Major Joachim Kuhn: Explosives Purveyor to Stauffenberg and Stalin’s Prisoner

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Abstract: Moved by the murder of the Jews and other Nazi atrocities, Joachim Kuhn joined Claus Stauffenberg in the conspiracy against Hitler and supplied explosives for his friend’s assassination attempt. When he was captured by the Red Army after the failed uprising, he was not welcomed as one who had fought Hitler from the inside. Instead the Soviets suspected him as an exponent of those anti-Hitler conspirators who sought a separate peace with the Western Allies and wished to continue the war against the Soviet Union. Caught in a singular historical trap on both the German and Soviet sides, he tried to escape with honor and dignity.

Major Joachim Kuhn was born on 2 August 1913 in Berlin as the son of a civil engineer, graduated from the Gymnasium in 1931, studied engineering at Technische Hochschule in Karlsruhe for a year, and joined No. 14 Infantry Regiment on 15 October 1932 as a professional soldier. During the Second World War he was repeatedly decorated for bravery: he received the Iron Cross Second Class in the Polish Campaign in 1939, was wounded in the French Campaign in June 1940 as a lieutenant and company commander, became a prisoner-of-war in French captivity, was awarded the Iron Cross First Class on 4 July 1940 and subsequently the Kriegsverdienstkreuz mit Schwertern Second and First Class, the Infanterie-Sturmbeschichten, and the Verwundetenabzeichen in Schwarz. Promoted Captain in August 1940, he served as Erster Ordonnanzoffizier (First Special Missions Officer) in the 111th Infantry Division staff and attended the General-Staff course at the Kriegsakademie from November 1941 to May 1942, finishing first in his class. He advanced to Major in January 1943 and Major im Generalstab (Major i.G.) effective 20 April 1943, and served with distinction in the General-Staff Organization Section (OKH/Generalstab des Heeres/Organisationsabteilung) from May 1942 to June 1944, successively under Colonel (i.G.) Helmuth Stieff, Major (i.G.) Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg (to January 1943), and Lieutenant-Colonel (i.G.) Bernhard Klamroth. All three—Stieff, Stauffenberg, and Klamroth—were in the conspiracy against Hitler. From 22 June to 27 July 1944, Kuhn was senior staff officer in the 28th Light Infantry Division (28. Jäger-Division). He received excellent fitness reports from his superiors, including Generalleutnant Otto Stapf, OC 111th Infantry Division (“mature personality [...] balanced judgment; proven before the enemy”), and General der Infanterie Waldemar Erfurth in 1942. His superiors found him brave and fearless, energetic, and “a shining example for his
men.” He was described as intelligent and circumspect. “Under external forms with an appearance of softness there is an absolutely firm core [Kern].”

In the summer of 1942, Stauffenberg convinced Kuhn that the war was monstrous and that Hitler must be removed. Kuhn procured the explosives for Stauffenberg’s assassination attack against Hitler.

On 20 July 1944, the day of Stauffenberg’s failed uprising, Kuhn’s division was in combat east of Bialystok. After escaping arrest by German authorities a week later, Kuhn was captured by Red Army forces and held without charge as a prisoner by the Commissariat of the Interior (NKVD—later the Ministry of the Interior, MVD) and by the Head Office for Military Counter-Intelligence Smersh (GUKR/Smersh). He was moved from one horrible prison to the next during 12 years, until 1951: camp Volkovysk after his capture, Lubyanka prison in Moscow (11 August 1944–1 March 1947), an MVD dacha near Moscow (1 March 1947–22 April 1948), Lefortovo prison in Moscow (22 April 1948–4 May 1950), and Butyrka prison in Moscow (4 May 1950–10 November 1951), where he was subjected to cold-cell water torture and heat-cell torture. He was formally arrested on 29 August 1951, charged on 4 October 1951 with having prepared and supported a war of aggression against the Soviet Union, and sentenced on 17 October 1951 to 25 years in penitentiary (dated from 27 July 1944). He served in the Aleksandrovskii Central Penitentiary of the Ministry for State Security in Irkutsk (5110/51) from November 1951 to 20 September 1955 and was held in the discharge camp Perye Ural’sk until 7 January 1956. Nine days later, he was released to the government of the German Democratic Republic and immediately handed over to the government of the Federal Republic. He was never treated as a prisoner-of-war. When Kuhn arrived in the Federal Republic, he was deeply disturbed, and initially did not acknowledge his own parents. He never quite recovered until his death on 6 March 1994.

On 30 November 1997 in Sawidowno, the Russian President Boris Yeltsin presented the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl with a deposition that Kuhn had been required to prepare on 2 September 1944 for Chairman Joseph Stalin. Excerpts of this deposition were published in July 1998. The Law of the Russian Federation of 18 October 1991 with amendments to 1995, “Concerning the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression,” provided for the rehabilitation of persons such as Joachim Kuhn who had been sentenced by Soviet courts, if relatives applied. Since no surviving relatives were found, the German government was prevailed upon to make the application in 1998. On 13 November 1998 the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Russian Federation requested that Kuhn be rehabilitated, because “his actions cannot be viewed as criminal.”

There are several stories here, and there are questions. There are the stories of: 1. Kuhn’s involvement in the conspiracy of 20 July 1944; 2. his capture by the Red Army; 3. the fate of his divisional commander; 4. his revelations in captivity; 5. his treatment in captivity.
The questions are: 1. Why was Kuhn not treated as a prisoner-of-war but held for 11 years in the worst and most notorious prisons of the Soviet Union? 2. What intentions of the Soviet authorities can account for Kuhn’s fate?

Sources

Until 1989, the little that was known about Kuhn’s involvement in the 20 July 1944 uprising came from Gestapo interrogations and from a few fellow soldiers. A fellow-prisoner published memoirs. The German Red Cross has a file of correspondence relating to Kuhn which contains information mainly from Kuhn’s last two years of imprisonment. A collection of correspondence relating to Kuhn’s location and condition is part of the papers of Marie-Gabriele Gräfin Stauffenberg. In the years since Kuhn’s return, both he and his family were generally uncommunicative.

From 1989, there became available private correspondences; sentences of courts-martial against Kuhn’s divisional commander and against Kuhn himself, in a military archive in Prague; NKVD/MVD records from the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (successor of KGB); Russian records on Institute 99 which controlled the strategic propaganda against the German Army, partly through the Soviet-sponsored Nationalkomitee „Freies Deutschland” and the Bund Deutscher Offiziere that had been formed of German Communist émigrés and German prisoners-of-war in Soviet custody.

The reports of interrogations conducted by the Head Office for Military Counter-Intelligence Smersh (GUKR/Smersh, from 1946 Ministry for State Security, MGB) from July 1944 until Kuhn’s release in January 1956 remain inaccessible; they are presumed to be in the archive of the military Intelligence Head Office (GRU).

Kuhn’s Involvement in the 20 July 1944 Conspiracy

Stauffenberg decided in the spring of 1942 that Hitler must be killed. He launched his own campaign to persuade senior military commanders to overthrow Hitler. In August 1942, at General Staff Headquarters near Vinnytsa in the Ukraine, Stauffenberg convinced Kuhn of the criminal nature of Hitler’s war. Kuhn quoted to his Military Counter-intelligence (Smersh) interrogators Stauffenberg’s words as he remembered them: “The daily staff reports about the treatment of the population by the German civil administration, the lack of political planning for the occupied countries, the treatment of the Jews prove that Hitler falsely claimed that he was conducting the war for the reorganization of Europe. Therefore this war is monstrous and [...] a senseless crime.” Stauffenberg said that peace was the priority. He told Kuhn (3 February 1943) that a temporary military government must be established, and on two succeeding occasions in 1943 that Hitler must be removed, that the aim of the conspirators was peace with all European nations, and that a temporary military dictatorship after Hitler’s elimination “must prepare the ground for a democratic state.”
Kuhn’s involvement gradually intensified.\textsuperscript{22} In the autumn of 1943, Kuhn became a supplier of explosives for Hitler’s assassination.\textsuperscript{23}

On 18 July 1944, when Kuhn’s division suffered overwhelming Red Army assaults, Kuhn and his divisional commander decided to disengage, without authorization from 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army command; the decision was subsequently approved as the correct one.\textsuperscript{24}

On 19 July 1944 Kuhn had advance warning of the uprising planned for 20 July. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army chief of staff, \textit{Generalmajor} Henning von Tresckow, who was one of the leading conspirators, visited LV Corps and its subordinated divisions on 19 July for a first-hand appraisal of the situation. He told Kuhn that Hitler would be killed on one of the next days, and that the orders of General Beck would then have to be obeyed.\textsuperscript{25} At 7 a.m. on 21 July Kuhn learned in outline what had happened on 20 July, as Kuhn’s division was going through difficult combat in retreat.

