I am glad that you got Mahoney's scalp.

William May Garland, I.O.C. Member (U.S.)

William May Garland's blunt assessment of one of the most controversial administrative meetings in the history of U.S. amateur sport typified the rhetoric and emotion expressed by sport officials in the latter months of 1935 concerning the issue of U.S. participation in the 1936 Berlin Olympics. As Yuletide shoppers braved the early December weather in New York City, delegates to the Annual Convention of the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) of the United States sought to resolve an issue that divided the U.S. amateur sport community. Avery Brundage, president of the American Olympic Committee (AOC) and a former president of the AAU, argued forcefully that politics and the Olympic Games should remain separate. The domestic affairs of the German government, asserted Brundage, should not prevent U.S. athletes from pursuing their dream to participate in an Olympic festival. Brundage, a tireless defender of his vision of the Olympic Games, turned aside the challenge to his principles provided by Jeremiah T. Mahoney, president of the AAU, an individual who could not support a celebration of Olympic ideals in a country rife with discriminatory social legislation. Although Mahoney focused the debate on the treatment of Jewish citizens in Germany and on the ability of German-Jewish athletes to represent their country in Berlin, he also raised issues pertaining to Nazi directives concerning religious and labor organizations. American participation in Berlin, countered Mahoney, represented tacit approval of Adolf Hitler's policies. After two days of bitter debate, Brundage secured AAU support for U.S. participation in the Berlin Olympics by a slim margin. AAU delegates departed New York's Commodore Hotel no less divided; however, Garland and Brundage were satisfied, and no doubt relieved, that their view prevailed.

The 1935 AAU Annual Convention represented the culmination of a lengthy debate within U.S. amateur sport circles concerning U.S. participation in Berlin. News reports from Germany, which detailed discriminatory social policies directed against the country's Jewish population in the aftermath of Hitler's rise to the chancellorship of the Reich, raised the eyebrows of U.S. amateur sport officials. Discriminatory measures against German Jews who desired to enter the medical, legal, and teaching professions, as well as policies designed to restrict the entry of Jewish students to German universities and harass Jewish shopkeepers, reflected the breadth of discrimination within German society. Between the early months of 1933 and the waning weeks of 1935, two camps formed in the United States. Olympic sport, voiced Brundage and his colleagues, was not a forum for the airing of the world's political, social, or religious issues. Despite his early concerns about the prospects of staging the Olympics in such an atmosphere, Brundage accepted the assurances of his fellow sport leaders in Germany who affirmed that the Olympic Games would be conducted in compliance with all Olympic regulations. In 1934, Brundage swayed members of the AOC to accept the invitation of the German organizers to send a U.S. team to Berlin. Mahoney grew increasingly skeptical of the value of German pledges that German-Jewish athletes would be allowed unfettered access to the team selection process in Germany. The Nazis trampled upon the fundamental Olympic principles of fairness and equality, charged Mahoney. The belief was that the U.S.'s absence from Berlin would prevent American athletes from sacrificing these principles and provide a clear message to the German population that its government's policies were viewed with disdain. Failing a reversal of the AOC's decision, Mahoney sought to withdraw the moral and financial support traditionally provided to the U.S. team by the AAU through fund-raising.

Although Brundage and Mahoney were the central protagonists in this confrontation, the debate pitted the AOC against the AAU, divided U.S. members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and ruptured friendships within the U.S. amateur sport community.

During the pre-World War II years, the AOC and the AAU played different roles in the administration of Olympic affairs in the United States. The AOC was a body whose membership was appointed from the parent American Olympic Association (AOA) prior to an Olympic festival. The AOC's responsibilities included managing the selection process for the U.S. Olympic team and acting as the driving force behind fund-raising efforts on behalf of the athletes. The AAU was the
national governing body for a number of sports in the United States, including the Olympic Movement’s flagship sport, track and field. Eligibility forms of U.S. Olympians required a signature of an AAU official which confirmed the individual athlete’s amateur status. Because of the AAU’s network of regional associations throughout the country, its members, who were dedicated to the promotion of amateur sport, served an important role in raising funds for the U.S. Olympic team. The fulfillment of U.S. Olympic goals required a coordinated effort between the AOC and the AAU.

This episode in the history of the administration of U.S. amateur sport had repercussions for a number of the participants and the AAU. The fierce debate served as a springboard for Brundage’s career in international sport as Brandge, who succeeded in shepherding a U.S. team to Berlin, was appointed to the IOC. Ernest Lee Jahncke, an American member of the IOC who refused to move in lockstep with the other two U.S. representatives, Garland and Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, was expelled from the international body for his strident opposition to U.S. participation in the latter months of 1935.

Mahoney and supporters such as Louis diBenedetto of the AAU’s Southern Association resigned from the AOC, while the vociferous Charles Ornstein of the Jewish Welfare Board was dismissed from the same body when he refused to follow their lead. Gustavus T. Kirby, Brundage’s stalwart ally who coveted a position on the IOC, was disappointed as he was passed over during the selection process to replace the deceased Sherrill. From an organizational standpoint, the AAU emerged from the debate with diminished status as a result of an agreement reached by Brundage and Henri Baillet-Latour, president of the IOC, in advance of the crucial AAU convention. Baillet-Latour determined that the signature from an AAU officer, attesting to the amateur status of U.S. Olympians in those sports which it governed, was not necessary. This decision was, as Brundage predicted correctly, the “death knell for the AAU.”

**U.S. Sport Officials Express Concern**

Kirby, AOC treasurer and a former president of the AAU, expressed concern over the impact of National Socialist policy on preparations for the Berlin Olympics. The bespectacled Kirby was aghast at remarks concerning the role of sport in German society uttered by Reich Sport Leader Hans von Tschammer und Osten. “German sports are for Aryans,” exclaimed von Tschammer und Osten, “German youth leadership is only for Aryans and not for Jews.” Von Tschammer und Osten’s vision became reality within months of Hitler’s rise to power in January 1933, as German sport federations moved to purge themselves of Jewish members. Theodor Lewald, a member of the IOC and president of the German Olympic Committee, was forced to resign the latter position and accept a position of limited authority on the Organizing Committee for the Berlin Games because of his Jewish ancestry. Kirby expressed his satisfaction that Garland seemed intent on pressuring German organizers for compliance with all Olympic regulations, including a guarantee that Jewish athletes would be permitted to qualify for the German Olympic team.

