-war portion, and others, such as youth and German exiles and prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. Despite this balance, many conservatives were dissatisfied with the museum even as it opened in 1989. In 1994, the apparent bankruptcy of Communism and the increased tension from the pressures of unifying German historical memory under the proud banner of the Federal Republic only made it that much more objectionable to them.[23]

The Great Debate

The sheer dimensions of this debate in the print media are extraordinary. By this measure, it far surpasses any of the public debates over resistance issues of the previous fifty years and thereby demonstrates that Germans believed that the issue of who was in the museum, that is, who was a resister, was significant enough for an earnest public debate. It is important to maintain some structure in order to prevent getting lost in all the acrimony and therefore missing the overarching character of the debate. There are many possible schemes for this, but the most revealing is the division of this discourse based on its origins: journalists, scholars, and politicians, resisters' relatives and the general public. This organization is the clearest way to demonstrate the most fundamental theme of this debate – divisions over the resistance existed within German society in all groups and thus any true consensus on the resistance, and its representation, was impossible.

The Two Sides: Stauffenberg vs. Steinbach

Before examining this debate in detail, it is necessary to outline its essential contours through the words of the two major antagonists: Franz von Stauffenberg, one of the would-be assassin's sons and also a conservative politician, and Peter Steinbach, the director of the museum.[24] Stauffenberg and others protested in Bonn and wrote a letter to the Berlin government calling on it to remove two main

groups of resisters from the museum exhibit. They also threatened to boycott the traditional solemn 20 July ceremony at the Bendler-Block if the government did not comply with their wishes. One objectionable group was exiled Communists who had agitated against the Nazi regime from Moscow as part of the National Committee to Free Germany. Especially notable in this group were Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, two early leaders of the East German regime. Stauffengerg's anger was even further fueled by the fact that these men's pictures actually hung in his father's old office. The other group was the League of German Officers, whose members – while prisoners of war in the Soviet Union – had called on their fellow soldiers to overthrow the regime. Stauffenberg argued that these men belonged to the shameful parts of German history, not to the most honorable part as the resisters of 20 July did.[25] He cited Ernst Reuter, the mayor of Berlin in early 1950s, because Reuter personally knew many of these men first-hand and concluded that they were "red fascists." In his letter to the Berlin government, Stauffenberg stated that there was a fundamental contradiction in honoring these men and those involved in the popular uprising against them in East Germany on 17 June 1953 by asking: "What must our neighbors think of us, when the mayor lays a wreath for the victims of the SED regime, while two blocks over the master jailers, murderers, and human despisers are honored in a city memorial with their names and pictures?" He also accused Peter Steinbach of pushing his own agenda of resistance dilution through the museum.[26]

Steinbach responded that it was the traditionalists who were pushing their own agenda to the detriment of resistance memory. He acknowledged that the museum had always had its critics, "above all those who identify the resistance with 20 July 1944." He strongly criticized two groups of opponents. First were the veterans groups that had allied themselves with Stauffenberg. Steinbach charged that they had hardly recognized the military resistance in the past, probably because they still believed the military resisters were traitors, and were thus only acting opportunistically now. He also criticized resisters' relatives, like Stauffenberg, who denounced the exhibit, stating: "This is their right as private persons – but it is not right to try to achieve their goals as politicians with boycott threats." Stein-

bach argued that both groups wanted to replace the pluralistic concept of resistance with an anti-totalitarian one, which, to him, only meant discrediting the Communist resistance. Steinbach asserted, "20 July is a day of German history, not family property."

Despite this defensive tone, Steinbach also argued that the controversy was fortuitous because it would allow an open discussion of these issues. It would demonstrate to the public that no one group owned the resistance legacy and that there were many types and phases of resistance that must be respected.

> The struggle over history is not only about memory. It is also not only about politics that eventually becomes history. But it is also about how we as Germans deal with a resistance history that reflects the divided Germany with its traditions.