Toward noon on 21 July, Tresckow arrived at Kuhn’s divisional headquarters and asked for Kuhn to accompany him on a visit to the endangered sections of the front.\textsuperscript{26} In a forest northeast of Novosiolki, at about 3 p.m., Tresckow fired some shots to simulate a partisan attack and committed suicide by detonating a grenade. Kuhn brought his body back in his staff car, reporting a partisan attack.\textsuperscript{27}

**Kuhn’s Capture**

From 25 to 27 July 1944, Kuhn’s division disengaged and withdrew to positions west of Bialystok in forced night marches. On 26 July, Kuhn took a stroll with the divisions’ Special Missions Officer, \textit{Rittmeister} Dietrich Graf zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, and talked about his political views. But he refrained from revealing his role in the conspiracy so that knowledge of it would not unnecessarily endanger Stolberg. Stolberg’s own comment in the conversation was that he personally deprecated political assassination, but that he thought it conceivable that Stauffenberg’s assassination attempt would one day become the most important piece of evidence for the rejection of Hitler’s regime by certain circles, “and thus also a justification for ourselves.” Kuhn, to Stolberg’s considerable bafflement, seized both Stolberg’s hands and said: “Thank you for these good words!”\textsuperscript{28}

On 26 July Hitler learned that Kuhn had provided Stauffenberg with the explosives for the attack upon his life.\textsuperscript{29} The order to arrest Kuhn went out to Army Group Center command immediately. At 8:40 p.m. on 26 July, the commander of Army Group Center, Fieldmarshal Walter Model had the adjutant of LV Corps command, Lieutenant-Colonel Koller, read the order to \textit{General der Infanterie} Friedrich Herrlein, commander of LV Corps. It said that Kuhn was to be arrested immediately and taken to Berlin under guard of “two officers and military policemen” (“wonach Major i.G. Kuhn sofort festzunehmen u. unter Bedeckung von 2 Offz. u. Feldgendarmen nach Berlin zu bringen ist”). Herrlein’s reaction was: “Incomprehensible. K. is a superb man, has, it is true, previously served at OKH.” “Ist mir unverständlich. K. ist ein vorzüglicher Mann, war allerdings früher einmal
Model and Herrlein then discussed several urgent tactical measures. At the end of the conversation Herrlein reiterated: “It is very difficult to be without Kuhn, an excellent man.” “Kuhn ist sehr schwer zu entbehren, da ein ausgezeichneter Mann.” Model: “There is nothing to be done against it. We were not given any reasons. And I cannot grant a delay.” Herrlein: “Then a takeover is necessary.” Model: “Yes. Schönau has to step in. Was Kuhn previously at OKH?” Herrlein: “Yes, with Organization Section. But it may also be that he wrote an incriminating letter.”

By 2 p.m. on 26 July, the expected Russian attack against 28th Light Division and elsewhere in the 2nd Army front had begun.31 The entire army retreated. The 28th Light Division’s disengagement was accomplished by the small hours of 27 July, through the professional competence of the divisional commander, Generalleutnant von Ziehlberg and his senior staff officer, Major i.G. Kuhn.32 After a sleepless night, the officers of the divisional staff were preparing to have a few hours rest.

At 5 a.m. on 27 July, Major i.G. Wernher Freiherr von Schönau-Wehr, senior staff officer of LV Corps command to which the 28th Light Infantry Division belonged, arrived at division headquarters, on a farm south of Bialystok, with a message from the corps commander, General Herrlein. The message said that, “by order of the highest authority” (“auf höchsten Befehl”), which meant by Hitler himself, Kuhn was to be arrested at once and to be sent under escort to the Armed Forces Investigative Prison (Wehrmachtuntersuchungsgefängnis) in Berlin. But neither Ziehlberg nor the other officers knew why Kuhn was to be arrested. They ignored the ominous words “auf höchsten Befehl.”

The order undoubtedly had to be obeyed. Ziehlberg knew that Kuhn had worked under Staufenberg in the General Staff, and that he was a close friend of Staußenberg.33 Ziehlberg also knew that Kuhn had falsely reported the manner of Tresckow’s death. Kuhn’s involvement in the 20 July insurrection had to be considered a strong possibility. But Ziehlberg had just enjoyed the professionally efficient and loyal collaboration of his senior staff officer in the most difficult combat situations, and he evidently balked at having to arrest him as though he were a criminal. Ziehlberg asked Kuhn whether he was involved. When Kuhn denied it, Ziehlberg said that then Kuhn had nothing to fear, and they would deal with this after the manner of officers. Rather than placing Kuhn under arrest, he ordered him to proceed to the new divisional headquarters, from where the LV Corps Ila (Adjutant, personnel officer) Lieutenant-Colonel Seydel would escort him to Berlin.34 The arrangement avoided any appearance of dishonor.

Ziehlberg’s remark that he expected Kuhn to conduct himself after the manner of officers was, in the context, also an unmistakable suggestion that he expected Kuhn to shoot himself if he was implicated in the 20 July plot. Although Kuhn had denied any involvement, Ziehlberg had to suspect that Kuhn was implicated.

On his way to the new divisional headquarters, Kuhn left his car and walked toward the front into a wooded area. Kuhn knew that there was a five-km gap in the German front line.35 Here he was not likely to walk into enemy fire. Kuhn’s
combat driver, Oberjäger Tiffert, waited for two hours for Kuhn, then returned to division headquarters and reported the incident, and that he had not heard any shots that might suggest an ambush laid by partisans.36

When Ziehlberg asked Stolberg whether Kuhn had arrived at the new divisional headquarters, and Stolberg said no, Ziehlberg said immediately: “Then he deserted to the enemy.”37 This was the general view in the divisional staff.38 Kuhn was expelled from the Wehrmacht on 4 August 1944.38 Ziehlberg said later, when he was indicted for insubordination, that he had assumed that Kuhn had committed suicide.40

There are several accounts of what happened afterwards on 27 July 1944. The official reports are reflected in the court-martial records. There are also recollections from witnesses in the divisional staff, and accounts derived from encounters that Germans who collaborated with Soviet authorities had with Kuhn after his capture. But there are no eyewitness accounts, other than Kuhn’s own. Kuhn, some Polish farmers, and Kuhn’s captors were the only witnesses of the circumstances of his capture.

When Kuhn had said farewell to his mother in Berlin on 18 June, on his way to his post with 28. Jäger-Division, he had asked her to pray for him, and said he wanted so much to be among those who survived.41 Did he mean that he hoped for the success of the conspiracy? In a statement Kuhn was required to prepare for Stalin on 2 September 1944, he related how Tresckow had come to commit suicide on 21 July, and how Kuhn had sought to dissuade him. Tresckow was adamant about his own decision to die, but seemed to encourage Kuhn to try to stay alive. It was Kuhn, it is true, who related what Tresckow said to him as his farewell: “if you succeed in staying alive, you must, when the time comes, make known what we wanted.”42 But Tresckow had expressed a similar sentiment when he had written to a friend who was then a prisoner-of-war in Australia and who knew the plotters’ aims: he was glad, Tresckow wrote, that at least “one of us” would certainly survive.42 Kuhn himself explained why he escaped arrest: “With my knowledge of the details and persons involved in the conspiracy I could not allow myself to fall into the control of Himmler’s Security Service. I had decided that suicide was only a last resort if there were no other method of escaping prosecution. Going over to the enemy was the most appropriate option, but it conflicted with the concepts and traditions in which I had been brought up. It remained to seek death by an enemy bullet. This could not be abhorrent since we who were participants in the overthrow [of the regime] had to be daily in expectation of a quick end.”44

Kuhn explained to his Soviet captors that he had left his car, moved toward the front, and stopped in the village of Starosielce45 to think over his next steps. Polish farmers had then reported him to a Russian patrol, who had taken him prisoner. In his interrogations in 1951, Kuhn also said that he had been captured by Soviet forces. The Soviet authorities took the same position.46 The “resolution of the special session at the Ministry of State Security of the USSR of 17 October 1951” in which Kuhn was sentenced to 25 years of “prison confinement, with
confiscation of property,” also mentioned Kuhn’s “capture in July 1944.” Later, in 1951 in Butyrka prison, he told a fellow-prisoner, Christian Ludwig Herzog zu Mecklenburg, that he had tried to make his way to Scandinavia—not to desert to the enemy. One may conclude from Kuhn’s accounts that he was willing but not determined to be killed on his way to and across the front line.

Kuhn could have tried to derive an advantage from saying that he had chosen to join the Soviet side. He could certainly have sought to join the Soviet-sponsored Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, as many had done before him. His interrogators told him on 15 August 1944 that he had been sentenced to death in Germany on 4 August 1944. This was not true. In fact, Kuhn had been expelled from Wehrmacht on 4 August 1944. But since he did not know this, he faced the possibility of being sent back to be executed. Still he maintained that he had not intended to desert to the enemy. His story thus has credibility.