Even Brundage, well known to Olympic historians for his firmly held belief that politics had no place in Olympic matters, concurred with Kirby that the IOC could not remain silent regarding indications that Jewish athletes would not be permitted to represent Germany in the Berlin Olympics. “I do not think that the International Olympic Committee can afford to dodge this issue,” noted Brundage. “The very foundation of the modern Olympic revival will be undermined,” concluded Brundage, “if individual countries are allowed to restrict participation by reason of class, creed, or race.” Sherrill, observed Brundage, was also prepared to deliver a strong message to German organizers at the upcoming IOC session. Sherrill’s determined efforts to obtain assurances from German organizers that Jewish athletes would not experience discrimination in the selection process for the Olympic team, and his success in this mission, appeased Brundage but failed to satisfy Kirby.

Kirby’s opinion of Sherrill’s value as a member of the IOC deteriorated during the 1933-1935 period, as evidenced by his characterization of Sherrill as a “weakling” and an individual preoccupied with the accumulation of honors, awards, and press clippings. Sherrill, an educator, art collector, and former diplomat who did not lack for feelings of self-worth, described his campaign to elicit assurances from the Germans that the rights of Jewish athletes would be upheld to Rabbi Stephen Wise (New York) and Frederick Rubien, secretary of the AOA and a member of the AAU’s Metropolitan Association, in melodramatic fashion. Kirby remained unconvinced about the sincerity of the pledges provided to Sherrill by Lewald and others and sought information concerning the plight of Germany’s Jewish citizenry. His personal inquiries prompted him to prepare resolutions for presentation at the annual conventions of the AOA and the AAU designed to withhold the support of these organizations for U.S. participation in the 1936 Berlin Olympics until it was apparent that steps had been taken to guarantee the rights of Jewish athletes in Germany.

Kirby’s initiative was opposed by Brundage and Rubien in light of the assurances provided by respected German sport officials such as Lewald, Carl Diem (secretary of the Berlin Organizing Committee), and Karl Ritter von Halt (IOC member). Rubien was concerned that his international colleagues would be embarrassed if the resolutions were adopted, while Brundage was not sure any purpose would be served through the action. Brundage encouraged Kirby to submit the resolutions to the executive committees of each organization for discussion but confided to Rubien that he would prefer if the sentiments contained therein were not presented to the general memberships. Brundage advised
Brundage supports U.S. participation

Brundage shared a measure of Lewald's distress at developments within the United States. In the early months of 1934, Brundage informed Sherrill that despite a plethora of correspondence from Americans who opposed U.S. participation in the Berlin Olympics, American Olympic officials “must not become involved in political, sociological, religious or racial controversies of any kind.” Kirby's scheduled appearance at a rally “arranged by New York Jews to protest against conditions in Germany,” commented Brundage, was unwise. Brundage and Murray Hulbert, an AOA member and a former AAU President, were concerned that Kirby's appearance might have a negative effect on fund-raising efforts for the prospective Olympic team. In Brundage's mind, the responsibility for dealing with the Jewish situation rested with the IOC. Following a personal visit to Germany to inspect conditions, Brundage's views hardened.

“Radical Jews” who advocated a U.S. boycott of the Berlin Games, Brundage told Ornstein, a Jewish member of the AOA and the AAU, promoted an action which was not “democratic or American.” Brundage visited Germany in September on behalf of the AOC and returned to the United States with a favorable report which served to convince the organization to accept the invitation of the Berlin Organizing Committee to participate in the 1936 Summer Games. Although Brundage believed that the Germans would abide by IOC regulations and act as cordial hosts to all foreign competitors, he declined comment on the prospect of Jewish participation on the German Olympic team. Brundage was committed to U.S. participation in light of his trip and further assurances given to the IOC by German organizers. In the months ahead, facing continued opposition to U.S. participation, Brundage lashed out at a number of prominent and vocal Jewish leaders who assailed his leadership and campaigned for an Olympic boycott, including Samuel Untermeyer, president of the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League, and Rabbi Wise, whom he considered to be villains in this affair. Nevertheless, Brundage's efforts in Germany drew support from Garland, Kirby, and AOA Vice-President Joseph Raycroft.

For Brundage, the decision in favor of U.S. participation was imperative, as the Olympic Movement must remain removed from politics. Although he acknowledged the significant level of correspondence from Jewish Americans who believed that the United States should avoid any form of relations with Germany, he was convinced that “if we deviate from our policy of concerning ourselves with sport alone, however, [we] will be in constant hot water.”

His ability and desire to provide American Olympic officials with an accurate representation of the plight of Jewish athletes in Germany has been highlighted by Richard Mandell, Allen Guttmann, Duff Hart-Davis, and other researchers. His own predisposition, the fact that he could neither read nor speak German,
and the presence of Nazi Party officials at his meetings with Jewish sport leaders have been raised as issues to be considered when assessing his mission to Germany. A comment to Ornstein revealed that Brundage also lacked a fundamental understanding of German domestic politics and hence provided further damage to his credibility as the sole individual entrusted to examine conditions in Germany on behalf of the AOC. In an attempt to convince Ornstein to use his “influence to prevent the radical Jews from ‘rocking the boat,’” Brundage observed that “even though Herr Hitler is at the moment in power, he is not Germany. As a matter of fact, he is not even a German.”

