

Per necessità familiare: Hypocrisy and Corruption in Fascist Italy

Over recent years, historians of Nazi Germany and of the USSR have been interested in endeavouring to locate the *mentalité* of these two societies.¹ Both police reports and letters of denunciation from the public have been scanned with a view to establishing what might have been the everyday thought patterns of the populace.² Fascist Italy, the third of the so-called 'totalitarian' states, has been presenting a rather different historiography. Led by Emilio Gentile³ but with greatest presence in the United States,⁴ an 'Anti-Anti-Fascist' school has sought to chart webs of significance which, it has been alleged, bound Fascist state to Italian society and so brought 'cultural revolution'.⁵ Fascism, it seems, aimed fundamentally to win its population over to 'new identities as citizens' and to create a fully Fascist 'self'.⁶ Typically these culturalist historians rely on published material, the words of party journals, the staging of a play, the messages of contemporary advertisements⁷ and all the natural documentary humus which might attract scholars self-consciously working after the linguistic turn. The danger of this concentration, it has been remarked often enough, is that it can sometimes obscure the messages written between the lines. When, for example, the staggers of the *avant-garde* Fascist 'event' *18BL* state that all tickets to the spectacle were sold, do we believe them or do we at a minimum ask for further evidence about the matter?⁸ To be sure, the more subtle of the culturalist historians have started talking about the 'Fascist form of pluralism'.⁹ Mabel Berezin, for one, admits that the Fascist spiritual revolution remained to a considerable degree 'prisoner' of 'available schema' in Italy, among which she lists the ideals and assumptions of family and church.¹⁰ And yet, she and her colleagues cling to the concept of a

truly Fascist aesthetic, and to the image of a regime where 'the public piazza was the cathedral of fascist culture, a nonliberal public sphere based on performances not text'.¹¹

Great caution, however, is necessary before accepting such analysis. How, after all, do we move from the surface of Fascism, which often glittered and may well have been 'fascinating',¹² to the response of the mass of Italians to the various policies of their dictatorship? What is the connection during Mussolini's regime between the appearance of Italian life and the deep structures of Italian society?

The answer to these questions is best sought through careful social history — Victoria De Grazia has already shown the way in her fine study of 'how Fascism ruled women'.¹³ In her book, De Grazia delineates a subtle and changing relationship between the enunciated policies of the regime and the response of a female population, itself differentiated by class, age, region, religious belief and many other factors. In the light of De Grazia's account, it becomes very difficult to argue that a totalitarian state had fully seized on at least the female part of society, atomizing its members and depriving them of agency. Although they were naturally influenced by the words and practices of the Fascist dictatorship, Italian women retained minds of their own. A history of their *mentalité* discloses nuance and the ability to dissent and manipulate as much as it reveals a willingness to 'believe, obey, fight'.

What we still do not possess, however, whether in Italian or English, is a proper social history of all Italians. Nor can I attempt such a work in this paper, even though I am aware that many of the thoughts and expectations of ordinary Italians under the Fascist regime may well be traceable in the published collections of 'letters to the *Duce*'¹⁴ and the numerous police reports and private denunciations preserved in the archives. My present ambition is more limited. In the pages which follow I shall provide a case study of the *mentalité* of members of what might be termed 'Mussolini's entourage'. To this end, I shall utilize material from the files of the *Segreteria Particolare del Duce* (that is, from Mussolini's private office).

Apologetic of the fact that I shall thus in some senses be returning to a 'history from above', or at least from way up there, I shall nonetheless restrict my consideration to documents preserved in the *Carteggio Riservato* of the *Segreteria*. Such files

concentrate on leading figures in the Italian political, economic and social order, with comments on more humble folk being relegated to the *Carteggio Ordinario*. The papers in both sets of *Carteggi* are arranged by person, but they are otherwise uncatalogued and are very mixed in significance and nature. They typically include letters of denunciation, signed and unsigned, from the public, official and unofficial police reports, telephone taps, and correspondence to and from the *Duce*. For example, there are five *buste* or packets on Roberto Farinacci,¹⁵ in which are found letters and other material by Farinacci but also material hostile to him, including police reports and denunciatory letters from the public at large.

What, then, is known about this Fascist leadership group? Denis Mack Smith has led the chorus of condemnation. 'If a leader can be judged by his chosen subordinates, Mussolini ranks very poorly indeed,' Mack Smith wrote peremptorily in his biography of the *Duce*. 'One or two of his ministers were of more than moderate ability, but most were less than competent and some would have been in prison in any other country.'¹⁶ Quite a few Italian commentators have endorsed this line¹⁷ and, in the archives, there is record of a contemporary joke, which reached Mussolini's desk in October 1940 with the warning that it was 'idiotic, of course, but offensive'. Wanting to invade England, Hitler, it was said, had petitioned the Italian government either for the use of its army or for a dozen party *gerarchi* (bosses). The latter were known to be so 'thirsty' that they would surely lick the Channel dry and so make the invasion a cake-walk.¹⁸

In recent decades, however, Italian scholarship, especially that linked to conservative biographer of Mussolini, Renzo De Felice, reacting perhaps not surprisingly to the lordly disdain of Mack Smith, has found reason to defend at least some of Mussolini's closest associates. In a general reworking of the image of the Fascist regime, based on the assumption that its administrative practices should not be assumed to have been worse than those of the post-war Republic,¹⁹ Anti-Anti-Fascist scholarship has treated Dino Grandi,²⁰ Giuseppe Bottai²¹ and even Achille Starace²² as serious thinkers, astute tacticians or competent administrators. Non-Italian historians, too, reminded that 'Italophobia' can sometimes be an 'English-speaking malady'²³ and simultaneously aware that the political elites of their own countries are not always seamless in their virtue and

competence, have eschewed Mack Smith's apparent sense of effortless superiority. However, the revisionism from either camp has not usually turned into applause for the Fascist regime. De Felice for one reiterated his view that continued experience of government made Mussolini more and more 'cynical'.²⁴ Mussolini's 'leadership style' often seemed based on an arch-realism in which a contempt for humankind in general and his own entourage in particular lay never far from the surface.

Why might this have been? Among the leading figures of Fascist Italy it is easy to find evidence of credulity, loyalty, an almost numbed admiration for Mussolini and belief in his star, as well as expressions of a fervent enthusiasm for this or that Fascist ideal or policy. Except in regard to their flaunted fealty to their *Duce*, however, the leadership group simultaneously evinced a continuing belief in a host of matters which Mabel Berezin might construe as composing the 'private self'.²⁵ Of course, if any of his colleagues ever had doubts about their *Duce*, they were likely to be encouraged by their leader to keep quiet about them. As Mussolini had proclaimed bluntly at a time of crisis in 1921, Fascism was his child: 'I, with the iron strength of my faith, courage and passion, shall either keep [the movement] on the right track or make its life impossible . . . If Fascism does not follow me, no one can force me to follow Fascism . . . The man who has founded and directed a movement and given it the very sum of his energy has the right to select from the opinions of a thousand local interests in order to see from on high a wider horizon, a panorama which is not that of Bologna, nor of Venice nor of Cuneo, but of Italy, of Europe and of the world.'²⁶ Seven years later, Mussolini, now entrenched in power, was even less ready to mince words about his authority. He had been sent by Emilio Bodrero, an ex-Nationalist philosopher, a reverential study of the *Duce's* thought. The work, Mussolini remarked, was 'interesting and, basically, it corresponded with reality'. He advised, however, that Bodrero had not gone far enough in his praise of his leader. He should add that 'my culture cannot be described as general or, worse, as generic; rather it is *systematic* [sic] on every question. This is because culture serves me, not I it. Means, not end. Armour, not adornment,' even though Mussolini added, with a belated modesty, that he did have a weakness for philosophy and had that moment finished reading some Platonic dialogues.²⁷

This combination of a prickly refusal to accept even a minimal dimming of his aura with a hectoring dominance over all his underlings served Mussolini well as dictator. Apart from the exchange over Mussolini's breadth as a philosopher, the archives preserve a pathetic, yet typical, letter of November 1938 in which Bodrero hoped that 'Padua where I have lived and taught for twenty years will not forget my career as a combatant in the war, as a Fascist of 1919, and as a devoted servant of the regime, just because my wife, who completed 19,000 hours of ward work and won a silver medal as a nurse in the [First World] War, does not belong to the Aryan race. I am certain that I shall not thus address in vain my *DUCE* to whom I confirm my unchanging fidelity.' Even more grovelling are the well-known remarks of Bottai in 1941 about how 'a Chief is everything in the life of a man'.²⁸ Here was a leader with the effrontery to tell the sceptical and manipulative businessman Giuseppe Volpi as he was about to conduct crucial financial negotiations in the US: 'The notes which follow are not so much the result of deep thought and study of the problem . . . but rather [they spring from] my personal intuition which is almost always infallible.'²⁹ Here was a leader whose followers did not challenge such absurd arrogance (or levity).

And yet Mussolini's verbal violence and flaunted fondness for bullying all who came near him³⁰ did not mean that the Fascist leadership group was ever purged with the murderousness which Stalin visited on his old Bolshevik colleagues, or with which some more radical Nazis were punished on the Night of the Long Knives. Rather, what is extraordinary about the Fascist leadership is its continuity. Boasted 'changes of the guard' could produce ministerial sackings or transfers to other positions. But the majority of prominent early Fascists remained prominent through the life of the regime. The most drastic attempt to provide the Fascist leadership with a fresh image, the appointment of the youthful Aldo Vidussoni as Party Secretary in December 1941, seems to have been quickly esteemed both a desperate act and a pointless one; as a police report to Mussolini commented in February 1943: 'the work of Vidussoni is restricted to visiting the wounded in hospital or going to football matches and boxing contests. Indeed, he knows so little about the party and its patterns of behaviour that he keeps asking for information on the background and actions of *gerarchi* who have held leadership positions in the Fascist system for many years.'³¹ Vidussoni, it is

plain, was ill equipped to comprehend the unspoken assumptions of Fascist Italy and so would never master his administrative role.