The courts-martial against Ziehlberg and Kuhn listed the circumstances of Kuhn’s disappearance as grounds for suspicion that Kuhn had deserted to the enemy. Then it cited the following as “proof” of Kuhn’s desertion to the enemy: two non-commissioned officers who had “returned from Russian captivity” reported having seen Kuhn or someone fitting Kuhn’s description in the Soviet transit camp of Lunna, 80 km northeast of Bialystok, on 31 July; one of them said that Kuhn had asked to be taken to Moscow because he had important things to report; the other said that a German lieutenant who was giving instruction (Schulung) to German prisoners-of-war had told him and the other non-commissioned officer that Kuhn had been connected with those involved in the 20 July uprising and that therefore they must not mention his arrival when they returned to Germany. They had evidently agreed to act as Soviet agents and agitators, had been sent back across the frontline to the German side, where they explained to German authorities how they had returned, and disavowed any intention of pursuing their mission. They were dubious witnesses, but the courts-martial accepted their testimony as “proof.”

On the day after Kuhn had been captured, the Frontbevollmächtigte des Nationalkomitee “Freies Deutschland” (Front Representative of the NKFD), Second Lieutenant Diedrich Willms, contacted Kuhn. Kuhn must have told him something about his role in the Resistance to Hitler. Thereafter Kuhn was immediately flown to Moscow. Here Kuhn explained himself more fully and asked to be put in touch with General der Artillerie Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, who had been captured at Stalingrad and had become a prominent member of the NKFD and the BDO. Now Kuhn was immediately isolated from all contact with these organizations and from other prisoners-of-war.

**Ziehlberg**

There is no direct evidence that Kuhn had given any thought to the position in which his desertion would place his divisional commander. The strain of having to keep his involvement, his knowledge, and his thoughts about the attack against
Hitler to himself for so many months, the added stress of the failure of the plot and the threat of exposure in its wake, Tresckow’s concealed suicide, the complex combat situations, retreats and looming defeat must all have weighed upon Kuhn’s consciousness. On 27 July 1944, Kuhn was especially fatigued and stressed by the preceding tense 48 hours of the division’s disengagement. Stolberg suggests that all these pressures temporarily prevented Kuhn from thinking clearly. Kuhn seemed to Stolberg deeply disturbed, on the verge of losing control. Stolberg wrote later: “From his [Kuhn’s] few remarks one could have gathered that he felt he had been delivered into a merciless political justice system which sought to destroy without distinction everything that was drawn into it [...] The sense of the arrest being an intolerable dishonor for oneself and for one’s next of kin and the wish to die lay nearer to the mentality of the front-line officer. Major Kuhn’s conversation with the Ib officer, Major i.G. v. Löbbecke, appeared to confirm this [presumed] attitude [in Kuhn].” Stolberg’s generous view is in agreement with Kuhn’s own view that he must not fall into the hands of the Gestapo lest he reveal under torture what and whom he knew in the conspiracy. And there was the fact that he passionately wished to survive.

On 27 July 1944, when Ziehlberg signed a report to LV Corps about Kuhn’s disappearance, he said to his new senior staff officer: “Schönau, jetzt unterschreibe ich mein Todesurteil.” “Schönau, I am signing my own death sentence.” On 2 October 1944 the Reichskriegsgericht sentenced Ziehlberg to nine months suspended detention for negligent disobedience (fahrlässigen Ungehorsam). Ziehlberg remained in command of his division until the end of October when he was given command of XXVII Corps. On 1 November 1944, Hitler voided the court-martial sentence. When Hitler ordered a new trial, the judges understood that he was not prepared to be lenient. Generaloberst Heinz Guderian wrote in his memoirs that Hitler had in fact ordered the death sentence. When the President of the Reich Court Martial, General-Stabsrichter Dr. Karl Schmauser, was interrogated by Mr. Fred Kaufman and Mr. Niederman in the United States Military [Prosecution] Division on 29 October 1947, he claimed that Ziehlberg’s statement in an interrogation after his first court martial that he had intentionally refrained from arresting Kuhn in order to give him an opportunity to shoot himself had led to the new trial and the capital sentence. He did not mention Hitler’s specific wishes. On 19 November, the President of the Reichskriegsgericht ordered Ziehlberg arrested. The Reichskriegsgericht tried Ziehlberg again and, on Hitler’s order, sentenced him to death on 21 November 1944. The judges had no new facts. Ziehlberg had admitted that he had given Kuhn the opportunity to commit suicide, but that had been clear from the beginning. They did in their sentence refer to Hitler’s wishes, obliquely, by citing his announcement after the 20 July attack that all those involved were “to be ruthlessly confronted, arrested, and done away with if they resisted.” Ziehlberg was shot at Spandau on 2 February 1945.
Kuhn’s Revelations

On 15 August 1944, Kuhn was told that he had been sentenced to death in Germany on 4 August 1944. This must have been deliberate disinformation, unless the Chief of GUKR Smersh, Colonel-General Viktor Abakumov is presumed to have believed a Soviet news service’s unconfirmed report. In fact Kuhn was expelled from the Wehrmacht on 4 August 1944.62 Apparently his Soviet interrogators also asked him about “the fate of General v. Ziehlberg,” since he stated in his 2 September 1944 deposition that he did not know it.63 Kuhn must have asked himself whether he had caused Ziehlberg to come to grief, and the thought must have tormented him. He learned of Ziehlberg’s fate in or not long before June 1945.64

Kuhn was interrogated from the moment of his capture.65 But the earliest direct record of his testimony that has come to light is a deposition of 26 pages which he typed himself, in the Head Office of Military Counter-Intelligence (GUKR Smersh), on a German typewriter, to each page of which he signed his name.66 Fellow prisoners reported that the deposition was made “for Stalin.”67 The deposition was sent to the State Defense Committee (GKO) which Stalin chaired. Stalin was personally informed and is presumed to have read a Russian translation of Kuhn’s deposition.68 On 23 September 1944 Abakumov wrote to Georgij Malenkov, a member of GKO, describing Kuhn’s prominence and value, and warning at the same time that he might be a Nazi agent.69

Kuhn’s own typed deposition in German contains both information and turns of phrase which can be attributed only to indoctrination or pressure.

In this and in his subsequent statements, Kuhn revealed information about German personnel reserves, demonstrating with numbers that they would be exhausted in about nine months,70 and about the views of a number of senior military officers. He explained that General Friedrich Olbricht, Head of Army Office, Home Army Command, and General Erich Fellgiebel, Chief of Armed Forces Communications, and Generalmajor Helmuth Stieff, Head of Organization Section in the General Staff/OKH were supporters of Stauffenberg’s views and intentions.71 He also implicated 16 other officers as favorably disposed toward the overthrow of Hitler: Manstein, Weichs, Küchler, Zeitzler, Wöhler, Speidel, Stapf, Halder, Müller-Hillebrand, Heusinger, Kielmansegg, Herzog von Ratibor, Köstring, Herwarth von Bittenfeld, Falk, Hagen.72 The list included names of officers who had not been arrested, and Kuhn hoped they would not be arrested.73

The question why Kuhn made such extensive revelations which could endanger those he named cannot be answered from what is in the known record. Kuhn was no turncoat. His resistance, in year after year of solitary confinement and torture, to Soviet attempts to use him for their policy in Germany makes that clear. Kuhn may have known that Olbricht had been shot on 20 July, and that Stieff and Hagen had been hanged on 8 August; he may have considered Fellgiebel doomed (Fellgiebel was hanged on 4 September 1944). The 15 others whom Kuhn implicated were in little or no danger of being arrested. Among them Herwarth was initiated and
involved in the plot to kill Hitler, and survived; General Franz Halder, from 1938 to 1942 Chief of the General Staff, knew a great deal about the plot, had made commitments to the conspirators in 1938 and 1939, and was arrested, but survived in concentration camp; Manstein had been contacted by the conspirators on several occasions without reporting it, and he survived unharmed. But Kuhn placed these persons in great danger. Hearsay from a presumed deserter might be considered to have limited usefulness in a court martial, but it might still have sealed the fate of some of those named. It is therefore unlikely that Kuhn gave this information voluntarily. The relevant phrases in his deposition also strongly suggest some form of “coaching” on the part of the interrogators.

Kuhn further provided information on the leadership, motives, and aims of the conspiracy against Hitler. Stauffenberg told Kuhn in November 1943 that he reported his conspiratorial activities nearly weekly to General Beck and that he was in complete agreement with him. Kuhn also found General Olbricht and General Fellgiebel in agreement with these views. In a further conversation at the beginning of December 1943 in Berlin Stauffenberg said, particularly with reference to the Soviet-sponsored National Committee Free Germany, that the appearance of treason must be avoided for political reasons, but that it was imperative to establish relations with Russia.