Brundage’s none-too-subtle advice to Ornstein was prompted by his knowledge that Ornstein wished to discuss the “German-Jewish problem” at the upcoming AAU convention. The AAU had taken no further action on the issue of U.S. participation since the passage of Kirby’s resolution. Ornstein was not committed to a U.S. boycott of the Berlin Olympics but desired a change in venue, postponement, or cancellation of the event. He took some umbrage at Brundage’s suggestion that Jewish sport officials in America were the only individuals who refused to let the matter rest in the wake of his inspection of the German capital and Olympic facilities. “It may interest you to know,” wrote Ornstein, “that there are more gentile colleagues who desire to bring the matter before the AAU convention than there are Jews.”

O r nstein’s claim failed to shake Brundage’s belief that the Jewish members of the AAU provided his primary adversaries in this matter. A review of Brundage’s files revealed a list of Jewish AAU officials who had attended the organization’s annual meetings between 1922 and 1933. A handwritten list of Jewish AAU members who planned to attend the upcoming meeting also appears on the same page. Although Brundage was concerned about the likely absences of allies Kirby and A. C. Gilbert, the issue of participation in Berlin was deferred at the AAU convention. The 1934 AAU convention was significant for two reasons: (1) The AAU was still on record with a resolution that withheld its support from a prospective U.S. Olympic team, and (2) Mahoney, a New York lawyer, was elected president of the AAU.

Brundage Versus Mahoney: A Bitter and Divisive Confrontation

Mahoney emerged as the principal spokesperson for sport officials and social activists who lobbied for a U.S. boycott of the Berlin Olympics. There is little indication that Mahoney was committed to such a position in the waning months of 1934. Industrious correspondents Brundage and Kirby exchanged no views on Mahoney’s candidacy and subsequent election. Described by Kirby as an “old friend,” Mahoney held no such status after staging a diligent campaign to prevent U.S. athletes from participating in Berlin. As late as April 1935, Mahoney remained silent on the issue of proposed U.S. participation. Mahoney and Kirby had attended a dinner sponsored by the New York City Baseball Federation in honor of the New York Yankees’ Lou Gehrig. Mahoney informed Kirby of a recent discussion with some Jewish and Catholic religious leaders who had voiced their opposition to U.S. participation in Berlin and questioned the value of Brundage’s assurances that the Berlin atmosphere did not preclude a successful celebration of the Olympic Games. They claimed that Brundage had been “bamboozled” by German officials. Kirby’s prediction concerning Mahoney’s future policy as president of the AAU, on the basis of this encounter, proved inaccurate. “Jerry, of course, will not be openly antagonistic, nor will he be eagerly enthusiastic,” opined Kirby. Kirby’s thoughts were limited to the impact of Mahoney’s neutral posture on fund-raising for the U.S. Olympic team. Brundage’s response revealed limited concern, as he hoped that Kirby had taken “pains to acquaint Jerry with the subject so that he [would] not be misled.”

Even though Mahoney remained uncommitted and had not yet used his authority as AAU president in the debate concerning U.S. participation, many Americans had formed their own opinions. A Gallup poll in March revealed that 43 percent of Americans supported a U.S. boycott of the Berlin Games. Mahoney’s involvement in the discussion beginning in mid-1935 intensified feelings on both sides of the issue. Numerous private citizens, politicians, public interest groups, newspaper editors, and sport organizations presented their views on the matter via media outlets, public forums, and personal correspondence directed to Brundage or elected officials.

Proponents of a U.S. boycott of the Berlin Olympics challenged Brundage’s conception of the mission of the Olympic Movement. The success of the Olympic Movement, maintained Brundage, depended on its ability to avoid entanglement in political, religious, or sociological issues. His frustration escalated as he considered that the lion’s share of opposition came from people who had been “no nearer to Germany than New York City.” He referred to advocates of a U.S. boycott as “enemies of sport,” “traitors to the youth of America,” and perpetrators of “the most vicious and insidious attack on the foundation of amateur sport.” Brundage detailed his position in a pamphlet entitled “Fair Play for American Athletes,” which was prepared for distribution to amateur sport organizations throughout the United States. In this document, Brundage asserted that opposition to U.S. participation was the result of a conspiracy between Jews and Communists. Brundage blamed Jewish America for much of his trouble, especially vocal leaders of the large Jewish community in New York. “We must force the Jews who wish to use the Games as a weapon to strike the Nazis,” noted Brundage, “to mind their own business and let sport alone.”

Brundage, Kirby, and Rubien also questioned Mahoney’s motives in championing the boycott cause on behalf of the AAU. They believed he was attempting to curry favor with the large Jewish electorate in New York City in advance of an
intended mayoral campaign. Kirby claimed that Mahoney had “burned his bridges” and “prostituted the AAU... and himself... for his personal and political ambitions.” Kirby believed that it was necessary to provide evidence that German-Jewish athletes did not face discrimination. Such evidence, said Kirby, would undermine Mahoney’s position.

Mahoney’s rebuttal to Brundage’s claim that he was mixing politics with sport was quite simple. It was the Germans, responded Mahoney, who were guilty of manipulating the Olympics for political gain and failing to provide credible evidence that they would allow German-Jews to participate on the German team. He articulated this message in numerous interviews with newspaper reporters and radio journalists. While Brundage, Kirby, and Rubien expressed disgust at the intense lobbying of Jewish organizations, and strained to understand that Mahoney could adopt such a stand without ulterior motives, Mahoney was also capable of thinking the worst of some people who favored U.S. participation.

When Mahoney announced his hesitancy to push forward with plans for U.S. participation in Berlin as a result of reports concerning discrimination against German-Jewish athletes, he noted that the AAU had a number of months to discuss the matter “amicably.” Later, Mahoney charged that Patrick Walsh, president of the AAU’s Metropolitan Association, was “Nazi-controlled” after he closed discussion of the issue prematurely at the association’s general meeting. When Sherrill claimed that his campaign for the rights of German-Jewish athletes revealed his pro-Jewish outlook, Mahoney charged that Sherrill was “no more a friend of the Jew than [was] Hitler.” Mahoney had not predicted the vituperative and vitriolic nature of the debate.