To be sure, in the years before there had been occasional cases of Fascists, especially 'radical' fascists,³² losing their jobs and even of them being sent to *confino*, that highly Italian punishment relegating the victim to some part of the country, an isolated island or a village deep in the South, which, ironically given recent claims in the historiography of a Fascist totalitarian nationalization of the masses, were thought to exist outside the full functioning of national life. During the 1920s, the most notorious victim of such a process was Mario Giampaoli, the editor of an extremist Fascist journal evocatively entitled *1919* and the *federale* (Party chief) of Milan. Already in 1926, Giampaoli was told by Mussolini's brother Arnaldo (of whom more later) that there were too many incidents under his rule which affronted 'the susceptibility of a great and sensitive city like Milan'.³³ This comment signalled a developing attack on Giampaoli who was accused of financial and sexual corruption — in the latter regard he was said to live with three women, one of whom, an ex-prostitute, he married in December 1926 in order to legitimize a son. The resultant wedding ceremony had been a great public event and occasioned the extorting of one million lire in wedding 'gifts'. Blackmail, gambling and drug-taking were thought to be among Giampaoli's sidelines.³⁴ By 1929 Party Secretary Augusto Turati was demanding that Giampaoli be expelled from the Fascist Party, a fate which Giampaoli would claim he first learned about from reading *Il Popolo d'Italia*.³⁵ Thereafter the affair was only kept alive by Giampaoli's persistence in writing to Mussolini about his dedication, poverty and compassion — the health of his grandmother in her nineties especially worried him, or so he said.³⁶ This persistence to some extent paid off. His term of *confino* came to an end, and, by 1938, Giampaoli was thanking Mussolini for intervening against allegedly malevolent Jewish forces and allowing him '*sistemazione*' with the Lancia automobile concern in Naples.³⁷ In February 1940 he could rejoice in the resumption of his Party membership, although the police remained watchful of his activities and were soon reporting dubious financial dealings and a fondness for exploiting friends in high places.³⁸ On May Day 1943 Giampaoli was still writing to the *Duce*, on this occasion with the suggestion that he return to Milan as *federale*. He could be relied on to get the city back on

the rails, he averred. Having thus displayed his Fascist valour and virtue he would then retire to being a simple *gregario* (follower) again.³⁹ Giampaoli was one Fascist who may have loved his *Duce* but who retained a strong sense of his own self and a belief, no matter the slings and arrows of immediate fortune, that a patron must sooner or later reward a worthy client. His Fascism may have been extreme and even literal, but his private self retained many ideals which could only be reconciled with difficulty to the character of the Fascist 'new man'.

A still more sensational case of a loser in internecine Fascist conflicts was Leandro Arpinati, the Fascist boss of Bologna. Like Giampaoli, Arpinati came from a radical background, having once been an anarchist.⁴⁰ In September 1929, Arpinati achieved national prominence by being promoted to the position of Under-Secretary for the Interior (the Minister was Mussolini himself). Arpinati was thus theoretically in charge of much of the policing of the Fascist regime and so was in a powerful but highly exposed position. Attacks soon followed, and were led by Achille Starace who, in 1931, would be promoted to be Secretary of the *Partito Nazionale Fascista*. In the destruction of Giampaoli, Achille Starace, then Party Vice-Secretary, had been the leading agent, with Arnaldo Mussolini singling out Starace's efficiency and rigour for recommendation to his brother.⁴¹ With Arnaldo's death, Starace to some extent took his place as the *Duce's* most loyal aide.⁴² Soon after that, he moved against Arpinati. On May Day 1933 Arpinati was suddenly sacked as Under-Secretary⁴³ and, in the aftermath of the dismissal, put under further police surveillance. Rumours spread of his financial corruption and his friendship with unworthy local Fascists, themselves tied up with prostitution, the corruption of minors and cocaine.⁴⁴ Worse, it was soon claimed that Arpinati had personally insulted the *Duce* and was threateningly associated with a group who had the potential to create a new political party.⁴⁵ In July 1934, Arpinati and some ten of his associates were arrested. They were soon sent off to *confino*, Arpinati's being on one of the remote Lipari islands, a sentence which was extended by five years in July 1939.⁴⁶ Not all of this term would be served because Italy's intervention in the war immediately brought him amnesty and he was back in Bologna by 14 June 1940,⁴⁷ there to await his fate as a victim of the Resistance at the end of the war.

What is most interesting about the Arpinati affair is Starace's

role in it. Starace took to purging with a will. The menacing pettiness of his campaign was even extended to denying to his victims the full capitalization of their names; in his prose, they became 'arpinati' or 'iraci'. In a letter to the *Duce*, Starace characteristically urged that Agostino Iraci, once Arpinati's chef de cabinet and then a prefect, should not just be dismissed but punished further: 'If iraci had been a genuine Fascist and not a vulgar criminal, he would not have endured the rise of arpinati but rather reacted as I reacted.'⁴⁸ Starace, it seems, was the potential Beria or Vyshinsky,⁴⁹ or even the Himmler *in pectore*, of the Fascist regime, desperate in his 'devotion' to Fascism.⁵⁰ Can Starace, then, have been the only person in Italy who had merged his 'public' and his 'private' selves?

Whatever the case, Starace's power was strictly limited since Mussolini notoriously left police activities in the professional hands of Arturo Bocchini, a career official and not a Party devotee.⁵¹ When, in October 1939, Starace lost his Secretaryship (shortly after he had presumed to criticize recent Mussolinian appointments and warned that 'the Fascists' wanted the anti-semitic campaign to go further and faster),⁵² he was treated more harshly than was normal in the Fascist regime, almost as though Mussolini, too, felt the distaste towards him which Starace so commonly invoked in others.⁵³ After a brief deployment to what was left of the MVSN (the Fascist militia),⁵⁴ Starace spent the war unsuccessfully petitioning his cherished leader for a job,⁵⁵ while rumours spread about a costly and incompetent land deal he was involved in on the outskirts of Rome and about his uneasy relationship with his son, Luigi.⁵⁶ In this last regard, a characteristic police report maliciously noted that Luigi Starace performed dismally as a lawyer. His incompetence ensured that most of his clients swiftly disappeared after his father fell from grace and office.⁵⁷ By the last months of the Salò Republic, Starace was enduring a pensioner's existence in Milan, dining at the *mensa di guerra* and feebly exhibiting his surviving Fascist élan by jogging around the streets, ignored or avoided by all. He would join his *Duce* at Piazzale Loreto in a bathetic end to his life, executed by partisans but, it seemed, only partially comprehending what was happening to the regime, to the country and to himself.⁵⁸ Here, then, was a Fascist True Believer but one of a decidedly equivocal kind, cleaving to his *Duce* and to the Fascist party and ideology as life-jackets for an existence which otherwise did not make

sense, opting for a public self because he, too, must have viewed with dismay the prospect of living with his private person.

Giampaoli, Arpinati and Starace, each in his different way seems to have thought of Mussolini as a patron, the purveyor of jobs, respectability or meaning. A still more striking case of Fascist clientship is provided by Amerigo Dumini,⁵⁹ leader of the squad which, on 10 June 1924, murdered reformist socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti. Dumini had been born in St. Louis, Missouri in 1894, and volunteered for the national Army in 1913 after having returned to be educated in Italy.⁶⁰ In the *dopoguerra*, Dumini became a Fascist activist in Tuscany and developed a career as an enforcer, ready for any violent act. When Matteotti disappeared, Dumini was quickly named as the person responsible and was arrested.⁶¹

The murder of Matteotti sparked a crisis in the Fascist regime, a crisis not resolved until Mussolini formally assumed the dictatorship on 3 January 1925. Whether or not the killing had been directly sponsored by the *Duce*, the Matteotti affair subsequently became a matter to be publicly forgotten. Dumini was thus an embarrassment, all the more so given his irrepressible fondness for rowdiness and violence and his less than subtle hints that the *Duce* had been directly responsible for the murder. The peril which he represented to the Fascist establishment was enhanced by his family's contacts with the United States and so by the ever present possibility that he would flee abroad and 'tell all' to some journalist.⁶² Dumini's story thus became a curious one of prison terms and of rustication to the colonies, while he could perennially rely on government subsidies — by the end of 1939 they tallied more than 2 million lire.⁶³ Here, it seems, was a black-mailer whose bluff was never called.

What is important in the twisted course of the Dumini story is not whether it proves Mussolini's guilt, or why, if he was such a threat, he did not meet with sudden death, but rather the phrasing of the letters which were occasioned by the affair. Dumini himself, his mother Jessie Wilson⁶⁴ and his mistress Bianca Fanfani wrote on very many occasions, normally to Mussolini, occasionally to Emilio De Bono, who had been head of the Fascist militia during the Matteotti affair, and frequently to each other. Although Dumini would sometimes evince a dedication to Fascism, the more obvious feature of the correspondence was that it was composed in the language of clientship.