Stauffenberg had come from Berlin to “Mauerwald” General Staff Headquarters near Angerburg in East Prussia “in the first days of October 1943,” and had told Kuhn that Hitler must die during that same month. He assigned to him the role as his conspiracy representative in General Staff Headquarters, as the assistant of General Helmuth Stieff who had agreed personally to assassinate Hitler, and as the organizer of the necessary preparations for taking control of the Headquarters installations. Stieff was to assassinate Hitler on 20 October 1943, when new weaponry was to be shown to Hitler. But the planned assassination date was cancelled in a meeting of Olbricht, Fellgiebel, Stauffenberg, and Kuhn because it appeared that the preparations were not yet sufficient. Another opportunity offered itself when Hitler spoke to young officers in Breslau on 20 November 1943. But here the objection was that too many others would be killed, and Fellgiebel said he could not effectively control communications there.

Kuhn related Stauffenberg’s statement that the conspirators sought “peace with all European nations.” All nations would have included the United States of America, which was the principal capitalist country and chief ideological enemy of the Soviet Union even if it was currently an ally. Kuhn also quoted Fellgiebel as giving preference to “the earliest possible accommodation with the Soviet Union because it alone has an interest in the preservation of and cooperation with a viable Germany. For the Anglo-Americans, the Continent will always be an undesirable competitor.” Kuhn’s reference to a German “democratic state” was not an affront to the Soviet Union, since it regarded itself as supremely democratic.
The “operational work” that GUKR/Smersh conducted with Kuhn also led to the discovery on 17 February 1945 of the conspiracy documents that Kuhn and a fellow-conspirator and would-be assassin of Hitler, Major Axel Freiherr von dem Bussche-Streithorst, had buried at “Mauerwald” OKH Headquarters. Kuhn was flown there in one of Lavrentii Pavlovich Beria’s airplanes, and had to show his guards Hitler’s bunker. Everything there had been demolished, as Kuhn later told a fellow-prisoner. Kuhn was also—always according to Mecklenburg’s recollection of Kuhn’s story—taken to Insterburg and Allenstein—which, he noted, were completely deserted.

Prisoner-of-War Status Denied

Neither the protecting power for German interests in the Soviet Union during the conflict (1941–1945), Bulgaria, nor the delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross for the Soviet Union were able to intercede on behalf of Kuhn or any other German prisoners-of-war in the Soviet Union. Throughout the conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, the ICRC—as an ICRC Report about ICRC activities during the Second World War relates—made frequent, vigorous efforts to carry out its mission, either on the basis of articles 79 and 88 of the Convention of 1929 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, or by means of ad-hoc arrangements. Since the Soviet government had not ratified the Convention, and the German government was therefore not legally bound by it with regard to Soviet prisoners-of-war, the ICRC proposed, for a start, that lists of prisoners be exchanged between Germany and the Soviet Union. Initially the Soviet government declared itself “ready to accept the proposal of the ICRC concerning the dispatch of particulars about prisoners of war, if such indications are forwarded by the countries at war with the USSR.” The ICRC informed the Soviet government on 9 July 1941 that Germany had consented to an exchange of lists.

On 19 July 1941 the Royal Swedish Legation in Berlin informed the German Foreign Office that according to information received from the Royal Swedish Minister in Moscow the government of the Soviet Union was prepared to act according to the terms of the Hague Convention relative to the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare of 18 October 1907, if the German government did so as well. Both the government of Germany and the government of the Soviet Union agreed to the proposal of the ICRC to facilitate the transmission of information about prisoners-of-war in the custody of the two powers. The German government informed the Swedish Legation in Berlin on 6 August 1941 of their agreement and declared that they were prepared, on condition of reciprocity, to permit visits by a representative of the Royal Swedish Legation to Russian prisoners-of-war in Germany. On 20 August the ICRC delegate in Ankara informed the ICRC in Geneva that he had sent to Moscow a copy of the first German list of Soviet prisoners-of-war. On 26 August, the Soviet Information Bureau informed the ICRC delegate in Ankara that they would send lists of German prisoners-of-war, written in Latin characters,
and that the prisoners-of-war would be allowed to send capture cards by post to their next of kin. But the Soviet government did not send any lists. The German government then said they would not send any more lists without reciprocity.

On 21 August 1941, the German Foreign Office replied to the note of the Royal Swedish Legation in Berlin of 19 July to express the German government’s “utmost astonishment” that, in view of the behavior of the troops of the government of the Soviet Union toward the German soldiers who had become their captives, the government of the Soviet Union thought themselves justified to speak of the application of rules of international law in the treatment of prisoners-of-war, and in this connection to raise the question of reciprocity. The German note further stated that it went without saying that the German government had consistently treated the prisoners-of-war who had become their captives according to the existing rules of international law. The German note continued to say that the Soviet troops, on the other hand, had “tortured and murdered German prisoners-of-war in an indescribable and bestial manner,” and that wounded soldiers had been tortured and murdered. This, the German note said, made it impossible to speak of the Red Army as the armed force of a civilized state. The Soviet government would have to prove that they were willing and able completely to change the behavior of their troops and other agencies vis-à-vis German prisoners before agreements about the treatment of prisoners-of-war could be discussed.

On 10 November 1941, the Chargé d’Affaires of the United States of America in Stockholm stated to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs “that the Department of State understood that the provisions of the Geneva Convention have not been applied in Germany to Soviet prisoners of war.” The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated in their memorandum concerning this discussion with the Chargé d’Affaires of the United States of America in Stockholm that, as the Soviet Union was not a party to the Convention “there is no obligation upon Germany to apply its provisions to Soviet prisoners under the control of Germany.” The Department of State had information, the memorandum continued, “that if this situation continues the treatment not only of Soviet prisoners of war but of all other prisoners of war in Germany may deteriorate.” “In the interest, therefore, not only of Soviet prisoners of war but of all other prisoners of war in various countries, it is hoped that the Soviet government will find it possible officially to indicate its willingness to apply the provisions of the Convention to German and associated prisoners in the event that the German government indicates that it is prepared similarly to apply the provisions to Soviet prisoners of war. The Department of State has learned that the Soviet government is extremely reluctant to adhere to the Prisoners of War Convention in the manner prescribed by Article 94 thereof because of its relations with the Swiss government. Nevertheless the American Ambassador in Kuibishev has been informed that the Department of State considers that such adherence together with a statement that the Soviet government intends immediately to apply the provisions of the Convention thus waiving the
six months’ period mentioned in Article [94] would be the most effective step that could be taken toward this humanitarian objective, and has been instructed first to take this matter up with the competent Soviet authorities on that basis and urge that adherence to the Convention be given the most serious consideration. He was also instructed to say that, if desired, the United States government would be pleased to act as a friendly intermediary for the delivery to the Swiss government of the Soviet government’s act of adherence to the Convention. If the Ambassador found that beyond all manner of doubt the Soviet government would not adhere under any consideration to the Prisoners of War Convention in the manner prescribed in Article 94, he was then instructed to suggest to the Soviet authorities that they might wish to make an official declaration to the effect that the Soviet government is prepared to apply to prisoners of war in its hands the provisions of Articles 1–88 inclusive of this Convention under terms of reciprocity. The Department of State would be pleased, in addition to such steps as might be taken through the representing powers, to communicate the terms of such a declaration to the opposing belligerents and to inquire of them whether they would be disposed reciprocally to apply the same provisions of the Convention to Soviet prisoners. If then the Ambassador should discover that the Soviet government does not desire to associate itself in any manner with the Prisoners of War Convention whether because of the fact that it is known as the Geneva Convention or because the Swiss government is the custodian or for any reason, the Ambassador was instructed to suggest to the competent Soviet authorities that that government might wish independently to agree with the German government to apply to prisoners of war a regime to be established in a reciprocal agreement entered into between the opposing belligerents and the Soviet government, the terms of which would be identical with Articles 1–88 inclusive of the Geneva Convention. The agreement would thus constitute an entirely separate bilateral agreement distinct from the Geneva Convention and the Department of State expressed its desire to take any possible measures to assist in the conclusion of such an agreement. The Chargé d’Affaires was instructed to express the hope of the United States government that the government of Sweden, which has undertaken the representation of Soviet interests in Germany and which, therefore, would appear to be in a strong position to make representations of a similar nature to the Soviet government, would do everything within its power to obtain the Soviet government’s agreement reciprocally to apply the terms of the Geneva Convention or similar treatment based on some reciprocal agreement to apply to prisoners of war. The Chargé d’Affaires under instructions suggested that the Swedish government, for example, might point out to the Soviet government from observation by Swedish representatives in Germany the nature of the protection the State Department’s representatives have been enabled by the Geneva Convention to afford the belligerent and British prisoners of war in Germany, a protection which the Swedish representatives will scarcely be able to extend to Soviet prisoners in the absence of an agreement between the Soviet and German
governments reciprocally to apply the Convention or provisions similar to it."94 These efforts, however, proved futile.