Steinbach had expressly designed the museum exhibit to bridge and end this division. But he could not do it alone. Thus he challenged his peers by reminding them that they had "a duty to defend the independence of their discipline" from appropriation by others. This was a direct, moralistic attack directed against those conservative historians who were deeply involved in federal efforts to create historical museums and exhibits as a way to promote a more positive national identity.[27]

Cultural Leaders

The leaders of public discourse – historians, journalists, and politicians – were openly divided on this issue. Historians from the functionalist school essentially supported Steinbach's position. Hans Mommsen argued that since resistance was fundamentally a political act and not a moral one, Communist resistance was obviously very important. Rainer Eckert argued that the historical issues were already clear and that this debate was essentially political in character, not historiographical. He also advocated the integration of the ideological divisions in resistance memory. Christoph Klessman lamented that "the raucous political debate over the Berlin museum conveys the unfortunate impression that the selective historical view of the 1950s can be restored."[28]

Of course Stauffenberg had his scholarly support, too. Lothar Gall, head of the German Historical Association in 1994, acknowledged the propriety of his criticisms because he too believed the

broadening of the resistance had gone too far. He further argued that true resisters had risked their lives and that in general, resisters should be honored because of their own actions, not because of any group membership. This was definitely a veiled reference to Communists. Klaus Hillebrand stated that the exile groups and 20 July resisters had nothing in common. Lastly, Joachim Fest, the editor of one of Germany's most influential newspapers and a popular historian, argued that the public still needed to connect with the resistance and that the inclusion of persons who became leaders of the East German regime simply confused the issue and made the establishment of such a connection more difficult. This apparent insult to the public's intelligence is understandable considering Fest's belief that his 1994 book would facilitate a connection that fifty years of commemorations and scholarly monographs had failed to produce.[29]

For the most part, journalists seemed to agree more with Stauffenberg. One journalist criticized Steinbach's exhibit because it only dealt only with actions, not motivations. He argued that family members and others certainly had a right to distinguish between 20 July resisters and those in Moscow. Another writer argued that not only did Germans have a right to make such a distinction, but that such a distinction was absolutely necessary if to remain true to resisters' memory. Another journalist argued that the resisters' moral stand against the regime could not be forgotten, nor could the contrasting amorality of the East German regime. Thus those who supported the Communist regime could not be called resisters. Yet another journalist wrote that the inclusion of Ulbricht and Pieck, along with other Communist resisters, in the museum exhibit implied a relativization of all resisters, which was unacceptable.[30]

However, Steinbach was not entirely without journalistic support, receiving it from at least one person in particular. This journalist, Karl-Heinz Janssen of the *Die Zeit*, argued that Claus von Stauffenberg had many connections with the Communist resistance in the common struggle against the Nazi regime. Overall, "the conspiracy was nothing less than a coalition from Right to Left," which is just what the museum exhibit highlighted. Janssen therefore maintained that no one should defame or marginalize any person or group in the exhibit. He even charged that those who did criticize it "ignored

knowledge and thought ahistorically and in a reactionary manner." In the end, he compared the German resistance to the allied coalition against Germany, because they were also united against Hitler despite their numerous internal differences. Therefore what they advocated was secondary. Another reporter wondered why several longtime Nazis who helped the conspirators only shortly before 20 July 1944 should be included if Communists who had resisted the regime since 1933 should not.[31]

Like historians and journalists, political leaders were divided over the inclusiveness of the museum. In his speech at the official governmental ceremony on 20 July, Kohl made his only public comments about the museum controversy. If taken out of context, his opinions could seem contradictory because he stated that "the moral dividing line ... was not between Right and Left, but between hesitation and vigorous action." If any group of resisters had hesitated, it was the conservative resistance, and if any group had acted vigorously, it was the Communist resistance. But his other comments on this issue reveal that he did not accept the legitimacy of Communist resistance because it could not be part of a new anti-totalitarian consensus in the new Germany. Kohl argued that resisters were "character examples first by their political-moral goals." A few moments later, he extended this argument by saying:

> In order to understand the continuing significance of the German resistance for the present and future we should not reduce the question to what it resisted. We must ask ourselves why the participants got involved. In these reasons lies the legacy that the united Germany has inherited.