In an open letter to Lewald, published in the New York Times, Mahoney outlined the basis of his opposition to U.S. participation in Berlin. His belief that preparations for the Olympics fell under the auspices of the German government was not shrouded in diplomatic niceties. German-Jewish athletes, commented Mahoney, had been prevented access to facilities required to train for the German Olympic team. The recent Kurfuerstendamm incident and the passing of the Nuremberg Laws, asserted Mahoney, were incongruous with German pledges to uphold the rights of potential German-Jewish Olympians. Lewald’s personal authority in Olympic matters, hence the credibility of his assurances that Jewish athletes had not been placed on the Olympic team because they were not of “Olympic caliber,” was exceedingly limited. Mahoney concluded that U.S. participation in the Berlin Games would reflect the country’s tacit support of Nazi policies and called for the transfer of the Olympic Games from the German capital. Mahoney’s campaign resulted in a number of actions on the part of Brundage and his supporters. Sherrill traveled to Germany for a personal audience with Hitler for the purpose of convincing him of the need to place a Jew on the German Olympic team. Although Hitler rebuffed Sherrill’s entreaty, further negotiations with von Tscharmer und Osten resulted in fencer Helene Mayer and ice hockey player Rudi Ball being named to the German summer and winter Olympic teams, respectively. Both athletes had one Jewish parent, and, for this reason, they were still considered German citizens. Germans with two Jewish parents had been stripped of their citizenship rights as a result of the Nuremberg Laws. Despite the transparent nature of the German “concession,” Sherrill considered the debate over Jewish participation settled.

Brundage was interested in limiting the impact of Mahoney’s efforts by seeking permission to submit eligibility forms for U.S. Olympians without the AAU signature which attested to their amateur status. If Baillet-Latour was amenable to this plan, U.S. participation would be ensured, and Brundage and his cohorts would be able to concentrate on fund-raising. Although Rubien was supportive, Kirby was not hopeful that the IOC would accept the proposal and had reservations about the wisdom of the idea itself. Baillet-Latour, who desired U.S. participation as much as Lewald did, accepted Brundage’s plan and offered to travel to New York in the weeks prior to the AAU convention.

Media coverage of the debate also provided a source of concern for Brundage and his supporters. Kirby was distressed about editorial opinions expressed in many U.S. newspapers against participation that would make fund-raising efforts more difficult. Brundage was critical of the print media in New York City and attributed the proboycott propaganda in that city to its significant Jewish population. F. Barnard O’Connor, chairman of the AOC Fencing Committee, lobbied Kirby to seek the appointment of an individual whose responsibilities would involve monitoring Mahoney’s statements for the purpose of supplying swift and effective counterarguments to the media. Although Kirby saw some merit in the idea, he believed that the plan was not feasible from a financial standpoint. Brundage’s suggestion that O’Connor, Hulbert, and Rubien meet with Kirby and himself to discuss the situation met with resistance from Kirby, who lacked confidence in the ability of those three individuals to provide accurate assessments of the situation. Both Brundage and Kirby believed that it was best to limit contact with the media to avoid being drawn into discussions that might stir up further agitation for a boycott.

As Brundage and Kirby believed that it was best to limit contact with the media to avoid being drawn into discussions that might stir up further agitation for a boycott.

Although not necessarily conspicuous by his absence from the debate, Jahncke, the third U.S. member of the IOC, entered the fray less than one month before the AAU convention. A proud German-American, and a member of former President Herbert Hoover’s cabinet (assistant secretary of the Navy), Jahncke expressed his unalterable opposition to Hitler’s policies and the celebration of Pierre de Coubertin’s Olympic ideals in Berlin in heavily publicized letters to Baillet-Latour and Lewald. Jahncke’s contribution to the Olympic Movement during his eight-year IOC membership had been negligible as the most consistent aspect of his IOC résumé was his record of absence from meetings of the General Session. In his analysis of Jahncke’s tenure on
the IOC, John Lucas noted that the respected Southerner’s priorities involved his family, community (New Orleans), yacht racing, and the Republican party. He possessed no particular allegiance to the IOC and had even attempted to resign from the organization a number of years earlier. His vehement opposition to U.S. participation in Berlin must have startled Brundage and Lewald, who had held out some hope of support from the previously silent Jahncke during the waning weeks of the debate.71

The verbal sparring and manipulations of the previous six months had given definition to the issue by the time the sound of Mahoney’s gavel opened the AAU Executive Committee meeting on the evening of 6 December 1935. Mahoney recognized that Brundage’s agreement with Baillet-Latour had eliminated the AAU’s ability to prevent U.S. participation by refusing to certify U.S. Olympians. Indeed, it is debatable whether this strategy was considered seriously by Mahoney, who conceded in July that the AOC had the final decision on matters pertaining to participation.72 Rather, the text of the resolution Mahoney presented at this meeting revealed his intent to seek a mandate for withholding the moral and financial support of the AAU from the U.S. Olympic team. He also called upon the AOC to review its decision to sponsor an Olympic team and urged the IOC to withdraw the Olympic Games from Berlin.73

Brundage’s initial attempt to stifle debate was dismissed summarily by Mahoney. Brundage claimed that the AOC had jurisdiction concerning the question of U.S. participation; however, Mahoney, who did not dispute the assertion, overruled Brundage in order to ensure discussion of the matter. Brundage’s hopes for a swift and advantageous resolution of the situation were dashed when Mahoney exercised his right as chairman of the meeting to cast a vote in favor of presenting the resolution to the convention delegates. Mahoney’s action left the Executive Committee deadlocked (7-7) on the question. Members of the Executive Committee agreed to present the resolution to convention delegates “without recommendation” and scheduled a four-hour debate for the following afternoon.74