Dumini often managed to be subservient and threatening at the same time. He would talk about reaching 'the end of his physical and moral resistance', about hunger,⁶⁵ cold⁶⁶ and other deprivation,⁶⁷ both in regard to himself and to his family.⁶⁸ He would describe illness,⁶⁹ depression and the prospect of suicide, and summon the deity to urge Mussolini not to abandon him, while all the time hinting at the services he had rendered: 'Can Your Excellency have forgotten what, in the years of danger, Dumini did for the Idea?'⁷⁰ A hint of violence was often there: the *Duce* could not know of the extent of his suffering but 'the moment in which he will take up our cause will see the end of our suffering and the extermination of all those who seek in vain to ruin me and the whole family', although for the moment God was their most immediate protection.⁷¹ It was indeed a wicked world, both for men and for women. As Jessie Wilson put it, her son was not only beset by 'communists and by the adversaries of Fascism' but also by 'occult and cowardly enemies' from within the movement, people who would, if they could, drag her son 'to disgrace, ruin and death'.⁷² The object of successful clientship was benefit to the family and so the location of a proper *sistemazione*.⁷³ It was also to ensure that the client lived within the ken of some form of civilization. Thus, when, in 1932, Dumini was briefly moved to Longobuco, a village in Calabria, his mother at once wrote to complain that such a *paese* was 'a place for wild beasts, in regard to the climate, the isolation and the food and lodging'.⁷⁴ In that classic Italian assumption about large stretches of the South, the Dumini's obviously deemed Longobuco part of 'Africa'.

Eventually, in 1934, Dumini was indeed transferred to Italian Africa and given an extensive holding near Derna in Cyrenaica.⁷⁵ He was soon writing back to tell the *Duce* of the pleasure he felt now that he could taste 'the joy of work', but also to request enhanced subsidies and a more public rehabilitation.⁷⁶ 'His Excellency' Mussolini should not 'forget that I am one of the old ones'.⁷⁷ It was this memory which, when Mussolini went on his celebrated 'Sword of Islam' visit to Libya in 1937, ensured that Dumini was simultaneously packed off on an Italian holiday.⁷⁸ As Dumini then explained while he headed for a comfortable hotel on Lago Maggiore: 'His Excellency the Head of Government had out of his family necessity helped him on various occasions' (tellingly, Dumini used the exact phrase, '*per le sue necessità famigliari*', which mocking rumour said was understood

to be the alternative meaning of PNF — *Partito Nazionale Fascista*).⁷⁹

The war found Dumini back in Cyrenaica where, at least by his own account, he was briefly captured by Anglo-Australian forces when they first took Derna. Summoning his American past, he allegedly welcomed the invaders in English.⁸⁰ By his own account nonetheless loyal to his ideology and nation, Dumini soon escaped, claiming heroism and good fortune and providing rich detail of the drunken barbarism of the Australian troops who had wanted to execute him.⁸¹ Soon he was back to requesting new subsidies; after all, he still felt 'a great need to work'.⁸²

Whatever understanding Dumini had of Fascism, his dedication to the revolution never obscured immediate concern for his family and his belief that he was deserving of 'moral' and financial help. Dumini belonged to that world which Mussolini's own relatives also inhabited, as 334 of them (229 have been counted from the *Duce's* own family; 105 from Rachele's) extracted funds from the Fascist government. Already in 1927, the extent of this largesse had prompted an irritated note from Arpinati, then *podestà* of Bologna, to the mayor and council of Predappio (the *paese* of the Mussolinis): '*Camerati*, the *Duce* is literally besieged by his relatives with requests for subsidies. The matter has become annoying and even indecent. Do the fullest documentary search which you can in the communal registers and in the baptismal files. Then hand over this sum in the most equal and rapid way possible. I attach 60,000 lire in bank-notes. The *Duce* will be profoundly grateful at the service you are rendering to him and to the decorum of the Fascist revolution.'⁸³

Dumini and the Mussolini family were lucky in that they were powerful clients, ones who could indeed expect to be paid. Sometimes more anxious about their ability to secure a place on the government's pay roll were many leading intellectuals. Their dallying with the Fascist state has already been the object of considerable review.⁸⁴ Certainly their alleged patterns of behaviour seem very little different from those of the political elite. Their Fascism, too, was scoured with hypocrisy and corruption. Architect Marcello Piacentini, for example, had claims of sexual misdeeds, speculation and plagiarism brought against him.⁸⁵ Composer Pietro Mascagni was always ready to push himself forward for greater financial and critical reward and also regularly averred that he was being persecuted by his enemies, who

included Farinacci, Bottai and Roberto Forges-Davanzati.⁸⁶ Officials occasionally risked irony in their description of such people. When, in 1939, ex-Futurist Ardengo Soffici, another petitioner of the *Duce's* favour, was elevated to the National Academy, a police report noted sharply that he was 'regarded as a great writer by the painters and a great painter by the writers, which means that he is really seen as an amateur by both'.⁸⁷

Elsewhere, the Fascist archives contain plenty of additional evidence of discontent at the fortune of others and an often greedy willingness to denounce 'corruption'. Again what is most significant for the purposes of the argument of this article is not whether or not each allegation of misdoing was true but rather the existence of a profound belief, which contradicts all Fascist preaching about the discipline and rigour of the Fascist new man, that corruption is what makes the world go round (and that the family is both the best agent and ideal recipient of any resulting opportunities and cash). Indeed, the evidence is so weighty that it counters any simple 'intentionalist' view that the behaviour and beliefs exemplified by Mussolini's entourage were occasioned simply by their *Duce's* leadership style. Rather hypocrisy and corruption, and what lay behind them, were a structure of Fascist Italian life.

It is thus hard to find a leading Fascist official around whom some rumour of illicit dealing did not eddy, even during the most tranquil of the 'years of [alleged] consensus'. Sometimes the evidence is straightforward. Telephone taps, for example, revealed Farinacci intervening to prevent a station-master being transferred from Stradella, near Cremona, to a *paese* in Calabria, doubtless like Longobuco by definition outside the Fascist 'nation'.⁸⁸ A brother was still more worthy of protection. Another telephone tap was recorded on the very day on which Farinacci had intervened to protect his client in the railways:

Farinacci: I have a brother [in the Army] who is about to do the exams to be promoted captain.

General Ottavio Zoppi (Ministry of War): Your brother won't run any risks. Leave it to me. I'll fix it.

Farinacci: It has to be done quick smart Zoppi, because the exams are already on.

Zoppi: I'll fix it.

Farinacci: Thanks.⁸⁹

Exams could be such taxing things. Another troubled by his prospects in that regard was Marcello Petacci, brother of Claretta, the *Duce's* most pertinacious mistress. In May 1938, young Marcello contacted Mussolini's private office with the announcement that, 'following the desire of the Chief', he intended to take his *libera docenza* in surgical pathology. In order to be safe he sent along a list of names of eminent professors of medicine, who 'could easily be summoned to be part of my examining commission'. The office duly set about preparing a letter of recommendation to some of these experts. The phraseology was direct enough: 'Dr Marcello Petacci is well known for his background in politics and for his scientific record which he has gained despite his youth. It would thus give great pleasure if Dr Petacci could achieve his wishes and we recommend him to you very strongly in any dealings which you will have with him.'⁹⁰ Someone then minuted dryly on this draft: 'I doubt if it is a good idea to make reference to his scientific record with these professors.'⁹¹ And so another, briefer, letter was written urging 'all possible interest' in Petacci receiving 'kind treatment'.⁹² He passed his exam. Petacci, it was plain, had friends in high places. He was not alone. Mussolini, too, in conversation, was given to defining men as 'friends'⁹³ and there is every reason to believe that, through the various levels of society, Fascist Italy remained a country where it was crucial to possess friends and friends of friends.⁹⁴

These friends, of course, were almost always male — even when he was speaking in favour of giving the vote to women in local elections, Mussolini (despite the boasted power of his own intuition) still characteristically averred that 'woman does not possess great powers of synthesis and great spiritual creations are simply denied to her'.⁹⁵ Nonetheless, the 'sexual order' of the Fascist elite was, like that favoured by most political elites, not identical with what became the rhetoric of Fascist gender relations. As Carl Ipsen has acutely noted, the battle of the births was scarcely assisted by the Fascist hierarchy. Mussolini himself had five legitimate and at least two illegitimate children, but the rest of his inner circle were not at all prolific, with members of the Grand Council in 1937 averaging 1.9 offspring.⁹⁶ A lack of children, however, did not always signify a low level of sexual activity, or the subordination of lubricity to a disciplined Fascist public self.