The ICRC Report speaks only of the efforts and involvements of the ICRC and does not seek to explain the positions and actions taken by any of the belligerent governments. It does not mention the fact that between two and three million Soviet prisoners-of-war perished in German custody during the course of the conflict (1941–1945),95 that by late August 1941 thousands had already been killed or succumbed to disease, and that any lists provided by the German government would have raised the gravest questions, nor does it mention that a number greater than one million of German prisoners-of-war died while in the custody of the USSR. The Soviet government, in any case, never provided the promised lists, nor did they make any other concessions. The ICRC continued throughout the conflict to attempt to negotiate with the two sides, to no avail. Only on 9 August 1944, the representative of the Soviet Red Cross Alliance in Tehran and the Soviet Embassy there verbally informed the delegate of the ICRC that, “for the time being, the Alliance was not authorized by the Soviet government to enter into official and direct relations with the ICRC, and that it was therefore not in a position to answer the proposals made by the committee.” The ICRC’s Report of 1948 concludes: “This decision placed a check on the unceasing endeavors of the ICRC on behalf of the Russian PW in the hands of Germany and her allies, and of Axis prisoners in the hands of the USSR.” The ICRC kept up “occasional contacts with the Soviet authorities and the Alliance,” but without ever gaining access to German prisoners-of-war in the Soviet Union. On the German side, too, the camps with Soviet prisoners-of-war “remained strictly closed to the ICRC, although it had constant relations with the German authorities.” The ICRC’s delegates remained at their posts, also in Berlin, from where they were “taken to Soviet Russia in June 1945, and interned for several months, without even knowing the grounds for this measure, before being repatriated to Switzerland.”96 Both Soviet prisoners-of-war in German custody, and German prisoners-of-war in Soviet custody were thus deprived of any rights under the Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and of the ministrations of the ICRC. The intransigence of both the Soviet and the German governments prevented the ICRC from acting on behalf of German prisoners-of-war.

Kuhn in Captivity
Kuhn stated on 2 September 1944 that initially he had said nothing about his involvement in the conspiracy, and that only on 4 August had he arrived at the view that it was better to reveal his involvement. He wrote that “the way I was treated as a prisoner-of-war and the conversations with Soviet officers and also with my fellow-prisoners-of-war have enlightened me [haben mich aufgeklärt].” He had then approached a Russian staff officer in Volkovy’sk camp in order to make important statements whereupon he had been taken to Moscow. “The conversations with
Soviet officers here confirmed in every way my first impression, in consequence of which I give the following account.97

According to the memoirs of the Duke of Mecklenburg, a fellow-prisoner in 1951, Kuhn was treated very well while the Soviets attempted to win Kuhn’s political cooperation in postwar Germany.98 In 1947 and 1948, Kuhn was accommodated at a dacha for about 13 months. He was well fed, well treated, provided with a constant companion, who was a Soviet second lieutenant and a commissar, who spoke German fluently, and with an NKVD soldier always in the house, and a woman who cooked for them. The commissar took walks with Kuhn, and he read to him from Russian newspapers but never allowed Kuhn to read them.99 The purpose was to prepare Kuhn for a role in the future administration of Soviet-occupied Germany.100 But at some point in this episode, probably shortly before it ended, Kuhn expressed his preference for living in the West and for collaborating with America.101

On 22 April 1948, Kuhn was placed into Lefortovo prison in Moscow, in solitary confinement, without any interrogations. He endured the worst tortures in cold cells, where water constantly dripped onto his head, and in hot cells, which drove him to the brink of madness.102

The Soviet Head Office of Military Counter-Intelligence (GUKR/Smersh) were intensely interested in winning Kuhn’s collaboration in building their influence in the Soviet occupied part of Germany, and in Germany as a whole.103 Kuhn was the only inner-circle conspirator of the 20 July 1944 uprising in their custody and control: he had been the supplier of explosives for Hitler’s assassination, and he had knowledge of documents produced in preparation for the uprising.

But his captors were in a dilemma. They believed that the 20 July 1944 conspirators had sought to conclude a separate peace with the western Allies and to continue the war against the Soviet Union together with these powers.104

On 2 September 1944, Kuhn wrote in his deposition that Heusinger was a decided opponent of Hitler, and that Major i.G. Johann A. Graf von Kielmansegg, Generalmajor Helmuth Stieff, and Stauffenberg had confirmed this (Stauffenberg in December 1943).105 After months of torture, during his pre-“trial” interrogations in 1951, Kuhn denounced Adolf Heusinger as a loyal follower of Hitler.106 In the light of the beginning rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1951, this information had to be useful to the Soviet government in its efforts to undermine the democratic credentials of the Federal Republic’s establishment, and to counter charges that the DDR was using tainted Wehrmacht officers in its rearmament. Since on 2 September 1944 Kuhn had written down the exact opposite, the new version may have been solicited by the Soviet authorities. Kuhn appears to have made a concession. But in fact, both his statements about Heusinger were correct. Heusinger was sympathetic toward the conspirators but refused actively to support them.107
Kuhn’s conduct before and after his capture indicates that his own position as an enemy of Hitler was unchanged, but that he did not want to support Communism. Accounts of prisoners’ sufferings in Soviet custody—beatings, verbal abuse, starvation, mock execution—by Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, who yielded to great pressure and joined the NKFD, or by Christian Ludwig Herzog zu Mecklenburg, who refused to collaborate with the Soviets, afford at least a glimpse of what Kuhn must have gone through.108 Until the last two years of his more than 11 years of imprisonment, he was not allowed to correspond with or otherwise contact his parents or other relatives or friends.109

Kuhn owed his long incarceration in notorious GRU (Military Intelligence Head Office) prisons, and the tortures he suffered, to his extraordinary status as a prominent member of the anti-Hitler conspiracy, to the Soviet government’s belief that the anti-Hitler conspirators were hostile toward the Soviet Union, to the suspicion that Kuhn had come as a subversive agent, and to his refusal to collaborate with Soviet authorities.110

On the second point, the indictment of 11 October 1951 against Kuhn, approved by the Deputy Minister for State Security of the USSR, is explicit: “During the investigation Kuhn testified that he was a member of the conspiracy against Hitler. It was established that the participants in this conspiracy pursued the aim of destroying Hitler, to conclude a separate peace with England, France and the U.S.A., and together with these countries to continue the war against the Soviet Union.”111

But Kuhn’s detention after the last attempt (1947) to “convert” him seems the result also of the internal contradictions of the Soviet investigative and judiciary apparatus in the Stalin era, and of the chaos in the last years of Abakumov’s administration.112 In 1943 the Ministry for State Security (MGB) was moved out of the Interior Ministry (MVD, until 1946 People’s Commissariat of the Interior, NKVD). The Military Intelligence Head Office of the Red Army (GRU) was incorporated into the MGB. Henceforth the MGB and the MVD competed for custody and control of the most “interesting” prisoners so that they might provide Stalin with the most important information and clear up the most spectacular cases. The MGB usually won this competition.113 Abakumov, born in 1908, served as Head of Military Counter-Intelligence and First Deputy People’s Commissar for Defense during the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, from April 1943 to October 1946 he was Head of Smersh; he was promoted General of the Army in July 1945; from October 1946 he was Minister for State Security (MGB). Through an intrigue of Beria’s he was removed from his position in July 1951.114 He was accused of not having properly investigated the activities of enemy intelligence, and “of not officially noting and registering all the interrogations of [German] agents under arrest. [This he did] in order to conceal his own errors from Stalin.”115 After Stalin’s death, Abakumov was sentenced to death and shot on 19 December 1954.116 He did not break down under torture and maintained to the end that he had done all he had done at Stalin’s behest. In 1954, this was not the correct answer. Ten years
later, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union changed Abakumov’s sentence to the effect that he could no longer be considered a state criminal. His case was reexamined in December 1997, with the result that the earlier verdict of shooting by firing squad was changed to 25 years of imprisonment.

When Kuhn had no more usefulness, he was stuck in the muddle of Abakumov’s system. Kuhn’s sentencing was analogous to that of most other German prisoners-of-war at the time. But it was again exceptional in that he was sent to Aleksandrovskii prison in Irkutsk.17

Conclusions

German scholars have examined the files of 30,782 German prisoners-of-war who were sentenced, like Kuhn, to long imprisonment or death (from 1941 to 1955, 218 were sentenced to death). There are some 3,000 additional penal files on German prisoners-of-war in the archive of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation, which had not yet been examined in June 2001.118 Most of these prisoners-of-war were sentenced to 25 years of forced labor for such “crimes” as having done what military officers must do when they lead troops, namely, for having provided food and munitions for soldiers under their command. This was construed as planning and preparing a war of aggression against the Soviet Union.119

The release of tens of thousands of sentenced and amnestied German prisoners-of-war since the autumn of 1953 and after Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s intervention in Moscow in September 1955 was in part the result of Soviet efforts to reduce tensions in the context of the beginning conflict with China, and to revise its policies toward the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic after the Korean War and the uprising in the DDR.