Brundage’s fingers must have been crossed when he consented to this plan. During the intervening hours, John T. McGovern, a Brundage confederate and representative of the Intercollegiate Amateur Athletic Association, lobbied undecided delegates for support of a motion to table Mahoney’s resolution. Delegates approached by McGovern were promised that a compromise resolution would be considered.75 Brundage’s strategy was revealed to an unsuspecting Mahoney when Walsh, a Brundage sympathizer with whom the AAU president shared feelings of mutual enmity, offered a motion to table the resolution before all of the delegates had settled in their seats for the afternoon session.76 Convention procedures left Mahoney no option but to put Walsh’s motion to a vote. When the final tally in favor of tabling Mahoney’s resolution was announced (61 11/20 - 55 7/60), Kirby delivered the promised compromise resolution for consideration. Although Kirby’s document conceded that certain conditions in Germany were troubling, it was the sole responsibility of the IOC to uphold the rights of all Olympic competitors. In addition, it was noted that AAU certification of U.S. Olympians did not reflect the organization’s support of Nazi policies.77 A small committee was assigned to review the resolution prior to further discussion.

Ornstein minced no words in his assessment of the vote to table Mahoney’s resolution when the delegates reconvened. Brundage had “double-dealed” those individuals who sought the opportunity to discuss the German situation in a free and open debate. He introduced an amendment to Kirby’s resolution that reiterated the AAU’s opposition to staging the Olympic Games in Berlin.78 Brundage replied calmly that he was willing to spend four hours debating Kirby’s resolution.79 Mahoney, still expressing his disgust at Walsh’s motion to table, opened the discussion by excoriating Nazi social policies and reserving the AAU’s privilege to express its reservations about staging the Olympics in Berlin.80 Brundage weighed into the debate with an emotional appeal for the support of convention delegates.

Intermingled with Brundage’s recollections of the contributions of pioneer members of the AAU, and expressions of the disappointment that they would feel if they were aware of the present turmoil,81 were purposeful oratorical salvos designed to discredit his opponents. Mahoney, claimed Brundage, would refuse to certify U.S. athletes if he prevailed. He questioned Mahoney’s motives and called into question the level of representation of American Jewry at the convention. A U.S. boycott, speculated Brundage, would harm American Jews:

There are maybe five percent of the population of the United States which is Jewish. A study of the records of the Olympic Games show about one-half to one percent of the athletes are Jewish. There is a larger percentage
of Jewish delegates here than that. And responsibility for action of this kind, right or wrong, would be charged to the Jew, I think.  

Brundage also attempted to convince delegates that German Jews had been provided an opportunity to qualify for the German Olympic team. Further discussion of the issue was deferred until the Sunday session.

After Sunday morning's session, which was punctuated by diBenedetto's (Southern Association) resignation as manager of the U.S. Olympic basketball team, a second confrontation between Walsh and Mahoney, AAU Vice-President Fred Steers' assertion that many opponents of U.S. participation lacked any experience in the administration of amateur sport, and Jack Rafferty's (Gulf Association) call for an end to the bickering, Judge Aron Steuer (Jewish Welfare Board) supplied the delegates with a means of concluding the discussion. Steuer proposed an amendment to Kirby's resolution which would have mandated the formation of a three-man committee that would be dispatched to Berlin to conduct an investigation. When the scrutineers finished their work, Brundage's view prevailed as the Kirby resolution was adopted without amendments by a vote of 58 1/4-55 3/4. Although Mahoney had the support of the AAU delegates (54 3/4-43 1/4), Brundage received the vast majority of votes (15-1) granted to allied sport organizations such as the Amateur Fencers League of America and the United States Amateur Baseball Association. The "unhappy gathering" had concluded its deliberations.

Although the verbal exchanges reflected the depth of feeling possessed by individuals on both sides of the issue, a review of the voting records reveals further evidence of the determination of some delegates to push forward their respective views. Neither the minutes of the meeting nor the coverage of the convention in the New York Times addresses reasons why alternates from some associations voted on the Steuer Amendment motion despite the fact that all elected delegates were present. According to convention rules, each AAU association had three votes that were divided on the basis of each delegate's individual vote.

For example, in an association represented by six delegates, each individual's ballot would have the weight of one-half of a vote. If four of the members endorsed Steuer's plan, two votes would be directed to Steuer's cause, while the two dissenters' opinions would result in one vote being registered in favor of adopting Kirby's resolution without amendment. Votes cast by alternates in a number of associations, when they had no apparent right to do so, altered the distribution of votes; however, both Mahoney supporters and Brundage sympathizers were responsible for this form of voting manipulation. Rubien's actions indicate a well-considered strategy to protect the share of the vote in favor of Brundage's agenda (a vote against the Steuer Amendment). As a member of the 12-delegate Metropolitan Association, Rubien voted in favor of tablening Mahoney's resolution. His opinion carried the weight of one-fourth of a vote. When it became apparent that former AAU Secretary Dixon would not be present for the second ballot, Rubien decided to cast his vote against the Steuer Amendment in his capacity as a former secretary, as former presidents and former secretaries had one vote (equivalent to an allied sport organization). Rubien's decision resulted in an additional three-fourths of a vote being registered against the Steuer Amendment. His action also reflected the perceived closeness of the impeding vote as delegates prepared to cast their ballots.

**Aftermath**

Brundage's troubles did not end as AAU members filtered out of the convention hall of New York's Commodore Hotel. The arduous task of raising funds loomed ahead, and he needed to eliminate dissenters from the AOC. Three weeks before the U.S. team departed for Berlin, reports surfaced that the solicitation campaign was $146,000 short of its goal. Brundage moved swiftly to purge the ranks of the AOC of Mahoney and his supporters, such as diBenedetto, Charlotte Epstein, and Ornstein. Kirby and Brundage had discussed the need to remove individuals from the AOC who could not fully support U.S. participation in Berlin. The first three individuals resigned without incident, but Ornstein proved more resolute. Kirby charged that any disserter "who [did] not have the decency to resign, should be made to do so." Ornstein replied that Kirby had failed to maintain his principles in choosing to side with Brundage. Ornstein's AOC membership was revoked by a nearly unanimous vote in April. A similar fate awaited Jahncke, who was expelled by his IOC brethren in July on the pretense that his dismal record of attendance at IOC meetings precluded continued membership.