Fascism did not publicize its sex scandals, but some were so notorious that news of them must have trickled down to the public. There was the *Duce* himself, another who was the 'first of his class', and clintonically involved in his last decade with Claretta Petacci, a woman who was two years younger than his daughter Edda (born 1910). After July 1943, it was revealed that Mussolini's own phone had been tapped and that conversations had been recorded between the *Duce* and his mistress. Mussolini was given to ringing around midnight, typically complaining in March 1940 that he was tired out, as well he may have been, from a day's talks with Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. Mussolini rang, too, on the night of 9 June 1940, starting his conversation with a discussion of his stress level and ending it with a somewhat decorous variety of phone sex. 'Ben' and Claretta also talked on 23 July 1943 about whether or not they should spend the following Sunday at the beach, the *Duce* alarming Claretta by his doleful admission that an indulgence in such pleasure at so critical a time would not be possible.⁹⁷

Mussolini was scarcely alone in his recourse to extra-marital sex. Roberto Farinacci filled quite a few police notebooks with stories of his affair with Gianna Pederzini, an opera singer. Expensive presents,⁹⁸ champagne dinners, overnight stays in adjoining rooms at the best hotels,⁹⁹ public¹⁰⁰ and private quarrels¹⁰¹ and offers from friends to find Pederzini work in Rome so that she could be near her lover — descriptions of all these went into the police files.¹⁰² However wayward his own behaviour, it was very much in character to find Farinacci complaining about the open sexuality of members of the *Gruppo Universitari Fascisti*, with whom he shared a compartment on a war-time night trip from Genoa to Rome: 'Dear *Presidente*, These are the sort of young people who widen the break between us and the new generations. Yes, this is why workers and peasants stay aloof. Only university students, it seems, have the right to represent the new spirit,' although, naturally, Farinacci added in heartfelt cliché, their deplorable promiscuity was really the fault of their teachers.¹⁰³ Like many another ageing male, it seems, Farinacci was by then forgetting his happy boast in his own younger days that, in his home redoubt of Cremona, chastity was 'as rare as the Arabian phoenix'.¹⁰⁴

Farinacci's views and behaviour are so predictable as to be of

little significance except in further establishing the *mentalité* of the regime and its evident hypocrisy. More vivid in his indulgence in sexual misdemeanour was Alessandro Pavolini, in some eyes the truest believer of the younger generation and a major crafter of the alleged cultural revolution. At much the same time that Farinacci was inveighing against the loose morals of university students, Pavolini was having a very public affair with Doris Duranti, a film actress. His infatuation involved his absenting himself from his office,¹⁰⁵ providing gifts of fur coats (five at a time!)¹⁰⁶ and indulging in jealous public spats. More intriguing was the rumour that Doris, along with some of her friends, had persuaded the Minister to strip at a party at her house, after he had been urged to let them 'see what a Minister was made of'. There allegedly followed a black mass, with Pavolini still in attendance!¹⁰⁷

This last allegation is of doubtful credibility. But, in any case, what is significant is the belief which seems to have extended deep into society that leading political figures were given to sexual adventure, and that their habits in this regard easily fitted into a more general predilection for peculation. Behaviour like that ascribed to Pavolini was widely believed to be the way of the world. Alessandro Lessona was thought to have risen socially through his adroit choice of rich mistresses, one of whom he allegedly married off to his brother.¹⁰⁸ Michele Bianchi was said to have encouraged his aristocratic mistress in Calabria to preside over important and well-remunerated local appointments.¹⁰⁹ Balbino Giuliano, like Pavolini, was accused of being hard to track down at the office because he was spending his time in city pleasure trips with a blonde lady.¹¹⁰ There were even hints of sexual misdeeds on the part of Rachele Mussolini. The *Duce's* wife had been befriended by a Ferdinando Boattini of Predappio. In the summer of 1942, the two showed up there in a car together, talked to the *podestà* about public works and then left, still together, for the Mussolini beach villa at Riccione.¹¹¹ Boattini had earlier developed business interests in the new Italian empire in East Africa, perhaps improving his business prospects by giving five leopard skins each to Rachele and to Edda Ciano who, it was said, had in return helped him acquire four Fiat trucks.¹¹²

Boattini was not the only Fascist rumoured to have engaged in sharp dealing in the Empire. In these imperial possessions,

Farinacci reported, after an unofficial visit in 1938, political anarchy and unchecked corruption reigned: 'Too many individuals, too many companies, criminally attach themselves to the breasts of the *madrepatria*.'¹¹³ The Quadrumvir Emilio De Bono, for example, was pursued by allegations of peculation while governor of Tripolitania in the late 1920s¹¹⁴ and, during the 1930s, by rather more persistent claims about the manipulation of state contracts by him or his clients in *Africa Orientale Italiana*.¹¹⁵ These latter rumours sparked off one of the numerous and characteristic outbreaks of internecine warfare in the Fascist elite, with De Bono, despite his considerable age, eventually challenging Lessona, the Minister of Colonies and the most public of his assailants, to a duel.¹¹⁶ Not even intervention by Mussolini himself, who wrote that he considered De Bono 'outside and above any suspicion', underlining that he himself took personal responsibility for a road which had been built from Asmara to Massawa without proper bureaucratic forms, calmed matters.¹¹⁷ De Bono grew apoplectic at his fate, bitterly bewailing Mussolini's failure to protect him as a patron should. He must, he complained, accept 'the little fidelity which you keep in regard to promises made to me . . . I am fed up with being fooled and you, so far, have gone on fooling me, and abusing my good will [sic]. In the unlimited and affectionate devotion which I have for You (I trust I'm not putting that in doubt), I have held myself back. But now matters have gone too far; the cord has been pulled too tight. I have subordinately drunk too much olive oil and my stomach revolts from it. Enough.' Lessona was a 'crude, dirty and sinister individual', who must be stopped from abusing his position. 'Perhaps you have not understood that there is not a drop of servile blood in my veins and that not in my brain, nor in my heart, nor in my kidney, is there a grain of fear. I repeat what I have already said and written to you and what I mean: I am afraid of nothing and nobody. I am ready for anything. So don't be surprised at what I can do.' Mussolini should not forget De Bono's role in the Matteotti affair. If that implied threat was not enough, there was always the King to appeal to, but 'it is you who have the obligation to look after me, to look after me because I am really one of your men. And if you do nothing, I shall find justice in the way which I judge most convenient and sure. Don't have any doubts about it. I shall act when I deem it most opportune and I shall do so exclusively in my own interests.'¹¹⁸

There was lots of huffing and puffing in this letter, as Mussolini well knew. De Bono's vaingloriousness had long been acknowledged.¹¹⁹ Yet, again the phrasing of the letter is significant. De Bono was doubtless an old and silly man, but he was also another Fascist who thought that patrons had certain responsibilities and clients certain rights and who believed that this truism extended deep into society. The patron-client nexus underpinned each individual's place in a machiavellian or Darwinian world of perpetual conflict. For De Bono, as for many in the Fascist leadership,¹²⁰ a cultural revolution of order and unity did not extend to them, except in their acceptance that the *Duce* presided over Fascist Italy. In their dealings with each other, however, the first question was the sagely machiavellian one: 'are you, for the moment, a friend or an enemy¹²¹ (or an enemy of an enemy, who thus becomes a friend)?' It was all very well for a police report on the dispute between De Bono and Lessona to say that it was occasioning 'a sense of disgusted amazement' among informed opinion,¹²² but such conflicts were endemic during Fascist rule and amounted to the Italian version of the 'institutional Darwinism', familiar in accounts of Nazi Germany. This was the 'Fascist cannibalism' bewailed by one of its victims during the disputes of the 1920s.¹²³

The rallying of 'friends' and the identification of enemies thus constituted a permanent Fascist activity. When, for example, Italo Balbo was appointed Governor of Libya, he was known to be disgusted by his elimination from the corridors of power. He blamed Starace, it was said, for his fall and also used the occasion to quarrel openly with De Bono. Once in the colony he soon sought better relations with Giuseppe Volpi (Count of Misurata) and Vittorio Cini, two Venetians who remained key figures in the Fascist financial world. To cement their (temporary) alliance, Volpi allegedly arranged to manipulate an insurance deal to the benefit of some humbler clients of Balbo, hoteliers in Tripoli.¹²⁴

The chronicle of charge and counter-charge grows repetitive. Of leading Ministers, both Dino Grandi¹²⁵ and Bottai endured rumours of corrupt land dealing. Bottai was thought to have acted through his wife.¹²⁶ Ex-Quadrivir Cesare De Vecchi was said to expect presents in return for employment favours and to have profited from land deals using his brother as a front.¹²⁷ Cini was reported to have made illicit but profitable speculations, both abroad and in regard to the land reclamation schemes which

he had directed.¹²⁸ Guido Jung, Minister of Finance in the first half of the 1930s, was believed to have exploited export and import deals to his own benefit while demanding 'servility' from his officials.¹²⁹ Renato Ricci, head of the *Balilla*, may have profited through his wife and father-in-law in the marble business of his home region of Massa Carrara.¹³⁰ Carlo Scorza was listed as an ally in this affair and was also denounced for other speculation in his home town of Lucca — there he allegedly used a brother who was conveniently made head of the local bank.¹³¹ Even the blind war hero Carlo Delcroix was accused of profiteering over a eulogy he had written on the *Duce* — it was said that, following the worldly advice of a brother, he forced sales on the public.¹³²

The family, then, was plainly one institution whose habits had been by no means cancelled by a Fascist 'revolution'; the *paese* was another. Mussolini would frequently boast that the Fascist revolution had overcome *campanilismo*, but even his own speeches gave this claim the lie. It is true that he often expatiated on the iron-hard unity of nation and race, but he himself never quite abandoned the Italian habit of almost automatically detecting regional and local difference. Thus, at the height of the forging of the totalitarian state, he told a Genoese audience to be proud of their special stock (*razza*), forged on the sea¹³³ and therefore plainly different from that of other Italians. Three years later he typified Pius XI as a man descended from 'the Lombard people' (*gente*) and thus 'level-headed and courageous in pushing through with an initiative'; Neapolitans, by contrast, he agreed with his brother, sprang from a city which was 'beautiful but shallow'.¹³⁴ In his behaviour, too, Mussolini showed a decided awareness of region.¹³⁵ It was characteristic of him that after 28 October 1922, he carefully placed the interests of the newspaper *Il Popolo d'Italia* in the hands of his brother Arnaldo, who was simultaneously put in charge of Mussolini's key power base of Milan.¹³⁶ The myth of Rome was one part of Italian Fascist history; the reality of Milan another.