Thus Kohl came to the exact opposite conclusion as Peter Steinbach, who believed that the only important criterion of resistance was opposition to the Nazi regime.[32]

Social Democratic leaders also expressed their positions on the resister identity issue. According to Helmut Schmidt, Kohl's predecessor as chancellor, "If one can fully rightfully say this day is an entirely significant, moral day in German history, then one must guard against repressing someone who offered resistance precisely because he was a Communist." Thus he used the moral dimension, which conservatives such as Kohl argued was an essential component of resistance memory, in an entirely different way. Instead of

dismissing Communist resisters as immoral due to their political allegiance, Schmidt implied that it was immoral to exclude them from resistance memory if one accepted the fundamental moral, rather than political, nature of resistance. Otherwise one would also have to remember the political motives of the conservative resistance, along with its many shortcomings and acceptance of many Nazi policies. Thus, to be fair, political allegiance should be irrelevant to the identification of resisters.[33]

At an unofficial commemoration ceremony on 20 July 1994, Annemarie Renger, a former Social Democratic president of the Bundestag and president of the Central Union of Democratic Resisters, provided a perspective on the museum controversy very similar to Steinbach's position. She stated,

> It is extraordinarily important to keep the unity and continuity of the resistance before our eyes. Thus it would be a horrible diminution to reduce the struggle against terror to particular persons or events both for how we view ourselves and for how others view us.

Renger qualified her statement by maintaining that it was much more important to ensure proper German political attitudes in the future by protecting the resisters' legacy and using them as models. Nevertheless, she made a strong case for Steinbach's and his supporters' view, which focused on the broadness of the resistance. In essence, she argued that this broad view was an important part of German self-identification, thereby using the conservatives' emphasis on identity against them.[34]

Family Members of Resisters

The museum debate divided even resisters' family members because many did not agree with Franz von Stauffenberg. Two widows of labor leaders involved in the coup of 20 July did not appreciate his politicization of resistance memory. They too argued that Claus von Stauffenberg had appreciated the acts of Communists, so the son was definitely not like his father in this respect. A member of Stauffenberg's military family, that is, a soldier who served with him, extended this argument. He claimed that Claus von Stauffenberg would be happy to share his office with Ulbricht and Pieck, in contrast to all the criticism of the location of these two men's portraits. The most outstanding example of resisters' relatives' support for the exhibit was a

declaration signed by several widows and others who were mostly relatives of those outside the 20 July conspiracy. In it they outlined several important reasons to support the museum. Like Steinbach, they called for a reintegration of resistance memory by stating, "After the unification of Germany, the division of the German resistance in former eastern and western perspectives should be undone and not renewed." They also lauded the exhibit: "We believe that the perspective of the entire resistance is shown from opposition to non-conformity that came from ideological and political sources and occurred in different forms." Thus, "the existing exhibit in the Berlin museum must remain a place of discussion and should not become a rallying point for particular groups or institutions." Steinbach could not have wished for any stronger support from such a credible source.[35]

However, other family members supported Franz von Stauffenberg's position completely. A daughter of a conservative resister maintained that Germans must continue to distinguish between conservative and Communist resisters, because their goals had been so different. The strongest support for this view came from Hans Christoph von Stauffenberg, Claus von Stauffenberg's cousin. The implication by some that Claus von Stauffenberg enjoyed working with Communists offended the relative since he believed that Stauffenberg had always considered the struggle with Communism to be more important than the struggle with Nazism. He also utilized many of the same arguments as historians who had criticized the exhibit. He argued that the exiles in Moscow were "collaborators with another tyranny who during the struggle [of real resisters] led a comfortable life in the Soviet Union," and that they had helped establish a system of persecution and murder. They were "not resisters, and should not be served by honorable memories."[36]

Public Opinion on the Controversy: Letters to the Editor

Letters to the editor in several German newspapers during the summer of 1994 showed that many people agreed with Franz von Stauffenberg. Two citizens criticized Peter Steinbach very personally and directly. Several also argued that linking the men of 20 July with the resisters in Moscow in any way was nothing short of historical falsification.[37] Others criticized the notion that the political objectives of Communists were irrelevant, not only during the war, but also

before 1933, and after 1945.[38] One writer succinctly summed up these criticisms when he wrote, "The equalizing of the so-called 'Communist resistance' that did not struggle for democracy and freedom but for the worldwide victory of communism ... Their equalizing with the resisters of 20 July is an insult to all who resisted a dictatorship for freedom."[39]