Much to the consternation of Brundage, Kirby, and Garland, the absence of Mahoney and Jahncke from the administrative structure of U.S. amateur sport was short-lived. Mahoney, who had been replaced by Brundage as president of the AAU, was reelected to that office in December 1936 over archrival Walsh. Mahoney proceeded to name the exiled Jahncke as a delegate-at-large to the AAU. Mahoney's decision indicated that memories of the 1935 AAU convention lingered. Kirby's delight at Mahoney's loss to Fiorello LaGuardia in the New York City mayoral race in 1937 provided additional evidence that some of the principals in the Olympic debate harbored grudges.

Meanwhile, Garland's nomination of Brundage as the individual to replace the ousted Jahncke was approved by the IOC. It would be improper to interpret Brundage's election to the IOC as a mere "payoff" for his determined efforts to ensure that American athletes participated in the Berlin Olympics. His profile was consistent with the requirements for the position during his era: male, sportsman (former
Olympian), wealth, and appropriate outlook regarding the purpose of the Olympic Movement. Still, it is evident that Brundage’s tireless crusade did no harm to his candidacy. Garland placed much value on Brundage’s actions. “You have accomplished a great deal during the past year and I know your services must be intensely appreciated by your German friends,” wrote Garland, “as they are by the great bulk of real Americans in this country.” Thirty-six years later, Brundage retired following a lengthy term as president of the IOC (1952-1972), an individual whose impact on the Olympic Movement has intrigued sport historians interested in amateurism, commercialism, and international politics.

Kirby yearned for the opportunity that was extended to Brundage by IOC President Baillet-Latour and his colleagues in 1936. Less than a day after Sherrill’s death on 25 June, Kirby reminded Brundage of his desire to serve on the IOC. Although he thought better of writing Baillet-Latour on the matter, he encouraged Brundage to make his views known at an appropriate time. “I believe that I have earned a place by your and Garland’s side,” wrote Kirby, but if he and Garland nominated someone else, it would “be just another disappointment to be borne without quibbling.” Soon, Kirby’s attitude changed. In recalling his dedication to U.S. amateur sport and the Olympic Movement since 1896, Kirby wrote wistfully, “there comes a time in one’s life when they feel that they either ought to be on the inside of things or not there at all.” Although he provided Brundage with a glowing appraisal of the character of Frederic Coudert, a New York lawyer, and an individual under consideration for appointment to the IOC, Kirby hinted that his connections with amateur sport were limited. The IOC would be best served by selecting representatives based on their “standing and ability,” concluded Kirby.

It seems that Kirby’s unabashed lobbying was doomed to fail. Neither Brundage nor Garland questioned Kirby’s contribution to amateur sport in the United States, but Baillet-Latour’s opposition to Kirby was an insurmountable hurdle for his candidacy. Garland informed Brundage that “personally, I am a friend of Gus, but I could name a dozen of our [IOC] colleagues who actually dislike him and particularly his personality. None are more emphatic in this respect than Baillet-Latour,” concluded Garland. Brundage was not enthused by the prospect of “delivering the bad news” to his friend who, “despite his unfortunate mannerisms,” was “alright.” Coudert was named to replace the deceased Sherrill as America’s third representative to the IOC. Although saddened that he had been overlooked, Kirby continued to serve as an administrator within America’s Olympic hierarchy.

Conclusions

Jeremiah T. Mahoney’s decision to champion the Olympic boycott movement crystallized the debate in the United States and provided the flash point for one of the defining moments in the career of Avery Brundage. Brundage’s dedication to the Coubertin ideal and his fierce determination to defend it, and his belief that the Olympic Movement could transcend international politics, were central elements of the battle of wills between Brundage and Mahoney. His inability to understand that it was possible for “real Americans” to differ with him on the efficacy of celebrating the Games of the Eleventh Olympiad in Berlin, and his propensity to impugn their motives, confirmed his obdurate and intractable conviction in the sanctity of the Olympic Movement.

Tactical maneuvers such as the accord negotiated with Henri Baillet-Latour and the removal of Mahoney’s resolution from discussion at the AAU convention revealed his resourcefulness and guile. Brundage’s combative nature, a key feature of the Mahoney-Brundage confrontation, his commitment to Pierre de Coubertin’s vision of the Olympic Movement, and his ardent desire for sport to remain separate from politics defined his tenure as president of the IOC.

From an organizational perspective, the dispute between the Brundage and Mahoney factions compromised the AAU’s influence in U.S. Olympic affairs and foreshadowed its decline. As a result of Brundage’s agreement with Baillet-Latour, the AAU’s signing authority as the agency that attested to the amateur status of U.S. Olympians was not renewed. The adoption of the Amateur Sport Act (1978) left the United States Olympic Committee ascendant and officially removed the AAU from the Olympic decision-making process in the United States because it lost its status as the national sport governing body for eight Olympic sports, including track and field and swimming.

Although the principal participants in the debate concerning U.S. participation in the 1936 Berlin Olympics should be admired for their dogged determination and persistence, their contribution to the degeneration of the exchange to the level of name-calling, mutual animosity, and vote-rigging provides a less flattering, but more accurate, basis for assessing their actions. Although the strength of their respective beliefs was evident, some questions remain concerning the leadership displayed during this episode in the history of U.S. amateur sport. It is just as well that Brundage’s effort to shift the 1935 AAU convention to New York’s Madison Square Garden, where members of the general public would have been permitted entry for $5 (all money raised to be directed to the Olympic fund), was not successful. Some patrons would have been disappointed by the actions of the delegates, while others would have exacerbated existing tensions.