Other Fascists behaved in the same way as had their Liberal predecessor and as would their Christian Democrat and other successors. Ricci and Scorza have already been noted as needing someone reliable at home while they sought to carve out a national career. More minor figures kept more closely to their *paesi*. Thus, a Fascist deputy from Trieste continued to believe that 'Trieste [should go] to the Triestines' and that he should conceive

of himself as 'the deputy for Lloyd Triestino', one who brought Fascist party honours to the management of the local shipping concern.¹³⁷ A Genoese colleague was just as ready to serve the cause of his shipping magnates.¹³⁸ Most notoriously Turin remained throughout the Fascist era the kingdom of Fiat at least as much as it was the subject of Fascism.¹³⁹ Every Fascist Italian also knew of the hierarchy which separated one place from another, as has already been seen in the functioning of the system of *confino*. There was thus no reason for the *Duce* to evince surprise when Agostino Lanzillo, a Fascist philosopher, appealed for *una sistemazione* at the University of Venice in order to escape his present posting at Cagliari (and having failed in his hopes for a position at Milan).¹⁴⁰

In any survey of the gaps between Fascist rhetoric and Fascist practice, the most notorious area is that of racism and the ambiguous application of antisemitic policies from 1938 onwards. In considering the Axis and the Holocaust, for example, Jonathan Steinberg has detected a profound national difference between Germans and Italians: 'If Italian humanity rested on a matrix of secondary vice, German inhumanity lay deeply entangled in a system of secondary virtue.'¹⁴¹ Such an avowal of national characteristics always has a worrying side. There undoubtedly were 'real' Fascist Italian racists, who genuinely believed in the policies adopted against the peoples of the empire and also against Jews. The case of Giuseppe Bottai has already been noted. Mussolini himself was inconsistent in his own 'scientific' racism, but was also much given to 'ethnic' stereotyping.¹⁴² Perhaps a quick and strident summation of 'difference' appealed to his journalist's soul.

Nonetheless it is also true that plenty of leading Fascists, including staunchly pro-German ones, remained highly sceptical about racial theoretics. Farinacci was the classic example, as he strove to defend 'his' Jew, a secretary who had worked with him for many years. Sacking her, he explained in characteristic phrases, would create 'a bad impression in Milan': 'I am ready even to have all the Jews exterminated but, before striking the humble and innocuous, we must begin with those in positions of authority.'¹⁴³ Whatever it was that could be done with the Jews of Italy, Farinacci had to confess that his own antisemitism was tactical in nature:

To be frank, I have never been persuaded by the anthropological line on the racial question. Rather the problem is overwhelmingly political. Indeed I am convinced that, when scientists are brought into political matters, they only compromise the situation. In the arenas of philosophy and science, it is always possible to argue; where reasons of state arise, one must just act and conquer.¹⁴⁴

Mussolini himself, on occasion, did not disagree, as he, too, uneasily discounted the findings of the *scienziati* about an Italian race.¹⁴⁵ As late as October 1941, he also had reason to regret opposition from another front: 'My sons staunchly protect their Jewish friends. They threaten to provide a bed for them in their own rooms unless these friends are allowed to emigrate or otherwise can legally and durably find a settled place for themselves [*sistemare*].'¹⁴⁶ A decade earlier Mussolini may have demanded that 'the work of the regime . . . must inflexibly ensure that the letter does not corrupt the spirit, and the material does not weaken the ideal, so that the little needs, interests and appetites of individuals prevail over the general interest of the people'.¹⁴⁷ But, even in his most intimate circles, it seems, his demands had not been reliably met.

The culturalist school of recent historiography has more and more confidently asserted the reality of a cultural revolution in Fascist Italy, a revolution allegedly extending to ways of eating, dressing, working and sleeping as a new Fascist body and a new Fascist mind came into being.¹⁴⁸ The Fascist self, subordinated to the state, signified the fundamental antithesis between the purpose of the dictatorship and that liberal democratic freedom in which private selves bloom. Mussolini, in particular, became the vehicle for this thought control; allegedly, he 'occupied all the visible realm of politics; he monopolized public space'.¹⁴⁹ There may be some truth in this perception, although it would be wise not to forget the long-standing view that Mussolini was a variety of 'weak dictator'; as one Liberal contemporary put it: 'Given his mentality and his innate fear of the stronger, I do not believe and shall never believe that Mussolini will sweep away his friends who have constructed a myth of him in order to prop up their own rotten houses.'¹⁵⁰ Indeed, the evidence assembled in this paper suggests that, both directly among his entourage, and indirectly among the police and people, the revolution had shallow roots. Further exploration of popular *mentalité* is needed. Yet, just as women, according to Victoria De Grazia, were frequently capable of blunting Fascist intrusions and adapting Fascist aims

in the gender order to their own ends, so, too, Italians in other areas of their lives seem to have retained their private selves and to have been as moved by the structures of the histories of the Italies as by the influence of the political event of Fascism. It is tempting to conclude, in echo of what Sheila Fitzpatrick has had to say about Soviet peasants' experience of the 1930s,¹⁵¹ that the variety of (weak) totalitarian regime established in Fascist Italy merely enhanced a popular Darwinism and a popular scepticism towards those in command. Such (often contradictory) behaviour and attitudes are always likely to be found in everyday life, and are locatable today in many a society as we bow beneath the global hegemony of economic rationalism and of the liberal capitalist, consumerist, 'end of history', but do not all believe or fully succumb.

Notes

1. See, for example, the special issue of the *Journal of Modern History* 68 (1996), and notably its editors' summary, S. Fitzpatrick and R. Gellately, 'Introduction to the Practices of Denunciation in Modern European History' (747–67). Fitzpatrick's follow-up work in a special issue of *Russian History*: S. Fitzpatrick, 'Editor's Introduction: Petitions and Denunciations in Russian and Soviet History', *Russian History* 24 (1997), 1–9. There is also a further piece, S. Fitzpatrick, 'Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s', *Slavic Review* 55 (1996), 78–105.
2. See, further, S. Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times. Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (New York 1999).
3. See, especially, E. Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge, Mass. 1996), translation of *Il culto del littorio: la sacralizzazione della politica nell'Italia fascista* (Bari 1993).
4. See, for example in the recent English-language literature, S. Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy* (Berkeley 1997), who (7) declares that Gentile has not gone far enough in representing Fascism's 'original totalitarian culture'.
5. For a review of this literature, see R.J.B. Bosworth, *The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the History of Mussolini and Fascism* (London 1998).
6. M. Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy* (Ithaca 1997), 4.
7. K. Pinkus, *Bodily Regimes: Italian Advertising under Fascism* (Minneapolis 1995).
8. J. Schnapp, *Staging Fascism: '18BL' and the Theatre of Masses for Masses* (Stanford 1996), 68.
9. M.S. Stone, *The Patron State: Culture and Politics in Fascist Italy* (Princeton 1998), 3; see also R. Griffin, 'The Sacred Synthesis: The Ideological Cohesion of Fascist Cultural Policy', *Modern Italy* 3 (1998), 5–23.

10. Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self*, 4, 243.
11. *Ibid.*, 30.
12. The adjective was first deployed by Susan Sontag, a usage duly emphasized, for example, in the 1996 anniversary issue of the *Journal of Contemporary History* devoted to Italian Fascism. See the introductory article by J. Schnapp, 'Fascinating Fascism', *Journal of Contemporary History* 31 (1996), 235–44.
13. V. De Grazia, *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy 1922–1945* (Berkeley 1992).
14. See, for example, G. Boatti (ed.), *Caro Duce: lettere di donne italiane a Mussolini 1922–1943* (Milan 1989). Boatti notes that, during his term in office, Mussolini received more than 100,000 letters (15).
15. They splendidly include copies of his plagiarized law thesis and the original thesis. See *Segreteria particolare del Duce, Carteggio Riservato*, busta 40 (hereafter SPDCR). Farinacci's thesis, entitled 'Le obbligazioni naturali dal punto di vista del diritto e del diritto civile', as presented to the University of Modena, was word for word with that by Stefano Marengi, 'Revisione critica delle varie teorie intorno al fondamento della obbligazione naturale', and was passed by the University of Turin. B. 42 (Farinacci) police report to Bocchini, 31 October 1931, contains further accounts of the 'well-known trick with the thesis', including richer details in a letter from Alberici to Arpinati, 24 July 1930. Also to be found in the Farinacci file is the legal statement that plagiarism should be punished with a term of six months gaol, that 'being mandatory in all universities in the kingdom where university exams are concerned' (b. 43, statement of 19 April 1925).
16. D. Mack Smith, *Mussolini* (London 1981), 128.
17. See, most recently, A. Petacco, *L'archivio segreto di Mussolini* (Milan 1997). Of journalistic accounts, see the much more De Felicean, M. Innocenti, *I gerarchi del Fascismo: storia del ventennio attraverso gli uomini del Duce* (Milan 1992). Bottai is here defined as 'the most human and elevated of Mussolini's followers' (83). Similar, too, is G.B. Guerri, *Fascisti: gli italiani di Mussolini, il regime degli italiani* (Milan 1995), who is also particularly respectful towards Bottai, describing him as 'the only leading Fascist to have an organic vision of the state and of the means to build it', a man with a generally positive influence on Italian history (161, 164).
18. SPDCR, b. 47 (E. Muti), police report of 31 October 1940.
19. For further background, see R.J.B. Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War 1945–1990* (London 1993), 138–9.
20. See the highly controversial book by R. Quartararo, *Roma tra Londra e Berlino: la politica estera fascista dal 1931 al 1940* (Rome 1980) and the biographical studies by Paolo Nello, *Dino Grandi: la formazione di un leader fascista* (Bologna 1987); *Un fedele disubbidiente: Dino Grandi da Palazzo Chigi al 25 luglio* (Bologna 1993). Galeazzo Ciano, by contrast, continues to have a very bad press among the De Feliceans, despite the insights which he does seem to have had from time to time.
21. Among the chief propagandists for his father has been Bruno Bottai, who rose to become Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1987–94), a position of influence and potential patronage. See his B. Bottai, *Fascismo familiare* (Casale Monferrato 1997). Giuseppe Bottai's journal, *Critica fascista*, had welcomed the racial laws in 1938, a line very difficult to explain away in the 1990s.