Of course Steinbach had his supporters among the public, too. One person believed that the museum offered the first real chance to honor all resisters, but this controversy threatened to close this window of opportunity before citizens could take advantage of it. The letter writer also argued that the link between East Germany and the Communist resisters was deceiving, because many of them had been dissidents after 1945. Another person used comparison to support the right of Ulbricht and Pieck to be in the exhibit, arguing that the conservative resisters' complicity with the Nazi regime was roughly equivalent to German Communists' support for the Stalinist regime. Thus Communists were no better, or worse, and deserved a place in the museum as much as the men of 20 July. Yet another person totally agreed with Steinbach's arguments. He wrote that Germans should no longer allow the Cold War to divide resistance perceptions. In addition, he emphasized that "no follower or self-designated heir of the resistance [Franz von Stauffenberg] has the right to use 20 July for his political or other goals." It follows that the people had a duty to all resisters to counter the attempts to destroy their common legacy and experience.[40] This support for Steinbach was not restricted to letter writing as several leftist groups rallied against the removal of the Communists from the exhibit.[41]

The Intermediate Position

As with all debates, there were persons in all groups who held intermediate positions. Many, including the mayor of Berlin, argued that there was a place for the Communist resistance in German memory, but not in a museum built on the site where Stauffenberg and his coconspirators were executed. Most people who felt this way thought the proper place for Communist resisters was the proposed German history museum in Berlin.[42] Family members found themselves occu-

pying the middle ground of the debate as well. A granddaughter of a member of the 20 July conspiracy warned that this debate should not sink to the level of politics, but she also clearly emphasized that all resisters were not the same. Even Claus von Stauffenberg's widow was ambivalent about the museum exhibit. She believed that resisters outside the 20 July conspiracy were mentioned far too little, and that the museum should educate young people about all resisters, except those in exile during the Third Reich who were not true resisters. Thus she felt Communist resisters in Germany were true resisters.[43] A letter writer echoed this sentiment in his reaction to the resisters' family members who had expressed their support for the exhibit. He claimed that this recognition of some Communists did not preclude vehement opposition to the inclusion of Ulbricht and Pieck among others as he wrote:

> No pseudo-scholarly foundation can justify putting them in the museum. The differences between the honoring of the men of 20 July and a documentation [of resistance activities] without differentiation must be clear indeed.[44]

Conclusion

The museum debate destroyed any chance, however remote, for a consensus on the resistance in the newly united Germany. It even divided the Stauffenbergs, the family synonymous with the resistance: Claus von Stauffenberg's sons attended a 19 July ceremony in Munich while his widow attended the traditional Bendler-Block ceremony as she always had. The volatile atmosphere, created by unification and the end of the Cold War, provided the circumstances for a re-evaluation, or perhaps a re-devaluation, of the Communist resistance, which had become increasingly valued in the 1970s and 1980s. But it also provided an opportunity to reconsider the concept of resistance to the Nazi regime through the continuing debate over complicity with the East German Communist regime. The mere existence of the museum, which was explicitly designed to educate citizens, especially young people, about the activities and values of the resistance, provided the catalyst for the debate.

Of course this debate over the resistance and its legacy is nothing new. Resisters had always been ambiguous figures to many Ger-

mans, and ever since the 1960s, two different schools of thought on the resistance had coexisted – though not always peacefully – in West Germany. Some identified resistance solely with the coup conspiracy coup of 20 July; others identified it with a wide variety of people who committed very different acts of resistance. So in a real sense, the museum was the spark that ignited yet another in a series of debates over the resistance to the Nazi regime. But this debate over the museum was more than just the most recent in a series of controversies; it was the most widespread and heated of all resistance debates in the Federal Republic precisely because the conditions of unification, combined with the significance of the fiftieth anniversary and the long-standing differences on the resistance, provided the necessary energy for such a great debate.

But this latest debate was no longer about the past, as it had been for fifty years; it was now about the present and future. The attacks directed against some Communist resisters reflect the efforts by many to disavow totally the legacy of the East German regime. On the other hand, the defense of the inclusion of Communists in the museum exhibits shows the appreciation some have both for Communist resistance and, to a lesser extent, for the positive aspects of East German society. But, of course, the history of East Germany isn't Germany's only past; the process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* continued with the Nazi past as well. In his speech commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the coup attempt, West German President Gustav Heinemann observed:

> The best and worst traditions of our history are interwoven in this date in their full implications. They appeal to us to undo their dramatic connection.[45]

Now, more than twenty-five years later, and more than fifty years after the tragic events of 20 July 1944, Germans are still sorting out and grappling with these implications as they seek to unify the history of a still divided nation with a uniquely burdensome past.