Notes

1. William May Garland (IOC Member, United States) to Avery Brundage (President, American Olympic Committee), 27 December 1935, Avery Brundage Collection 1908-1975 (hereafter cited as RQES: June 1996
ABC), Box 56. The *Avery Brundage Collection* is located at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. A microfilm copy of the collection located at the Centre for Olympic Studies, University of Western Ontario, was used by the author.


3. Jeremiah T. Mahoney’s views were detailed in an open letter to Theodor Lewald, a German member of the IOC, appearing in the *New York Times*, 21 October 1935.


8. Following the AOC’s decision to accept the Berlin Organizing Committee’s invitation to participate in the 1936 Olympics, a writer for the *New York Times* indicated that Brundage needed to obtain the support of the AAU in order to further the mission of the U.S. Olympic team. “American participation in Germany without the AAU would be akin to running a horse race without a horse,” concluded the columnist, “the jockey might go the distance but not very well.” *New York Times*, 28 September 1934.


11. Kirby’s plight is the subject of an interesting exchange of letters between Brundage and Garland in the early months of 1937. It seems that Henri Baillet-Latour, president of the IOC, was opposed to his candidacy. Other IOC members would withhold support because of an argument between Kirby and Pierre de Coubertin some years earlier. Brundage did not question Kirby’s qualifications, but he and Garland realized that he had no chance for election. Instead, Garland and Brundage nominated an East Coast lawyer named Frederic Coudert. For this exchange of letters, see ABC Box 56.


17. Kirby to Brundage, 19 May 1933; and Kirby to Brundage, 25 May 1933. Both letters are found in ABC Box 28.

18. Brundage to Kirby, 31 May 1933, ABC Box 28; Charles Hitchcock Sherrill’s view was addressed in the *New York Times* on 2 June and 5 June 1933.


20. Kirby to Brundage, 8 July 1935, ABC Box 29. Garland shared Kirby’s opinion. In a letter to Brundage, Garland commented that “it is a well-known fact that [Sherrill] loves the limelight…” Garland to Brundage, 7 August 1935, ABC Box 56.

21. For Rabbi Stephen Wise’s letter, see *Preserve the Olympic Ideal: A Statement of the Case Against American Participation in the Olympic Games at Berlin* (New York: Fair Play Committee in Sports, 1935), 2; President’s Personal File (PPF) 879, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York; Sherrill to Frederick Rubien, 11 June 1933, ABC Box 35.

22. Kirby had predicted that the Germans would try to convince the IOC at its General Session in Vienna (June 1933) that the Berlin atmosphere would be ideal for Olympic competition. See Kirby to Brundage, 25 May 1933, ABC Box 28. For comments on Kirby’s gathering of facts on the situation faced by German Jews, see Kirby to Brundage, 2 November 1933, ABC Box 29.

23. Kirby to Brundage, 2 November 1933; and 8 November 1933, ABC Box 29.

24. Rubien to Brundage, 28 October 1933, ABC Box 35.

25. Brundage to Rubien, 27 October 1933, ABC Box 35; Brundage to Kirby, 5 November 1933, ABC Box 29.

26. Brundage to Kirby, 5 November 1933, ABC Box 29.

27. Kirby to Brundage, 2 November 1933, ABC Box 29.

28. Ibid.


31. George S. Messersmith (U.S. Consul General, Berlin) to Cordell Hull (U.S. Secretary of State), 28 November 1933, No. 1766 862.4063 Olympic Games/IGC, Record Group 59, Diplomatic Branch, National Archives of the United States. A review of
Messersmith’s personal papers and records at the National Archives reveals his diligent efforts to monitor preparations for the 1936 Berlin Olympics. He was critical of the attitude adopted by Brundage and Sherrill. He believed that both sport officials were well aware of the discrimination against Jews in Germany but chose to ignore the situation. The U.S. State Department did not relay his detailed reports to the members of the AOC. For an analysis of the conflicting views of Sherrill and Messersmith, see Wenn, “A Tale of Two Diplomats.