See, for example, *Critica fascista*, XVI, 15 August 1938; 1 September 1938. In the latter case, an editorial argued that Italian racism was different from German even while '3000 years of history' proved the existence of 'a solidly based Italian race, always homogeneous, equal to itself on every occasion'. Neither 'Africans' nor Jews could belong to this race since, after all, 'the spiritual personality of Jews is too diverse from ours. Actually to be precise it is the complete opposite of the Roman and Catholic Italian personality.' An educational campaign might be needed to convince all Italians of this truth and it should proceed 'with what we can define as surgical intransigence in the Mussolinian sense' (*Critica fascista*, 15 October 1938). Corporatism (always Bottai's special 'intellectual theme'), too, was fundamentally extraneous to Jews. 'Impossible to assimilate to the Italian race as to others in Europe, the Jew has found in anonymous and speculative capitalism his sanctuary and his *patria*' (issue of 15 December 1938).

22. R. De Felice, *Mussolini il duce: gli anni del consenso 1929-1936* (Turin 1974), 216-7, 221.

23. For the starkest presentation of this case, see R.F. Harney, 'Italophobia: An English-speaking Malady', *Studi emigrazione* 22 (1985), 6-44.

24. See, for example, R. De Felice, *Mussolini il fascista II L'organizzazione dello Stato fascista 1925-1929* (Turin 1968), 357-61; *Mussolini il Duce: gli anni del consenso, 1929-1936*, 19-21, 174.

25. Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self*, 15, remarkably argues that 'Few fascists (I cannot identify one) began their career as liberals and few liberals converted to fascism.' Perhaps it depends a little on definition, but many in the leadership group and presumably even more ex-servants of the Liberal regime indeed surrendered their liberalism to fascism (though, doubtless, often without thinking that there was much that was contradictory between the two ideologies and practices).

26. B. Mussolini, *Opera omnia* (ed. E. and D. Susmel), vol. XVII (Florence 1955), 80-3.

27. SPDCR b. 81, 8 January 1928, Mussolini to Bodrero. Even in desperate circumstances in October 1943, Mussolini ostentatiously kept a volume on Socrates open on his desk. See E. Dolfin, *Con Mussolini nella tragedia: diario del capo della segreteria particolare del Duce 1943-1944* (Cernusco sul Naviglio), 1949, 35.

28. G. Bottai, *Diario 1935-1944*, ed. G.B. Guerri (Milan 1982), 247.

29. *Documenti diplomatici italiani*, 7th series, vol. IV, 387, 8 August 1926, Mussolini to Volpi.

30. He frequently remarks publicly on how tough and sharp-edged a personality he is. See, for example, B. Mussolini, *Opera omnia* (ed. E. and D. Susmel), vol. XIX (Florence 1956), 354, in which he defined himself as 'an unsociable animal'. He also was rather given to talking rhetorically about his dislike of speechifying and of ceremoniously regretting too many public ceremonies. See, for example, vol. XVIII (Florence 1956), 422; cf. vol. XXI (Florence 1956), 146, in which he urged that the people, too, were tired of ceremonies.

31. SPDCR b. 50 (Vidussoni), 16 February 1943, Caruso to Mussolini. Vidussoni was sacked in April 1943. He was replaced by Carlo Scorza who promptly wrote a devastating series of accounts of the feebleness of Fascist ideals then surviving in either Party or nation. See, for example, b. 49 (Scorza), 7 June 1943, Scorza to Mussolini.

32. Almost all the numerous case studies of regional Fascism have as their

theme the defeat of radicals by conservatives, often people with excellent contacts with power elites before 1922.

33. SPDCR b. 46 (Giampaoli), 9 October 1926, A. Mussolini to Giampaoli.

34. Ibid., 30 September 1927, 16 January 1928, both police reports; telephone tap, 25 December 1928. Edmondo Rossoni, another Fascist from a humble social background, also had to put up with allegations that his wife had once been a prostitute (along with lots of other claims about peculation, for example through land deals fronted by his uncle); b. 91 (Rossoni), 3 December 1928 report.

35. SPDCR b. 46 (Giampaoli), 1 April 1929, Turati to Mussolini; 19 April 1929, Giampaoli to Mussolini.

36. Ibid., 14 January 1930, Giampaoli to Mussolini; see also his further appeal on 23 August 1930 which ran to fourteen pages.

37. Ibid., 6 and 8 October 1938, both Giampaoli to Mussolini.

38. Ibid., 17 February 1940, Giampaoli to Mussolini; 9 September 1941, 20 April 1942, police reports.

39. Ibid., 1 May 1943, Giampaoli to Mussolini.

40. See the still highly positive summation of his career, SPDCR b. 79 (Arpinati), 6 October 1927 police report.

41. SPDCR b. 46 (Giampaoli), 20 November 1928, Arnaldo Mussolini to B. Mussolini.

42. SPDCR b. 48 (Parenti) 26 June 1933, police report, underlines the belief that the new *federale* of Milan, Rino Parenti, was a client of Starace. Denunciations eventually accused him of sex troubles with a maniac and of possessing a socially crude wife.

43. SPDCR b. 79 (Arpinati), 1 May 1933, Mussolini to Arpinati; see also b. 49 (Starace), 3 May 1933, Starace to Mussolini. Starace was especially troubled by the fact that Arpinati had presided over a province in which there were only 36 subscribers to *Il Popolo d'Italia*.

44. SPDCR b. 79 (Arpinati), 17 October 1933, Ciro Martignoni to Starace. Arpinati loudly denied the financial misdealing charge. See, for example, 20 October 1933, Arpinati to Mussolini.

45. Ibid., 20 July 1934, Bologna questore report.

46. Ibid., 19 October 1939, Prefect of Bologna to Ministry of the Interior.

47. Ibid., 14 June 1940, Prefect of Bologna to Ministry of the Interior.

48. SPDCR b. 49 (Starace), 15 September 1934, Starace to Mussolini; b. 25 (Iraci), 10 September 1934, Starace to Mussolini.

49. It is of course the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Bolsheviks: Short Course* (Sydney 1942) which happily talks about 'bukharins', 'rykovs', 'kamenevs' and other 'insects' (347).

50. Consider his pledge to Mussolini: 'You have the right to know everything about my every act, including those in my private life.' SPDCR b. 94, 14 April 1937, Starace to Mussolini.

51. There were also rumours of financial and sexual misconduct in his regard and he was thought to have gone to an early grave in 1940, exhausted by the combination of a heavy dinner and a young wife. Innocenti, *I gerarchi del Fascismo*, 168.

52. SPDCR b. 49 (Starace), 22 June 1939, Starace to Mussolini.

53. Even at the moment of his first successes, there was a file of allegations about his alleged fondness for peculation, sexual misdeeds, taking of cocaine and

his troubles with his wife who was thought to prefer a cousin to him. See SPDCR b. 94 (Starace), 13 October 1928, police report.

54. For his dismissal, see *ibid.*, 1 June 1941, police report on the pleasure of 'public opinion' at the news.

55. For an example, see *ibid.*, 26 January 1943, Starace to Mussolini. Also in the Starace file, perhaps for Mussolini's amusement, was conserved an epigram, ascribed to a military chaplain in Ethiopia in 1936, who imagined Starace's grave with the inscription: 'Qui giace Starace, dal volto rapace, di nulla capace, requiescat in pace.'

56. There were also stories of his avoiding rationing requirements in Rome hotels and of a costly friendship with an opera singer. See *ibid.*, 24 December 1941, Starace to Mussolini. Cf. b. 53 (Morgagni), 9 January 1942, police report that Manlio Morgagni, the journalist who would alone suicide at the news of Mussolini's downfall in July 1943, had spent 3,200 lire on a dinner for other journalists at a Rome hotel, 'naturally' ignoring completely the official rationing requirements.

57. SPDCR b. 94 (Starace), 14 July 1942, police report.

58. A. Petacco, *L'archivio segreto di Mussolini*, 74–5.

59. For his post-Second World War memoirs, see A. Dumini, *Diciassette colpi* (Milan 1958).

60. See M. Canali, *Il delitto Matteotti: affarismo e politica nel primo governo Mussolini* (Bologna 1997), 104.

61. B. Mussolini, *Opera omnia* (ed. E. and D. Susmel), vol. XX (Florence 1956), 325–6.

62. See Canali, *Il delitto Matteotti*, 526–44.

63. See *ibid.*, 547, and SPDCR b. 84 (Dumini), November 1939, report to Bocchini, reckoning that the figure was 380,386.40 directly but that indirectly it amounted to 2,376,780.25 lire.