Notes

1. Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, trans Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 96, 110; Natalie Zemon Davis and Randolph Starn, "Introduction," *Representations*, no. 26 (Spring 1989): 2-6; Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire," trans. Marc Roudebush *Representations*, no. 26 (Spring 1989): 8-9; Patrick H. Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1993), p. 77.
2. Nora, (see note 1 above), p 21; Davis and Starn, (see note 1 above), p. 3; Hutton, (see note 1 above), pp. 78-79.
3. For collections of 20 July commemoration speeches see *Bekenntnis und Verpflichtung: Reden und Aufsätze zur zehnjahrigen Wiederkehr des 20 Juli 1944* (Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag, 1955) and Informationszentrum Berlin, *Der 20. Juli 1944: Reden zu einem Täg der deutschen Geschichte*, vols. 1 & 2 (Berlin: Informationszentrum Berlin, 1984 & 1986). For several speeches by federal presidents in English, see Forschungsgemeinschaft 20. Juli e.V., *Reflections on July 20th 1944*, trans. Larry Fischer (Mainz: V. Hase & Koehler, 1984). For a brief analysis of speeches see Ulrike Emrich and Jürgen Nötzold, "Der 20. Juli in der öffentlichen Gedenkreden der Bundesrepublik und in der Darstellung der DDR," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* no. 26 (30 June 1983): 3-7, 11-12; and Johannes Tuchel, "Öffentliche Reden über den Widerstand," *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte* 1 (1988): 131-137.
4. "Erklärung der Jungdemokraten," *Der Tägesspiegel* (Berlin), 19 July 1974, p 2; Diethart Goos, "Filbinger würdigt die Männer des 20. Juli," *Die Welt* (Hamburg), 20 July 1974, p. 2; "Gedenkfeiern zum 20. Juli," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 July 1974, p. 5; "Gedenkfeier zum 20. Juli mit Protesten gegen Filbinger," *Der Tägesspiegel* (Berlin), 20 July 1974, p. 2.
5. David Clay Large, "Uses of the Past: The Anti-Nazi Resistance Legacy in the Federal Republic of Germany," in *Contending with Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich*, edited by David Clay Large (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1991), pp. 167, 181.
6. For statements prepared by several prosecution experts, see Herbert Kraus (ed.), *Die im Braunschweiger Remerprozess erstatteten moraltheologischen und historischen Gutachten nebst Urteil* (Hamburg: Girardet and Company, 1953), and for a brief account of the trial, see Rudolf Wassermann, *Der 20. Juli aus der Sicht des Braunschweiger Remerprozesses* (Braunschweig: Städtisches Museum Braunschweig, 1984).
7. According to a 1968 survey, only 4 percent of those persons age sixty and over who knew the significance of 20 July believed the resisters were traitors while 43 percent believed they wanted to save Germany. Elisabeth Noelle Neumann and Erich Peter Neumann (eds.), *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung* (Allensbach: Institut für Demoskopie, 1974), p. 207. For similar periodic survey data on German public opinion of the resistance, see the other volumes in this series by Elisabeth Noelle Neumann published as *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung* (Allensbach: Institut für Demoskopie, 1956, 1957, 1965, 1967, 1974), as *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie* (Vienna: Verlag Fritz Molden, 1977) and as *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie* (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1983, 1993).