The condemned prisoners-of-war had by 1955 become merely hostages.120 The rehabilitation decisions of the 1990s in many cases simply stated that there was no evidence of a crime.121 749 prisoners were released but not amnestied.122

But in Kuhn’s case there were reasons for his treatment that had nothing to do with the trumped-up charges at his “trial”. Kuhn’s collaboration would have enabled the Soviets to expand the antifascist base of their regime in occupied eastern Germany beyond the narrow Communist minority. From time to time, Soviet authorities made vigorous efforts to postulate, and establish, a community of ideas between the NKFD and the anti-Hitler conspirators of 20 July 1944.123 The purpose of the NKFD was always propaganda with the aim of breaking down German military opposition. On 14 August 1943, six days after Fieldmarshal Friedrich Paulus’ proclamation to the German soldiers, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, told the British Ambassador in Moscow, Lord Lothian (Philip Henry Kerr), that the proclamation “was useful but not particularly significant,” and that the NKFD was being used “entirely for propaganda purposes.” On 13 January 1944, Averell Harriman, the American Ambassador in Moscow, reported: “At the Moscow Conference the Soviet government stated that its support of the Free German Committee in Russia had
been from its inception a propaganda move designed to weaken German resistance and that the statements of the Free German Committee were not expressions of policy of Soviet government." The Soviet government also asked Harriman to ensure "that its attitude toward the Free Germany Committee be kept secret." It has been argued that the collapse of the 20 July uprising deprived the NKFD of its usefulness as a tool to break down the German military machine. The NKFD had certainly lost its role in Soviet policy toward Germany well before the Conference of Yalta in February 1945, perhaps before the Conference of Tehran in 1943. But the Soviet government still aimed at the cooperation of "antifascist forces" in Germany with the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). Kuhn related to his captors Stauffenberg’s view of the NKFD, that the appearance of treason must be avoided for political reasons, but that it was imperative to establish relations with Russia. This view of Stauffenberg’s is likely to have had an impact upon Soviet thinking in this matter.

From the Soviet point of view, Kuhn might have been the key to a successful policy in Germany. Kuhn, however, steadfastly refused to cooperate. Kuhn, a mere individual prisoner, frustrated a superpower.

But the Soviet authorities were also schizophrenic. They believed that the conspirators of 20 July had sought to collaborate with the western imperialist powers to continue the war against the Soviet Union, while the same Soviet authorities were trying to win over former anti-Hitler conspirators as prominent collaborators for their policy toward Germany. An enemy of Hitler could be an enemy of Stalin as well. By 1966, the publication of a book on 20 July 1944 by the Soviet writer Daniil Mel’nikov led to a fresh campaign to co-opt non-Communist anti-Hitler resisters. Captured officers such as Otto Korfes served in high-ranking positions in the Nationale Volksarmee of the DDR. DDR authors now produced a few works in which they tried to claim that some of the younger leaders of the conspiracy—Stauffenberg, Mertz von Quirnheim—had pro-Soviet leanings. They tried desperately to construct an affinity between Stauffenberg, Oberst i. G. Albrecht Ritter Mertz von Quirnheim, and any other such "progressive" officers on the one hand, and NKFD and BDO members such as Otto Korfes on the other. At least one author employed forgery to make the point.

A conceivable explanation for the decision not to allow Kuhn to see Seydlitz is the fear of the Soviets that their allies would suspect them of seeking a separate arrangement with Germany. The British and American ambassadors had hinted at such suspicions with respect to the Soviet sponsorship of the Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutschland" and the Bund Deutscher Offiziere in August 1943 and January 1944. But there is a more likely explanation: the Soviet authorities feared that Kuhn might be an agent sent for subversive purposes. The manner of Kuhn’s capture in itself suggested it. The Soviet authorities routinely considered Germans who crossed over to their side subversion agents. Their suspicions were never quite laid to rest even if those who crossed over worked for Soviet espionage or propaganda.
agencies. The conspirators of 20 July 1944 had made numerous attempts to collaborate with the Western Allies, and hardly any to contact the Soviet side. Thus Kuhn was bounced back and forth between the perception that he was a potential ally of Soviet political and geopolitical aims, or an enemy of the Soviet Union.

No doubt Kuhn was traumatized, and he was disturbed in his mind. But had he lost his sanity?

What is documented is a pattern of Kuhn adopting other identities. This began during his imprisonment. A few months after his sentence and transfer to Irkutsk, on 15 February 1952, Kuhn wrote a letter in German to the Soviet Minister for Security, signing himself “Graf von der Pfalz-Zweibrücken, Generalmajor.” He declared his friendship toward the Soviet Union, and that it compelled him to request authorization for the following disclosures: that a decree of the President of the German Republic dated 13 June 1926 had identified him as Graf von der Pfalz-Zweibrücken; he wished to add to his personnel record that he had been promoted from Colonel in the General Staff (Oberst i.G.) to Generalmajor “in the Army of West Germany”; that he was involved in “a process of science and technology,” which was conducted by German engineers and university professors and which interested the Americans; that he could offer clarifying statements only in Moscow, and “upon instructions from the West German government and the U.S.A.”; that, inasmuch as he was suffering from dystrophy, he was prepared to offer further communications only if he was accommodated in a hotel and provided with “ample normal civilian rations, and, as soon as it will be confirmed that the promise of his imminent liberation, upon the basis of which he had acted, [and that his request] for release into his homeland in the very nearest future will not constitute a charge [against him].” When he was interrogated on 15 October and 21 November 1952, he made the same declarations, including the claim that he had been promoted to Brigadier (Generalmajor) but had been taken prisoner by Red Army forces before a written order to that effect reached him. Although he had no documents to prove his statements, he had decided to make them in order to prove his loyalty toward the Soviet Union, of which he had made repeated declarations in Moscow. There followed a story about a super-short-wave radio transmitter, about which Kuhn proposed to discover more details and to communicate them to “the Russian representative in East Germany,” if he were released to his home in West Germany. When he was finally allowed to write to his family in November of 1953, he continued to style himself Joachim Graf von der Pfalz-Zweibrücken, wrote a postcard addressed to Fieldmarshal Erich von Manstein, and one to “Sir President of United Croix Rouge, U.S.A.—CIIIA Section Washington Pfalz Washington, 16 Liverpool Avenue.”

On 14 August 1954, Dr. V. Belik, director of the Psychiatric Department, and Dr. V. Leksikova, director of the Medical Department of the Psychiatric Section of Aleksandrovskii Central Penitentiary infirmary, signed a report of their ambulatory neuro-psychic examination “of the imprisoned Kuhn, Joachim, sentenced as a
war criminal to 25 years, in connection with his inappropriate utterances.” Both Kuhn’s neurological condition and his psychiatric condition were found to be normal, although Kuhn reported that he heard voices of Americans, that he was tuned into a radio station, that the waves were working upon him, that the voices read verses and sang songs to him, and that once the voices suggested that he kill himself so that he had wounded himself in the chest near the heart. Nevertheless, the doctors declared Kuhn “emotionally quite lively,” tactful, polite, with a wholly adequate bearing. They concluded that Kuhn had undergone a “psychogenic paranoia,” but that at present there were “no symptoms of a psychiatric disorder.” Based on these findings “he was fit to continue serving his punishment in places of incarceration.”

Two points emerge here. The first is that, if Kuhn had hoped to win an early release, his repeated references to West Germany, the West German Army, and the American voices could not have been calculated to strengthen his case. Regardless of Kuhn’s hopes and possible designs, he was quite obviously suffering from something. The second is equally obvious. The doctors reported what seems to have been expected of them, namely, that Kuhn was fit to stay in the penitentiary.

Kuhn continued to use his assumed name. In 1954 he addressed his mother as Hildegard von der Pfalz-Zweibrücken. The German Red Cross advised his parents that it would probably facilitate correspondence and transmission of parcels and money if they addressed them to him under his assumed name, and if Kuhn’s mother agreed to sign herself with the name Kuhn had given her. When the frequency of correspondence increased to about one card per month, Kuhn wrote to his parents (under his fictitious name) on 29 September 1954: “what lies behind me was not easy to endure, but I am in entire good health.” When Kunrat Freiherr von Hammerstein, a friend from before the war, and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, around 1980, visited Kuhn in Bad Bocklet, Kuhn was calling himself Kronprinz Wilhelm von Hohenzollern and gave Einsiedel, who came from Munich and had arrived two hours before Hammerstein who came from Bonn, a calling card with this name. He told Einsiedel he had never had anything to do with the attempted assassination of Hitler, Hitler had wanted to have him murdered because he was the Crown Prince and Pretender. He had broken with Stauffenberg, he said, because Stauffenberg had declared to him in April 1944 that he wanted to go Seydlitz’s way and negotiate with the Soviets, Stauffenberg had wanted to turn Germany over to the Soviets. Einsiedel recalls that, when Hammerstein arrived and failed to address Kuhn as His Imperial Highness, Kuhn became upset, called his visitors provocateurs, left the room and asked his landlady to show the visitors out. Hammerstein’s companion, who had travelled to Bad Bocklet with him, remembers that Kuhn had become upset when Hammerstein had mentioned Major Lev Kopelev to whom a Polish farm woman had reported Kuhn on 27 July 1944.