32. Brundage to Sherrill, 17 April 1934, ABC Box 63.
33. Brundage to Murray Hulbert (former AAU president), 16 March 1934, ABC Box 27.
34. Ibid. Also Hulbert to Brundage, 12 March 1934, ABC Box 27.
35. Brundage to Charles Ornstein, 22 October 1934, ABC Box 234.
37. Garland to Brundage, 9 October 1934, ABC Box 56; Kirby to Brundage, 4 October 1934 and 10 October 1934, ABC Box 28.
38. Brundage to Kirby, 5 October 1934, ABC Box 28.
39. See, for instance, Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 73; Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, 68; and Hart-Davis, Hitler’s Games, 65.
40. Brundage to Ornstein, 22 October 1934, ABC Box 234.
41. Ornstein to Brundage, 16 October 1934, ABC Box 234.
42. Ornstein to Brundage, 25 October 1934, ABC Box 234.
43. “Jewish Delegates at the AAU Conventions,” ABC Box 153.
44. Brundage to Kirby, 5 November 1934, ABC Box 28; and Brundage to A. C. Gilbert, 17 November 1934, ABC Box 28.
45. Kirby to Brundage, 23 December 1932, ABC Box 28.
46. Kirby to Brundage, 18 April 1935, ABC Box 29.
47. Brundage to Kirby, 22 April 1935, ABC Box 29.
49. Brundage to Kirby, 27 September 1935, ABC Box 29.
50. Brundage to Rubien, 5 October 1935, ABC Box 35.
51. Brundage to Kirby, 27 September 1936, ABC Box 29.
52. For an assessment of this document, see Kruger, “Fair Play for American Athletes.”
53. Brundage to Rubien, 5 October 1935, ABC Box 35.
54. Kirby to Brundage, 4 November 1935; Brundage to Kirby, 11 November 1935, ABC Box 29; and Rubien to Jack Rafferty (AAU Vice-President), 31 October 1935, ABC Box 35.
55. Kirby to Gilbert, 12 August 1935, ABC Box 26.
56. Kirby to Samuel Hoyt (AAU president), 6 December 1937, ABC Box 29.
57. Kirby to Brundage, 12 September 1935, ABC Box 29.
59. Daily Mirror, 17 October 1935. As an indication of the capacity of this issue to divide, Patrick Walsh had seconded Mahoney’s nomination for President of the AAU at the 1934 convention. See Minutes of the 1934 AAU Convention, 216. Prior to the meeting of the Metropolitan Association, Brundage and Kirby sent Walsh letters of encouragement. They realized that Mahoney and Ornstein (members of the Metropolitan AAU) would raise the issue. “This dragging of politics, race and religion in the AAU will do nothing but wreck the organization,” lamented Brundage. Brundage to Walsh, 5 October 1935, ABC Box 10. Kirby was insistent that the responsibility for determining whether the Germans had violated their pledge rested with the IOC and International Sport Federations. No such information had been relayed to U.S. sport officials, wrote Kirby, “and in this regard let us not be led astray if and when these tryouts bring forth few or no Jews of Olympic caliber—we should remember that since 1896 down through the time to Emperor William and Von Hindenburg and long prior to any of the Hitler edicts or Hitler himself, the Jews which have represented Germany in the Olympic Games can be counted on the fingers of one hand.” Kirby to Walsh, 8 October 1935, ABC Box 10.
62. On the evening of 15 July approximately 200 youths caused havoc on the Kurfuerstendam, one of Berlin’s more fashionable streets. They harassed Jewish citizens and vandalized a number of cafes as well as automobiles owned by Jews. The thugs also inflicted physical harm on Jews and individuals who were thought to have been Jewish. New York Times, 16 July 1935. In September 1935, the Nazi Party Congress passed the Nuremberg Laws. This legislation prohibited marriages (at home or abroad) and extramarital relations between German citizens and Jews. It also precluded Jews from hiring German women under forty-five years of age as domestic workers. Jews were no longer considered German citizens, rather “state subjects.” See Hamilton T. Burden, The Nuremberg Party Rallies: 1933-39 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 109-110; and Norbert Frei, National Socialist Rule in Germany: The Führer State, 1933-1945 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 130.
64. Rubien to Brundage, 3 October 1935, ABC Box 35; Baillet-Latour to Ferris, 5 October 1935, ABC Box 56; Kirby to Brundage, 27 September 1935, ABC Box 29.
65. Kirby to Brundage, 30 September 1935, ABC Box 29.
66. “You who are in New York City and subjected to the continuous barrage from the opposition may feel discouraged at times,” Brundage told AAU colleague James F. Simms, “but remember that out of the sixteen million Jews in the entire world, four million are in the United States and over two million in New York City.” Brundage to Simms, 29 October 1935, ABC Box 35. “You can’t imagine what the situation is in New York City, where because of the fact that 30% or 40% of the population is Jewish,” Brundage complained, “the newspapers are half given up to the German situation.” Brundage to Garland, 28 October 1935, ABC Box 56.
67. Kirby to Brundage, 15 November 1935, ABC Box 29.
68. Kirby to Brundage, 4 November 1935; and Brundage to Kirby, 11 November 1935, ABC Box 29.
69. Brundage to Rubien, 28 October 1935, ABC Box 35. There is little doubt that Brundage was spoiling for a flight. Brundage warned Garland that if Mahoney and the AAU “[attempt] to keep any free-born American citizens who are at perfect liberty to attend the Games and sit in the stands, off the playing field, there will be an old fashioned Boston Tea Party.” Brundage to Garland, 28 October 1935, ABC Box 56.
70. See Lucas, “Ernest Lee Jahncke: The Expelling of an IOC Member.”
71. Lewald to Garland, 17 October 1935; and Brundage to Garland, 28 October 1935, ABC Box 56.
73. Minutes of the 1935 AAU Convention (Indianapolis, IN: National AAU Headquarters, 1936), 124.
76. Ibid.
77. Minutes of the 1935 AAU Convention, 129.
78. Ibid., 142.
79. Ibid., 143.
80. Ibid., 147-148.
81. Ibid., 153-154.
82. Ibid., 155.
83. Ibid., 157.
84. Ibid., 158.
85. Ibid., 162, 165, 176.
86. Ibid., 186.
87. See, for instance, voting results of the District of Columbia, Minnesota, Michigan, Middle Atlantic, and Niagara Associations. Minutes of the 1935 AAU Convention, 1, 126, 212-213. Some problems also exist with results from the vote on the motion to table Mahoney’s resolution with a number of the associations.
88. Minutes of the 1935 AAU Convention, 126, 215.
90. Kirby to Brundage, 11 November 1935; and Brundage to Kirby, 19 November 1935, ABC Box 29.
93. “Not only was he [Mahoney] licked and well-licked, but he is generally being blamed for his own licking,” Kirby told Brundage. “As you probably know, he lost even in his own district. He ran his campaign his own way and not only was it in an unsuccessful way but a foolish, vituperant, kike way. Politically, he is through,” concluded Kirby. Kirby to Brundage, 4 November 1937, ABC Box 29.
94. Garland to Baillot-Latour, 26 June 1936, ABC Box 56.
95. Garland to Brundage, 22 January 1936, ABC Box 56.
96. Kirby to Brundage, 26 June 1936, ABC Box 29. Although Kirby conceded that Sherrill had made a contribution to amateur sport, he was rather uncomplimentary of Sherrill’s motives. He considered that Sherrill had been driven by self-aggrandizement.
97. Kirby to Brundage, 26 October 1936, ABC Box 29.
98. Kirby to Brundage, 3 February 1937, ABC Box 29.
99. Ibid.
100. Garland to Brundage, 24 February 1937, ABC Box 56. Why was there such opposition to Kirby’s candidacy within the ranks of the IOC? Kirby surmised that it was related to an incident involving Coubertin prior to the latter’s retirement as IOC president. At a meet-