8. In their article on resistance historiography, Klaus-Jürgen Müller and Hans Mommsen used the familiar labels "intentionalist" and "functionalist" to remind scholars of one of the major issues of historical debate in the Third Reich. This dichotomy usually refers to the two opposing interpretations of how the Nazi regime functioned, especially in the persecution and mass murder of Jews and others. However, it is also a useful tool for understanding the major differences between the two schools of resistance historiography. The intentionalists focus more on the moral motives of resisters and the coup attempt. They believe that resisters intended to resist the regime from a conscious, moral decision and acted accordingly. Functionalists focus more on resisters' political rather than ethical motives and their place within longer trends in German history. They argue that resisters acted based on their current situation rather than on some fundamental opposition to the regime. Klaus-Jürgen Müller and Hans Mommsen, "Der Deutsche Widerstand gegen das NS-Regime," in *Der Deutsche Widerstand 1933-1945*, edited by Klaus-Jürgen Müller (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1986), pp. 15-17. For a more detailed analysis of this broadening of resistance membership, see Gerd R. Ueberschär, "Von der Einzeltat des 20. Juli zur 'Volksopposition'? Stationen und Wege der westdeutschen Historiographie nach 1945," in *Der 20. Juli 1944: Bewertung und Rezeption des deutschen Widerstandes gegen das NS-Regime*, edited by Gerd R. Ueberschär (Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1994), pp. 104- 115.
9. Large, (see note 5 above), pp. 180-182.
10. For recent work on this divided memory see Jürgen Danyel, "Die geteilte Vergangenheit. Gesellschaftliche Ausgangslagen und politischen Dispositionen für den Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen Staaten nach 1949," in Jürgen Kocka (ed.), *Historische DDR Forschung. Aufsätze und Studien* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), pp. 129-148; and for an extensive analysis in English, see Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
11. For a comparison of commemoration speeches in the two Germanys, see Ulricke Emrich and Jürgen Nötzold, "Der 20 Juli in den öffentlichen Gedenkreden der Bundesrepublik und in der Darstellung der DDR," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 26 (30 June 1984): 3-12; and for a comparison of the two historiographies of the resistance, see Hans Mommsen, "Der 20. Juli 1994 in der historiographischen Sicht des gespaltenen Deutschland," *Politik und Kultur* 11 (1984): 9-20.
12. For the chronological divergence and subsequent convergence, to a certain point, of these two memorial traditions, especially their historiographical elements, see the complementary articles, Jürgen Danyel, "Bilder vom 'anderen Deutschland'; Frühe Widerstandsrezeption nach 1945," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 42 (1994): 611- 621, and Ines Reich, "Geteilter Widerstand. Die Tradierung des deutschen Widerstandes in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 42 (1994): 635-648.
13. Bernd Faulenbach, "Auf den Weg zu einer gemeinsames Erinnerung? Das Bild vom deutschen Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus nach den Erfahrungen von Teilung und Umbruch," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 42 (1994): 589-596; Moshe Zimmerman, "Die Erinnerung an Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand im Spannungsfeld deutsche Zweistaatlichkeit," in *Die geteilte Vergangenheit: Zum Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen Staaten*, edited by Jürgen Danyel (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), pp. 133-138.