Had Kuhn chosen eccentric behavior in captivity as a means to secure his release, there would have been no reason to continue it after his release. Had he isolated himself after his return to Germany because he knew he was considered a
deserter? Or because his friends now shunned him? Who can say whether it was the consciousness that his comrades believed him dishonored, the burden of Ziehlberg’s fate, or the guilt feelings of the survivor, or the tortures and long imprisonment in isolation that made him a recluse during the remaining 38 years of his life?

Kuhn had dared to join the Resistance to Hitler; he had risked being apprehended and hanged by the Nazi authorities, or shot by the Soviets; he had dared to resist Soviet indoctrinations; he had dared to endure torture and cruel imprisonment; and he had dared to return to Germany. But the remaining 38 years of his life were a continuing, self-imposed torture and tragic imprisonment.145

Glossary:
Herrlein: General der Infanterie Friedrich Herrlein = Kommandierender General LV. Armee-Korps
Schönau: Major i.G. Wernher Freiherr von Schönau-Wehr = Ia LV.A.K.
Seydel: Oberstleutnant Seydel = Ila LV.A.K.
Hölz: Oberst i.G. Hölz, Chef des Generalstabes im LV.A.K.
CA FSB RF: Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (successor of KGB)
GKO State Defense Committee
GRU Intelligence Head Office
GUKR/Smersh Head Office for Military Counter-Intelligence Smersh
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
KGB Committee for State Security
MGB Ministry for State Security
MVD Ministry of the Interior
NKVD Commissariat of the Interior

3 Bundesarchiv (Aachen) to author 19 August 1998; Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 4, CA FSB RF; Vernehmungsprotokoll Kuhn, Joachim 23. August 1951, translated from the Russian by
Kristin von Tschtschke, CA FSB RF; author’s interview with Marie-Gabriele Gräfin Stauffenberg, 3 August 2004.

4 Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Kuhn.
6 Details see pages 526–29 below.
8 Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 3; indictment against Kuhn 4 October 1951; note 28 March 1951; interrogation of Kuhn 21/22 November 1952; protest against Kuhn’s sentence by General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation/Head Military Prosecutor no. Bud-28992-51 dated 13 November 1998; all in CA FSB RF, Kuhn penal file no. 5141; Hans Schauschütz, last 3 years fellow-prisoner in Aleksandrovskii central penitentiary to M.G.Gräfin von Stauffenberg 17 August 1955.
10 Standesamt Bad Brückenau to the author, 11 September 1998; Maria Engelbreit (Kuhn’s landlady, 1979–94) to the author, 15 and 16 May 2003.
14 Reichskriegsgericht, Anklageverfügung Ziehlberg; Reichskriegsgericht, 21 November 1944, Feldurteil in der Strafsache gegen den Generalleutnant Gustav Dietrich Adolf Heistermann von Ziehlberg. BA-MA “Prag-Film” M 1010/A 13; Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Kuhn.
16 Hilger/Schmidt/Wagenlehner, 10.
Peter Hoffmann


19 Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 6; quotation translated from German original.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Pocket diary entries of M.G.Gräfin von Stauffenberg; pocket diary entry of Elisabeth Gräfin von Stauffenberg; interview with Maria Gabriele Gräfin von Stauffenberg, 3 August 2004.


26 Anlagenband zum Ktb. A.O.K. 2/la 21.7.44, Ferngespräche 21.7.1944, BA-MA RH 20/2/937; Heerespersonalamt Personalkartei, National Archives II (College Park, Maryland) RG 242; Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Kuhn; Kuhn recalled in “Aussagen,” 1 that the “Chef des Stabes” (really: Ia in LV Corps command) Major i.G. [Wernher Freiherr] von Schönau[-Wehr] had announced Tresckow’s arrival that morning who wished to inform himself about the situation at the front, and that Tresckow had asked for Kuhn to accompany him; Schönau to the author, 3 December 2003 [!]does not recall this and thinks that Kuhn’s memory was at fault; (then) Rittmeister Dietrich Graf zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, the O 1 (Erster Ordonnanzoffizier) in Kuhn’s divisional staff who was attached to the Commander, Generalmajor Gustav Heistermann von Ziehlberg, recalled in 1974 that Tresckow had visited the 28th Jäger-Division commander on 18 or 19 July, and again “3–4 days later” (actually: on 21 July), and that Tresckow had asked for Kuhn to accompany him on this second visit, had the Ia combat driver (Ia-Gefechtsfahrer) drive himself and Kuhn to the endangered sections of the division’s front; that after about two hours Kuhn returned with Tresckow’s body in the car and reported a partisan attack; Tresckow, of course, had committed suicide; [Dietrich Graf zu] Stolberg[-Wernigerode], “General v. Ziehlberg,” typed, n.p., October 1974, in the possession of his daughter, Bettina Freiherr von Uslar-Gleichen), 3–4.

27 Stolberg, Ziehlberg, 3–4.


29 Spiegelbild, 54–55, based on interrogations of Lieutenant-Colonel Bernhard Klamroth, formerly Kuhn’s superior in the General Staff Organisationsabteilung.


31 Ibid., Ferngespräche vom 26.7.1944, BA-MA RH 20/2/942.

32 Stolberg, Ziehlberg, 3–4.

33 When Kuhn had reported to Ziehlberg for duty, on 22 June 1944, he had told him of these connections; Reichskriegsgericht, Anklageverfügung Ziehlberg; Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Ziehlberg.
34 Stolberg, letter to M.G.Gräfin von Stauffenberg, 2 November 1948; Stolberg, Ziehlberg, 3–4; Kuhn “Aussagen,” 3, reports the same attitude of Ziehlberg; Reichskriegsgericht, Anklageverfügung gegen Ziehlberg, 9 September 1944; Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil gegen Ziehlberg, 21 November 1944.
35 Mecklenburg to M.G. Gräfin von Stauffenberg, 16 March 1954; Stolberg, 6; Schönau, 3 December 2003.
36 Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Kuhn.
37 Schönau, 3 December 2003.
38 AOK 2-Ic/AO, Tätigkeitsbericht Gruppe Ic/AO vom 1.7.–30.9.44, 27.7.1944, BA-MARH 20/2/1367; Army Personnel Office List No. 1 re officers involved in 20 July, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde EAP 105/2; Hoffmann, *History*, 516. followed this source when the post-1997 revelations were not available.
39 Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 4; Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Kuhn; interrogation of Kuhn 21/22 November 1952, Archive of FSB RF penal file no. 5141; Reichskriegsgericht, 21 November 1944, Feldurteil in der Strafsache gegen den Generalleutnant Gustav Dietrich Adolf Heistermann von Ziehlberg, BA-MA “Prag-Film” M 1010/A 13. Chavkin and Kalganov, “Neue Quellen,” 365–66, come down firmly on both sides of the question whether or not Soviet authorities had intentionally misinformed Kuhn about having been sentenced to death on 4 August 1944; on p. 365, they say he had not intentionally been misinformed, and on p. 366 that he had “probably” been intentionally misinformed; Abakumov might have been misinformed himself: on 23 September 1944, Abakumov wrote to Malenkov that Kuhn had been sentenced to death in absentia; but then Abakumov’s suspicion that Kuhn might be a Nazi agent is not very plausible.
40 Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Ziehlberg. Schönau, 3 December 2003, recalls that Ziehlberg said immediately when Stolberg told him that Kuhn had not arrived at the new headquarters: “Dann ist er übergelaufen.” Stolberg to M.G.Gräfin von Stauffenberg, 2 November 1948, implies that it was assumed by him and others that Kuhn had deserted to the enemy; Stolberg, Ziehlberg does not report this but leaves no doubt that Ziehlberg, Stolberg and Schönau assumed that Kuhn had deserted to the enemy.
41 Hildegard Maria Kuhn to M.G. Gräfin von Stauffenberg, 16 June 1948.
42 Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 1–2.
44 Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 3.
45 The two villages of Starosielce—minor and major—were occupied by Soviet forces on 27 July; Ic-Abendmeldung an AOK 2, Ic/AO 27.7.1944, Oberkommando LV.A.K. Abt. Ic, Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ic, BA-MA RH 24/55/99.
46 Interrogation of Kuhn, 19 September 1951; indictment against Kuhn, 4 October 1951; decision No. N-240, Military Court of the Moscow Military Region, 23 December 1998, rehabilitating Kuhn, received by German Embassy in Moscow; all in Central Archive of FSB RF penal file no. 5141.
47 Decision No. N-240, Military Court of the Moscow Military Region, 23 December 1998 rehabilitating Kuhn, Archive of FSB RF penal file no. 5141.
48 Mecklenburg to M.G. Gräfin von Stauffenberg, 16 March 1954.
49 Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 4; Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Kuhn; interrogation of Kuhn, 21/22 November 1952, Archive of FSB RF penal file no. 5141; Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Ziehlberg; Chavkin and Kalganov, “Neue Quellen,” 365–66.
50 Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Kuhn.