64. Jessie sometimes wrote in English, for example on one occasion producing 'an Appeal from a Mother for help' 29 April 1929, Jessie Wilson to De Bono. Another letter (12 March 1930, Jessie Wilson to Mussolini), which asked: 'Have pitz for this motter soho util praz to save your sous' [sic], suggests that a letter-writer (who did not know English) was being used. Later, Dumini would claim that his mother was reduced to teaching English as a way of keeping body and soul together (24 April 1932, Dumini to Mussolini). Cf. from still further down the social scale the case of Albino Volpi, a member of Dumini's squad. Volpi and his wife each petitioned the *Duce* for an improvement in their life as market stall-holders. See b. 97 (A. Volpi), 25 May 1929, Asmara Norchi Volpi to Mussolini; 3 September 1930, Volpi to Mussolini. For accounts of the subsidies and recommendations which Volpi had received by 1934, see 26 June 1934, police summary. Volpi addressed Mussolini as 'Adored *Duce*, Your Excellency' (18 June 1934, Volpi to Mussolini).

65. SPDCR, b. 84 (Dumini), 20 May 1928, Dumini to Mussolini, where he complained 'I am hungry. I don't have a bean . . . I don't merit being treated this way.'

66. Sent to *confino* on the Tremiti islands, he asked to be sent warm clothing. *Ibid.*, 31 October 1928, Dumini to Mussolini.

67. On the Tremiti islands, Dumini appealed for a gramophone and a radio while also suggesting he had privileged information on local corruption. See *ibid.*,

18 June 1929, Dumini to Mussolini (and a similar letter to Bocchini).

68. See, for example, *ibid.*, 18 February 1929, stating that his father was 'on the edge of ruin' and his 'women' were only bringing in 40 lire per week from their humble activities.

69. The cold and damp of the Tremiti allegedly brought on arthritis, inflamed his war wounds and damaged his sight. See 20 March 1930, Dr Luigi Mazzilli to Direzione coloni confinati; 4 March 1931, Jessie Wilson to Bocchini. See also 4 December 1933, both Dumini and Jessie Wilson to Rachele Mussolini, appealing against a return to the Tremiti islands after Dumini had apparently been about to despatch abroad documents 'which would have compromised the responsibility of the Head of Government' (Report, 13 August 1933).

70. *Ibid.*, 19 December 1929; see also 1 January 1928, where Dumini offered to change his name and make himself disappear.

71. *Ibid.*, 21 November 1928, Dumini to Bianca; cf. 21 November 1929, Dumini to Bianca, in which the same phrase about exterminating enemies is used but now it is God who will do the deed. It is also typical that Dumini should talk about his 'innocence', which both a distant God and a distant *Duce* understood and would eventually reward.

72. *Ibid.*, 20 March 1929, Jessie Wilson to Mussolini.

73. Cf. the similar use of this word by the Novara Fascist Amadeo Belloni, SPDCR b. 80 (Belloni), 12 February 1930, Belloni to Mussolini.

74. SPDCR, b. 84 (Dumini), 23 July 1932, Jessie Wilson to Mussolini.

75. *Ibid.*, 15 May 1934, Mussolini to Bocchini, permitting Bianca and a servant to go with them.

76. *Ibid.*, 14 July 1934, Dumini to Mussolini.

77. *Ibid.*, 8 June 1935, Dumini to Mussolini.

78. Bocchini and the Fascist secret police were alert at the time to a possible assassination attempt against Mussolini. See V. Rizzo, *Attenti al Duce: storie minime dell'Italia fascista 1927-1938* (Florence 1981), 93.

79. SPDCR b. 84 (Dumini), 25 March 1937, Dumini memorandum (cf. 1 March 1937, Sebastiani note).

80. *Ibid.*, 19 April 1941, Teruzzi to Mussolini.

81. *Ibid.*, 8 May 1941, Dumini report. Dumini's account may have nourished the contemporary Italian press campaign against the barbarism of the Australians. See, for example, Ministero della Cultura Popolare (ed.), *Che cosa hanno fatto gli inglesi in Cirenaica* (Rome July 1941).

82. SPDCR, b. 84 (Dumini), 1 May 1941, Dumini to Sebastiani. For a time he got work in Italian-occupied Tunisia but eventually fled before the Allied advance. In April 1943, he was back in Italy and asking to be given a truck, a request which Mussolini approved but which the army seems to have successfully blocked until July. Dumini thereupon supported the Salò Republic, amid further charges of corruption. He was imprisoned after the war but, like so many others, was amnestied before too long.

83. V. Emiliani, *Il paese dei Mussolini* (Turin 1984) 46-7; see also V. Emiliani, *I tre Mussolini: Luigi, Alessandro, Benito* (Milan 1997), an extended edition of the former book.

84. Most effectively by R. Ben-Ghiat, 'Fascism, Writing and Memory: The Realist Aesthetic in Italy, 1930-1950', *Journal of Modern History* 67 (1995), 627-65; 'Italian Fascism and the Aesthetics of the "Third Way"', *Journal of*

Contemporary History 31 (1996), 293–316.

85. SPDCR b. 103 (M. Piacentini), 16 April 1931, 5 April 1932 reports. Cf. even more drastic claims made about the architect Armando Brasini; b. 98 (Brasini), 9 January 1937, police report. Brasini was thought to possess a solid patron in Francesco Giunta.

86. SPDCR b. 102 (Mascagni), 24 June 1926, a characteristic eleven-page letter, Mascagni to Mussolini; 15 July 1931, Bottai to Mussolini; 1 September 1931, Mascagni to Mussolini; 1 March 1935, Farinacci to Mussolini.

87. SPDCR b. 14 (Soffici), 10 June 1939, report. The most grovelling file is probably that of Fascist novelist Ada Negri, notably when she recorded her delight at Grazia Deledda winning the Nobel prize for literature but wondered if Mussolini could not himself recommend her for the same prize one of these years. See b. 14 (Negri), 19 December 1927, Negri to Mussolini. By 1934, Negri enjoyed a 25,000 lire government subsidy; see 27 February 1934, Chiavolini note.

88. SPDCR b. 43 (Farinacci), 10 October 1934, police report.

89. *Ibid.*, 10 October 1934.

90. SPDCR b. 103 (M. Petacci), 10 May 1938, Petacci to Sebastiani.

91. *Ibid.*, undated, Sebastiani to Professor Perez.

92. *Ibid.*, 16 January 1939, Sebastiani to Ministry of Education. The files also contain reference to Petacci's deplorable habits of brawling in public places, insulting a Venetian countess, and encouraging his dog to bite a journalist's ear. Another curious example of Fascist double-speak was provided by Francesco Saverio Petacci, the father of Marcello and Claretta. In 1937, he published an over-blown article in *Il Messaggero* about the triumphs of Fascism, both spiritually and medically, in making pure young Italian womanhood. See b. 103 (F.S. Petacci, article of 16 November 1937). Claretta would before long have an abortion, presumably occasioned by her adulterous relationship with the *Duce*. See A. Petacco, *L'archivio segreto di Mussolini*, 156.

93. For many examples, see Y. De Begnac, *Taccuini mussoliniani* (Bologna 1990), 87, 426, 438, 445 (actually here 'my ex-friend [Henri] Barbusse'), 446, 617 (this last case being Ezra Pound).

94. For another example, see SPDCR b. 91 (Riccardi), 28 January 1943, police report on Raffaello Riccardi, noting that his elevation to the post of Minister of Exchange had at once brought him a flood of 'friends', seeking deals, *raccomandazioni* and import-export rights.

95. B. Mussolini, *Opera omnia* (ed. E. and D. Susmel), vol. XXI (Florence 1956), 303.

96. C. Ipsen, *Dictating Demography: The Problem of Population in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge 1996), 179. Acerbo, Angelini, Cianetti, De Bono and Solmi lacked legitimate heirs.

97. Petacco, *L'archivio segreto di Mussolini*, 150–61.

98. SPDCR b. 40 (Farinacci), 4 July 1934, police report noting that Farinacci had bought her a rifle costing 17,000 lire.

99. *Ibid.*, 20 September 1933, police report; cf. also 20 July 1935 and b. 44 (Farinacci), 7 August 1936, both occasions when the pair showed up at the Venice *Biennale* and stayed at the Hotel Excelsior. Cf. similar claims made about mistresses and the best hotels in internecine Fascist conflicts, both in Piedmont and in Umbria. See b. 49 (Tuninetti) undated file; b. 49 (Uccelli), 2 November 1927, report on Oscar Uccelli.

100. *Ibid.*, b. 44 (Farinacci), 24 July 1936, police report.

101. See, for example, the telephone tap read by Mussolini in which Pederzini declared roundly that the only thing which she and Farinacci really had in common was bed. *Ibid.*, b. 43 (Farinacci), 14 February 1935, telephone tap.

102. *Ibid.*, 11 October 1934, Avvocato Salvatore Pantano to Farinacci.

103. *Ibid.*, 14 May 1942, Farinacci to Mussolini. For a rather more naive view of the Fascistization of university students at the behest of Starace, see L. La Rovere, 'Fascist Groups in Italian Universities: An Organization at the Service of the Totalitarian State', *Journal of Contemporary History* 34 (1999), 457-75.

104. SPDCR b. 42 (Farinacci), 6 June 1927, Farinacci to Mussolini. Cf. also b. 52 (Enciclopedia Treccani), 31 December 1937, Farinacci to Mussolini (and relevant telephone taps). Here Farinacci urged the *Duce* to intervene in order to save Count Treccani from an avaricious prostitute, remarking predictably that, by paying 1,000 lire a session, the naive count was ruining the market. 'In regard to women, Treccani must be an ingenué of 1000 horse power,' Farinacci concluded.