14. Peter Steinbach, "Teufel Hitler – Beelzebub Stalin? Zur Kontroverse um die Darstellung des National Komitees Freies Deutschland in der ständigen Austellung 'Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus' in die Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 42 (1994): 651-653. For more on this early Cold War debate see Large, (note 5 above), pp. 167, 170-174.
15. Marianne Heuwager, "Missklänge vor den stillend Heldengedenken," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), 16 June 1994, p. 3; "Streit um Gedenkfeier zum 20. Juli," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 June 1994, p. 5. (Note *Süddeutsche Zeitung* will be referred to as *SZ* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* will be referred to as *FAZ*.)
16. "Gedenkstätte Deutsche Widerstand besetzt," *FAZ*, 19 July 1994, 1; Jens Jessen, "Die Ehre," *FAZ*, 20 July 1994, 27; "Sechs Stunden Protest gegen den Deutsche Bild vom Widerstand," *Der Tagesspiegel* (Berlin), 19 July 1994, 8. (Note *Der Tagesspiegel* will be referred to as *Tages*.) For an historical criticism of the emphasis on the conservative resistance in 1994, see Frank Ster "Wolfsschanze versus Auschwitz. Widerstand als deutsches Alibi?" *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 42 (1994): 645-650.
17. For some of the earliest work criticizing the ideas of the conservative resistance see Walter Schmitthenner and Hans Buchheim (eds.), *The German Resistance to Hitler*, trans. Peter Ross and Betty Ross (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), particularly the articles by Herman Graml, "Resistance Thinking on Foreign Policy," pp. 1-54 and Hans Mommsen, "Social Views and Constitutional Plans of the Resistance," pp. 55-147.
18. For the proceedings of the 1984 conference on "German Society and Resistance to Hitler," see Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), *Der Widerstand gegen Nationalsozialismus: Die Deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler* (Munich: Piper, 1986). For newspaper coverage of the conference, see especially the Berlin daily *Der Tagesspiegel*, 4 July through 8 July. For some of the most recent examinations of the military resistance, see Gerd R. Ueberschär, "Die deutsche Militäropposition zwischen Kritik und Würdigung. Zur neueren Geschichtsschreibung über die 'Offiziere gegen Hitler' bis zum 50. Jahrestag des 20. Juli 1944," in *Aufstand des Gewissens: Militärischen Widerstand gegen Hitler und das NS-Regime 1933-1945. Katalog zur Wanderausstellung, im Auftrag des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes*, edited by Heinrich Walle (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1994), pp. 657-683.
19. Christoph Dipper, "Der 20 Juli und die 'Judenfrage,'" *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), 8 July 1994, p. 20. For a more detailed criticism, see Dipper's article "Der deutsche Widerstand und die Juden," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 9 (1983): 349-380. Peter Hoffmann, "Sie erhoben sich, weil sie die Morde nich dulden wollten," *FAZ*, 15 July 1994, p. 6.
20. This was not the first resistance museum in Berlin. In 1948 the Union of Victims of the Nazi Regime, a group composed mostly of leftist resisters, opened an exhibit to showcase their collection of archival resources thus far. However, this museum did not remain open long as it was not political enough for the Communist regime. Jürgen Danyel, "Bilder vom 'anderen Deutschland,'" *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 42 (1994): 618.
21. Marianne Heuwager, "Aufbegehren – akribisch dokumentiert," *SZ*, 19 July 1989, p. 3.
22. Peter Steinbach, "Vermächtnis oder Verfälschung? Erfahrungen mit Ausstellungen zum deutschen Widerstand," in Ueberschär, (see note 8 above), pp 170-177.

23. For a brief description of the museum exhibit room by room, see Peter Steinbach, *Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand* (Berlin: Hellmich, 1990). For an excellent, brief history of the museum between 1979 and its opening in 1989, see Marianne Heuwager, "Aufbegehren – akribisch dokumentiert," *SZ*, 19 July 1989, p. 3; and for a more detailed history of the memorial site and an explanation of the purpose of the museum, see Johannes Tuchel, "Zur Geschichte und Aufgabe der Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand," in *Aufstand des Gewissens* (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1994), (see note 18 above), pp. 705-717.
24. For a less personal and emotional encapsulation of the two major positions in the museum and the wider resistance debate in 1994, see the discussion among Marion Dönhoff, a longtime journalist and steadfast conservative resistance advocate, former President Richard von Weizsäcker and former chancellor Helmut Schmidt in *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), 22 July 1994, p. 3. They also touched on other resistance dilemmas, such as the status of deserters and troops who did not internalize Nazi ideology, as well as the armed forces' complicity in Nazi crimes.
25. For a brief historical background on these two groups, see Peter Steinbach, "Teufel Hitler – Beelzebub Stalin?"pp. 651-653.
26. "Streit um das Gedenken zum 20 Juli," *FAZ*, 28 June 1994, p. 4.
27. All quotes taken from Peter Steinbach, "Der 20 Juli ist kein Familienbesitz," *Tagesspiegel*, 20 June 1994, p. 11. See also Steinbach, "Teufel Hitler – Beelzebub Stalin?" pp. 651, 661. For a more detailed explanation of Steinbach's ideas on resister identity, see his article, "Wer gehört zum Widerstand gegen Hitler?" *Dachau Heft* 6 (1994): 57-72.
28. Wer gehört zum Widerstand?" *Tagesspiegel*, 12 July 1994, p. 2; Rainer Eckert, "Widerstand gegen Hitler," *Tagesspiegel*, 24 July 1994, Weltspiegel section, p. 2; Christoph Klessmann, "Nicht in Zweifel ziehen," *FAZ*, 17 June 1994, p. 8.
29. "Wer gehört zum Widerstand?" *Tagesspiegel*, 12 July 1994, p. 2. For Fest's comments about the public's lack of connection with the resistance, see the introduction to his book *Staatsstreich: Der Lange Weg zum 20. Juli* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1994). Or see the preface of this work in English published as *Plotting Hitler's Death*, trans. Bruce Little (New York: Henry Holt, 1996), pp. 3-6.
30. Jens Jessen, "Nicht alles Freunde der Freiheit," *FAZ*, 10 June 1994, p. 35; Marion Dönhoff, *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), 22 July 1994, p. 3; Albrecht von Maltzan, "Der Unrechtsbewusstsein der Deutschen," *Die Welt* (Hamburg), 16 July 1994, p. 5; Herbert Kremp, "Entscheidenden Wurf gewagt," *Die Welt* (Hamburg), 18 July 1994, p. 4. (Note: *Die Welt* will hereafter be referred to as *DW*.)
31. Karl-Heinz Janssen, "Ein Anschlag auf den Widerstand," *DZ*, 15 July 1994, p. 13; Herbert Riehl-Heyse, "Das Band der Sippenhaft," *SZ*, 20 July 1994, p. 3.
32. Helmut Kohl, "Verpflichtung und Vermächtnis," *Das Parlament* (Bonn), 5 August 1994, p. 22.
33. Helmut Schmidt, *Die Zeit*, 22 July 1994, p. 3.
34. Annemarie Renger, "Die Tat anerkennen," *Tages*, 21 July 1994, p. 4.
35. Marianne Heuwager, "Missklänge vor den stillend Heldengedenken," *SZ*, 16 June 1994, p. 3; "Stauffenbergs Urteil über das Nationalkomitee," *FAZ*, 7 July 1994, p. 8; "Erklärungen von Widerständlern," *Tages*, 17 July 1994, p. 15, "Überlebende lehnen Ausgrenzung ab," *SZ*, 19 July 1994, p. 6.
36. "Unterschiede im Widerstand gegen Hitler," *FAZ*, 13 June 1994, p. 8; "Kollaborateure einer anderen Tyrannei," *SZ*, 13 July 1994, p. 10.