54 Puttkamer, 26 March 1949. Throughout his detention Kuhn was denied the most elementary rights of prisoners-of-war. At the beginning of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, the Soviets had offered to honor the Hague Conventions and particularly the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929, but the German government itself had no intention of honoring the Convention and, for this and other reasons, refused the offer. In spite of vigorous and sustained efforts particularly by the International Committee of the Red Cross, neither representatives of the IRC nor the Protecting Power, Bulgaria, was able to bring aid to or even visit German prisoners-of-war detained by the Soviet Union. Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978), 224–37. See also pages 536–37 below.

55 Stolberg, 5.

56 Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 3.

57 Schöna, 3 December 2003.


59 Vernehmung No. 981 B. Vernehmung des General-Stabsrichters Dr. Karl Schmauser am 29. Oktober 1947 von 14.00 bis 16.00 Uhr durch Mr. Fred Kaufman. Für: Military Division (Mr. Niederman), National Archives II, College Park, Maryland, RG 238.

60 Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Ziehlberg, 21 November 1944.


62 Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil Kuhn; interrogation of Kuhn, 21/22 November 1952, Archive of FSB RF penal file no. 5141; Reichskriegsgericht 21 November 1944, Feldurteil gegen Ziehlberg; Chavkin and Kalganov, Neue Quellen, 365–66; Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 4.

63 Ibid., 3.


66 Ibid.

67 Tempelhoff; Indictment of Kuhn, Joachim, P-46988 penal case no. 5141, leaves 56–80, CA FSB.

68 Chavkin and Kalganov, “Neue Quellen,” 359–60 and notes 17 and 18; CA FSB RF File J.Kuhn No. P-46988, penal file no. 5141 includes the Russian translation of Kuhn’s Aussagen.


71 Ibid., 9–10.
73 Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 18–25.
74 See pages 531–32.
76 Ibid., 9–10.
77 Ibid., 10–11.
78 Ibid., 7.
79 Ibid., 13.
80 Ibid.
82 Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 8–9.
83 Ibid., 10.
84 Ibid., 8–9.
86 Mecklenburg, 16 March 1954.
89 Royal Swedish Legation to Foreign Office, 19 July 1941, Utrikesdepartementet (Stockholm), B-avdelningen volume 277–78, Utrikesdepartementet 1920 års dossiersystem volume HP 1426.
90 German Foreign Office to Royal Swedish Legation in Berlin 6 August 1941, Utrikesdepartementet (Stockholm), B-avdelningen volume 277–78, Utrikesdepartementet 1920 års dossiersystem volume HP 1426.
91 Report, 415–16.
92 Ibid., 417.
93 German Foreign Office to Royal Swedish Legation in Berlin 21 August 1941, Utrikesdepartementet (Stockholm), B-avdelningen volume 277–78, Utrikesdepartementet 1920 års dossiersystem volume HP 1426.
94 [Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden], Stockholm, Aide-Memoire 10 November 1941, Utrikesdepartementet (Stockholm), B-avdelningen volume 277–78, Utrikesdepartementet 1920 års dossiersystem volume HP 1426.
95 Streit, 9–10, with higher estimates; see Rüdiger Overmans in vol. 9/2 of Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2005).
Kuhn, “Aussagen,” 3–4. A hearsay variant comes from Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, a fighter pilot shot down and captured near Stalingrad, who joined the Soviet-sponsored Nationalkomitee “Freies Deutschland” in captivity, and heard about Kuhn’s capture from the German Air Force Second Lieutenant Diedrich Willms who was a “front-line representative” of the Nationalkomitee, and later also from Major Lew Kopelev of 7th Section GlawPURKKA (Central Political Administration of the Red Army), to whom a Polish farm woman reported Kuhn’s presence in her house. According to Willms, Kuhn demanded to see General der Artillerie Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, who had been captured at Stalingrad and had become a prominent member of the NKFD and the BDO: Einsiedel, Erinnerungen, 344–45; Einsiedel to the author, 3 December 2004.

Einsiedel, 25 May 1949; Mecklenburg, Erzählungen, 137.

Mecklenburg to M.G. Gräfin von Stauffenberg, 16 March 1954, recalled the name of the prison as “Fotiskaja.” Chavkin and Kalganov, “Neue Quellen,” 367.

Deutsches Rotes Kreuz Suchdienst München to author, 7 August 1998; Mecklenburg, Erzählungen, 137.

Einsiedel to M.G. Gräfin von Stauffenberg 25 May 1949.

Indictment of Kuhn, Joachim, dated 11 October 1951, P-46988 penal case no. 5141, leaves 56–80, CA FSB.


Interrogation of Kuhn, 3 February 1951.


Heinrich von Einsiedel, Tagebuch der Versuchung (Berlin: Pontes Verlag, 1950); Jesco von Puttkamer, Irrtum und Schuld (Neuwied: Michael-Verlag, 1948).


See Hilger, Schmidt, Wagenlehner, 114, on this issue of double jeopardy. Indictment of Kuhn, Joachim, dated 11 October 1951, P-46988 penal case no. 5141, leaves 56–80, CA FSB.

Ibid.

Abakumov’s successor Semyon Denisovich Ignatyev cleared up the backlog. Hilger, Schmidt, and Wagenlehner, 245.


My colleague V.Boss kindly provided the reference to Leonid Mlechin, Predsedateli KGB—raskekrehennye sud'by (Moscow: Tsentrropoligraf, 1999), 301; see also A.G.Bezverkni [et al.], SMERSH. Istoricheskie ocherki i arkhivnye dokumenty (Izd-vo Glavarkhiva Moskvy, OAO “Moskovskkie uchebniki i kartolitografii”, 2003), 107–10.

Roewer, Schäfer, and Uhl, 9.

CA FSB RF file no. P-46988, penal file no. 5141.

Hilger, Schmidt, and Wagenlehner, 11.

Decision No. N-240, Military Court of the Moscow Military Region, 23 December 1998, rehabilitating Kuhn received by German Embassy in Moscow; all in CA FSB RF penal file no. 5141; Mecklenburg, Erzählungen, 208, 210.

Hilger, Schmidt, and Wagenlehner, 255, 19.

Ibid., 17–20, 357–58, 365–82.
122 Ibid., 19.
123 Morré, 89.
126 Morré, 91.
128 Vernehmungsprotokoll des Inhaftierten Kuhn, Joachim, 24 September 1951; Mecklenburg to M.G. Gräfin von Stauffenberg, 16 March 1954.
132 See note 123.
133 The author thanks Dr. Helmut Roewer for the reference to A.G. Besverchnyi, *Smersh* (Moscow: Izd-vo Glavarkhiva Moskvy, 2003), 163–90; also Chavkin and Kalganov, 359–60.
135 Copy of handwritten letter in CA FSB RF file no. P-46988, penal file no. 5141.
136 Interrogation record 21 November 1952, CA FSB RF file no. P-46988, penal file no. 5141.
137 Ibid.
139 CA FSB RF file no. P-46988, penal file no. 5141.
140 Akt 228a, CA FSB RF file no. P-46988, penal file no. 5141.
142 Hildegard M. Kuhn to Deutsches Rotes Kreuz Suchdienst Hamburg, 5 November 1954.
144 Author’s telephone conversation with Maria Tomalla 26 Feb. 2005; Maria Tomalla, letter to the author 7 March 2005.
145 Kuhn’s chosen isolation may be explained by his consciousness of dishonor; by the knowledge that he was regarded as having deserted to the enemy; by the knowledge of, and feeling guilt for, the fate of his divisional commander Generalleutnant von Ziehlberg. Thirty-eight years of seclusion must have been a hard fate to bear. Was it bearable? Perhaps not: in 1979 Kuhn sent M.G. Gräfin von Stauffenberg a telegram to inform her of his arrival in Ulm to fetch her from Risstissen; he came to Ulm, she was not at the station, and he searched for her in hospitals in and around Ulm; in the last years of his mother’s life, he did not acknowledge her as his mother but only as his “aunt.” Interview with M.G. Gräfin von Stauffenberg, 4 September 2004.