105. SPDCR b. 48 (A. Pavolini), 26 May 1942, pro-memoria.

106. See *ibid.*, 25 March 1942. It was also claimed that Pavolini had handed over to her 3 million lire in shares in order to favour the floating of a new cinema company.

107. *Ibid.*, 4 March 1942. Ironically, given Pavolini's eventual prominence in the Salò Republic, his brother Corrado was charged with being married to a Jewess, one correspondent denouncing him as thus responsible for the 'Jewish mentality' which, it was alleged, characterized the Italian theatre and film industries. See b. 102 (C. Pavolini), 17 February 1942, report.

108. SPDCR b. 87 (Lessona), 27 December 1927, 24 June 1930, police reports. When, in 1937, Lessona was dropped as Minister of Colonies, his wife was recorded on the phone bewailing the ruin of her household that had resulted, a lamentable fate requiring the surrender both of her maid and her cook. 2 December 1937, telephone tap.

109. SPDCR b. 100 (M. De Seta), 17 August 1929.

110. SPDCR b. 75 (B. Giuliano), 5 June 1931, Anna Sile (from the Ministry) to Mussolini.

111. SPDCR b. 98 (F. Boattini), 27 July 1942, police report.

112. *Ibid.*, 21 July 1942, police report. Boattini was another who was alleged to have lived it up with his mistress, a woman from the local centre of Forlì, in the hotels of Bologna. It was also thought that he had found means of evading the draft. Rumours of illicit land dealings similarly surrounded Boattini.

113. SPDCR b. 44 (Farinacci), 25 December 1938, Farinacci to Mussolini.

114. SPDCR b. 3 (De Bono), 3 October 1928, report.

115. *Ibid.*, 22 March 1935, report.

116. *Ibid.*, 6 February 1937, 8 July 1937, both De Bono to Mussolini. De Bono was 71.

117. *Ibid.*, 28 February 1937, note.

118. *Ibid.*, 8 July 1937, De Bono to Mussolini. He added the charge that De Vecchi and Balbo were behind Lessona. De Bono duly used the intimate 'tu' form in this correspondence. Cf. also 4 September 1937 in which De Bono threatened that the 'good' version of himself could easily turn into the 'bad'.

119. See, for example, *ibid.*, 15 May 1934, Mussolini to Balbo; 1 June 1934, Balbo to Mussolini.

120. See, for example, the file on Giuseppe Caradonna, sometime Fascist boss of Puglia, for a while a friend of De Bono, and, by the late 1930s, under accusation for major corruption in the functioning of the port of Naples, a charge of which it was decided in June 1943 he was not guilty. SPDCR b. 81 (Caradonna), 10 February 1928, March 1929, 24 February 1939, 14 June 1942, 26 June 1943, police reports. Caradonna complained typically (28 April 1940, Caradonna to Mussolini) that he was 'the victim of a prodigious effort at mystification'. If guilty, he should be shot. But, since he was not, he should be left to go on with his career.

121. SPDCR b. 87 (Lessona), 15 September 1938, Lessona to Mussolini has the now ex-Minister apologizing for interrupting him during the Munich crisis but also complaining of De Bono's continued plots against him and of unjustified charges of corruption. That year, Lessona was also having to explain away the back-dating of his Fascist party membership so that he could wear the insignia of those who had marched on Rome (11 April 1938, Lessona to Mussolini; 31 January 1938, De Bono to Starace).

122. SPDCR b. 3 (De Bono), 28 February 1937, report. Police interest in De Bono's clients did not cease. In 1942, one of the Scalera brothers lost his party membership, with a report noting that he had been 'one protected' by De Bono 'in a heartfelt manner', all the more because he gave employment to his illegitimate son (b. 23 [De Bono], 3 February 1942, police report).

123. SPDCR b. 2 (Giuseppe Mastromatti), 18 June 1928, Mastromatti to Mussolini after internecine conflicts in Genoa.

124. SPDCR b. 3 (De Bono), 23 October 1934, 18 January 1935, both police reports.

125. SPDCR b. 14 (Grandi), 17 June 1929, Grandi to Mussolini, giving a detailed refutation of the charge and, perhaps characteristically, using the occasion to expatiate on the relative poverty which he, his wife and children had endured for the cause. He then asked for a pay rise of more than 100%.

126. SPDCR b. 4 (Bottai), for example report of 13 April 1942. He was similarly thought to possess a clique of corrupt friends. See note of 27 May 1935.

127. SPDCR b. 4 (De Vecchi), 19 September 1934, report; 6 July 1935, telephone tap.

128. SPDCR b. 38 (Cini), 19 February 1929, police report.

129. SPDCR b. 86 (Jung), undated report. He was also thought to possess in Alberto Beneduce a stubborn and eventually successful personal enemy. See b. 98 (Beneduce), 4 February 1935 police report.

130. SPDCR b. 48 (Ricci), January 1931, 31 July 1942, police reports. See also report of 11 September 1942 which noted that the father-in-law was locally known as 'the pirate of the marble business'.

131. *Ibid.*, January 1931 report; b. 73 (Tullio Benedetti), 16 September 1927, report; 28 May 1934, Benedetti to Scorza.

132. SPDCR b. 62 Del Croix, January 1929, report.

133. B. Mussolini, *Opera omnia* (ed. E. and D. Susmel), vol. XXII (Florence, 1957), 138.

134. *Ibid.*, vol. XXIV, Florence, 1958, 75; vol. XXIII, Florence, 1957, 304. For more on Fascist bickering in Naples and allegations of corruption through family contacts also in the academic world, see SPDCR b. 38 (N. Castellino), 9 January 1930, letter from University of Naples *liberi docenti* to Mussolini, Turati and minister Balbino Giuliano. On the same file, by contrast, is a letter of

raccomandazione from Corradini to Mussolini and in favour of Castellino; perhaps that helped Castellino to pursue a distinguished Fascist career and to be able in July 1940 to write an article in *Nuova Antologia* explaining the 'fattori biologici della disfatta franco-inglese'.

135. For an early example, see SPDCR b. 4 (Acerbo), 18 September 1924, Acerbo to Mussolini hailing the 'glorious Fascism of the Abruzzi' (his home region) and the right of his cousin to prominence in it. See also the telegram of Sergio Panunzio to Mussolini of 28 November 1925 defending his *paese* of Molfetta against the disgrace of having to number (Anti-Fascist) historian Gaetano Salvemini as one of its sons. B. 48 (Salvemini).

136. For a classic example of Arnaldo's use of the *raccomandazione*, see SPDCR b. 78 (Appelius), 24 February 1926, Arnaldo Mussolini to his brother.

137. SPDCR b. 79 (Banelli), January 1929, police report. Barelli was also said to be locked in conflict with Giuseppe Cobolli Gigli, a more radical local Fascist. Cf. b. 38 (Cobolli Gigli) with allegations of a wartime manipulation of petrol rationing by his socially ambitious wife, 19 February 1941, phone tap.

138. SPDCR b. 87 (Lantini), 22 November 1927, police report on Ferruccio Lantini as being on the pay-roll of Genoese shipping interests. Lantini was also described as being in conflict with Farinacci, Bottai, Balbo, Rossoni and Pala (the then *federale* of Genoa), but being able to rely on the friendship of A. Turati.

139. For an account of the equivocations involved, see L. Passerini, *Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin Working Class* (Cambridge 1987).

140. SPDCR b. 87 (Lanzillo), 2 July 1934, Lanzillo to Mussolini. A phone tap of 25 March 1932 showed Lanzillo relying on his 'friend' Farinacci should it prove necessary to fight a duel with 'those people at *Critica fascista*', that is, with Bottai.

141. J. Steinberg, *All or Nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust 1941-3* (London 1990), 170.

142. Examples from his works are too numerous to list here but see, for example, B. Mussolini, *Opera omnia* (ed. E. and D. Susmel), vol. XVIII (Florence 1956), 96, on 'the soul of the German people': p. 103 on Rathenau's belonging to 'an ancient and much embattled race' (Mussolini was speaking admiringly).

143. SPDCR b. 44 (Farinacci), 6 June 1938, Farinacci to Mussolini. These views did not stop Farinacci, shortly after, writing a letter of *raccomandazione* for the fanatical racist Giuseppe Preziosi (see 14 October 1938, Farinacci to Mussolini). Preziosi, he suggested, should be given a roving diplomatic role or a seat in the Senate. With his taste for scandal, Farinacci also asked for confirmation that the mother of Pius XI was Jewish. If she was, he surmised that a delightful anti-clerical campaign could be unleashed (3 August 1938, Farinacci to Mussolini).

144. SPDCR b. 44 (Farinacci), 5 August 1938, Farinacci to Mussolini.

145. Y. De Begnac, *Palazzo Venezia: storia di un regime* (Rome 1950), 642.

146. *Ibid.*, 643.

147. B. Mussolini, *Opera omnia* (ed. E. and D. Susmel) vol. XXV (Florence 1958), 173-4. The comment appeared in a preface written by Mussolini to a book on *Il Gran Consiglio nei primi dieci anni dell'era fascista*, published late in 1932.

148. Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle*, 100.

149. *Ibid.*, 86.

150. SPDCR b. 75 (Lusignoli), May 1927, police report.

151. S. Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization* (New York 1994). She says that peasants in the aftermath of the 1930s were 'contemptuous of any notion of public good, suspicious of energetic or successful neighbours, endlessly aggrieved at what "they" the bosses were doing, but virtually immovable in their determination not to do anything themselves' (320).

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