37. Helmut Tiedemann, "Unrecht," *DW*, 25 July 1994, p. 5; Ulf Heinsen, "Widerstand," *DW*, 7 July 1994, p. 5; Eugen Fritze, "Das 'Nationalkomitee' hat wenig überzeugt," *FAZ*, 22 June 1994, p. 10; Horst Zank, "Verfälschung," *DW*, 7 July 1994, p. 5; Jürgen Lohmann, "Teufelspakt," *DW*, 20 July 1994, p. 5.
38. Willy Werner, "Frühe Kämpfer für eine Diktatur," *FAZ*, 26 July 1994, p. 7; Horst Zank, "Verfälschung," *DW*, 7 July 1994, p. 5; Rolf Hinze, "20. Juli," *DW*, 19 July 1994, p. 5.
39. Egon Kunze, "Makaber," *DW*, 27 July 1994, p. 5.
40. Oliver Thomas Domzalski, "In ihrer Ziet ehrenhaft verhalten," *FAZ*, 16 June 1994, p. 10; Hermann Biermann, "Fehldeutung," *DW*, 27 July 1994, p. 5; Karl-Heinz Wiezorrek, "Wem gehört zum der Widerstand?" *Tagesspiegel*, 17 July 1994, Weltspiegel section, p. 2.
41. Malte Lehming, "Vom Widerstand gegen Hitler zum Protest im Mutlangen," *Tages*, 17 July 1994, p. 2.
42. "Irritation um Diepgen-Ausserung," *Tagesspiegel*, 21 July 1994, p 2; "Kohls Mahnung am 20. Juli," *FAZ*, 21 July 1994, p. 2; Günther Gillessen, "Aber wofür waren Sie?" *FAZ*, 10 June 1994, p. 1; "Streit um das Gedenken zum 20, Juli," *FAZ*, 28 June 1994, p. 4.
43. Caroline Neubar, "Die Tat hat es doch gegeben," *FAZ*, 5 July 1994, p. 33; "20. Juli-Kein Familienbesitz," *Tagesspiegel*, 17 July 1994, Weltspiegel section, p. 2.
44. "Widerstand ist nicht unteilbar," *Tagesspiegel*, 7 August 1994, Weltspiegel section, p. 2.
45. Fischer (trans), (see note 3 above), p. 68.